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LABOR RELATIONS LAW
I. REPRESENTATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY
A. *A Second Decade Of Health Care Bargaining Unit Litigation: St. Francis H I
Section 9(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) 2 requires that the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) determine which groups of jobs within the
work place will serve as the constituency for purposes of elections and collective bar-
gaining. 3 The selected group of jobs is termed the appropriate bargaining unit. 4 In the
traditional industrial context the Board seeks an employee group that is united by a
"community of interests." 5 Under the community of interests test the Board considers
such factors as wages, working conditions, job qualifications, skills and duties, and em-
ployees' interaction and supervision. 6 In 1974 Congress amended the Act to include
nonprofit health care institutions within the Board's jurisdiction, thereby requiring the
Board to determine appropriate health care bargaining units. 7 While Congress intended
to give health care employees the rights and protections of the Act, 8 Congress also
* By John W. Sagaser, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
St. Francis Hospital, 271 N.L.R.B. 948, 116 L.R.R.M. 1465 (1984) (St. Francis 11).
2 29 U.S.C. H 151-69 (1982).
3 Section 9(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982), provides in relevant part: "The Board shall
decide in each case whether, in order to assure employees the fullest freedom in exercising the
rights guaranteed by this subchapter [Act], the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof." See generally
R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 66-92 (1976).
R. GORMAN, SUpra note 3, at 66.
R.GoRmAx, supra note 3, at 69. In the traditional industrial context the Act has been inter-
preted to oblige the Board to delineate an appropriate bargaining unit, not necessarily the most
appropriate unit. As the Board stated in Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409, 418, 26
L.R.R.M. 1501, 1506 (1950), enf'd, 190 F.2d 576, 28 L.R.R.M. 2364 (7th Cir. 1951):
There is nothing in the statute which requires that the unit for bargaining be the only
appropriate unit, or the ultimate unit, or the most appropriate unit; the Act requires
only that the unit be "appropriate." It must be appropriate to ensure employees, in
each case, "the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act."
Id. (quoting § 9(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 159(b) (1982)).
6 R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 69. 'The Board in St. Francis 11 identified several community of
interest factors:
[E]mployees' wages, hours, and working conditions; qualifications, training, and skills;
frequency of contact and degree of interchange with other employees; frequency of
transfer to and from the petitioned-for unit; commonality of supervision; degree of
integration with the work functions of other employees; area practice and patterns of
collective bargaining; and collective bargaining history.
271 N.L.R.B. at 953 n.35, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1470 n.35.
7 29 U.S.C. § 152(14) (1982). The 1974 amendments, which became effective August 25, 1974,
eliminated the nonprofit hospital exemption from § 2 of the NLRA and added subsection 14 to § 2
of the NLRA as follows: "The term 'health care institution' shall include any hospital, convalescent
hospital, health maintenance organization, health clinic, nursing home, extended care facility or
other institution devoted to the care of sick, infirmed or aged persons."
The 1974 Amendments also changed § 8(d)(4)(A), (B), (C), (G) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d)(4)(A), (B), (C), (G) (1982) (notice provisions), and § 19 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 169 (1982)
(adding religious belief exemption).
6 This is self-evident from the passage of the 1974 health care amendments. See S. REP. No.
93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE. CONG. & AD. NEWS 3946, 3948.
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recognized the special needs of the health care industry. The legislative history of the
Act indicates that Congress intended that the Board prevent the "proliferation" of
bargaining units in the health care field." A proliferation of bargaining units, Congress
believed, would increase the likelihood of strikes and hence disrupt patient care.'"
Whether the determination of appropriate health care bargaining units under the tra-
ditional "community of interests" test is consistent with Congress' nonproliferation di-
rective has been the subject of vigorous litigation" and heated disagreement between
the courts and the Board. 12
In recent years health care employers have challenged the Board's use of the
community of interests test for bargaining unit determinations in the health care field."
In addition, the courts of appeals have vigorously rejected the Board's use of the
community of interests test in the health care industry, arguing that the Board had not
complied with the nonproliferation directive.' -' The circuit courts of appeals have di-
vided, however, on what should be the appropriate approach. The Ninth' 5 and Tenth''
Circuits have ruled that the Act requires the Board to adopt a "disparity of interests"
test. This test requires that the Board start with the largest possible unit in health care
facilities, and then exclude only those employees whose interests are so disparate from
the rest of the employees that their presence in the bargaining unit would impair effective
collective bargaining representation." The Second, 18
 Third,'" Seventh,'" and Eighth''
Circuits have interpreted the Act and the nonproliferation directive as requiring the
Board — when making health care bargaining unit determinations — to balance com-
munity of interests factors against the public's interest in nonproliferation of bargaining
units. 22
Responding to the criticism from the circuit courts of appeals, the Board adopted
a new analysis for health care bargaining unit determinations in its 1982 decision, St.
"1d, at 3950.
'" Id. at 3948, 3950.
" See infra notes 13-22 and accompanying text.
12 1d.
13 See, e.g., Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 967, 968, 102 L.R.R.M. 2784, 2786,
2787 (3d Cir. 1979); NLRB v. West Suburban Hosp., 570 F.2d 213, 215, 216, 97 L.R.R.M. 2929,
2931 (7th Cir. 1978).
' 4 See infra notes 1522 and accompanying text. One commentator reported that from 1974 to
1983, circuit courts of appeals had reviewed twenty Board health care unit determinations, and
denied enforcement in sixteen instances. Comment, The Nonproliferation Mandate and the Appropriate
Legal Standard in Health Care Bargaining Unit Determinations, Il FORDI1AM URB. L. J. 663, 683 (1983).
NLRB v. HMO Intl, 678 F.2d 806, 810, 110 L.R.R.M. 2745, 2797 (9th Cir. 1982); NLRB v.
St. Francis Hosp., 601 F.2d 404, 416, 101 L.R.R.M. 2943, 2951 (9th Cir. 1979).
16 Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 950, 457 n.6, 107 L.R.R.M. 2953,
2958 n.6, modified on different grounds, 688 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1981).
17
 See, e.g., id.
"Trustees of the Masonic Hall v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 626, 638, 112 L.R.R.M. 2908, 2918 (2d Cir.
1983); NLRB v. Mercy Hosp. Ass'n, 606 F.2d 22, 27, 102 L.R.R.M. 2259, 2262 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 971, 103 L.R.R.M. 3082 (1980).
Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 968-71, 102 L.R.R.M. 2784, 2787-89 (3(1
Cir. 1979).
7*
 Mary Thompson Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858, 862 (7th Cir. 1980).
2 ' Watonwan Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 848, 850, 113 L.R.R.M. 3481, 3482 (8th
Cir. 1983).
27 See, e.g., id.
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Francis Hospital (St. Francis 1). 29 In that decision the Board designated seven bargaining
units which would be presumptively appropriate in the health care context." Any pro-
posed unit that did not fall into one of those seven categories would be rejected. 25 If,
however, the proposed unit fell within one of the categories, the Board would apply its
traditional community of interests test. 26
During the Survey year, in St. Francis Hospital (St. Francis 11), 27 the Board vacated its
position in St. Francis I and adopted a disparity of interests test for determining appro-
priate bargaining units in health care facilities. 28 The Board held that the seven-category
analysis adopted in St. Francis 1 was contrary to the congressional nonproliferation
directive,29 and was in reality no different than the community of' interests approach
previously used by the Board and discredited by the courts." The Board's new test
requires greater disparities in the usual community of interests test elements before the
Board will grant groups of health care employees representation separate from the other
professional and nonprofessional employees." The new disparity of interests test looks
at why the petitioned-for bargaining unit should not be larger. Consequently this test
will result in fewer separate units in health care facilities than the Board had previously
granted." Because the Board declined to state what factors will be deemed most signif-
icant, determinations of appropriate bargaining units in the health care industry will
turn upon the facts in each case." This lack of guidelines will result in increased health
care bargaining unit litigation before the Board.
The controversy in St. Francis 11 arose from a representation drive at St. Francis
Hospital (Hospital) by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No.
474 (Union)." In a petition filed with the Board for a representation election, the Union
proposed a collective bargaining unit composed of all the Hospital's thirty-nine main-
tenance employees. 55 The Regional Director of the NLRB found that the petitioned-for
unit, with the addition of two less skilled job classifications, shared a community of
" St. Francis Hosp., 265 N.L.R.B. 1025, 112 L.R.R.M. 1153 (1982) (St. Francis I).
Id. at 1029, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1157. The seven units were physicians, registered nurses, other
professional employees, technical employees, business office clerical employees, service and main-
tenance employees, and skilled maintenance employees. Id.
25 Id. at 1029, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1158.
26 1d. at 1031, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1160.
27 St. Francis II, 271 N.L.R.B. at 948, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1465.
29 Id. at 953, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1468.
29 Id. at 952, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1468.
"Id.
51 Id. at 953, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1470.
Id.
"Id. at 954, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1471.
Si Id. at 948, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1465.
"Id, at 954, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1471. The unit found appropriate consisted of:
All maintenance employees, including communications technicians, painters, carpen-
ters, maintenance helpers, x-ray processor mechanic, refuse and linen collectors, utility
operators, cabinet makers, painter/vinyl hanger, HVAC trainee, HVAC mechanic,
boiler operators, electronics technicians, electricians, general maintenance mechanics,
pneumatic tube mechanic, groundskeeper, utility mechanic, refrigeration mechanic,
and plumber employed by the Employer at its hospital, excluding office clerical em-
ployees, Bio-Medical Engineering Department employees, service employees, guards
and supervisors as defined in the Act.
Id. at 948 n.5, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1466 n.5.
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interest sufficient for separate representation." Granting the Hospital's request for
review of the Regional Director's findings,37 the Board issued its decision — St. Francis
I — in which it designated seven potentially appropriate units for bargaining unit
determinations in the health care industry." Applying this test, the Board concluded
that the proposed maintenance unit was appropriate," and therefore ordered a repre-
sentation election. In the election the tally was, of forty-three eligible voters, twenty-
three for the Union, and twenty against." On January 5, 1983 the Union was certified.'
Claiming that the bargaining unit was not an appropriate one, 42 the Hospital refused
to bargain with the newly certified unit. 43 At a hearing held to resolve the dispute," the
Board vacated St. Francis I" and adopted a disparity of interests test." In order to give
the parties opportunity to present additional facts relevant under the new test, the Board
remanded the case to the Regional Director. 47
In explaining its holding, the Board first examined the legislative history of the
1974 amendments. The Board noted that in extending the Act to the health care industry
Congress sought to avoid jeopardizing patient care by work disruptions caused by unit
fragmentation, union jurisdiction disputes, and work stoppages.'" To this end, both the
House and the Senate Committee Reports stated that "[djue consideration should be
given by the Board to preventing proliferation of bargaining units in the health care
industry."'" Moreover, the Board stated, this concern was reiterated by virtually every
senator and representative speaking on the passage of the amendments.5° The Board
concluded that Congress clearly intended that the NLRB, when determining appropriate
bargaining units in health care facilities, apply a stricter test than the community of
interests analysis traditionally used in the industrial and commercial sphere." The seven
category test of St. Francis I was contrary to congressional intent, the Board reasoned,
because seven potential units in a health care facility was simply too large a number.52
Moreover, the Board continued, the St. Francis I test was in reality no different than the
community of interests test disapproved of by the courts of appeals."
The Board then examined the standards for health care bargaining unit determi-
nations advocated by the various circuits. The Ninth Circuit's disparity of interests test"
" Id. at 948-49, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1466.
"Id. This review by the Board was the decision in St. Francis!, 265 N.L.R.B. 1025, 112 L.R.R.M.
1160 (1982).
" St. Francis II, 271 N.L.R.B. at 950, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1467.
" Id.




1 4 Id, at 948, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1465.
* 5 Id. at 948, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1466.
46 Id. at 953, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1468.
a7 Id. at 954, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1471.
"Id. at 951-52, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1468.
49 Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 93-766, supra note 8; H.R. REP. No. 93-150; 93d Cong., 2d sess.
6-7 (1974).
"Id, at 951, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1468.
51 1d. at 953, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1469.
" id. at 952, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1469.
" See id.
54 See, e.g., St. Luke's, 653 F.2d at 457 n.6, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2958 n.6.
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was too rigid, the Board criticized, because it apparently would require the NLRB to
select the largest possible bargaining unit in health care facilities. 55 Such a test, the Board
stated, would have the unwarranted result of allowing no more than two units —
professional and nonprofessional — in a health care facility. 5° The Board then presented
the balancing approach adopted by the other courts of appeals, but made no analysis of
Rather than adopt the balancing approach, the Board adopted a modified Ninth .
Circuit approach. The Board explained that although the Ninth Circuit's disparity of
interests analysis was too rigid, the phrase "disparity of interests" properly emphasized
that sharper differences in community of interests criteria (such as wages, working
conditions, skills, etc.)." between employees would be required in the health care field
to justify a separate unit." The Board explained that applying the test to a number of
cases would result in recurring factual patterns, and these patterns would illustrate what
units would be typically deemed appropriate. 6°
Applying its new test for bargaining unit determinations to the case before it, 61 the
Board found that the maintenance workers requesting a separate bargaining unit had
significant and frequent work contact with nearly all categories of the Hospital's em-
ployees, especially service employees. 62 The Board also pointed out that the service and
maintenance employees were subject to the same hourly pay plans, 65 and eligible to
receive the same fringe benefits. 61 Finally, the Board noted that seven transfers between
the service and maintenance departments had occurred in recent years. 65 Because the
maintenance employees worked closely with and shared the same basic terms and con-
ditions of employment as the larger group of service employees, 66 the Board explained,
there was not an adequate disparity of interests between the maintenance employees
and other nonprofessionals to justify separate representation.° The Board remanded
the case to permit the parties to introduce further evidence relevant under the new
standard."
Member Dennis, concurring, stated that she would have preferred the Board to
clearly define a limited number of appropriate health care units in order to provide
immediate stability and obviate continued litigation of the appropriate unit issue. 6° She
suggested that the disparity of interests test would readily reveal that there would be
four separate appropriate units in a large, diversified health care industry (professionals,
" St. Francis II, 271 N.L.R.B. at 953, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1470. Commenting on the Tenth Circuit's
test, the Board stated, "We emphasize again that we are not establishing a rigid disparity-of-interests
test that would always result in two broad units." Id. at 953 n.39, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1471 n.39.
56 Id. at 953, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1470.
57 Id.
38 See supra note 6 for a listing of the Board's community of interest criteria.
59 St. Francis II, 271 N.L.R.B. at 953, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1470.
6° Id. at 953 n.39, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1471 n.39.
61
 Id. at 953, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1471.
62 1d.






69 Id. at 954-55, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1472 (Dennis, Member, concurring).
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service and maintenance employees, technicals, and business office clericals) and two
separate units in a small, functionally integrated facility (professionals and nonprofes-
sionals).70
In a lengthy dissent, Member Zimmerman argued that the Board's new standard
was unnecessary, uncertain, and perhaps signalled a rigid approach that collided with
the Board's role in national labor relations," The reconsideration of St. Francis 1 was
unnecessary, Member Zimmerman reasoned, because that decision had fully addressed
the criticisms by the courts of appeals./ 2 The St. Francis 1 standard was a clear, straight-
forward approach, Member Zimmerman stated, because it established seven potentially
appropriate units." This clarity promised to end the legal debate that had raged for ten
years,''' paralyzing the processing of health care representation cases,'" and thereby
denying thousands of employees their statutory right to choose or reject collective
bargaining representation, Member Zimmerman protested.'" Unlike the clarity promised
by the St. Francis I standard, Member Zimmerman concluded, the Board's disparity of
interests test injects uncertainty into health care bargaining unit determinations."
Because the new test is the consequence of change in the Board membership and
in views regarding the purposes of the Act,'" Member Zimmerman argued, the new
disparity of interests lest is evidently designed to grant fewer separate bargaining units
in the health care industry.79 Although the Board purported to reject the disparity of
interests test, Member Zimmerman continued, it had failed to demonstrate how its test
would be any different than the one employed by the Ninth Circuit.s° This indicates,
Member Zimmerman staled, the Board's predilection for finding only two basic units
(professional and nonprofessional) appropriate in the health care field."' Member Zim-
merman concluded that the new disparity of interests test is a gross overreaction to
criticism from the courts of appeals," and is based on a distortion of legislative history."
St. Francis II clearly rejects the Board's precedent in health care unit determinations
since the time of Congress' 1974 health care amendments. Responding to directives from
the courts of appeals, the Board in St. Francis 11 ruled that compliance with the congres-
sional directive to prevent a proliferation of bargaining units required a stricter test than
has previously been used." By adopting a test which so closely resembles the Ninth and
Tenth Circuits' test, however, the Board overreacted to the criticism by the courts of
appeals. Only two circuits (the Ninth and Tenth) 8" had imposed a disparity of interests
7" Id. at 955, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1472 (Dennis, Member, concurring).
71 Id. at 955-59, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1472-75 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).






7" Id. at 955 & n.4, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1473 & n.4 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
79 See id. at 956, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1473 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
"" Id. at 957, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1474 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
8, Id.
"2 Id. at 958, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1475 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
83 a
Bald. at 953, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1471.
85 See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
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test on the Board, whereas five circuits (the Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth)"
have held that a disparity of interests test was not required.
Instead of adopting a disparity of interests test resembling the Ninth Circuit's
proposed test, the Board could have adopted a test closer to the balancing approach of
the other circuits. Under such a test the Board could satisfy Congress's nonproliferation
directive by explicitly weighing concern for nonproliferation of units against the com-
munity of interest factors when making health care bargaining unit determinations.
Moreover, the balancing approach would be consistent with section 9(b) of the Act, which
vests broad discretion in the Board for making bargaining unit determinations. The
disparity of interests test of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, on the other hand, is incon-
sistent with section 9(b) because it requires the Board to select the largest possible
bargaining unit. 87
The Board claims that the disparity of interests test will look to the facts in each
particular case, but a comparison of the Board's treatment of the same facts in St. Francis
I and St. Francis II shows that the facts matter less than the mold into which the Board
chooses to insert them. The Board's characterization of the facts in SL Francis II is
markedly different than the characterization of the same facts in St. Francis. I. For
example, the St. Francis I Board noted that the maintenance employees were at the high
end of a pay scale covering maintenance and service employees." The Si. Francis II
Board, however, stressed only that the service and maintenance employees were subject
to the same pay plan," The St. Francis I Board found the greater experience require-
ments for maintenance jobs than for service jobs to be significant,"" while the St. Francis
II Board stated that maintenance employees did not perform functions requiring a high
degree of skills."' In St. Francis I the Board found that there was a complete separation
of supervision between maintenance and service employees, 92 but in St. Francis II the
Board noted that maintenance and service employees were subject to departmental
supervision,"" failing to note that they were different departments. Finally, the St. Francis
I Board characterized the frequent work contact between maintenance and service
employees as not indicative of functional integration because maintenance workers per-
formed their duties separately.° In St. Francis 11, however, the Board stated that there
" See supra text accompanying notes 17-21.
87 The Board in St. Francis II noted this characterization of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits'
disparity of interests test by the Second and Eighth Circuits. St. Francis II, 271 N.L.R.B. at 952-53,
116 L.R.R.M. at 1469-70. The effect of the disparity of interests test of the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits, apparently, is that only two units, professional and nonprofessional, would he considered
appropriate in the health care industry. Allowing only two unit configurations unnecessarily in-
fringes the rights of health care employees under the Act on two grounds. First, it is difficult for
employees to unionize if the election constituency is too broad. Section 9(b) of the Act directs the
Board to use its discretion in determining bargaining units in each case. See 1983-84 Annual Survey
of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law — Determining Bargaining Units in Health Care
Settings: Watonwan Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 26 B.C.L. REV. 17] (1984). Second, it is more
difficult for a union to carry out its duty of fair representation in a large unit. See id.
" St. Francis 1, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1034, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1162.
8" St. Francis II, 271 N.L.R.B. at 954, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1471.
'KJ St. Francis I, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1033, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1161.
9 St. Francis II, 271 N.L.R.B. at 954, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1471.
"12 St. Francis 1, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1034, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1162.
93 St. Francis II, 271 N.L.R.B. at 954, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1471.
Si. Francis I, 265 N.L.R.B. at' 1034, 1 l2 L.R.R.M. at 1162.
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was significant and frequent work contact between maintenance and service employees. 95
This reinterpretation of the facts by the St. Fran-cis II Board could indicate that the mold
the Board has chosen to put the facts into is an unspoken policy that the Board will no
longer consider separate maintenance bargaining units appropriate in health care facil-
ities. Moreover, the lack of guidelines by the Board on why it reads the facts so differently
in St. Francis I and Si. Francis II only adds to the uncertainty that will spur renewed
litigation in this area.
The bargaining unit pattern suggested by Member Dennis — four units in large
health care facilities, and two in small facilities — is the most appropriate. The seven
unit approach under St. Francis I is contrary to the congressional nonproliferation
directive; Congress emphasized that the Board must give special attention to the public
interest in uninterrupted access to hospitals and patient care. 95 On the other hand, a
two units per se approach runs counter to section 9(b) of the Act, 97 which requires that
the Board make appropriate bargaining unit determinations in each case in order to
assure to employees the fullest freedoms in exercising rights guaranteed by the Act. A
two unit per se approach thus unnecessarily infringes upon the exercise of organizing
rights by health care employees. Member Dennis' approach therefore appears a logical
midway position between the contrasting congressional intent of free exercise by health
care employees of rights under the Act, and the paramount public interest in undisrupted
health care. Moreover, it may well be the pattern that in time emerges from continued
health care bargaining unit litigation because it is a compromise position between the
rejected seven unit approach in St. Francis I and the two units per se approach of the
Ninth and Tenth Circuits, from which the St. Francis II Board's disparity of interests test
is derived.
In summary, St. Francis II, decided during the Survey year, establishes a disparity of
interests test for determining appropriate bargaining units in health care facilities. This
test uses the traditional community of interests criteria, but requires sharper disparities
be shown between the employees in the petitioned-for bargaining unit and the other
employees in order for the Board to grant a separate unit. This new test is intended to
prevent the proliferation of bargaining units in the health care industry and thereby
meet the public interest in maintaining uninterrupted access to health care facilities and
undisrupted patient care. The Board vacated its St. Francis I decision because it deemed
the potential of seven appropriate units under that case to be contrary to these public
interests.
What units will be appropriate under the new disparity of interests test, however, is
unclear because the Board provides little guidance as to what disparities of interests will
be considered most significant. The pattern that eventually emerges may well be four
units for large facilities and two units for small facilities, as Member Dennis suggested.
This approach would satisfy the courts of appeals as well as preserve employee free
choice in organizing and Board discretion in selecting appropriate bargaining units. In
the case before it the Board held that a petitioned-for maintenance unit had not dem-
onstrated sufficient disparity of interests from the other employees, especially service
employees, to justify a separate bargaining unit.
St. Francis II, 271 N.L.R.B. at 954, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1471.
96 See text accompanying note 49 for the language of Congress's nonproliferation directive.
97 Section 9(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982). See supra note 3 for text of § 9(b).
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Considering the holding and the Board's intent to reduce the number of separate
units in the health care field, St. Francis II indicates that separate maintenance units in
health care facilities will no longer be considered appropriate. The Board in St. Francis
II claims that it has adopted a disparity of interests test different from a rigid test that
would compel only two units in the health care field. The nature of this difference,
however, is left unexplained. The Board has shut fast and hard the door on proliferation,
it seems, but opened the door of a second decade of health care bargaining unit litigation.
B. *Exclusion of Family Members of Management from Bargaining Units: NLRB.v. Action
Automotive, Inc.'
Section 9(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) provides that the National
Labor Relations Board (Board) shall determine the appropriate unit for collective bar-
gaining. 2 The appropriate units is determined by various factors, focusing on the com-
munity of interests shared by employees within the unit.4 The breadth of these factors
and the flexibility required in making unit determinations have raised the issue of the
proper role of judicial review of Board determinations of appropriate bargaining units. 5
The Board determines the appropriate bargaining unit through case by case adju-
dication rather than by formulating rules of general application. 6 The Board generally
bases its bargaining unit decision on shared job characteristics.' Although the Board's
focus is normally on the job rather than the individual holding the job, 8 employees
related to the employer present the issue of whether they should be excluded from the
bargaining unit. 9 In determining the appropriate bargaining unit under section 9(b), the
Board has reasoned that the interests of employees related to the employer lie with
*By Thomas W. Bridge, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 105 S. Ct. 984, 118 L.R.R.M. 2577 (1985).
2 National Labor Relations Act, § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982). Section 9(b) provides in
relevant part: "The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the
fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision
thereof ...."
Although commonly called a bargaining unit, this unit is the body which will elect bargaining
representatives. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 66 (1976).
4 Id. at 69. The factors the Board considers in determining bargaining units include:
(1) [Slimilarity in the scale and manner of determining earnings; (2) similarity in
employment benefits, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;
(3) similarity in the kind of work performed; (4) similarity in the qualifications, skills
and training of the employees; (5) frequency of contact or interchange among the
employees; (6) geographic proximity; (7) continuity or integration of production pro-
cesses; (8) common supervision and determination of labor-relations policy; (9) rela-
tionship to the administrative organization of the employer; (10) history of collective
bargaining; (I I) desires of the affected employees; (12) extent of union organization.
Id.
5 Id. at 67.
6 See, e.g., NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 762-66, 70 L.R.R.M. 3345, 3346-47
(1969).
7 See R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 66.
"Id.
" See 2 C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1474-77 (1983).
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management, and therefore these employees do not share a community of interests with
other employees."'
For a period, the Board automatically excluded relatives of employers from bar-
gaining units.' ' In 1953, however, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that
the Board could exclude a related employee only if the Board found that the employee
received special job status or working conditions, and could not base its decision solely
on the family relationship." For a period thereafter, the Board excluded only those
family members of employers who received special job status or working conditions."
In addition to the general terms of section 9(b), the Act also explicitly excludes
certain relatives from its coverage. In section 2(3) of the Act, Congress excluded from
the definition of "employee" "any individual employed by his parent or spouse."" The
Board's decisions generated some confusion over whether related employees were to be
excluded as not fitting the statutory definition of "employee" under section 2(3), or
excluded under section 9(b) and its community of interest standard.' 5 In early years
under the Act, the Board restricted the application of section 2(3) to sole proprietor-
ships,"' and automatically excluded relatives of management under section 9(b)." After
the Sixth Circuit rejected the Board's automatic exclusion of related employees under
section 9(b)," the Board excluded only those related employees who received special
benefits."
Beginning in 1967, however, the Board also began to exclude related employees
under a more expansive interpretation of section 2(3). 2" In addition, the Board began
to focus again on the community of interests a family member shared with employees. 2 '
The Board's subsequent decisions wavered among a broader interpretation of section
2(3),22
 the special status standard," and the community of interests standard24 under
See, e.g., Foam Rubber City #2 of Fla., Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. 623, 66 L.R.R.M. 1096 (1967)
(relatives of management may he excluded because interests more closely aligned with manage-
ment); Louis Weinberg Associates, Inc., 13 N.L.R.B. 66, 4 L.R.R.M. 270 (available in summary
form only in L.R.R.M.) (1939) (per se rule of automatic exclusion of employees related to manage-
ment).
" See, e.g., Louis Weinberg Associates, Inc., 13 N.L.R.B. 66, 4 L.R.R.M. (available in summary
form only in L.R.R.M.) 270 (1939).
2
 NLRB v. Sexton, 203 F.2d 940, 940, 32 L.R.R.M. 2105, 2105 (fith Cir. 1953).
" See, e.g., International Metal Products Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 65, 67, 33 L.R.R.M. 1055, 1056
(1953).
14 National Labor Relations Act, § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982).
15 See Linn Gear Co. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 791, 794, 103 L.R.R.M. 2021, 2023 (9th Cir. 1979); 2
C. MORRIS, supra note 9, at 1474-77.
16 See Parkers' Brass Foundry, 63 N.L.R.B. 1238, 1239-40, 17 L.R.R.M. 57 (available in sum-
mary form only in L.R.R.M.) (1945); O.U. Hoffman & Sons, 55 N.L.R.B. 683, 684, 14 L.R.R.M.
38 (available in summary form only in L.R.R.M.) (1944), enforced, 147 F.2d 679, 681, 15 L.R.R.M.
951 (3d Cir. 1945). The Board expanded this interpretation to exclude the child or spouse of the
sole owner of a corporation. See P.A. Mueller & Sons, Inc., 105 N.L.R.B. 552, 553, 32 L.R.R.M.
1299, 1300 (1953).
17 See Louis Weinberg Associates, Inc., 13 N.L.R.B. 66, 69, 4 L.R.R.M. 270 (available in summary
form only in L.R.R.M.) (1939).
' 9
 NLRB v. Sexton, 203 F.2d 940, 32 L.R.R.M. 2105 (6th Cir. 1953).
' 9
 International Metal Products Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 65, 67, 33 L.R.R.M. 1055, 1056 (1953).
2° Foam Rubber City #2 of Fla., Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. 623, 624, 66 L.R.R.M. 1096, 1098 (1967).
21 Id. at 624 n.10, 66 L.R.R.M. at 1098 n.10 (overruling International Metal Products requirement
of special job status).
22
 See, e.g., Foam Rubber City #2 of Fla., Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. 623, 66 L.R.R.M. 1096 (1967)
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section 9(b) in what one court characterized as a "zig-zag course." 28 The expansive
interpretation of section 2(3) and inconsistent application resulted in an absence of clear
standards and a lack of focus on the underlying reasons for exclusion of related em-
ployees.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit confronted the problem of the Board's
absence of clear standards and focus in NLRB v. Caravelle Wood Products (Caravelle 1).28
The Board's expansive interpretation of section 2(3), the court noted, "virtually repeals
the statutory language." 27 In addition to restricting the Board's interpretation of section
2(3), the court held that the Board could not apply a per se rule of automatic exclusion
of related employees. 28 Instead, the court focused on those factors which indicated that
a related employee would not share a community of interests with fellow employees. 29
Although the court focused on special benefits a related employee might receive, the
factors it listed did not include special benefits, and instead concentrated on the closeness
of the employee's relation to and identification with management."
(Board excluded son of 50% shareholder of corporation); Cerni Motor Sales, Inc., 201 N.L.R.B.
918, 82 L.R.R.M. 1404 (1973) (section 2(3) applies only to spouses or children of shareholders
holding at least 50% of company's stock).
2' See, e.g., Wilkes-Barre Wholesale Serv., Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 491, 102 L.R.R.M. 1627 (available
in summary form only in L.R.R.M.) (1979) (brother of owner received higher pay and not required
to punch time clock); Mid-America Machine Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 537, 99 L.R.R.M. 1290 (available in
summary form only in L.R.R.M.) (1978) (father of 40% owner not required to punch time clock or
work regular hours).
24 See NLRB v. H.M. Patterson & Son, Inc., 636 F.2d 1014, 1017, 106 L.R.R.M. 2543, 2545
(5th Cir. 1981); Linn Gear Co. v, NLRB, 608 F.2d 791, 795-96, 103 L.R.R.M. 2021, 2024-25 (9th
Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Caravelle Wood Products, Inc., 466 F.2d 675, 679, 80 L.R.R.M. 3411, 3414
(7th Cir. 1972) (Caravelle I); NLRB v. Caravelle Wood Products, Inc., 504 F.2d 1181, 1186, 87
L.R.R.M. 2579, 2583 (7th Cir. 1974) (Caravelle II).
25 See Linn Gear Co. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 791, 794, 103 L.R.R.M. 2021, 2023 (9th Cir. 1979).
2" 466 F.2d 675, 80 L.R.R.M. 3411 (7th Cir. 1972). Although the text discusses only Caravelle
I, that case was billowed by a further decision under the same name. These cases are therefore
distinguished to avoid confusion.
27 Id. In Caravelle I, the Board asserted that, under section 2(3), it could exclude the spouse or
child of a 10% shareholder in a company in which seven family members each owned 10% of the
company's stock. Id. at 676, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3411-12. The Board relied on its holding in Foam
Rubber City #2 that section 2(3) excluded the spouse or child of a "substantial shareholder" from
the Act. See Foam Rubber City #2 of Fla., Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. 623, 624, 66 L.R.R.M. 1096, 1098
(1967). In Caravelle f, the Board also contended that section 9(b) of the Act gave the Board unlimited
discretion to exclude related employees, even by a per se rule of automatic exclusion. Caravelle I,
466 F.2d at 678, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3413.
2 ' 466 F.2d at 678, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3413.
2" Id. at 678-79, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3414. The court enumerated the following factors for the
Board to consider: .
[Hlow high a percentage of stock the parent or spouse owns, how many of the
shareholders are related to one another, whether the shareholder is actively engaged
in management or holds a supervisory position, how many relatives are employed as
compared with the total number of employees, whether the relative lives in the same
household or is partially dependent on the shareholder.
Id. at 679, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3414. The Ninth Circuit added three factors: "(1) Mlle activity, if any,
of the employee in the Union, (2) the total number of employees as against the number of blood
related employees, and (3) the overall ties and social activities of the family involved." Linn Gear
Co. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 791, 706, 103 L.R.R.M. 2021, 2025 (9th Cir. 1979).
"Caravelle I, 466 F.2d at 679, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3414. On remand, the Board again excluded
the related employees, noting the high percentage of stock owned by parents and spouses, the
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Although every other court of appeals which heard challenges to the Board's au-
thority to apply this broader community of interests standard upheld the Board's au-
thority,"' the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit continued to reverse the Board's
decisions. 32
 According to the Sixth Circuit, the Board could only exclude a family
member from a bargaining unit upon finding special status."
During the Survey year, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and upheld the Board's authority to consider a wide range
of factors in evaluating a family member's community of interest with other employees
in the bargaining unit. 34 In NLRB v. Action Automotive, Inc.," the Supreme Court held
that the Board was not restricted to excluding from bargaining units only those em-
ployees falling outside the definition of "employee" provided in section 2(3) of the Act
or relatives of' management who receive special status.w The Supreme Court's decision
grants the Board broad discretion in defining bargaining units, and marks increased
deference to the determinations of the Board.
Action Automotive, Inc. is a closely held corporation held equally and operated by
brothers Richard, Robert, and James Sabo." The Retail Store Employees Union, Local
50, requested a representation election." The union and the company agreed to elections
in two bargaining units, one composed of the retail employees, the other of clerical
workers at the company's headquarters." Although the union received a plurality in
both units, 4° management challenged several ballots, throwing the result into doubt. The
union, in turn, challenged the ballots of Diane Sabo, wife of company president Richard
Sabo, and Mildred Sabo, mother of the three co-owners. 4 '
The Board's hearing examiner found that neither Diane Sabo nor Mildred Sabo
received any special benefits of employment, but nonetheless concluded that they should
be excluded because they did not share a community of interests with other employees: 42
relationships of the family members, and the managerial and supervisory activities of the family
shareholders. The Board's exclusion, based on these factors, was enforced by the Seventh Circuit.
Caravelle II, 504 F.2d at 1188, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2585.
31 See supra note 24 and cases cited therein.
32 See Action Automotive, Inc. v. NLRB, 717 F.2d 1033, 1035-36, 114 L.R.R.M. 2660, 2662
(6th Cir. 1983), reed, 105 S. Ct. 984, 118 L.R.R.M. 2577 (1985); NLRB v. Hubbard Co., 702 F.2d
634, 636, 112 L.R.R.M. 3238, 3240 (6th Cir. 1983); Cherrin Corp. v. NLRB, 349 F.2d 1001, 1004-
05, 59 L.R.R.M. 3016, 3018 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 981 (1966).
" NLRB v. Action Automotive, Inc., 717 F.2d 1033, 1035-36, 114 L.R.R.M. 2660, 2662 (6th
Cir. 1983).
" NLRB v. Action Automotive, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 984, 118 L.R.R.M. 2577 (1985).
35 Id.
Id. at 989, l 18 L.R.R.M. at 2579.




 The term "plurality" is the Court's. The votes reported were 20-18 for the retail store
employee unit, and 4-3 in the clerical unit in favor of the union. Enough ballots were challenged
in each unit to throw the results into doubt. Id. at 986 n.1, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2578 /1.1.
4, Id. Neither Diane Sabo nor Mildred Sabo was excluded by the statutory definition of employee
contained in section 2(3). Mildred Sabo was the mother of the owners, not a spouse or child. Diane
Sabo was the spouse of a co-owner, but her husband owned only 33% of the stock, each of his two
brothers also holding 33%, less than the majority shareholding required under section 2(3). See
Caravelle 1, 466 F.2d at 678, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3413. See supra note 27.
41 105 S. Ct. at 986, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2578.
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The Board adopted those recommendations, noting that Diane Sabo did enjoy special
benefits of employment, and ordered the company to bargain with the union.'"
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's
order:" An employee's relationship to the employers, according to the court, could only
serve to exclude an employee from a bargaining unit where the employee enjoyed special
benefits:" Following prior decisions of the Sixth Circuit, the court held that the Board
could not use its broad community of interest standard to exclude relatives of manage-
ment from the bargaining unit." In this case, the court of appeals held, neither Diane
Sabo nor Mildred Sabo enjoyed special privileges which would merit exclusion from the
bargaining unit:"
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in a six to
three decision:" In an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held that the
Board did not exceed its authority in excluding employees related to management from
bargaining units without finding that the employees enjoy special benefits:" The Court
began its analysis by noting that section 9(b) of the Act gives the Board broad discretion
to determine the appropriate bargaining unit." In its determinations, the Board focuses
on the employees' community of interest, the Court noted." Relatives of management
frequently have interests different from those of other employees, the Court continued,
prompting the Board to exclude them. 52 The Board at first applied a per se rule of
exclusion, the Court noted, and more recently had considered a number of factors
bearing on the employee's relationship to management." Although the employee may
receive no special benefits, the Court held that the Board may exclude a related employee
when other criteria satisfy the Board that the employee's interests are aligned with
management."
Judicial review of the Board's determinations, the Court held, is limited to finding
a reasonable basis in law," and the Board's orders are "rarely to be disturbed."'" Con-
sidering the Board's decision, the Court found that the Board could reasonably conclude
that relatives of management would receive closer attention to their employment con-
cerns, would find their self-interest closely aligned with management, and might threaten
confidentiality and free expression at union meetings." The special benefits standard
might, as the Court noted, more narrowly achieve the goal of excluding those related
1, Id. at 987 n.2, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2578 n.2.




42 Id. at 1036, 114	 at 2662.
4" NLRB v. Action Automotive, 105 S. Ct. 984, 118 L.R.R.M. 2577 (1985). Chief Justice Burger
wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell, and Blackmun.
justice Stevens dissented in an opinion joined by Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor. Id.
45 Id, at 990, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2581.
30 Id. at 987, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2579.
si
52 Id.
"Id. at 987-88, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2579. See supra note 29.
54 105 S.Ct. at 988, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2579.
55 Id .
56 Id. (citing Packard Motor Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 491, 19 L.R.R.M. 2397, 2400 (1947)).
57 Id. at 988, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2580.
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employees who pose such problems. 58 The Court held, however, that Congress vested
the authority to make labor policy in the Board, and the Court would not second guess
the Board's informed judgment. 59
Congress did not limit the Board's discretion in defining bargaining units, the Court
continued, by directing the Board to exclude related employees only where they receive
special job benefits. 69 The Court held that it could not bind the Board in ways not
mandated by Congress.61 Section 2(3) of the Act, the Court held, does not limit the
Board's discretion to define bargaining units. 62 Instead, the Court reasoned, that section
placed individuals employed by a parent or spouse wholly outside the stattite. 63 The
Board retains discretion, the Court held, to exclude from bargaining units those who
are not excluded by section 2(3). 64
Finally, the Court held that excluding family members because of a lack of common
interests does not violate the requirement that the Board remain wholly neutral as
between the contending parties. 65 Any effect favoring the union, the Court held, is
incidental. 66 In this case, the Court concluded, the Board acted reasonably in excluding
Diane Sabo and Mildred Sabo. 67 Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the
court of appeals. 66
Justice Stevens wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor. The majority's decision, the dissent contended, permitted the Board to ex-
clude employees solely because of their probable opposition to the union. 69 Congress
limited the permissible exclusion of family members by enacting section 2(3), the dissent
argued." Permitting  exclusion based solely on probable opposition to the union, the
dissent reasoned, violated the requirement that the Board equally protect employees'
right to resist unionization. 7 ' Although the majority purported to rely on objective factors
for exclusion, the dissent contended that the decision would be based on the family
member's opposition to the union rather than characteristics of the job itself." The
dissent concluded that family members could be excluded only where they received
special privileges."
The Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Action Automotive, Inc., reversing the Sixth
Circuit's split with the other circuits, grants the Board discretion to consider a broad
array of factors in determining the appropriate bargaining unit. 24 Employees related to
management pose a special problem because they are likely to identify more closely with
." Id. at 988-89, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2580. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.







67 Id. at 989-90, 118 1..R.R.M. at 2580-81.
68 Id. at 990, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2581.
69 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
711 Id.
7/ id.
n Id. at 991, 118 1..K.R.M. at 2581-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 991, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2582 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74 Id. at 987, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2579.
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management than with their fellow employees. 75 Unit determinations, however, are in
general based on characteristics of the job, not of the person occupying it. 76 Most factors
considered by the Board in determining the appropriate unit are based on objective
characteristics of the job, such as skills, location, and compensation." Certain employees
are excluded from the bargaining unit because they have conflicting interests and loy-
alties, such as confidential employees and guards:78 Those exclusions, however, are based
on characteristics of the job, not of the individual. 79 Exclusion of related employees is,
on the other hand, based on characteristics peculiar to the individual.
In Action Automotive, the Supreme Court clarified the relationship between section
2(3) and section 9(b) of the Act, and the analysis under which the Board may exclude
related employees. Section 2(3) provides a threshold question of whether the family
member is covered by the Act at all." Presumably this inquiry will be more narrowly
circumscribed than the expansive interpretation pressed by the Board in Caravelle Ls'
This more restrictive application of section 2(3) is offset, however, by the increased
flexibility granted the Board in making unit determinations under section 9(b)." 2 Because
the Court did not require the Board to find special status as a prerequisite to exclusion
under section 9(b), the Board has more flexibility in focusing on the underlying concern
of whether a related employee shares a community of interests with fellow employees.
This focus on community of interests also avoids the per se rule of automatic exclusion,
which deflects consideration of the community of interests shared by a particular related
employee. 83
The Court's rejection of a finding of special status as a prerequisite to excluding a
related employee gives the Board increased flexibility in considering the community of
interest. The dissent contended that special status was the only objective basis for exclu-
sion." The other factors, the dissent argued, amount to a decision based solely on
probable opposition to the union." The dissent's analysis, however, neglects the central
75 Id. at 988, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2579.
76 See R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 66.
" Id. at 69.
" In section 9(b)(3) of the Act, Congress specifically prohibits the Board from joining persons
employed as "guards" with other classes of employees in a bargaining unit. National Labor Relations
Act, § 9(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1982). The Board has used its discretion to exclude employees
with access to confidential, labor relations information of their employer. See NLRB v. Hendricks
County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 185, 108 L.R.R.M. 3105, 3110 (1981). In
addition, Congress amended section 2(3) of the Act to exclude employees in a supervisory capacity
from coverage under the Act. National Labor Relations Act, § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982); see
also NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 181-85, 108 L.R.R.M.
3105, 3109-10 (1981). Finally, the Supreme Court has enforced Congress's intention to exclude
managerial employees from the Act. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 283-84, 85
L.R.R.M. 2945, 2951 (1974). See generally R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 75.
'" See generally R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 75.
Bo 105 S. Ct. at 989, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2580.
81 See supra note 27. In light of the great deference the Action Automotive Court extends to the
Board's decisions, it is not clear whether the Court would place any limits on the Board's application
of these standards. See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
" 105 S. Ct. at 989, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2580.
" Sec infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether the Court might
place any limit on the Board's discretion.
"4 105 S. Ct. at 991, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2581 (Stevens, 	 dissenting).
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issue of community of interests. A related employee who receives special status on the
job would clearly lack a community of interests with other employees. It is because of
the absence of community of interests, however, that such an employee is excluded, not
solely because of the special status."
The appeal of the special status standard may lie in its objectification of the related
employee's affiliation with management into characteristics of the job itself. The special
status standard may appear to conform to the goal of decisions based on job character-
istics rather than the individual employee, 97 but it deflects inquiry from the underlying
problem that a related employee's interests may be most closely identified with manage-
ment. The Court's rejection of special status as the only basis for excluding related
employees returns the focus to the community of interests shared with employees.
The dissent was concerned that the Court's more flexible factors in analyzing com-
munity of interests would, in application, reduce to whether the employee was opposed
to the union, and would thus violate the neutrality required of the Board." The dissent
neglects that related employees are excluded because they identify more closely with
management, not solely because they oppose the union. The community of interests
standard is used to include in a bargaining unit employees in similar positions of em-
ployment, with similar concerns, and relations with their employer." In this regard, this
standard polices the line the Act draws between labor and management." The dissent
correctly noted that the Board would probably exclude a related employee who opposed
the union. This is true because of the high congruence between being closely allied with
management and opposition to a union. High congruence suggests to the dissent that
the two may be substituted freely. Not all related employees, however, are aligned with
management. Although most related employees who also oppose the union might not
share a community of interests with other employees, focusing on the factors in each
individual situation would permit a related employee who opposed the union, but who
nonetheless shared a community of interests with fellow employees, to be included in
the bargaining unit. It is, of course, possible that the Board would exclude even such an
employee. The problem to which the dissent alludes lies with the application of the
standard rather than the correctness of the standard itself. The Board's more flexible
community of interests standard, which the Court upheld, avoids the harshness of
automatic exclusion regardless of individual circumstances, and restores the focus on
whether a related employee identifies more closely with management than with fellow
employees. 9 '
The Court's decision in Action Automotive demonstrates the deference granted to the
Board's determinations of bargaining units. The Court allows the Board to exercise its
" 105 S. Ct. at 989, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2580.
" See R. CoamArg, supra note 3, at 66.
8g 105 S. Ct. at 991, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2581-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89 "Eligibility ... depends on whether an employee is sufficiently concerned with the terms and
conditions of employment in a unit to warrant his participation in the selection of a collective
bargaining agent." Shoreline Enterprises of America, Inc. v. NLRB, 262 F.2d 933, 944, 43 L.R.R.M.
2407, 2414 (5th Cir. 1959).
99 See supra note 78 for other examples of the line drawn between labor and management
under the Act.
9 The Court did not address whether the flexible, broad factors used in evaluating a related
employee's community of interests with fellow employees might be applied to exclude an individual
not blood related, but whose interests were most closely identified with management.
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discretion based on its experience, and to modify its policies. 92 The limits to the Court's
deference are unclear. If the Board were to impose an expansive interpretation of
"employee" under section 2(3) or a per se rule of automatic exclusion, for example,
whether the Court would defer to the Board's decision is uncertain. 93 In Caravelle I, the
Seventh Circuit limited the Board's discretion to interpret section 2(3) or to apply a per
se rule of automatic exclusion, while granting more flexibility under section 9(b) deter-
minations of bargaining units. 94 Such guidelines serve an important purpose. If the
Court were to defer to an expansive interpretation of section 2(3) or a per se rule of
automatic exclusion, the analysis of related employees would again shift from the un-
derlying issue of whether the particular related employee's interests were more closely
aligned with management. This would be an unfortunate result obscuring the underlying
basis for exclusion.
The Court's decision in Action Automotive reversed the Sixth Circuit's limitation of
the Board's discretion to exclude related employees, requiring a finding of special status.
The Court's decision grants the Board flexibility to consider various factors and returns
the focus of the analysis to the community of interests a related employee shares with
fellow employees. 95 The decision accords the Board's determination great deference,
and indicates an unwillingness to subject the Board's determinations to scrutiny. 96 The
immediate effect of the Board's increased flexibility is to focus more closely on the
underlying issue of whether a related employee is more closely aligned with management.
Paradoxically, the Court's unwillingness to scrutinize the Board's determinations could
result in a shift away from that focus on community of interests, if the Board chooses
to exclude related employees from bargaining units under the section 2(3) definition of
"employee" or by applying a per se rule of automatic exclusion.
C. *The Difficulty of Applying the Yeshiva Standard: Loretto Heights College v. NLRB'
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) protects the right of "em-
ployees" to bargain collectively. 2 This protection, however, extends only to certain classes
'2 105 S. Ct. at 988 n.4, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2579 n.4.
° The Court indicated that the Board's decisions must have a "reasonable basis in law." Id. at
988, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2579 (quoting NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131, 14
L.R.R.M. 614, 622 (1944)). The Court noted that the Board no longer applied a per se rule of
automatic exclusion, but did not indicate such a rule would be impermissible. Id. at 988 n.6, 118
I..R.R.M. at 2579 n.6.
Caravelle 1, 466 F.2d at 678, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3413.
"Action Automotive, 105 S. Ct. at 988, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2579.
96 Id.
*By Juan Perea, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
742 F.2d 1245, 117 L.R.R.M. 2225 (10th Cir. 1984).
2 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982). Section 7 states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or
all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment
as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
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of employees as defined in section 2(3) of the Act.' The Act's definition of "employee"
explicitly excludes any person employed as a supervisor.' The United States Supreme
Court has held that the definition excludes managerial employees from the protection
of the Act as well.'
Prior to 1980, the National Labor Relations Board (Board or NLRB) had stated that
college faculty members were not managerial employees and were therefore eligible for
protection under the Act. 6 In 1980, however, the United States Supreme Court, in NLRB
v. Yeshiva University,' rejected the NLRB's position and held that faculty members may
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982). Section 152(3) states:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the
employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise,
and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice,
and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment,
but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the
domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by
his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor,
or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer
subject to the Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.C. 151 et seq.], as amended from time to
time, or by any other person who is not an employer herein defined.
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982).
4 Id.; see also R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING 33 (1976). There were two rationales for excluding supervisors from coverage under the
Act. Id. at 34. The first rationale was to assure that supervisors would not ally with or become
subordinate to employees within the union and, as a result, renounce the supervisor's duty of
undivided loyalty to the employer. Id. Second, Congress wanted to assure that rank-and-file em-
ployees could unionize without undue influence from supervisors. Id.
5 NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275, 85 L.R.R.M. 2945, 2948 (1974). Prior to
1970, the National Labor Relations Board (Board or NLRB) excluded all managerial employees
from coverage under the Act. American Locomotive Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 115, 118-19, 27 L.R.R.M.
1064, 1064 (1950). See R. GORMAN, SUprtl note 4, at 38. In 1971, the Board attempted to alter its
position by excluding only those managerial employees whose positions were so closely involved
with labor relations that to permit them to bargain would create a severe conflict between the
managerial employee and his employer. Textron, Inc., 190 N.L.R.B. 431, 431, 77 L.R.R.M. 1265,
1265 (1971). See R. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 38. In NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 85
L.R.R.M. 2945 (1974), the Supreme Court reversed the Board's position and held that Congress
intended to exclude all managerial employees from coverage under the Act. Id. at 275, 85 L.R.R.M.
at 2948. On remand to the Board, the Board articulated its definition of a managerial employee:
[T]hose who formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making
operative the decisions of their employer, and those who have discretion in the per-
formance of their jobs independent of their employer's established policy ....
IMIanagerial status is not conferred upon rank-and-file workers, or upon those who
perform routinely, but rather it is reserved for those in executive-type positions, those
who are closely aligned with management as true representatives of management.
Bell Aerospace, 219 N.L.R.B. 384, 385, 89 L.R.R.M. 1664, 1665 (1975) (quoting General Dynamics
Corporation, Convair Aerospace Division, 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 857, 87 L.R.R.M. 1705, 1715 (1974)).
6 See C.W. Post Center of Long Island Univ., 189 N.L.R.B. 904, 905, 77 L.R.R.M. 1001, 1003
(1971); Gray, Managerial Employees and the Industrial Analogy: NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 33 LAB.
L.J. 390, 393 (1982). See also NLRB v. Wentworth Institute 515 F.2d 550, 89 L.R.R.M. 2033 (1st
Cir., 1975) (affirming the Board's position that college faculty had the right to organize and bargain
collectively).
444 U.S. 672, 103 L.R.R.M. 2526 (1980).
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exercise such control over academic matters at the university that they are managerial
employees and therefore not protected by the Act. 8
Two criteria emerged from Yeshiva for determining whether college faculty members
are to be considered manageria1. 8 One was the importance of the subject matter of the
faculty's decisions to the functioning of the university.") The second was the extent to
which the faculty's decisions actually controlled the final outcome of these matters." The
Court left open the possibility of coverage under the Act for full-time faculty at colleges
"unlike Yeshiva."
Id. at 679, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2529. The Court stated that the Yeshiva faculty exercised authority
which "in any other context unquestionably would be managerial." Id. at 686, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2532.
The Court found that the faculty had absolute authority in academic matters such as determining
teaching methods, grading policies, matriculation standards, and standards for retaining and grad-
uating students. Id. The Court also noted that the Yeshiva faculty occasionally determined the size
of the student body, the amount of tuition, and the location of a school. Id. The Court found it
difficult to imagine more managerial decisions than these within a university. Id. See generally Gray,
supra note 6.
9 Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 686-90, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2532-34. See also Gray, supra note 6, at 397.
to id. at 686, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2532. For example, decisions on academic matters, teaching,
student body size, and grading policies are clearly very important to the functioning of the entire
university. On the other hand, a teacher's decisions about how to teach an individual course would
not have the same importance to the entire university. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 690 n. 31, 103 L.R.R.M.
at 2534 n,31.
" Id. See also Gray, supra note 6, at 397.
12 Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 690 n.31, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2534 n.31. Much litigation has arisen in the
wake of the Yeshiva decision, See Douglas, Distinguishing Yeshiva: A Troubling Task for the NLRB, 34
LAB. L.J. 104, 105 (1983), and cases cited therein. Colleges and universities have challenged attempts
by faculty members to organize and bargain collectively. Id. These institutions typically justify their
refusal to recognize and bargain with the faculty union by alleging that faculty members are
managerial employees excluded from protection under the Act in the wake of Yeshiva. See id.
In the following cases, the court or the Board rejected the managerial status of the faculty and
permitted certification of a bargaining unit: Stephens Institute v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 720, 727, 104
L.R.R.M. 2524, 2529 (9th Cir. 1980) (Yeshiva does not apply where instructors do not engage in
policy making nor in management level decision-making; Yeshiva is also inapplicable to an Institute
unlike the nonprofit, "mature" Yeshiva University); Florida Memorial College, 263 N.L.R.B. 1248,
1252-53, I 1 1 L.R.R.M. 1547, 1552-53 (1982) (full-time faculty are not managerial employees
because, unlike the Yeshiva faculty, this faculty's authority is "far from absolute" in the academic
sphere and the faculty has no substantial control in other spheres). But see 263 N.L.R.B. 1254-55,
111 L.R.R.M. 1553-54 (1982) (finding extensive faculty involvement rising to the level of manage-
ment authority that was described in Yeshiva) (Van de Water, Chairman, and Hunter, Member,
dissenting). As this chapter on Loretto demonstrates, it is not surprising that NLRB members, like
courts, would reach differing conclusions when applying the fact-intensive Yeshiva "standard";
Wordsworth Academy, 262 N.L.R.B. 438, 443, 110 L.R.R.M. 1296, 1300-01 (1982) (teachers,
psychologists, and therapists are not managerial employees under Yeshiva; they are professional
employees whose decisions are limited to the routine discharge of their professional duties in
projects assigned to them); Bradford College, 261 N.L.R.B. 565, 565-67, 110 L.R.R.M. 1055, 1057-
58 (1982) (faculty members are not managerial employees because the faculty's recommendations
on academic and administrative matters were often ignored or rejected by the administration);
Montefiore Hospital and Medical Center, 261 N.L.R.B. 569, 572, 110 L.R.R.M. 1048, 1052 (1982)
(staff doctors' alleged managerial participation was insufficient to warrant bringing them within the
managerial exclusion); Pratt Institute, 256 N.L.R.B. 1166, 1167, 107 L.R.R.M. 1404, 1405 (1981)
(Yeshiva decision did not intend to exclude nonacademic administrative employees who routinely
carry out decisions and standards made by higher authority); see also Milton College, 260 N.L.R.B.
399, 400, 109 L.R.R.M. 1172, 1173 (1982) ("Yeshiva constitutes a substantial change in the state of
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During the Survey year, in Loretto Heights College v. NLRB, 13
 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that faculty members at Loretto Heights College
(Loretto or the College) were not managerial employees within the meaning of Yeshiva."
As a result, the court found that Loretto had committed an unfair labor practice under
sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act* by refusing to recognize and bargain with the faculty's
union. 16 In reaching its decision, the court of appeals found that the faculty's power was
diluted and that the faculty did not control its employer's policies." As will be demon-
strated, the facts of Loretto and Yeshiva are quite similar, yet their respective courts reached
opposite conclusions based on those facts. The Lore- Ito case illustrates, therefore, the
difficulty of predicting the outcome of particular factual situations under the general
standard of Yeshiva.
The Loretto faculty began organizing in 1971. 18
 In 1972, the Loretto Heights
College/Faculty Education Association (the Association) was certified as the collective
bargaining representative for all regular full and part-time faculty members. 19 The
College and the Association subsequently agreed to a series of collective bargaining
agreements." A few months before the expiration of the last of these agreements, 21
Loretto notified the Association of its intent to end the agreements. 22 The College,
the law regarding the supervisory and/or managerial status of faculty members"; hearing on the
appropriateness of the faculty unit at Milton College is therefore warranted).
In the following cases, the Board found that the faculty was managerial under Yeshiva: Uni-
versity of New Haven, 267 N.L.R.B. 939, 943, 114 L.R.R.M. 1140-41 (1983) (full-time faculty who
play a major and effective role in the formulation and effectuation of broad management policies,
policies established by the board of governors of the university, "are managerial employees without
organizational rights protected by the Act"); Duquesne University of the Holy Ghost, 261 N.L.R.B.
587, 589, 110 L.R.R.M. 1046, 1048 (1982) (Duquesne Law School faculty exercises managerial
authority in critical academic matters and in nonacademic matters in a manner nearly identical to
the Yeshiva faculty's; Duquesne faculty members are therefore managerial employees); Ithaca
College, 261 N.L.R.B. 577, 578, 110 L.R.R.M. 1059, 1060 (1982) (Ithaca faculty exercises authority
similar to the authority exercised by the Yeshiva faculty, formulating policies for schools in academic
matters and having substantial authority in nonacademic spheres; Ithaca faculty members thus
classified as managerial employees); Thiel College, 261 N.L.R.B. 580, 586, 110 L.R.R.M. 1041, 1046
(1982) (faculty makes decisions and recommendations in the "overwhelming majority of critical
areas relied upon by the Supreme Court in Yeshiva University"; therefore, like the Yeshiva faculty,
the Thiel faculty was found to be managerial).
See generally Foley, Yeshiva Update: Administration 8, Union 0, 29 CAM. LAW. 33, 45-49 (1984)
(arguing that the impact of Yeshiva was largely to sound the death knell for "future union organi-
zation at most private, four-year colleges").
13 742 F.2d 1245, 117 L.R.R.M. 2225 (10th Cir. 1984).
" Id. at 1254, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2232.
Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act provides, in pertinent part: "(a) It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer — (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7; ... (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a) ...." 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(a)( I), (5) (1982).
16 Loretto, 742 F.2d at 1256, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2233.
" Id. at 1254, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2232.
18 Id. at 1246, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2225.
19 Id. Part-time faculty members were required to carry at least a one-fourth faculty load. Id.
2, Id.
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questioning its duty to bargain with the Association in light of Yeshiva, refused to rec-
ognize the Association and discontinued further negotiations."
The Association responded by filing an unfair labor practice charge with the Board,
alleging that the College had violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) by withdrawing its
recognition of the Association and refusing to negotiate. 24 The case was tried before an
administrative law judge (ALJ), who found that the College had violated the Act. 25 The
Aq found that the faculty members were not managerial employees who could be
excluded from coverage under the Act,26 and ordered the College to recognize and
bargain with the Association.'" The Board reviewed the AL.I's decision, affirmed his
findings, and adopted his recommended order.23 Loretto petitioned the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals for review of the Board's order, and the Board cross-applied for
enforcement of its order. 29
In reaching its decision to enforce the Board's order, the court first reviewed the
Supreme Court's Yeshiva decision." Yeshiva's exposition of the rationale of the managerial
exclusion, the court stated, relies on a basic assumption that an employer is entitled to
the "undivided loyalty" of his employees. 3 ' Managerial employees, exercising indepen-
dent discretion and aligned with management, are excluded from coverage under the
Act to guarantee that their loyalty is not divided between their employer and their
union. 32 According to the Tenth Circuit, the Yeshiva faculty was found to be "in effect,
substantially and pervasively operating the enterprise."" For example, the court noted,
in the "overwhelming majority of cases" Yeshiva's central administration followed faculty
recommendations regarding faculty hiring, tenure, sabbaticals, termination, and pro-
motion." Thus in Yeshiva, the court concluded, the problem of the faculty's potentially
divided loyalty was "particularly acute." 33
The court of appeals then reviewed at length the structure of college governance
at Loretto." The Board of Trustees, according to the court, had ultimate authority for
the operation of the college." The administration of the college consisted of a President,
25 Id. at 1246, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2226. The College did, however, continue to honor most
provisions of the expired contract. Id.
24 Id. See supra note 15 for pertinent text of section 8.
Loretto, 742 F.2d at 1246, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2226.
26 Id.
° Id.
26 Id. The Board affirmed all but one of the AL's findings. Id. at 1246 n.2, 117 L.R.R.M. at
2226 n.2. The ALL had discussed a "divergence of interests" between the faculty and the College.
The Board found it unnecessary to discuss the divergence. Id. The Board concluded that the other
reasons cited by the ALL were sufficient to justify his finding that the faculty members of Loretto
were not managerial employees under Yeshiva. Id.
" Id. at 1245, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2225.
31' Id. at 1246-48, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2226-27.
3j Id. at 1247, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2226.
"Id. at 1246-47, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2226.
33 Id. at 1246-47, 117 L.R.R.hl. at 2226 (quoting Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 679, 103 L.R.R.M. at
2529).
" Id. at 1247, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2227.
35 Id. at 1248, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2227 (quoting Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 689, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2533).
" Id. at 1248-52, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2227-30.
97 Id. at 1248, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2227.
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five division heads, and program directors who administered each of the college's aca-
demic programs.'"
Faculty participation in governance at the college, according to the court, occurred
mainly through committees containing at least sonic faculty members." The most sig-
nificant of the committees were the Academic Forum, the Faculty Administration Rela-
tions Council (FARC), and the Program Review and Recommendation Committee
(PRRC). 4° The court noted that besides such committee work, faculty members partici-
pated mainly in decision-making within particular program areas, including decisions
regarding curriculum development. 4 ' Finally, the court stated that faculty members had
only very limited impact into the budget process for their program areas. 12
The court then analyzed the key question of whether the faculty's involvement at
Loretto rose to the levet of managerial involvement as defined in Yeshiva. While the court
found that the faculty played a substantial role in governing Loretto, the court decided
that the faculty's authority in most aspects of Loretto's governance was severely circum-
scribed.43 In areas outside the academic sphere, the court found that the faculty had
little or no authority.'' Turning to the faculty's role in academic affairs, the court
contrasted the. Loretto faculty's participation in decision-making from the Yeshiva fac-
ulty's decision-making.45 While at Yeshiva the faculty at each school met and decided
academic matters as a collective body, the court noted that the Loretto faculty's partici-
pation was through its representation on committees. 4,1 Faculty involvement in these
39 Id. at 1249, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2227-28.
39 Id. at 1249, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2228. The court reviewed, at great length, each committee with
faculty participation. These committees included: the Academic Forum, a self-governing committee
including all full and part-time faculty members; the Faculty Administration Relations Council
(FARC), which advised the college president and consisted of the President, four administrators
and four faculty members, and which was involved in developing the College's academic policies;
the Rank Committee, consisting of five full-dine faculty members, which made recommendations
to the President concerning faculty rank; the Tenure Committee, which consisted of five full-time
tenured faculty members and two program directors, and which recommended faculty for tenure
to the President; the Faculty Review Committee, which consisted of five full-time faculty members,
and which made recommendations to the President concerning the disposition of grievances; the
Affirmative Action Committee, which consisted of faculty, staff and students appointed by the
President; the Faculty Evaluation Committee, which consisted of three full-time faculty members
and two students; the Academic Review Committee, composed of administrators, which dealt with
matters of student retention; the Sabbatical Committee, chaired by the Academic Dean, included
one program director and two full-time faculty members, and which reviewed sabbatical applications
and made recommendations to the President; the Program Review and Recommendation Com-
mittee (PRRC), consisting of five appointed faculty members, which reviewed programs for consis-
tency with college goals and for overlap among college courses; and finally the Research Committee,
the membership of which varied between faculty members and program directors, and which
reviewed applications for research money and made recommendations regarding disposition of
$1000 of research funds. Id. at 1299-51, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2228-29.
40 Id. at 1253, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2231.
4 I Id. at 1251-52, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2229-30. These decisions included decisions regarding such
areas as the hiring of new faculty and salary level for faculty. See rd. at 1251, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2229-
30. The Academic Dean followed faculty hiring recommendations in every case. Id. at 1251, 117
L.R.R.M. at 2230.
42 Id. at 1252, 117 L. R.R.M. at 2230.
Id.
44 Id.
45 1d. at 1252, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2231.
40 id,
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committees, stated the court, was only incidental to the faculty's primary teaching re-
sponsibilities.'" The court found, therefore, that the faculty's participation in the com-
mittees was not truly managerial:0' Moreover, the court found that several of the lesser
committees were either relatively ineffective or insignificant in their impact on governing
Loretto College. 4" Even in the seemingly more powerful organizations — the Academic
Forum, the FARC, and the PRRC — the court found that the faculty's power was more
theoretical than actual. 50
Thus, the court concluded that the Loretto faculty did not "effectively control or
implement employer policy," 51 and therefore the faculty's behavior was not truly man-
agerial. In summarizing, the court listed the factors which led to its conclusion. These
factors included the infrequent or insignificant nature of some of the committees' work,
the mixed membership (faculty and administrative members) on many committees, the
limited decision-making authority held by the faculty, and the administrative approval
required to finalize decisions. 52
The court also reasoned that the issue of potentially divided loyalty that was present
in Yeshiva was absent in Loretto." The court noted that in Yeshiva there was potential for
divided loyalty because the school depended on the faculty to such a great extent to
formulate and implement academic policy!" Further, the court noted that because of
the relatively small size of Yeshiva's administrative staff, there was no buffer between
management and the faculty." In contrast, at Loretto, the court stated, the administrative
staff was relatively large. 55 The court found it significant that the Loretto program
directors formed a very effective buffer between the management of Loretto and its
faculty," The program directors, according to the court, were considered part of the
administration while also functioning as faculty." Loretto relied on the expertise of these
program directors within the administration, noted the court, and thus did not need to
rely as much on its faculty to determine academic policy. 5" Thus the court concluded
" Id. at 1253. 117 L.R.R.M. at 2231.
"Id. The court found that the faculty's involvement on the Sabbatical, Faculty Review, Tenure,
and Rank Committees, among others, was incidental. Id. These committees met only infrequently
and only for short periods of time. N.
1" Id. The court referred specifically to the Affirmative Action Committee, the Faculty Evalu-
ation Committee, and the Research Committee. Id.
3" Id. For a description of the various committees, see supra note 39. With regard to the
Academic Forum, the court found that decisions on college philosophy, curriculum, admissions,
retention and graduation policy were made largely by the various committees, even though the
Forum's bylaws stated that the Forum would share in these decisions. Loretto, 742 F.2d at 1253, 117
1...R.R.M. at 2231. Regarding the 1:ARC, the court reasoned that its policies were riot controlled by
the faculty because faculty members constituted only a minority of FARC's membership. Id. The
PARC, while composed solely of faculty members, the court stated, lacked final decision-making
authority. Id. at 1253-54, 117 L.R.R..M. at 2231-32.
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that the facts of Loretto did not present a problem of potentially divided loyalty such as
that found in Yeshiva. 6°
Finally, the court determined that the administration, not the faculty, made man-
agement decisions and exercised control over Loretto." Thus the court found that faculty
members at Loretto were not managerial employees as defined in Yeshiva. 62 Accordingly,
the court agreed with the Board that faculty members at Loretto were entitled to the
Act's protection of their right to organize and bargain collectively."
The Loretto case illustrates how difficult it is to predict the results when a court
embarks on a Yeshiva -type analysis. Yeshiva formulated a general standard, that faculty
"substantially and pervasively operating the enterprise," or exercising "authority which
in any other context unquestionably would be managerial" are to be considered mana-
gerial employees. In practice, however, this standard is so vague that essentially similar
facts can lead to opposite results.
Despite the Loretto court's conclusion that the degree of control exercised by the
Loretto faculty fell far short of that exercised by the Yeshiva faculty," a close comparison
of the facts in Loretto with the facts in Yeshiva shows that the two institutions did not
differ as much as the Loretto court found. One of the controlling factors mentioned by
the Yeshiva Court was that the subject matter of the faculty's decisions, academic affairs,
was critical to the functioning of the university." The Loretto court relied on the "insig-
nificant" work in academic affairs of some of Loretto's committees as a basis for its
decision." Yet those committees recommended action on college philosophy and curric-
ulum changes,67 faculty tenure," faculty promotion," and other academic issues similar
to those found to he critical at Yeshiva. Somewhat contradictorily, the Loretto court argued
that the Academic Forum's power was more theoretical than actual precisely because
other committees made most of the decisions regarding college philosophy, curriculum,
admissions, retention, and graduation policies." Thus the court actually conceded the
importance of the committees in making decisions regarding academic policies. More
importantly, these kinds of decisions were very similar to the kinds of decisions made
by the Yeshiva faculty."' It is not clear, therefore, that decisions made by Loretto's faculty
were any less significant than those made by Yeshiva's faculty.
Another important aspect of Yeshiva was the extent to which the faculty's recom-
mendations actually controlled the outcome of decisions." In Yeshiva, the court found




6' Id. at 1255, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2233.
Id. at 1254, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2232.
6' Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 686, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2532.
66 Loretto, 742 F.2d at 1254, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2232.
0 Id. at 1253, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2231.
68 Id. at 1250, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2228.
69 /d. at 1249-50, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2228.
" Id. at 1253, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2231.
7' See Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 676-77, 686, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2528, 2532.
72
	 at 686, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2532.
73 Id.
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that Loretto's faculty had limited decision-making authority. 74 In the cases of the Tenure,
Sabbatical, and Rank Committees at Loretto, however, all of their recommendations had
been accepted. 75 In addition, all faculty hiring recommendations had been followed.'"
Thus the Loretto faculty had a significant degree of control over these matters.
Further, the Loretto court focused on the infrequent meetings and mixed member-
ship of many of the committees as one reason why the faculty's impact fell short of
effective control. 77 The Yeshiva faculty, however, participated in university-wide gover-
nance through the faculty representatives on a similarly mixed student-faculty advisory
council." The Loretto court also focused on the layers of administrative approval neces-
sary to implement faculty recommendations as evidence of diluted faculty control." Yet
Yeshiva vested ultimate authority in a Board of Trustees and the university had an
extensive administration." Thus, it can be argued that the Loretto faculty had significant
decision-making authority of the same type, and with similar structure, as the faculty at
Yeshiva. Despite this similarity in facts, however, the Yeshiva and Loretto courts reached
opposite conclusions about whether the faculty at issue was managerial.
As demonstrated, several arguments can be made that the roles of the faculties at
Loretto Heights College and at Yeshiva University were not, in fact, as different as
stressed by the Loretto court. Because such arguably similar facts can lead to such different
outcomes, Loretto demonstrates the difficulty of predicting the outcome of a case under
the vague Yeshiva standard. Although Yeshiva appeared to spell out a standard, in fact it
provided no standard for evaluating specific facts. The Yeshiva rule states that when
faculty members "in effect, substantially and pervasively operat[e] the enterprise," they
are managerial. 81 The Yeshiva court, however, provided no meaningful guidance for
deciding which facts lead to a conclusion that a faculty "substantially and pervasively"
operates a college or university. Loretto does little to clarify the standards for assessing
faculty "managerialness," reaching as it does the opposite conclusion that the Yeshiva
Court reached from essentially similar facts. Loretto does, however, reveal the ineffec-
tiveness of the Yeshiva standard, and it suggests that the issue of the managerial status
of a college faculty will continue to he litigated. Loretto may also indicate that courts are
74 Imam, 742 F.2d at 1254, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2232.
" Id. at 1249-50, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2228-29.
7 " Id. at 1251, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2230.
77 Id. at 1254, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2232. One commentator has criticized the NLRB for not
presenting the more convincing argument that faculty members should not be considered mana-
gerial because they spend only a small percentage of their time on managerial, as opposed to
professional, tasks. See Gray, supra note 6, at 405. The Loretto court thus seems to be presenting this
kind of argument for finding the faculty members to be nonmanagerial.
One other factor mentioned by the Loretto court, the infrequency of committee meetings,
appeared to play an important part in the court's decision. The court used this infrequency to show
that faculty involvement was only incidental to the faculty's other duties. This factor was not
considered by the Yeshiva court and thus it constitutes a new measure of a faculty's managerial
status.
7" Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 676, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2528. The Yeshiva Court did mention that at four
schools the faculty met regularly pursuant to their bylaws. Id. at 676, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2528.
"742 F.2d at 1254, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2232.
" Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 675, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2528.
Id. at 695, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2534 (quoting NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 582 F.2d 686, 698
(2d Cir. 1978)).
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attempting to cut back on the scope of the Yeshiva decision by not excluding faculties
from the Act's coverage except under the most extreme circumstances.
One promising approach for resolving the vagueness of the Yeshiva standard has
been suggested by John A. Gray. 82
 He suggests that rather than focus on the subject matter
of faculty decision-making, the courts (and the NLRB) should focus on the percentage
of a faculty's time that is spent on "managerial decision-making." 83
 Under the present
Yeshiva standard, two faculties, both of whose recommendations regarding academic or
faculty matters were followed by the administration, could be considered equally man-
agerial. Yet the first faculty might spend sixty percent of its time on such matters, while
the second faculty might spend only ten percent of its time deciding such issues. Assum-
ing these facts, the first faculty clearly behaves more "managerially" than the second, yet
under Yeshiva a court might find that both faculties should be excluded from the Act's
coverage. 84
By examining the amount of time a faculty spends on such matters, a court could
distinguish between faculties whose behavior is truly managerial (those who spend most
of their time making managerial decisions) and those whose managerial behavior is
incidental to other professional responsibilities (those who spend only a small fraction
of their time deciding managerial issues). Arguably, the only faculties that ought to be
excluded from coverage under the Act are those that spend most of their time making
managerial decisions. These faculties are analogous to managerial employees in industry,
who spend most or all of their time on managerial affairs. 85
 Conversely, faculties whose
managerial decision-making is only incidental to their other duties could properly be
allowed to unionize under the Act. 86
D. *Union Access to Employer's Plant for Safety Inspection: Holyoke Water Power Co)
Section 8(a)( I) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) makes it an unfair
labor practice for an employer to interfere with employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed in section 7 of the Act. 2
 In addition, under section 8(a)(5) of the Act it is an
82 See Gray, supra note 6, at 404.
83 Id.
" The Loretto court, however, applied Yeshiva in a way that took into account, to some extent,
the amount of time the faculty spent deciding managerial issues. Loretto, 742 F.2d at 1253, 117
at 2231. The court pointed out that several of the faculty committees met "infrequently
and only for short periods of time in performing their functions in past years." Id. at 1253 & n.19,
177 L.R.R.M. at 2231 & n.19. See also supra note 78.
" See Gray, supra note 6, at 405.
8" Id.
* By Brian D. Shonk, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1
 273 N.L.R.B. No. 168, 118 L.R.R.M. 1179 (1985).
2
 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) (1982). Section 8(a)(1) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer — (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982). Section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities For the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or
all of such activities except to the extent that such right may he affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment
as authorized in section 8(a)(3).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
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unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain over terms and conditions of
employment with the elected bargaining representative of its employees. 3 To protect
employees' rights to proper representation under the Act, the Supreme Court has
interpreted sections 8(a)(1) and (5) as obligating employers to furnish to employees'
union representatives all information relevant and necessary to the union's performance
of its representation duties:I
The Supreme Court has also recognized, however, that the Act protects the property
rights of employers. 5 Consequently, conflicts arise between the employees' right to proper
representation and the employers' right to control their property. 6 In most instances,
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) balances these two conflicting
interests.' In prior cases, when access to an employer's plant was requested by a union
to investigate health and safely conditions, however, the Board did not balance the
employees' and the employers' conflicting interests." Instead, the Board ruled that such
requests were in the nature of requests for information, and thus summarily granted
union requests for access to an employer's property." Accordingly, in these earlier cases,
the Board had held that under sections 8(a)( I) and (5) of the Act, union requests to
enter an employer's premises to investigate health and safety conditions could not be
denied by an employer."
During the Survey year, the National Labor Relations Board ruled that employers'
property rights and employees' right to proper representation must be carefully balanced
and accommodated when considering a union's request for access to an employer's
property to survey potential health and safety hazards.'' In Holyoke Water Power Co., the
Board expressly overruled Winona Industries" and similar cases which had summarily
granted union requests for access to an employer's plant to investigate health and safety
conditionS and did not consider the employer's property rights." Under the standards
put forth in Holyoke Water Power, union requests for access to the employer's property
for inspection of potential health and safety hazards may properly he denied by the
employer when the union can effectively represent employees through some means
other than by entering the employer's premises."
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
4 NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 64 L.R.R.M. 2069 (1967); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg.
Co., 351 U.S. 149, 38 L.R.R.M. 2042 (1956).
5 NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112, 38 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2004 (1956).
" Id. (accommodation between employers' property rights and workers' organization rights
when nonemployee access to employer's property for organizational purposes is involved "must he
obtained with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other"); Fafnir
Bea'ring Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1582, 1586, 56 L.R.R.M. 1108, 1111 (1964), enforced, 362 F.2d 716, 721-
22, 62 L.R.R.M. 2415, 2418 (2(1 Cir. 1966) ("a balance must be struck between these competing
interests" of employee statutory rights and employer property rights, although here balance favors
employees' rights).
' Fafnir Bearing Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1582, 1586-87, 56 L.R.R.M. 1108, 1111 (1964), enforced,
362 F.2d 716, 721, 62 L.R.R.M. 2415, 2418 (2d Cir. 1966) (access to determine piece rates in plant).
See Winona Industries, 257 N.L.R.B. 695, 696-97, 107 L.R.R.M. 1605, 1605 (1981).
9 Id.
'°Id. at 698, 107 L.R.R.M. at 1605.
" Holyoke Water Power Co., 273 N.L.R.B. No. 168, at 4, 118 L.R.R.M. 1179, 1180-81 (1985).
12 Id. at 5, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1 1 80.
11 See Winona Industries, Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 695, 107 L.R.R.M. 1605 (1981).
j4 Holyoke, 273 N.L.R.B. No. 168 at 5, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1180.
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In Holyoke Water Power, the employer's power plant contained a fan room which had
a substantial noise problern.15 The employer posted signs in the fan room warning of
high noise levels and provided earmuffs for employees who were required to enter that
room. 16
 In January of 1983, the union requested that the employer permit the union's
industrial hygienist to survey the potential health and safety hazards in the fan room. 17
The employer denied the union's request, and instead gave the union a summary of an
overall noise survey conducted five months earlier by a hygienist hired by the employer.'"
The summary, however, did not specifically cover the noise level of the fan room.'" The
employer later instructed its own test coordinator, who was not an industrial hygienist,
to take a noise level reading in the fan room and provide the union with the results. 2 °
The employer also granted access to the fan room to the union's business agent, but not
to the union's hired industrial hygienist. 21
 The union refused to accept either proposal,
and filed a complaint against the employer charging that the employer had violated
sections 8(a)(I) and (5) of the Act by failing to provide the union with information
relevant and necessary to the union's performance of its representation duties. 22
The administrative law judge (AIJ) found that the employer had violated sections
8(a)(I) and (5) of the Act by denying the union's industrial hygienist access to the fan
room." The ALJ first noted the employer's obligation to provide a union with infor-
mation relevant and necessary to the union's performance of its duties as the employees'
representative. 24
 Recognizing that safety and health conditions are terms and conditions
of employment over which the employer is obligated to bargain, the AL.] stated that
under the Board's decision in Winona Industries, union requests for access to an employer's
premises to investigate safety hazards are in the nature of requests for information and,
therefore, cannot be denied by an employer. 25
 The ALJ supported his Finding of section
8(a)(I) and (5) violations by noting that the dangers of exposure to high noise levels
made this matter relevant to the union's duties of representation," and that the test
results given to the union by the employer were inadequate for the union to properly
perform its duties."
The Board disagreed with the ALys method of analysis, but agreed with the ALJ's
conclusion that, under the facts of the case, the employer must grant a union hygienist
access to the fan room to test for noise hazards. 28
 Although the Board recognized that
' 5 1d. at 1-2, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1179.




20 Id. at 2. 118 L.R.R.M. at 1179-80. The test coordinator later testified that he was unaware
of whether the conditions in the fan room at the time of the test were representative of its usual
conditions. Id. at 2, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1180.
21 1d. at 3-4, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1180.
22 Id. at I, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1179-80.
23 Id. at 2-3, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1180.
24
 Id. at 3, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1180.
28 1d.
26 Id,
"Id, The test results given to the union were found inadequate because the first test only
gauged average noise levels to determine compliance with Occupational Health & Safety Admin-
istration (OSHA) standards, and it was undisputed that hearing can be damaged even where average
noise levels comply with OSEIA's standards. Id. Further, the AI,[ noted that there was some dispute
over the technique and results of that test. Id.
28 1d. at 4-5, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1180-81.
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an employer's right to control its property is a factor that must be considered in deciding
whether a nonemployee .union representative should have access to the employer's
premises, the Board found that in this case the employer's property rights were out-
weighed by the employees' right to responsible representation. 29 Thus, the Board held,
union access to the company's fan room was required."
In reaching its decision, the Board rejected the Ali's analysis that the union was
entitled to access to the employer's premises merely upon a showing that the information
sought was relevant to the union's performance of its representation duties." Instead of
applying a simple relevance standard which considers only the union's need for infor-
mation, the Holyoke Water Power Board recognized that the right of the employer to
control its property and protect its operations from interference from nonemployees
should also be considered." Employee representation rights and employer property
rights must be balanced, according to the Board, to do as little harm to one "as is consistent
with the maintenance of the other." 99 In balancing the employer's property rights against
the employees' right to proper representation, the Board found that where the union
can effectively represent its members through some means other than having access to
the employer's premises, the employer's property rights outweigh the employees' inter-
ests in proper representation. 34 In such a case, the Board stated, an employer may
properly deny a union's request for access." If responsible representation can be
achieved only through union access to the employer's premises, the Board ruled, how-
ever, the employees' right to proper representation will predominate" and the employer
will be required to grant access to its premises." The Board held, however, that the
access granted must be limited to a reasonable amount of time allowing the union to
effectively discharge its representation duties without unduly interfering with the em-
ployer's operations."
In applying this analysis to the facts of Holyoke Water Power, the Board found that
the employees' right to proper representation outweighed the employer's property
rights." Holyoke Water Power Company, the Board concluded, was therefore required
to grant the union hygienist reasonable access to the fan room. 4° In requiring access,
the Board first noted that excessive noise in the plant was a proper subject for the union
to pursue because health and safety conditions are terms of employment over which an
employer is obligated to bargain." Additionally, the employer's safety superintendent
admitted that there was a noise problem in the fan room, the Board observed:42 Second,
the Board stated that under these circumstances, the employees' right to proper repre-
sentation included the union's ability to obtain accurate noise level readings for the fan
" Id. at 5, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1180-81.
59 Id.
31 Id. at 4, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1180.
52 Id.
" Id.
34 Id. at 5, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1180.
55 Id.
36 Id. at 4-5, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1180.
" Id.
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room.'" The union needed accurate data, the Board noted, to determine the extent of
the danger to employees and to propose ways to ensure that employees are properly
protected." The Board agreed with the ALJ's ruling that the test results submitted to
the union by the company were insufficient to meet the union's needs.'" The company's
willingness to grant the union's business agent access to the fan room was also insufficient,
the Board ruled, without evidence that the business agent was qualified to conduct and
evaluate noise level tests." Because the union had no other reasonable alternative to
properly represent its members, and because access to the fan room by a union hygienist
would cause little if any interference with the employer's operations, the Board ordered
the employer to grant the union hygienist access to the fan room. 17 Consistent with its
stated method of analysis, the Board limited that access to a reasonable period of time
sufficient to enable the union hygienist to observe and test the noise level hazards."
In Holyoke Water Power Co., the Board adopted a balancing test of employee and
employer interests to be used when determining whether to grant a union access to the
employer's premises in order to survey potential health and safety hazards." Under the
Board's decision, only if the union has no other reasonable means of properly repre-
senting its members will the employees' right to proper representation outweigh the
employer's property rights." In overruling Winona Industries and its progeny which had
summarily granted union access for inspection of potential health and safety hazards,
the Board in Holyoke Water Power reached a result which is consistent with one of the
purposes of the National Labor Relations Act — the accommodation of employer and
employee interests." Moreover, because the Board's decision is in accordance with 'Su-
preme Court precedent,52 Holyoke Water Power is likely to be followed in the future.
The Supreme Court has held that employees' rights to proper representation under
the NLRA require employers to furnish relevant bargaining information to union rep-
resentatives during contract negotiations 53
 and during administration of a collective
bargaining agreement." An employer who refuses to supply relevant information to the
union violates its duty to bargain in the same manner as if the employer had declined
to meet and negotiate with the union in good faith. 55 The employees' right to proper
representation, however, does not always predominate over employer interests. The
43
	 at 5-6, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1180.
44 Id.
15 Id. at 6, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1181.
Id.
47 Id. at 5-6, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1181.
48 Id. at 6, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1 18 1.
49 Id. at 5, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1180-81.
"' Id. at 4-5, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1180-81.
51 See C. Moktus, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 71, 616 (1983). The varied interests of employ-
ees, employers, and unions must be balanced. Id. at 71. The right of a union and its members to
access to relevant information is not absolute, but must be balanced with other interests. Id. at 616.
52
 See Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 317-21, 100 L.R.R.M. 2728, 2734-35 (1979)
(Supreme Court balanced the union's interest against the employer's interest in deciding that union
was not entitled to aptitude test data); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113, 38
L.R.R.M. 2001, 2004 (1956) (balancing test used by Court to determine whether the union had the
right of access to the employer's property for organizational purposes).
" NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 38 L.R.R.M. 2042 (1956).
" NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 64 L.R.R.M. 2069 (1967).
" Curtiss-Wright Corp. (Wright Aerospace Div.) v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61, 59 L.R.R.M. 2433 (3d
Cir. 1965), enforcing 145 N.L.R.B. 152, 54 L.R.R.M. 1320 (1963).
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employer's duty to disclose information is not absolute. 56 According to the Supreme
Court, the duty to supply information under sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act turns
upon "the circumstances of the particular case." 57
In considering "the circumstances of the particular case," the Supreme Court usually
undertakes a balancing of competing employee and employer interests, much like the
Board did in Holyoke Water Power." For example, in Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 59 the
Supreme Court upheld an employer's refusal to supply to the union psychological
aptitude test questions and answers, and individual employee's scores. 6° The employer
used the aptitude test scores to screen applicants for a particular job classification." The
union sought disclosure of the questions, answers, and scores for the purpose of pro-
cessing a grievance concerning certain denials of promotion to union members and the
hiring of nonunion personnel from outside the plant to fill six positions on the basis of
those test scores.6' In reaching its conclusion that the union was not entitled to the test
data, the Detroit Edison Court balanced the union's interests in obtaining information
relevant to contract administration against the employer's interest in maintaining test
security and employee confidence in the testing procedure."
The Court has also balanced employee/union rights against employers' rights in
cases involving the issue of nonemployees' access to an employer's property for organi-
zational purposes." For example, in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.," the Supreme Court
held that an employer's property rights outweighed the employees' section 7 rights to
have a nonemployec enter the employer's premises for organizational purposes. 66 The
Court recognized that the right of employees to organize depends in some measure on
the opportunity to learn about self-organization, but found that in this case, it had not
been shown that employees were unable to use alternate means to have access to union
communications. 67 The Board's method of analysis in Holyoke Water Power, therefore, is
consistent with the Supreme Court's analysis of similar labor disputes.
Not only does the Board's method of analysis in Holyoke Water Power find support
in Supreme Court precedent, but the Board's balancing test adopted in Holyoke Water
Power is consistent with the purposes of the NLRA. Congress enacted the NLRA to
equalize bargaining power between employees and their employer." The Act was drafted
56 Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 100 L.R.R.M. 2728 (1979). See C. MORRIS; Su/n2
note 51, at 608, 616.
" Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 314-15, 100 L.R.R.M. 2728, 2733 (1979).
" See supra note 52.
59 440 U.S. 301, 100 L.R.R.M. 2728 (1979).
6° Id. at 319-20, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2735.
6, Id. at 307, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2730.
62 Id.
65 See Id. at 318, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2734. The Court stated: -The Board's position appears to
rest on the proposition that union interests in arguably relevant information must always predom-
inate over all other interests, however legitimate. But such a rule has never been established ."
Id.




66 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). Section I of the Act provides in pertinent part:
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize
and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interrup-
tion, and promotes the How of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of
industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly
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not to create absolute rights for employees, but to encourage compromise and accom-
modation of competing employer and employee interests- 69 The Board's analysis rec-
ognizes the employees' right to proper representation and relevant information by
requiring union access to the employer's premises if the union can show that no other
means are available to the union to obtain the data needed. The Holyoke Water Power
analysis, however, also accommodates the employer's property rights. The Board will
uphold an employer's denial of union access to its premises if the union has other
reasonable means of acquiring information. 7° If the union must be granted access, that
access will be limited to reasonable times and places so as not to unduly interfere with
the employer's operations. 71 The Board's analysis in Holyoke Water Power, therefore, is
consistent with the underlying policies of the Act.
In sum, the NLRB, in Holyoke Water Power, ruled that employer's property rights
and employees' right to proper representation must be carefully balanced and accom-
modated when considering a union's request for access to the employer's premises to
survey potential health and safety hazards. Holyoke Water Power thus overrules Winona
Industries and its progeny, which had summarily granted union access to employers'
property if the union could show a relevant relation to administration of the collective
bargaining agreement. The Board's decision is supported by Supreme Court decisions
that have also advocated an analysis that involves balancing and accommodating em-
ployer rights against employee rights. In addition to the support of Supreme Court
precedent, the Board's balancing test will also better effect the underlying purposes of
the Act by equalizing bargaining power between employees and their employer, and
accommodating the competing interests of both parties. The Board's decision, therefore,
is likely to find acceptance in the courts.
II. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Employer Unfair Labor Practices
1. *The Cyclical Nature of an Industry justifies an Employer's Failure to Reinstate Former
Strikers with Full Seniority: NLRB v. Harrison Ready Mix Concrete'
Section 8(a) 2 of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) protects the rights 3 of
employees to organize, bargain and choose whether to engage in strikes and other
adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or
other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between
employers and employees ... ,
Id. See also C. MORRIS, supra note 51, at 71 (the Board's primary objective is to protect employee
rights, but in doing so, it must balance those rights with employer and union interests).
69 C. MORRIS, supra note 51, at 71, 616. The varied interests of employees, employers, and
unions must be balanced. Id. at 71. The right of a union and its members to have access to relevant
information is not absolute, but must be balanced with other interests. Id. at 616.
70 Holyoke Water Power Co., 273 N.L.R.B. No. 168 at 4-5, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1180. See supra
notes 31-38 and accompanying text for an explanation of the Board's holding.
71
 Holyoke, 273 N.L.R.B. No. 168 at 5, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1180.
* By Roger T. Manwaring, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
770 F.2d 78, 120 L.R:R.M. 2077 (6th Cir. 1985).
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982).
8 § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982), guarantees employees "the
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concerted activities free from the interference of employers. 5 Section 8(a)(3) of the Act
provides that an employer may not discriminate in the hiring or firing of employees or
in setting terms of employment in order to encourage or discourage union membership'
Thus, an employer violates section 8(a)(3) of the Act when he both discriminates in
making these employment decisions and that discrimination has the result of encouraging
or discouraging union membership.' Courts have broadly interpreted the language of
section 8(a)(3) to provide protection for employees' decisions about whether to engage
in union activities as well as their choice about membership. 8 Thus, discriminatory
conduct which encourages or discourages union activities such as strikes also violates
section 8(a)(3). 9
The major question arising under section 8(a)(3) today is how to prove .a violation
of the section. The wording of section 8(a)(3) implies that an employer violates the
provision only if she acts with anti-union motivation. 10 The National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB or Board) and the courts have adopted a method of analysis, however,
which does not always require proof of specific anti-union motivation as an element of
a section 8(a)(3) violation." In the 1967 case of NLRB v. Great Dane, Inc., 12 for example,
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively . . . and
to engage in other concerted activities .. „" Id.
4 Courts have interpreted the term "employees" to include not only employees of the particular
employer involved but members of the working force generally. See Giant Food Mkts., Inc., 241
N.L.R.B. 727, 728 n.5, 100 L.R.R.M. 1598, 1599 n.5 (1979).
5 Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act guarantees workers the right not to join or
assist labor unions, stating that employees shall have "the right to refrain from any or all of such
[union] activities ...." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
A concerted activity is any activity engaged in to enforce a collective bargaining agreement so
long as the goal is shared by a group of employees. 2 C. MORRIS, TilL: DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 73-
74 (2d ed. 1983). Thus, even a single individual's actions may qualify as concerted activity if those
actions have a relation to interests shared by a group of employees. Id.
Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982). Section
8(a)(3) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization ...." Id.
Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 43, 33 L.R.R.M. 2417, 2427 (1954).
Id. at 39-40,33 L.R.R.M. at 2426.
9 Id.
Ill The use of the phrase ''discrimination ... to encourage or discourage" union membership,
29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3) (emphasis added), implies that the employer's motivation is a necessary element
of an 8(a)(3) violation.
" See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34, 65 L.R.R.M. 2465, 2469 (1967). The
Supreme Court has also adopted an analysis which does not always require a showing of anti-union
motivation as a element of a section 8(a)(3) violation. See id.; NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S.
221, 53 L.R.R.M. 2121 (1963); Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 33 L.R.R.M. 2417
(1954).
In the 1954 case of Radio Officers, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to three cases in each
of which employees had charged either an employer with violating section 8(a)(3) or a union with
violating sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the Act. Section 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. 158(6)(1)(A) (1982),
prohibits unions from coercing or restraining employees in the exercise of their rights to join or
assist unions, to bargain collectively, to engage in concerted activities or to refrain from doing such
things. Section 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(2) (1982), makes it an unfair labor practice For a union to
attempt to cause an employer to discriminate with regard to hire, termination or conditions of
employment in order to encourage or discourage union membership. The cases raised the issue
whether a showing that an employer intended his discriminatory conduct to affect union member-
ship is an essential element of the proof of a section 8(a)(3) violation. Radio Officers, 347 U.S. at 23,
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the United States Supreme Court noted that the employer must bear the initial burden
of showing some legitimate business justification for her discriminatory conduct.I 3 Where
an employer fails to put forward any such justification, the Court asserted, the petitioners
need not demonstrate actual anti-union motivation to prove a violation of section
8(a)(3).° Conversely, the Court stated, in cases where the employer succeeds in meeting
its initial burden of justification the reviewing court then must determine whether the
employer acted in a manner "inherently destructive" of employee rights, or in a manner
having only a lesser effect on those rights. 15 Where the employer's conduct has only
slight effects on employee rights, the Great Dane Court held that once an employer meets
its initial burden of justification, the petitioner must show specific anti-union motivation
in order to prove a violation of section 8(a)(3).' 6 Where, on the other hand, the employer
acts in a manner inherently destructive of employee rights, the Court asserted, the
petitioner need not establish anti-union motivation to prove a violation of section
8(a)(3),I 7 The Great Dane Court relied upon its previous decision in NLRB v. Erie Resistor
Corp.'s for the proposition that some conduct is so inherently destructive that it carries
its own indicia of intent.' 9 Moreover, the Great Dane Court stated, when an employer
33 L.R.R.M. at 2419. The Court stated that a violation of section 8(a)(3) must always be based on
a finding that the employer intended his conduct to affect union membership. Id, at 43-44, 33
L.R.R.M. at 2427. The majority noted, however, that specific evidence of anti-union motivation was
not an essential element of the proof of such intent. Id. at 44, 33 L.R.R.M. at 2428. According to
the Court, "proof of certain types of discrimination satisfies the intent requirement." Id. at 45, 33
L.R.R.M. at 2428. Specifically, the Court held, proof of discriminatory conduct which inherently
encourages or discourages union membership satisfies the intent requirement. Id. The Court cited
the common law rule that a man is to be held responsible for the foreseeable consequences of his
actions. Id. In each of the three cases, the Court enforced the Board's orders, finding that section
8(a)(3) or sections 8(b)(l)(A) and 8(b)(2) had been violated. Id. at 55, 33 L.R.R.M. at 2432.
Nine years later, in Erie Resistor, the employer attempted to give superseniority to strike
replacements and persons who abandoned the strike. 373 U.S. at 223, 53 L.R.R.M. at 2122. The
trial examiner found that the employer had no discriminatory motivation and that the superseniority
plan was justified by legitimate business considerations. Id. at 224-25, 53 L.R.R.M. at 2123. The
Board, however, held that the employer's acts constituted an unfair labor practice arid that such
actions are unlawful even when the employer has advanced a business justification for his conduct.
Id. at 222, 53 L.R.R.M. at 2122. On a petition for enforcement, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit rejected the Board's reasoning and held that the granting of superseniority
does not automatically violate section 8(a)(3). Id, at 226, 53 L.R.R.M. at 2123. Rather, according to
the court of appeals, the petitioners must show that the superseniority plan was motivated by a
discriminatory purpose. Id. The Supreme Court reversed the holding of the court of appeals,
holding that under some circumstances, specific intent need not be shown by petitioners claiming
a violation of section 8(a)(3). Id. at 227-28, 53 L.R.R.M. at 2124. The Court cited Radio Officers for
the proposition that certain kinds of conduct carry their own indicia of' intent, in that the conduct
has foreseeable consequences which the actor must have intended. Id.
1 ' 388 U.S. 26, 65 L.R.R.M. 2465 (1967).
13 1d. at 34, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2469.
14 See id.
0 Id. at 34, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2469. Radio Officers was the first case to hold that employer conduct
which inherently encourages or discourages union membership violates section 8(a)(3) of the Act
even absent a showing of anti-union motivation. 347 U.S. at 45, 33 L.R.R.M. at 2428.
° Great Dane, 388 U.S. an 34, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2469.
' 7 1d.
18 373 U.S. 221, 53 L.R.R.M. 2121 (1963).
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acts destructively of employee rights, a court may hold that the employer violates section
8(a)(3) even if the employer shows substantial business justification for its conduct. 2°
The Great Dane Court did not define the types of conduct which it considered
inherently destructive. In Erie Resistor, however, the Court held that an employer's acts
were inherently destructive where the acts discriminated against strikers as a class, dealt
a crippling blow to the strike effort, and made future bargaining difficult. 21 Specifically,
the Erie Resistor Court held that granting superseniority 22 to strikebreakers is inherently
destructive of employee rights. 23 In Portland Williamette Co. v. NLRB," the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit offered a similar definition. The court in Portland defined
this type of conduct as conduct with "far reaching effects which would hinder future
bargaining, or conduct which discriminates solely upon the basis of partieipation in
strikes or union activity." 25 Like the Supreme Court in Erie Resistor, the Court of Appeals
in Portland stated that an employer's granting of superseniority to strikebreakers consti-
tutes one example of inherently destructive conduct. 25
Because the Great Dane/Erie Resistor analysis requires that an employer justify conduct
that has an adverse impact on employee rights, the question arises whether an employer
is justified in hiring permanent replacements for striking employees. The use of replace-
ments does have a harmful impact on employee rights. 27 In the 1938 case of NLRB v.
Mackay Radio & Telegraph, 28 the Supreme Court set forth the general rule with regard
to the replacement of strikers and defined the circumstances under which striking
employees must be reinstated, 29 The Mackay Court held that an employer has a right to
'° Id. It appears that the Great Dane analysis requires the Board to balance the interests of the
employer against the severity of the damage to section 7 rights. See Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 228-
29, 53 L.R.R.M. at 2124. This balance is to be conducted in light of the purpose of the Act to
protect employee rights to organize, to bargain, and to engage in concerted activity. Id. at 229, 53
L.R.R.M. at 2124. When the conduct of the employer is inherently destructive, the damage to
employee rights will always outweigh the employer's business interests and, therefore, such conduct
can be prohibited by the Board even without a showing of motive. See Great Dane, 388 U.S. at 34,
65 L.R.R.M. at 2469. When, however, the conduct is not inherently destructive but has only a slight
effect on employee rights, the employer who advances a business justification can win the initial
balancing of interests. Id. Only in this situation does the Great Dane analysis provide for inquiry
into the employer's motivation. Id. The additional factor of motive could only tilt the balance away
from the employer and thus is only to be considered when the employer's asserted justification
outweighs the harm to employee rights. See id. Finally, the Great Dane Court Found that motive
need not be considered when the employer advances no justification for his actions. See id. See also
NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 380, 66 L.R.R.M. 2737, 2738-39 (1967). If no
explanation for the discrimination is given, the violation of section 8(a)(3) is automatic, according
to the Great Dane Court. '388 U.S. at 34, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2469.
Si Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 230-31, 53 L.R.R.M. at 2125.
22 Superseniority is granted to strikebreakers when the strikebreakers are given seniority status
above that of reinstated former strikers, thereby moving the strikers to a relatively lower position
on the seniority hierarchy. See, e.g., id. at 230, 53 L.R.R.M. at 2125.
25 See id. at 231, 53 L.R.R.M. at 2125.
24 534 F.2d 1331, 1334, 92 L.R.R.M. 2113, 2115 (9th Cir. 1976).
25 Id. at 1334, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2115.
26 Id
27 NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 365, 380, 66 L.R.R.M. 2737, 2739 (1967).
26 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel., 304 U.S. 333, 2 L.R.R.M. 610 (1938).
2' Id. at 345, 2 L.R.R.M. at 614.
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hire permanent replacementss° and to refuse to discharge them when strikers apply for
reinstatements'
Although the Mackay Court apparently held that the employer's promise merely to
give consideration to the strikers' applications as jobs became available was satisfactory,
later cases required the employer to seek out and give preference to strikers who have
made unconditional offers to return to work.s 2 In the 1968 case of Laid law Corp.s3 the
Board held that strikers who make unconditional offers to return to work must be
3" Id.
31 Id. at 346, 2 L.R.R.M. at 614. In Mackay, the employees of a radio and telegraph company
engaged in a strike, during which the employer hired eleven permanent replacements. Id. at 337-
38, 2 L.R.R.M. at 611. When the striking employees asked to be reinstated, the employer agreed
to reinstate all but eleven of the strikers, stating that due to the eleven permanent replacements,
eleven jobs were unavailable. Id. at 337-39, 2 L.R.R.M. at 611-12. The employer specified which
eleven workers would not be reinstated and said that those men had to file applications for
reinstatement to which the employer would give consideration as jobs became available. Id. at 338-
39, 2 L.R.R.M. at 611-12. The employer reinstated six of the eleven men on the day the rest of
the men returned to work because six of the replacements had by that time departed. Id. The
remaining five men whom the employer did not reinstate had been active in the union and the
strike. Id. at 339, 2 L.R.R.M. at 612.
After three weeks, the union filed a complaint with the Board which issued a complaint against
the employer asserting, inter alia, that the employer had violated section 8(a)(3) of the Act by
discriminating against the five men because of their union activity in order to discourage union
membership. Id. The Board held that by refusing to reinstate the five men, the employer had
discharged them, thus discriminating in regard to tenure of employment. Id. at 340, 2 L.R.R.M. at
612. The Board further held that the discrimination discouraged membership in the union and,
therefore, violated section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Id. at 340-41, 2 L.R.R.M. at 612.
On appeal, the court of appeals refused to enforce the Board's order; the Supreme Court,
however, reversed the court of appeals decision. Id. at 351, 2 L.R.R.M. at 616. The Court in Mackay
held that the employer had discriminated against the five men, constituting a violation of section
8(a)(3). Id. at 346-47, 2 L.R.R.M. at 614-15. The Court held that in Mackay, the employer had
discriminated by deliberately choosing to deny reinstatement to the most active union members,
but acknowledged that the employer had a right to hire permanent replacements and to refuse to
discharge them when striking employees applied for reinstatement. Id. Thus, while finding a
violation in the particular case, the Mackay decision created a general rule that an employer may
hire permanent replacements who he is not obligated to discharge in order to reinstate strikers.
52 In Great Dane the Court held that even when employer conduct has only a slight effect on
employee rights, it must be justified by some legitimate business purpose, 388 U.S. at 34, 65 L.R.R.M.
at 2469, and in Fleetwood Trailer the Court found that refusing to reinstate former strikers did have
an adverse effect on employee rights. 389 U.S. at 380, 66 L.R.R.M. at 2739. Thus, the Fleetwood
Trailer Court decided that an employer could only refuse to reinstate a former striker if the employer
had a legitimate business justification. Id. at 381, 66 L.R.R.M. at 2739. Later cases have made clear
that when permanent replacements have been hired, there exists a legitimate business justification
for not reinstating former strikers. See, e.g., NLRB v. Mars Sales & Equip. Co., 626 F.2d 567, 572,
105 L.R.R.M. 2138, 2142 (7th Cir. 1980) (employer was justified in not discharging permanent
replacements when former strikers applied for reinstatement because the employer's valid interest
in continuing his business during the strike was served by using the inducement of permanent work
to attract replacements). However, once a permanent replacement has departed, and a job is
available, the courts have found that the employer no longer has a justification for not reinstating
the striker. See NLRB v. Cutting Inc., 701 F.2d 659, 662, 112 L.R.R.M. 3056, 3058 (7th Cir. 1983)
(employer could not legally refuse to reinstate a striker whose position was not filled by a permanent
replacement); NLRB v. Murray Prods., Inc., 584 F.2d 934, 939, 99 L.R.R.M. 3269, 3272 (9th Cir.
1978) (strikers not permanently replaced are entitled to reinstatement upon their unconditional
offer to return to work).
" 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, 68 L.R.R.M. 1252 (1968).
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reinstated unless the employer can show a legitimate business justification for not doing
so. 34 The reinstatement required by Laidlaw included full seniority status."
During the Survey year, in NLRB v. Harrison Ready Mix Concrete, 36 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered whether the failure of an employer
engaged in a cyclical business to reinstate strikers with full seniority constitutes a violation
of section 8(a)(3) of the Act." In Harrison, the court held that such conduct is not
inherently destructive" and is, in fact, justified by the cyclical nature of the industry. 39
In Harrison, the employer produced, sold, and distributed concrete.° The employer
had a contract with the Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers Union which expired
on February 28, 1983. 4 ' The parties failed to reach a new agreement by that date, and
the employees commenced a strike on March 1, 1983. 42
During the following week, nine of the strikers returned to work, and the employer
hired fifteen permanent replacements.43 The nine employees who had returned to work
were assigned slots one through nine of the seniority list44 while the permanent replace-
ments were given slots ten through twenty-four. 45 Due to the cyclical nature of its
business, the employer based the amount of work given to each employee on that
employee's position on the seniority list, and wide discrepancies existed in hours worked
between employees at the top and bottom of the seniority
Two weeks after the strike began, while the strike was still in progress, the petition-
ers, Weitz and Ramey, unconditionally offered to return to work but were told by the
job supervisor that no jobs were available at that time.'" Shortly thereafter, however, two
34 I n Laidlaw, the Board held that permanently replaced strikers who made unconditional offers
to return to work remained employees and were entitled to reinstatement as positions became
available. Id. at 1369-70, 68 L.R.R.M. at 1258. According to the Board, the only exceptions to this
requirement occur when either the former strikers obtained "regular and substantially equivalent
employment," or the employer advanced a legitimate business justification for not reinstating the
strikers. Id. at 1370, 68 L.R.R.M. at 1258. Cases have made clear that the hiring of permanent
replacements provides such a justification. See, e.g., NLRB v. Mars Sales & Equip. Co., 626 F.2d
567, 572, 105 L.R.R.M. 2138, 2142 (7th Cir. 1980) (employer justified in not discharging permanent
replacements when former strikers applied for reinstatement because the employer's valid interest
in continuing his business during the strike was served by using the inducement of permanent work
to attract replacements). When the permanent replacements depart, however, and a position be-
comes available, that justification is lost. See NLRB v. Cutting, Inc., 701 F.2d 659, 662, 112 L.R.R.M.
3056, 3058 (7th Cir. 1983) (employer could not legally refuse to reinstate a striker whose position
was not filled by a permanent replacement); NLRB v. Murray Prods., Inc., 584 F.2d 934, 939, 99
L.R.R.M. 3269, 3272 (9th Cir. 1978) (strikers not permanently replaced are entitled to reinstatement
upon their unconditional offer to return to work); Laidlaw, 171 N.L.R.B. at 1370, 68 L.R.R.M. at
1258.
35 See NLRB v. Anvil Prods., Inc., 496 F.2d 94, 96, 86 L.R.R.M. 2822, 2824 (5th Cir. 1974).
36 770 F.2d 78, 120 L.R.R.M. 2077 (6th Cir. 1985).
" Id.
" Id. at 80-81, 120 L.R.R.M. at 2079.
35 Id. at 80, 81, 120 L.R.R.M. at 2079.





45 Harrison, 272 N.L.R.B. 331, 331, 117 L.R.R.M. 1235, 1236 (1984).
46 Harrison, 770 F.2d at 79, 120 L.R.R.M. at 2078.
47 Id.
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openings developed, and Weitz and Ramey were reemployed and assigned to the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth slots on the seniority list. 48 An assignment based only on the
date of original hire would have placed Weitz and Ramey in the third and fourth slots
respectively. 49 When asked why he had placed the charging parties so low on the list,
the supervisor replied that he had an obligation to the employees who had returned to
work before Weitz and Ramey and to the permanent replacements who had driving
experience. 50 Weitz and Ramey returned to work with seniority levels below those of all
the employees who had returned to work earlier and below all of the experienced
drivers.5 i
As a result of this action, Weitz and Ramey filed an unfair labor practice complaint
against the employer with the NLRB on April 11, 1983. 52 On behalf of Weitz and Rainey,
the General Counsel of the Board asserted before the Board that the employer had
violated both 8(a)(1) 55 and 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act by reinstating the
petitioners without their full seniority status. 54 The employer claimed two defenses to
the charged violations. 55 First, the employer asserted that the cyclical nature of its
business provided a legitimate business justification for its refusal to reinstate the peti-
tioners with full seniority status. 56 This justification, according to the respondent, brought
its conduct within an exception to Laidlaw's general requirement that former strikers be
reinstated with full seniority: 57 Second, the employer asserted that its right under Mackay
to hire permanent replacements for strikers, and its right not to discharge those replace-
ments, would be violated if it was forced to reinstate the strikers with full seniority."
The employer argued that reinstating the strikers with full seniority would result in
reducing the seniority of replacements and that, because seniority determined the avail-
ability of work, this reduction amounted to discharge."
The Board dealt with each of the employer's asserted defenses separately. 6° First,
the Board rejected the claim that the cyclical nature of Harrison's business provided it
with a legitimate business justification under Laidlaw. 6 ' The cyclical nature of the em-
ployer's business, stated the Board, could not justify any deviation from the Laidlaw
requirement that employers fully reinstate strikers as positions become available.° The
18 1d.
91d.
" Harrison, 272 N.L.R.B. at 332, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1236.
5, Harrison, 770 F.2d at 79, 120 L.R.R.M. at 2078.
" Id.
The General Counsel asserted that the employer in harridan had violated section 8(a)(1) in
addition to section 8(a)(3), because any violation of section 8(a)(3) is a derivative violation of section
8(a)(1). Section 8(a)(1) is more general in its prohibitions, making it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 7." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982). The discriminatory conduct which violates section 8(a)(3)
also interferes with, restrains, and coerces employees and, therefore, violates section 8(a)(l).
54 Harrison, 272 N.L.R.B. at '332, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1236.
55 Id. at 332, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1236-37.
561d. at 332, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1236.
"7 See id.
" Id. at 332, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1236-37.
"See id. at 332 11.11, 117	 at ]236-37 n.11.
"Id. at 332 nn.10 & 11, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1236-37 nn.10 & 11.
61 1d, at 332 n.I0, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1236 n.10.
62 See id.
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Board also rejected the claim that by requiring that full seniority be given to reinstated
strikers, the Board had violated the employer's right to hire and maintain permanent
replacements." The Board agreed with the employer that full reinstatement of the
strikers would result in the replacements losing seniority. 64 The majority denied, how-
ever, that requiring full reinstatement of the strikers would force the employer to
discharge its permanent replacements." According to the Board, a change of seniority
would at most affect the amount of work done by the replacements in their jobs, and
would not demote them to less desirable or different jobs." Thus, the Board concluded
that full reinstatement of the strikers would not violate the employer's right not to
discharge permanent replacements." The majority of the Board further pointed out
that a failure to reinstate strikers with full seniority would be equivalent to giving the
workers who had abandoned the strike and the replacements superseniority in violation
of the Supreme Court's previous holding in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp. 69
Having dealt with the employer's arguments, the Board proceeded to cite Laidlaw's
requirement that strikers be reinstated with full seniority as permanent replacements
departed, unless the employer could show justification for not reinstating the strikers.69
The Board stated that because the employer had not justified its failure to fully reinstate
the strikers, the employer's conduct was inherently destructive of employee rights and
violated sections 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(3) of the Act."
In his dissenting opinion, Board Member Hunter agreed with the employer that, in
the limited case of cyclical industries, full reinstatement of strikers did interfere with the
employer's right under Mackay to hire permanent replacements:7 ' The dissent noted that
when a business is cyclical, and seniority governs work availability, persons at the bottom
of the seniority list get significantly less work than persons at the top. 72 In such circum-
stances, Board Member Hunter stated, the reduction of the seniority of replacements
caused by the reinstatement with full seniority of strikers amounted to a forced discharge
of those replacements and violated the rule of Mackay." Board Member Hunter asserted





66 Id. (citing NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 53 L.R.R.M. 2121 (1963)). For further
discussion of Erie Resistor, see supra note 1 I .
69 Id. at 332, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1237. For further discussion of Laidlaw, see supra notes 33-35
and accompanying text.
7° Harrison, 272 N.L.R.B. at 332, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1237. The Board ordered that the employer
cease and desist from denying full seniority to the petitioners and from interfering in any other
way with § 7 rights. Id. at 333, 117 L.R.R.M. at Additionally, the Board ordered the employer
to restore the petitioners to their correct places on the seniority list and to award them back pay
equaling the amount they lost due to their lower seniority placement. Id. Finally, the Board's order
required the employer to keep and make available all records necessary to determine the back pay
amount and to post the appendix to the order in a conspicuous place. Id.
7]
	
at 334, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1237 (Hunter, Member, dissenting).
72 Id.
" Id. The dis .sent attempted to distinguish the Supreme Court's decision in Erie Resistor, in
which the Court found that an employer had engaged in unfair labor practices when it offered
twenty years additional seniority to permanent replacements and persons abandoning a strike.
Harrison, 272 N.L.R.B. at 334, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1237-38 (Hunter, Member, dissenting). According
to the Harrison dissent, Erie Resistor did not bar the employer from placing the petitioners below
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that, for this reason, the Laidlaw rule should not have been applied in the instant case."
Laidlaw, itself, did not involve a cyclical industry and was, according to the dissent,
distinguishable on that ground."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied enforcement of
the Board's order in Harrison. 76 The court first rejected the Board's apparent conclusion
that the failure to reinstate the strikers with full seniority constituted an inherently
destructive act under Erie Resistor." Distinguishing the Erie Resistor precedent,'" the
Harrison court asserted that while in Erie Resistor the Board had made detailed findings
of the damage to employee rights caused by the offer of superseniority, the Board in
Harrison had made no such findings." Rather, the court stated, the Board in Harrison
had applied the inherently destructive label to the employer's acts in a conclusory
manner. 8° Moreover, the Sixth Circuit stated, Harrison was factually distinguishable from
Erie Resistor on the ground that Harrison did not involve an offer of superseniority to
replacements as Erie Resistor did.'" Thus, according to the court, because the Erie Resistor
precedent was distinguishable, the Board in Harrison erred in holding the employer's
acts inherently destructive. 82
Under the Great Dane analysis of section 8(a)(3) claims, the Sixth Circuit held that a
violation may be found even when an employer's acts are not inherently destructive if
the employer has failed to advance any valid justification for its acts." The court in
Harrison next found that, in the context of a cyclical industry, the employer's right under
Mackay to hire and retain permanent replacements justified the employer's failure to
reinstate strikers with full seniority. 84 The court noted that under Mackay an employer
has the right to hire replacements for striking employees and need not terminate such
replacements in order to rehire returning strikers. 85 The court quoted with approval
dissenting Board Member Hunter's conclusion that where the amount of work available
depends upon a worker's seniority, and reinstatement of strikers with full seniority
reduces the seniority of replacements, such reinstatement may result in a reduction of
work for replacements and amount to a forced discharge in violation of the employer's
Mackay rights. 88 Thus, the court asserted, the employer's acts in Harrison, just as in
the replacements and workers who had abandoned the strike because doing so was not the same
as awarding superseniority. Id. at 334, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1238 (Hunter, Member, dissenting). The
dissent distinguished Harrison from Erie Resistor on the ground that in Erie Resistor superseniority
was given while in Harrison replacements were only given the jobs previously held by the strikers.
Id. This distinction appears to be illusory. There is no real difference between giving extra seniority
to strikebreakers and reinstating strikers with reduced seniority. Both are banned by the Court's
decision in Erie Resistor. See Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 236-37, 53 L.R.R.M. at 2127-28.
74
 Harrison, 272 N.L.R.B. at 334, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1237 (Hunter, Member, dissenting).
"Id.
76 Harrison, 770 F.2d at 81, 120 L.R.R.M. at 2080.
77 id. at 80-81, 120 L.R.R.M. at 2079.
7, Id
79 Id. at 80, 120 L.R.R.M. at 2079.
Bo Id.
8 ' Id. at 80-81, 120 L.R.R.M. at 2079.
as Id. at 80, 120 L.R.R.M. at 2079.
" See Great Dane, 388 U.S. at 34, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2469. For further discussion of the Great Dane
analysis, see supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
84 Harrison, 770 F.2d at 80-81, 120 L.R.R.M. at 2079.
n Id. at 80, 120 L.R.R.M. at 2079.
86 Id.
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Mackay, were justified by the business interest in attracting permanent replacements. 97
Having found that the employer's acts were not inherently destructive and were justified,
a violation could only be established, according to the court, by a specific showing that
the employer intended its acts to discriminate against strikers.'" The court found that
no such intent existed" and therefore denied enforcement of the Board's order."
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Harrison is flawed in a number of respects. The court's
decision was incorrect both because the court should have found the employer's acts
inherently destructive and because the decision failed to give adequate weight to the
policy underlying the Act. The court in Harrison should have held that the employer's
acts were inherently destructive because such a conclusion is consistent with the Supreme
Court's Erie Resistor decision. In Erie, the Supreme Court held that an employer's offer
of twenty years superseniority to permanent replacements and workers who abandoned
the strike was inherently destructive of employee rights. 9 ' The Harrison Court attempted
to distinguish Erie Resistor by asserting that granting twenty years superseniority is
different from simply allowing replacements and earlier returning strikers to keep their
assigned positions when later returning strikers are reinstated.92 The reasons why both
Erie Resistor and Portland Williamette99 held that offers of superseniority were inherently
destructive, however, is contrary to the Harrison rationale. Both courts emphasized that
offers of superseniority are destructive because they inflict harm, in the sense of lower
relative seniority, upon all persons who continue to strike, and only upon them." Such
conduct discriminates solely on the basis of whether a person exercises the right to strike.
In addition, each court pointed out that superseniority is inherently destructive because
it makes future bargaining difficult. 95 The employer's conduct in Harrison had exactly
the effects which make superseniority inherently destructive. By refusing to reinstate
returning strikers with full seniority, the employer created a situation in which all the
strikers who had returned to the job later had seniority lower than all union members
who had abandoned the strike earlier." This conduct, like an offer of superseniority,
discriminated solely on the basis of whether a person had continued to exercise the right
to strike. Moreover, because the seniority structure is visible and lasting, 97 the employer's
conduct is likely to make future bargaining difficult by chilling the right to strike and
creating a permanent rift between those union members who abandoned the strike and
those who did not." The conduct in Harrison created the same evils which make super-
87 Id. at 81, 120 L.R.R.M. at 2079.
88 Id.
85 Id.
9° Id. at 81. 120 L.R.R.M. at 2080.
Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 230-31, 53 L.R.R.M. at 2125.
92 See Harrison, 770 F.2d at 80 n.1, 120 L.R.R.M. at 2079 n.l.
gs For a discussion of the holdings of both Erie Resistor and Portland, see supra notes 21-26 and -
accompanying text.
54 Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 230, 53 L.R.R.M. at 2125; Portland, 534 F.2d at 1334, 92 L.R.R.M.
at 2115.
5' Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 231, 53 L.R.R.M. at 2125; Portland, 534 F.2d at 1334, 92 L.R.R.M.
at 2115.
56 Harrison, 770 F.2d at 79, 120 L.R.R.M. at 2078.
"The seniority hierarchy is visible and lasting in that it is known to employees and is relatively
permanent.
98 Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 231, 53 L.R.R.M. at 2125.
94	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 27:37
seniority inherently destructive, and therefore, the court should have applied the Erie
Resistor precedent and enforced the Board's order.
Even if the employer's acts in Harrison were not inherently destructive, the court
should have held that even in a cyclical industry, an employer's Mackay right to retain
permanent replacements does not provide a valid justification for failing to reinstate
strikers with full seniority. Such a decision would have better effectuated the Act's
underlying policy to protect the rights of employees to organize and engage in concerted
activities including strikes." 9 Harrison posed a situation in which the employee's right to
reinstatement with full seniority and the employer's right to retain permanent replace-
ments could riot both be protected. Full reinstatement of the later returning strikers in
Harrison was likely to reduce the amount of work available to some replacements so
greatly as to amount to discharge in violation of the employer's rights, while, on the
other hand, failure to fully reinstate the strikers violated the employees' rights.
In rejecting the assertion that full reinstatement would force the employer to dis-
charge its replacements, the Board focused on the fact that the formal employer-em-
ployee relationship between the employer and the permanent replacements continues
to exist even if the seniority of the replacements is reduced.'" By emphasizing these
facts, the Board interpreted Mackay narrowly to give employers only the right not to
discharge formally the permanent replacements.l°' Accordingly, the Board found that
an employer's Mackay right to hire permanent replacements and maintain them does
not constitute a justification for failure to reinstate strikers unless such reinstatement
would require formal discharge of replacements.'" This result was in accord with the
policy underlying the Act and section 8(a), to protect the rights of workers to organize
and to engage in concerted activities including strikes.'"
In contrast, the court of appeals adopted the more pragmatic reasoning of the
Board's dissenting member.'" Although it is objectively correct to argue that lack of
work amounts to discharge, the court should have adopted the Board's reasoning to
resolve the conflict between the rights of the employer and employees in favor of the
latter. The Board's narrower interpretation of the employer's Mackay rights was consis-
tent with the overall goal of the Act, because such an approach resolved a conflict between
the rights of employers and employees in favor of the employees.'"
In conclusion, the Sixth Circuit in NLRB v. Harrison Ready Mix Concrete held that
the failure of an employer engaged in a cyclical industry to reinstate returning strikers
with full seniority does not constitute an unfair labor practice. The court held that such
conduct was not inherently destructive of employee rights. Rather, the court asserted
that the failure to reinstate strikers with full seniority is justified in a cyclical industry by
the employer's right to retain permanent replacements.
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Harrison is flawed in two respects. The court's holding
that the employer's conduct was not inherently destructive was inconsistent with the
rationale underlying the Supreme Court's decision in Erie Resistor. Moreover, the Sixth
"9 See National Labor Relations Act, §§ I, 8, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 158 (1982).
"-}° See Harrison, 272 N.L.R.B. at 332 n.11, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1236 n.11.
See id.
102 Id.
'"" National Labor Relations Act, §§ 1, 8, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 158 (1982).
104 Harrison, 770 F.2d at 80, 120 I...R.R.M. at 2079.
105 National Labor Relations Act, §§ I, 8, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 158 (1982).
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Circuit's finding of a valid justification for the employer's failure to fully reinstate the
strikers is inconsistent with the policies embodied in the Act and with section 8(a). These
policies require a court to interpret narrowly an employer's right to hire permanent
replacements when it conflicts with the rights of employees.
2. *Appropriate Remedies for Weingarten Violations Where Employees Have Engaged in
Misconduct: Taracorp Industries'
Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) states in part: "No order
of the Board shall require the reinstatement and backpay of any individual as an
employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any backpay,
if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause."'" This provision litnits the
power of the National Labor Relations Board (N.L.R.B, or Board) to order "make-
whole" remedies, or remedies which return jobs or pay which employees would have
kept or earned but for their suspension or discharge.'
By common practice, employers who suspect employee misconduct deserving dis-
cipline or dismissal conduct investigatory interviews to confirm or disprove their suspi-
cions. In 1975 the Supreme Court determined in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc. 4 that an
employer violates an employee's rights under section 7 and commits an unfair labor
practice under section 8(a)(1) of the Act in refusing a request by an employee to have a
union representative present at an investigatory interview which the employee believes
could result in disciplinary measures.' The employer in Weingarten did not discipline or
discharge the employee involved, and the remedy was an order to the employer to cease
and desist from further refusals of such employee requests." On the same day in Inter-
* By Amy Bressler, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW RE:viEw.
' 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54, 117 L.R.R.M. 1497 (1984).
2 National Labor Relations Act, § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
Taracorp, 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54 at 4, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1498 (make-whole remedy "restor[es]
the status quo ante, thereby placing the employee in the position enjoyed prior to the discriminatory
conduct").
4 420 U.S. 251, 88 L.R.R.M. 2689 (1975).
5 Id. at 252-53, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2689-90. Section 7 of the Act states in pertinent part: "Employees
shall have the right ... to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of ... mutual aid or
protection." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as codified in the United States Code, provides: "It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer ... to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title ... " 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982).
6
 Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 253, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2689. At issue in Weingarten was an investigatory
interview during which an employer interrogated a saleswoman about allegations that she stole
chicken from the lunch counter where she worked. Id. at 254, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2690. The employee
requested that a union representative join the interview both at this stage and later when, after the'
employer was satisfied that the allegations were unfounded, the employee revealed that she and
other employees had been taking free lunches as a matter of habit. Id. at 255, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2690.
In each instance, the employer denied her requests. Id. at 254-55, 88 I...R.R.M. at 2690.
The Supreme Court upheld the Board's construction of section 7 of the Act, acknowledging
that employees had a right to request the presence of a union representative at an investigatory
interview. Id. at 260, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2692. The Court agreed that the presence of a union repre-
sentative offers employees "aid or protection" against perceived threats to job security, safeguards
the interests of the bargaining unit by allowing the monitoring of employers' disciplinary practices,
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national Ladies' Garment Workers Union u. Quality Manufacturing Co., 7 however, the Supreme
Court held that reinstatement and payment of backpay were appropriate remedies where
an employee lost her job because she requested that her union representative accompany
her to an investigatory interview. 9
Between 1975 and late 1984, a conflict developed between the Board and the courts
of appeal about the circumstances under which reinstatement and backpay would be
proper remedies for Weingarten violations. At first, the Board ordeied make-whole
remedies whenever an employee proved that an employer based disciplinary action or
discharge upon employee conduct which was the subject of an unlawful investigatory
interview. 9 In Kraft Foods, Inc.,"' in 1980, the Board modified the procedure for deter-
mining the appropriateness of a make-whole remedy. First, the employee had to make
a prima facie showing that the employer imposed disciplinary action for the conduct
which was the subject of the unlawful interview." At that point, the burden shifted to
the employer to prove that the unlawful interview was not the source of the information
helps to redress the imbalance of economic power between employers and employees, and assists
employers in gathering facts expeditiously. Id. at 260-63, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2692-94.
The Supreme Court set four limitations on Weingarten rights: the employee must request the
representation; the employee must reasonably fear that disciplinary action may be an outcome of
the interview; once the employee succeeds in obtaining representation, the employer has no duty
to bargain with the union representative who attends the interview; and the employee's assertion
of the right to representation cannot interfere with legitimate employer prerogatives. Id. at 257-
60, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2691-92.
7 920 U.S. 276, 88 L.R.R.M. 2698 (1975).
Id. at 280-81, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2699-700. In Qualify Manufacturing Co., an employee met with
company administrators to complain about her wage rate. Id. at 278, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2699. Later
the same day, when she and other employees stopped their machines to talk and the production
manager ordered her to resume production, she told the production manager to mind her own
business. Id. The production manager ordered her to report to the company president. Id. Over
the next several days, the president refused all of the employee's requests to have union represen-
tation at an interview, and the employee refused, for that reason, to submit to an interview. Id. at
278-79, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2699. The president eventually suspended or discharged the employee,
the union chairwoman who attempted to represent her, and the assistant chairwoman who filed
grievances related to the incident. Id. at 278-80, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2699-700.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Board that the employer unlawfully punished the em-
ployees for asserting the right to union representation at an investigatory interview which reasonably
could result in disciplinary action. Id. at 280-81, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2700. The Court enforced the
Board's make-whole remedies for each of the employees. Id. at 281, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2700.
9 Following Weingarten, early Board decisions granted make-whole remedies for employees
regardless of whether misconduct preceded the assertion of Weingarten rights. See, e.g., Potter Elec.
Signal Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 1289, 1291-92, 99 L.R.R.M. 1248, 1249 (1978) (employee was involved
in an argument and a fight); United States Postal Service, 237 N.L.R.B. 1104, 1105-08, 99 L.R.R.M.
1179, 1179 (1978) (employee failed to justify sick leave and was insubordinate); Brown & Connolly,
Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 271, 286, 98 L.R.R.M. 1572, 1572-73 (1978) (employee requested union rep-
resentation at an investigatory interview); Super Value Stores, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 1581, 1590, 1592,
98 L.R.R.M. 1605, 1605 (1978) (employee missed work); Columbia Foundries, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B.
34, 36-39, 95 L.R.R.M, 1090, 1091 (1977) (union representative insisted on attending employee's
investigatory interview). But see Detroit Edison, 218 N.L.R.B. 61, 63-64, 89 L.R.R.M. 1336, 1336
(1975) (while it is not clear that employee requested a make-whole remedy, Board granted a cease-
and-desist order, but no make-whole remedy, where employer denied request for representation
during a conference in which employer investigated employee's alleged lies and misconduct).
'° 251 N.L.R.B. 598, 105 L.R.R.M. 1233 (1980).
" Id. at 598, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1233.
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upon which it based its decision to discipline the employee. 12 If the employer succeeded
in meeting its burden, then the Board would issue a cease-and-desist order rather than
reinstatement and backpay. L5 On the same day, in Illinois Bell Telephone Go.," the Board
explicitly affirmed that the employee need not prove that the request for a representative
was the cause for discharge or discipline," The Board consistently applied the procedure
and reasoning of Kraft Foods and Illinois Bell to later cases."
Even before the Board's decisions in Kraft Foods and Illinois Bell, however, one circuit
court had found that reinstatement and backpay for Weingarten violations were justifiable
only where the employee's request for assistance during an investigatory interview was
12 Id.
" Id. The Board issued a cease-and-desist order in Kraft Foods. The Board found that the
information which the employer obtained during the investigatory interview of the complainant
employee played no part in the dismissal of the employee. 251 N.L.R.B. at 598-99, 105 L.R.R.M.
at 1234. The employee was discharged for initiating a fight, but divulged no information about the
fight during his interview. Id. The employer received independent reports about the fight from
several witnesses. Id.
" 251 N.L.R.B. 932, 105 L.R.R.M. 1236 (1980), enforcement denied, 674 F.2d 618, 109 L.R.R.M.
3244 (7th Cir. 1982).
'Id. at 934, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1239. The employee in Illinois Bell confessed that she had
improperly adjusted six long-distance phone calls for prisoners and had made five long-distance
calls for free. Id. at 932, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1237. The Board found that the fact that the employer
obtained a confession of misconduct during the unlawful interview and relied on that confession
in deciding to discharge the employee was enough to make reinstatement and backpay appropriate.
Id. at 934, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1238-39.
16 See, e.g., Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 262 N.L.R.B. 970, 971, 110 L.R.R.M. 1396,
1396 (1982); Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 254 N.L.R.B. 826, 826, 106 L.R.R.M. 1148, 1149
(1981), enforcement denied, 664 F.2d 1095, 109 L.R.R.M. 2005 (8th Cir. 1981); Kahn's & Co., 253
N.L.R.B. 25, 25, 105 L.R.R.M. 1407, 1408-09 (1980), enforcement denied, 694 F.2d 1070, 112
L.R.R.M. 2683 (6th Cir. 1982); Roadway Express, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 975, 975, 105 L.R.R.M. 1287,
1288 (1980).
In numerous cases, the Board applied the Kraft Foods analysis and found that the information
upon which discipline or discharge was based did not come from the unlawful interview. See, e.g.,
Great Western Coca Cola Bottling Co., 265 N.L.R.B. 1488, 1489, 112 L.R.R.M. 1067, 1069 (1982);
Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 1034, 1038, 110 L.R.R.M. 1416, 1417 (1982); Gulf States
Mfgrs. Inc., 261 N.L.R.B. 852, 853, 110 L.R.R.M. 1132, 1133 (1982); I.T.T. Lighting Fixtures, 261
N.L.R.B. 229, 231, 110 L.R.R.M. 1025, 1026-27 (1982); Coyne Cylinder Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1503,
1504, 105 L.R.R.M. 1270, 1271 (1980).
The Board extended its Kraft Foods analysis in two subsequent cases. In L.A. Water Treatment,
Div. of Chromalloy American Corp., 263 N.L.R.B. 244, 110 L.R.R.M. 1506 (1982), a shop super-
intendent called an employee into his office for insubordination after they argued about a work
assignment. Id. at 244, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1506. The shop superintendent denied the employee's
request for union representation at the ensuing investigatory interview. Id. During the interview,
the superintendent sought assurances from the employee that he would not be insubordinate again,
which the employee refused to provide. Id. at 245, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1508. The Board determined
that the employee's insubordinate conduct and his refusal to provide the requested assurances were
"inextricably intertwined," and therefore that the employee was unlawfully discharged for conduct
which was the subject of the interview. Id. at 245 n.10, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1508 n.10.
The Board applied this analysis and accordingly ordered make-whole remedies in Consolidated
Casinos Corp., 266 N.L.R.B. 988, 113 L.R.R.M. 1081 (1983), where two employees both unsuc-
cessfully requested union representation and refused to sign waiver forms associated with a poly-
graph examination. Id. at 1015, 113 L.R.R.M. at 1081. The Board found that, as in L.A. Water
Treatment, discharge was unlawful insofar as "the subject of their interview and the 'insubordination'
of their refusing to sign the waiver form are 'inextricably intertwined' .... " Id. at 1016, 113
at 1081.
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the sole reason for discipline or discharge.' 7 The courts generally have reversed the
Board's orders for make-whole remedies where employees were discharged for dishon-
esty or misconduct, often noting that section 10(c) forbids the Board to order reinstate-
ment and backpay where discharge or discipline is for cause. 18 Occasionally, courts held
that section 10(c) precluded a make-whole remedy where the evidence of employee
misconduct upon which discharge or discipline was based did not come exclusively from
the improper interview.°
During the Survey year, in Taracorp Industries, 20 the Board overruled Kraft Foods,
Illinois Bell, and related cases, 21 and brought its analysis of make-whole remedies for
Weingarten violations into conformity with the views of the courts of appeals." The Board
held that where discharge of an employee is for cause, section 10(c) denies the Board
authority to order reinstatement or backpay even if an employer unlawfully denied a
17 See Newton Sheet Metal, Inc. v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 478, 480 n.2, 101 L.R.R.M. 2422, 2423 n.2
(8th Cir. 1979); cf. NLRB v. Potter Elec. Signal Co., 600 F.2d 120, 123-24, 101 L.R.R.M. 2378,
2380-81 (8th Cir. 1979) (denying a make-whole remedy because employees were discharged for a
fight that closed down the production line, and not for requesting representation).
18 See, e.g., Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 134, 137-38, 113 L.R.R.M. 3529, 3531-
32 (9th Cir. 1983) (confessions during unlawful interview proved that discharge for unauthorized
possession of company equipment was for cause, and language of § 10(c) bars Kraft Foods construc-
tion requiring employer to prove that information upon which discharge -was based did not come
from unlawful interview); NLRB v. Kahn's & Co., 694 F.2d 1070, 1071-72, 112 L.R.R.M. 2683,
2684 (6th Cir. 1982) (employee was discharged for overstaying his work break, and § 10(c) precludes
back pay and reinstatement where there is evidence of misconduct independent of the improper
interview); NLRB v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 674 F.2d 618, 623, 109 L.R.R.M. 3244, 3248 (7th Cir.
1982) (employee was discharged for dishonesty in billing, and § 10(c) prohibits reinstatement or
back pay if an individual was suspended or discharged for cause); Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
NLRB, 664 F.2d 1095, 1097, 109 L.R.R.M. 2005, 2007 (8th Cir. 1981) (employees were discharged
for stealing merchandise, and § 10(c) prohibits reinstatement and backpay where discharge is for
cause); NLRB v. Potter Elec. Signal Co., 600 F.2d 120, 123-24, 101 L.R.R.M. 2378, 2380-81 (8th
Cir. 1979) (employee was discharged for fighting, and § 10(c) prohibits Board from ordering
reinstatement or backpay for employees discharged for obvious personal misconduct).
19 See, e.g., NLRB v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co, 674 F.2d 618, 623, 109 L.R.R.M. 3244, 3248 (7th Cir.
1982) (prior to investigatory interviews where employees confessed putting through phone calls
free of charge for prison inmates, employer received information of their misconduct from prison
officials); General Motors Corp. v. NLRB, 674 F.2d 576, 578, 109 L.R.R.M. 3345, 3346 (6th Cir.
1982) (independent of employee's confession during an improper investigatory interview, security
officer's report proved that employee was bowling during work hours). Insofar as these courts
accepted that the unlawful interviews must not be the source of the information upon which
employers base the decision to discharge or discipline employees, they appear to adopt the reasoning
of die Kraft Foods analysis, at least in part. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
20 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54, 117 L.R.R.M. 1497 (1984).
21 Id. No. 54 at 4, 9, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1498, 1500. In addition to Kraft Foods and Illinois Bell, the
Board listed L.A. Water Treatment, Division of Chromalloy American Corp., 263 N.L.R.B. 244,
110 L.R.R.M. 1506 (1982), and Ohio Masonic Home, 251 N.L.R.B. 606, 105 L.R.R.M. 1281 (1980).
Taracorp, 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54 at 4 11.6, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1498 n.6.
22 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54 at 6, 117 L.R.R.M, at 1499. The Board voluntarily chose to reconsider
its own earlier decision in Taracorp, in which it had decided against the respondent company,
combining a cease-and-desist order with an order for reinstatement and backpay. See Taracorp
Industries, 257 N.L.R.B. 463, 467, 107 L.R.R.M. 1541, 1541 (1981). When the respondent filed a
petition for review with the Eleventh Circuit, the Board successfully moved to withdraw the record
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request for union representation at an investigatory interview. 23 In a footnote, the Board
noted that reinstatement and backpay could be appropriate remedies in these situations
if, but only if, an employee receives discipline or discharge for asserting the right to
have a union representative present at an investigatory interview. 24 As a consequence of
the Board's decision in Taracorp, employers may discipline or discharge employees on
the basis of information they obtain during unlawful interviews. Absent proof by an
employee that the assertion of the right to representation at an investigatory interview
was the sole cause for discipline . or discharge, the maximum remedy for Weingarten
violations is a cease-and-desist order against future Weingarten violations.
In Taracorp, the employer argued that it discharged an employee, Fred Elmore, for
insubordination, and thus for cause. 25 Elmore's work consisted of "feeding" used storage
batteries to a moving conveyor belt, which frequently jammed. 26 In the incident which
eventually led to his discharge, the belt jammed and Elmore refused to follow a foreman's
order to help pull the belt to start it moving again, replying that it was not his job. 27 The
foreman suspended Elmore and told him to report to the plant manager's office." At
the office, the plant manager refused Elmore's request that a union representative
accompany him to the interview." Elmore admitted that he had not obeyed the foreman's
order, but argued again that pulling on the belt was not his job, and added that the
activity was unsafe. 3° After the foreman arrived and repeated the story, the plant man-
ager terminated Elmore." On the basis of these facts, the Board found that the plant
manager illegally conducted the investigatory interview because he denied Elmore's
request for a union representative." It also found that he terminated Elmore for cause. 39
To evaluate the appropriateness of a make-whole remedy for employees whose
Weingarten rights are violated but whose discharge was for cause, the Board outlined
three categories of cases." The first category consisted of cases in which employers
disciplined or discharged employees for engaging in union or other protected activities. 33
Cases in the second category involved discipline or discharge for misconduct or some
nondiscriminatory reason, even though the employer may have violated the employees'
rights under Section 7 of the Act in ways unrelated to the discharge or discipline. 36 In
the third category were cases in which the employer's reason for discharge or discipline,
though at first appearing legitimate, proved upon further consideration to be an unfair
labor practice."
"Id. No. 54 at 1, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1497.
24 Id. No. 54 at 7 n.12, 117 L. R. R.M. at 1499 n.12 (citing International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. 276, 88 L.R.R.M. 2698 (1975)).
25 Id. No. 54 at 3, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1498.
26 Id. No. 54 at 2, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1497.
27 Id .
28 Id.
29 Id. No. 54 at 3, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1497.
30 Id.
51 Id.
" Id. No. 54 at 2, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1497.
22 Id. No. 54 at 10, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1500.
34 Id. No. 54 at 4-6, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1498-99.
"Id. No. 54 at 4-5, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1498.
36 /d. No. 54 at 5, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1498.
3 ' Id. No. 54 at 5-6, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1499.
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The Board noted that, historically, it had deemed reinstatement and backpay proper
remedies in cases in the first and third categories." With respect to the first category,
the Board observed that, since the time of the Board's first published decision in 1935, 3.9
reinstatement and backpay have been the traditional remedy where employers have
disciplined employees who engaged in protected concerted activity.'" As an example of
the third category, the Board cited Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 41 in which
the employer decided to subcontract work and therefore discharged several employees.
The Supreme Court found in Fibreboard that the employer's refusal to bargain about the
subcontracting violated section 8(a)(5) of the Act,42 such that the discharge of the em-
ployees stemmed directly from an unfair labor practice.'"
As for the second category of cases, the Taracorp Board found that, by the terms of
section 10(c) of the Act, reinstatement and backpay are not appropriate remedies where
employees who have engaged in misconduct have been subject to discipline. 44 The Board
noted that section 10(c) embodied the principle that employers could discipline employ-
ees for misconduct or "cause," 45 and that "cause" in section 10(c) "effectively means the
absence of a prohibited reason." 48 Thus, when an employee is discharged for misconduct,
the Board concluded, section 10(c) precludes a make-whole remedy even when the
employer has committed an unrelated unfair labor practice. 47
Having discussed the categories in this manner, the Board determined that typical
Weingarten cases fit into the second category, for which make-whole remedies are inap-
propriate. 48 The Board found that Weingarten cases for the most part fell outside the
first category of cases in that they involved discharge or discipline of employees for
misconduct rather than for participation in protected activity. 49 The Board reviewed the
Kraft Foods rule requiring an employee to prove that discharge or discipline was "for the
conduct which was the subject of the unlawful interview."39 This rule, the Board rea-
soned, implicitly acknowledges that misconduct, and not the protected activity of re-
questing that a representative attend the interview, is the cause of the discharge or
discipline.3 '
Further, the Board found, although an employer commits an unfair labor practice
by denying an employee's request for representation at an investigatory interview, usual
38 1d. No. 54 at 4-6, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1498-99.
36
 Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, I N.L.R.B. 1, 1 L.R.R.M. 303 (1935).
4° Taracorp, 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54 at 4-5, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1498.
41 379 U.S. 203, 57 L.R.R.M. 2609 (1964).
42 Section 8(a)(5) states that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees " National Labor Relations Act, 8(a)(5),
29 U.S.C. I 158(a)(5) (1982).
4 ' Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 217, 57 L.R.R.M. at 2614. As additional examples of cases in the third
category in which the Board ordered make-whole remedies, the Board listed Boland Marine Mfg.
Co., 225 N.L.R.B. 824, 93 L.R.R.M. 1346 (1976), and Alfred M. Lewis, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 757, 95
L.R.R.M. 1216 (1977).
44 Taracorp, 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54 at 5, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1498.
45 Id,
46 Id. No. 54 at 5 n.8, 117 L.R.R.M, at 1498 n.8.
47 /d. No. 54 at 5, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1498.
48 Id. No. 54 at 8, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1499.
49 Id. No. 54 at 7, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1499,
" Id.
5 ' Id.
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Weingarten cases differ from the Fibreboard category of cases in which the reason for the
discharge or discipline is an unfair labor practice.52 In the typical Weingarten case, the
Board observed, the employee misconduct upon which discharge or discipline is based
is not so closely related to the employer's unfair labor practice as to warrant a make-
whole remedy." According to the Board, only in those Weingarten cases where the
employee misconduct is a response to the employer's denial of representation would the
Board grant make-whole remedies in the future." Otherwise, despite the employer's
unfair labor practice, the Board concluded, usual Weingarten cases are in the category in
which discharge or discipline is for misconduct, and thus "for cause;" such that section
10(c) precludes a make-whole remedy. 55
Preclusion of a make-whole remedy in most Weingarten cases had support not only
in section 10(c), the Board continued, but also in other remedial limitations in the Act."
The Board argued that previous Board decisions which allowed reinstatement and
backpay in Weingarten cases resulted in punitive remedies against employers and windfalls
to employees. 57 The Board stressed that these are remedies which the Act does not give
the Board authority to order."
The Board further reasoned that its decision in Taracorp conformed to the limitations
on Weingarten rights that the Supreme Court originally established. 59 It urged that past
Board decisions unjustifiably exceeded those limitations, such that the rules regarding
investigatory interviews had come to resemble the labyrinthine rules of criminal proce-
dure and the interviews themselves had begun to resemble formalized adversary pro-
ceedings.w To curb this expansionist approach, and to reduce the possibility that em-
ployers would forego investigatory interviews due to their increasing complexity and
adversarial nature, the Board found that, as a matter of policy, its denial of a make-
52 Id. No. 54 at 7-8, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1499.
53 Id.
" Id. No. 54 at 7 n.12, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1499 n.12.
55
	 No. 54 at 8, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1499.
56- Id.
" Id. If, independent of an unfair labor practice, employers discharged or disciplined employees
and then had to obey orders to return the employees to the status quo ante, the Board reasoned,
then employers would pay penalties despite the fact that discharge for misconduct was not improper,
and employees would win benefits although there was justification for their discharge or suspension.
Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. No. 54 at 8-9, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1499.
Id. The Supreme Court in Weingarten explicitly indicated that it did not intend that the union
representative at an investigatory interview would turn the interview into a confrontation in which
both parties had equal power: "A knowledgeable union representative could assist the employer by
eliciting favorable facts, and save the employer production time by getting to the bottom of the
incident occasioning the interview. Certainly his presence need not transform the interview into an
adversary contest." Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 263, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2693. This statement qualifies the
Court's earlier acknowledgment that an employee's right to a union representative at an investi-
gatory interview is consistent with the Act's goal of realigning the imbalance of economic power
between labor and management. See id. at 262, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2693. The Court apparently did not
believe that the realignment of the balance should go so far as to transform an investigatory interview
into an adversary proceeding in which the employer's power to adjudicate was limited. The Board's
recognition of this point in Taracorp emphasizes that the employer, as judge, should not be sanc-
tioned for failing to follow proper procedures during an interview. Taracorp, 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54
at 9, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1499.
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whole remedy would serve the interests of both employees and tnanagement. 61 There-
fore, the Board overruled Kraft Foods and its progeny, finding that it had no authority
to order reinstatement or backpay in most cases involving Weingarten violations, including
Elmore's case." 2
Board member Zimmerman, who had previously voted in favor of the Kraft Foods
approach,63 concurred, agreeing that Kraft Foods should be overruled and the view of
the courts of appeal regarding make-whole remedies for Weingarten violations should be
adopted.° The concurrence did not accept, however, that past Board decisions generally
exceeded the limitations set forth in the Weingarten opinion65 or that make-whole rem-
edies for Weingarten violations would constitute bad policy. 66
In light of the ten-year history in which the courts of appeal generally refused to
enforce make-whole remedies based on Kraft Foods, the Taracorp decision essentially
represents a surrender by the Board to the courts of appeal's position. As a result of the
decision, parties to cases involving Weingarten violations have the benefit of knowing that,
should their cases proceed from the Board to a court of appeals, the outcome will be
uniform. In the majority of cases, the only consequence of a denial of Weingarten rights
that an employer need fear in either forum is the expense of defending itself against an
unfair labor practice charge and the possibility of being obliged to obey a cease-and-
desist order. An employee cannot win reinstatement or backpay from an employer unless
there is proof that the sole reason for the employee's suspension or dismissal was the
assertion of the right to have a representative.
Cl
 Id. No. 54 at 9, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1499.
62 Id. No. 54 at 9, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1500.
6' Board member Zimmerman approved of the application of the Kraft Foods analysis in L.A.
Water Treatment, Div, of Chromalloy American Corp., 263 N.L.R.B. 244, 110 L.R.R.M. 1506
(1982). See Taracorp, 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54 at 12 n.1, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1500 n.1 (Zimmerman, Member,
concurring). Member Hunter likewise reconsidered and reversed his decision about the remedy
that the Board ordered in L.A. Water Treatment. Id, No. 54 at 6 n.6, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1498 ri.6.
61 Taracorp, 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54 at 12-13, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1500 (Zimmerman, Member,
concurring). Member Zimmerman specifically cited NLRB v. Potter Elec. Signal Co., 600 F,2d 120,
101 L.R.R.M. 2378 (8th Cir. 1979), which the Eighth Circuit decided prior to Kraft Foods. Taracorp,
273 N.L.R.B. No. 54 at 12, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1500 (Zimmerman, Member, concurring). In Potter
Elec. Signal Co., the court found that the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 10(c) in Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp., 379 U.S. 203, 57 L.R.R.M. 2609 (1964), would not support a make-whole
remedy except in those Weingarten cases where discharge or discipline was solely for the assertion
of the right to representation, or was a product of an unfair labor practice. 600 F.2d at 123-24,
101 L.R.R.M. at 2380-8]. Member Zimmerman agreed with the Eighth Circuit's finding in Potter
Elec. Signal Co. that § 10(c) precludes an order for a make-whole remedy where discharge or
discipline is for misconduct. Taracorp, 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54 at 12, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1500 (Zimmerman,
Member, concurring).
65 Taracorp, 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54 at 13 n.3, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1500 n.3 (Zimmerman, Member,
concurring). Member Zimmerman mentioned Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010, 110
L.R.R.M. 1401 (1982), as an example of a decision in which the Board had not exceeded the
Supreme Court's intended limitations on Weingarten rights. Taracorp, 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54 at 13
n.3, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1500 n.3 (Zimmerman, Member, concurring). In Materials Research, the Board
determined that Weingarten rights applied equally to union and nonunion employees because the
§ 7 right to act in concert for mutual aid and protection does not protect only unionized workers.
262 N.L.R.B. at 1012-16, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1403-06.
ss Taracorp, 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54 at 13 n.3, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1500 n.3 (Zimmerman, Member,
concurring).
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The Taracorp decision is significant in two respects. First, insofar as it eliminates the
possibility of a compensatory remedy, the case demonstrates the Board's unwillingness
to retain a strong deterrent against Weingarten violations if the price is impairing free
decision-making by employers.° In this regard, the Board's comparison of the availability
of a make-whole remedy to the rules of criminal procedure is an apt one." The Supreme
Court has noted that the exclusionary rule, which forbids the introduction of evidence
obtained during illegal searches or seizures, helps to deter such unconstitutional searches
and seizures.° The rule has been subject to criticism in that it has allowed criminals to
go free because constables blundered in authorizing searches or gathering evidence.70
The Kraft Foods approach established a rule subject to similar criticism: it permitted
employees to escape justifiable discharge or discipline only because the employer blun-
dered or even willingly proceeded unlawfully with an investigatory interview.
In overruling Kraft Foods, the Taracorp Board decided that the employees' interest
in receiving fair evaluations of their alleged misconduct does not extend so far that
unfairness in an evaluation procedure mandates reversal of the evaluation's outcome.
The Board's decision reinforces one limitation that the Supreme Court originally set on
the scope of Weingarten rights: an employee's assertion of those rights cannot interfere
with legitimate employer prerogatives. 71 Thus, the Taracorp decision reaffirms that em-
ployer prerogatives have priority over employee protections where an employer merely
67 The Kraft Foods rule could operate as a deterrent in the sense that if an employer's refusal
of a request for union assistance predictably would result in the employer's inability to discharge
or discipline an employee, employers would be likely to refrain from such refusals, such that
employee rights would be better protected. Alternatively, as the Board noted, employers might be
likely to refrain from holding investigatory interviews, such that employees would suffer discharge
or suspension without having an opportunity to answer the employer's charges. Id. No. 54 at 9,
117 L.R.R.M. at 1499. To the extent that the Taracorp decision preserves incentive for employers
to hold interviews, and thus preserves the limited protection of an employee's right to offer a
defense to the employer's allegations during an interview, it does not reject the goal of employee
protection by rejecting a make-whole remedy. c f. id.
66 See id.
69 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (noting that "the purpose of the exclusionary rule
is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional gUaranty in the only effectively available way
— by removing the incentive to disregard it.'" (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217
(1960)). See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976).
7" In People v. before, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926), Justice
Benjamin Cardozo wrote the much-quoted line, "The criminal is to go free because the constable
has blundered." Id. at 21, 150 N.E. at 587. The court in that case considered whether, because
authorities committed trespass in the course of obtaining evidence of the defendant's criminality,
the evidence should not be admissible. Id. at 19, 150 N.E. at 587.
" In Weingarten, the Supreme Court emphasized that the existence of the employee's right to
have representation at an investigatory interview does not limit the employer's right to refuse to
accept a representative's presence and investigate the employee's misconduct without holding an
interview. 420 U.S. at 258, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2691. The Court noted that this leaves the employee
with a choice of having an interview without a representative, or forgoing the interview and any
benefits which might be obtainable from it. Id. at 258, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2691-92. The Court cited
two Board cases with approval in reaching its conclusion that investigatory interviews ultimately are
optional for employers and voluntary for employees. Id. at 258-59, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2692 (citing
Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052, 1052, 80 L.R.R.M. 1188, 1191 (1972), and Quality Mfg. Co.,
195 N.L.R.B. 197, 198-99, 79 L.R.R.M. 1269, 1271 (1972)). The Board's Taracorp decision, there-
fore, returns to the view which the Board espoused prior to Weingarten and which the Supreme
Court adopted from the Board in deciding Weingarten.
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disregards proper procedures in imposing discipline or discharge for employee miscon-
duct.
The Taracorp opinion is significant in a second respect in that it explicitly signals the
reversal of the Board's past tendency to accept broad interpretations of the Supreme
Court's Weingarten decision. In determining the inappropriateness of reinstatement and
backpay for Weingarten violations, the Taracorp Board made it clear that its objections to
past Board decisions applied not only to the treatment of the narrow issue before it, but
also more broadly to the "expansionist approach to Weingarten, including make-whole
remedies."72 In past conflicts between the Board and the courts of appeal, the Board
attempted to extend Weingarten in several ways: to cover disciplinary interviews" and
pre-interview consultations" as well as investigatory interviews; to include nonunionized
as well as unionized employees;" to presume a request by an employee where an
Taracorp, 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54 at 9, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1499.
73
 A disciplinary interview differs from an investigatory interview in that, in the former, the
employer merely executes a predetermined decision to impose discipline or discharge. In Certified
Grocers of California, 227 N.L.R.B. 1211, 74 L.R.R.M. 1279 (1977), enforcement denied, 587 F.2d
449, 100 L.R.R.M. 3029 (9th Cir. 1978), the Board accepted that Weingarten rights would arise in
disciplinary as well as investigatory interviews insofar as the Supreme Court mentioned both
"investigatory interviews" and "interviews" in Weingarten. Id. at 1214, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1282. The
Board also noted that the Supreme Court cited language from Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052,
80 L.R.R.M. 1188, ensuring protection where an employee must "appear unassisted at an interview
which may put his job security in jeopardy." Certified Grocers, 227 N.L.R.B. at 1214, 74 L.R.R.M. at
1282 (citing Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 257, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2692). The Ninth Circuit denied enforce-
ment in NLRB v. Certified Grocers of California, 587 F.2d 449, 100 L.R.R.M. 3029 (9th Cir. 1978),
holding that the right to representation does not arise where the interview is not an occasion for
the employee to offer a defense to an employer's allegations. Id, at 451, 100 L.R.R.M. at 3030. See
also Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 403, 411-12, 99 L.R.R.M. 2841, 2846 (9th Cir. 1978);
Brodie, Union Representation and the Disciplinary Interview, 15 B.C. INDUS. & Cont. L. REV. 1, 28
(1973).
The Board reversed its stance in Baton Rouge Water Works, 246 N.L.R.B. 995, 103 L.R.R.M.
1058 (1979). A decision authorizing representation at disciplinary interviews, the Board reasoned,
would encourage employerS to forgo interviews of all types to avoid unfair labor pr'actice charges,
and to return to the practice of deciding on discipline and issuing "pink slips" without giving
employees opportunities to offer defenses. Id. at 998, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1058. See also Tokheim
Corp., 265 N.L.R.B. 1658, 1658-59, 112 L.R.R.M. 1057, 1059 (1982).
" In Climax Molybdenum Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1189, 94 L.R.R.M. 1177 (1977), the Board found
that employees are entitled to a pre-interview consultation under Weingarten, but the Tenth Circuit
reversed the Board's opinion. 584 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1978). The courts of appeal are split on this
point. In Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 134, 113 L.R.R.M. 3529 (9th Cir. 1983), the
Ninth Circuit accepted the Board's view that an employer commits an unfair labor practice in
refusing to allow a pre-interview conference.
7' The Board determined that nonunion workers have the same right to representation by a
co-worker during investigatory interviews as union workers for the following reasons: the Supreme
Court did not exclude them from protection in Weingarten; section 7 protects their right to act in
concert for mutual aid and protection; nonunionized workers may need such protection more than
unionized workers because they have no collective bargaining agreement to discourage employers
from acting unjustly; and a co-worker could serve the purposes and perform the limited activities
of a Weingarten representative despite a lack of formal union experience. Materials Research Corp.,
262 N.L.R.B. 1010, 1012-15, 110 L.R.R.M. 1401, 1403-06 (1982). See also Glomac Plstics, 234
N.L.R.B. 1309, 1311, 97 L.R.R.M. 1441, 1443-44 (1978).
Two cases that the Board decided on the same day as Materials Research reflected the same
reasoning. See E.1. duPont de Nemours & Co., Inc. and Walter J. Slaughter, 262 N.L.R.B. 1028,
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employee leaves an interview to find a representative; 76 and to authorize active partici-
pation by representatives during interviews." The criticism in Taracorp of the Board's
expansive interpretation of Weingarten indicates that employees can no longer expect the
Board to arrive at generous readings of the Supreme Court's limitations on Weingarten
rights.
With Taracorp, the Board ends nearly a decade in which decisions about make-whole
remedies for Weingarten violations depended on the forum in which the question was
considered. In an area that has seen considerable disagreement between the Board and
the courts, the decision may presage a period of lesser activism by the Board and greater
conformity between the Board and the judiciary. If the opinion provides a reliable
compass, future Board decisions will reassert the value of Weingarten rights in promoting
the employer's ability to learn the truth of allegations against employees and the union's
ability to monitor the fairness of employees' disciplinary practices. 7° The Board will be
likely to emphasize, however, that in accordance with the right of employers to run their
110 L.R.R.M. 1417 (1982); El. duPont de Nemours & Co., Inc. and Henry M. Burker, 262 N.L.R.B.
1040, 110 L.R.R.M. 1419 (1982).
The Ninth Circuit rejected the Board's holding in 5.1. duPont de Nemours & Co., Inc. and Henry
M. Burke, finding that the request for representation of an individual acting out of self-protection
does not constitute concerted activity, and that the evidence did not reveal any history of concerted
activity between the requesting employee and others. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. NLRB, 707
F.2d 1076, 1078-79, 113 L.R.R. M. 2931, 2932-33 (9th Cir. 1982). The court did not exclude the
possibility, however, that Weingarten protections could apply in other cases where a nonunion
employee acted as part of a group. Id. at 1079, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2933.
In E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., Inc. and Walter J. Slaughter, the Third Circuit rejected the
Ninth Circuit's limited reading of the meaning of concerted activity in section 7 and accepted the
Board's general extension of Weingarten rights to nonunion employees. E.1. duPont de Nemours &
Go. v. NLRB, 724 F.2d 1061, 1065-67, 115 L.R.R.M. 2153, 2156, vacated, 733 F.2d 296, 116
L.R.R.M. 2343 (3d Cir. 1984) (per curiam). Upon the Board's request to reconsider the case along
with another case presenting similar questions, however, the court agreed to vacate its decision and
remand for panel rehearing. 733 F.2d at 297, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2343-44. Insofar as the Board's
request followed a federal court of appeals decision favorable to its past opinions, it may suggest
that the Weingarten rights of nonunion employees also may be an area in which the Board will
retreat from its "expansionist approach."
76 See Spartan Stores, 235 N.L.R.B. 522, 100 L.R.R.M. 1181 (1978), enforcement denied, 628 F.2d
953, 105 L.R.R.M. 2293 (6th Cir. 1980). The Board found that an employee who left an investigatory
interview to find a union representative and ignored two requests by supervisors to return was
legally asserting his right to Weingarten protection. Id. at 522-23, 100 L.R.R.M. at 1181-82. The
Sixth Circuit held, however, that the assertion of Weingarten rights requires an express request For
representation. 628 F.2d at 958, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2297.
" The courts of appeal have disagreed about the Board's finding that an employer commits
an unfair labor practice by ordering a union representative to remain silent during the course of
an investigatory interview. In NLRB v. Texaco, 659 F.2d 124, 108 L.R.R.M. 2850 (9th Cir. 1981),
the Ninth Circuit noted the Supreme Court's intention that Weingarten representatives, though they
should not transform investigatory interviews into adversary proceedings, should help to elicit facts
favorable to the employee. Id. at 126, 108 L.R.R.M. at 2851. Therefore, the court held that
employers may not relegate Weingarten representatives to the role of passive observer. Id. at 126,
108 L.R.R.M. at 2852. The Fifth Circuit held to the contrary in Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v.
NLRB, 667 F.2d 470, 109 L.R.R.M. 2602 (5th Cir. 1982). Its finding that the employer's demand
for silence during the interview fell "within the perimeters [sic] set forth by the Supreme Court"
may have depended on the fact that, at the end of the interview, the employer asked the union
representative if he wished to ask any questions or add any clarifications. Id. at 473-74 & n.3, 109
L.R.R.M. at 2604 & n.3.
76 See Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 260-64, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2692-93.
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businesses as they see fit, Weingarten rights properly do not guarantee employees any
relief from discipline or discharge for misconduct.
B. Union Unfair Labor Practices
1. *Union Restrictions on Members' Right to Resign: International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge 1414 and Neufeld Porsche-Audi,
Inc.'
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) guarantees employees
the right to organize or join labor organizations, to engage in other concerted activities
for their mutual benefit, and to refrain from any or all such activities.' Under section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, it is an unfair labor practice for a union to restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights. 2 A proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A),
however, prescribes that the section 8(b)(1)(A) restriction on unions shall not impair a
union's right to adopt its own rules concerning the acquisition or retention of member-
ship in the union. 4 Tension arises, therefore, between an employee's right to refrain
from union activity and a union's right to control acquisition and retention of member-
ship. This tension becomes particularly acute immediately prior to and during a strike,
when some employees may wish to leave the union to retain their jobs.
Section 8(b)(1)(A) had been interpreted by the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or Board) to recognize a union's need, particularly at the time of a strike, to
protect against erosion of its status as the exclusive representative of employee interests. 5
Accordingly, the Board permitted "reasonable" union rules which limited a union mem-
ber's right to resign from the union provided those rules.were applicable during both
strike and nonstrike periods.6
 In Machinists, Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor I!), 7 a union rule
prohibiting resignations during the entire course of a strike or within fourteen days
preceding the strike's commencement was held to violate section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act."
* By Brian D. Shonk, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
270 N.L.R.B. 1330, 116 L.R.R.M. 1257 (1984).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or
all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment
as authorized in section 8(a)(3).
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1982). Section 8(b)(1)(A) provides in pertinent part: It shall be an
unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents — (1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 . ." Id.
1d. Section 8(b)(1)(A) further states: "Provided, that this paragraph shall not impair the right
of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of
membership therein ... ." Id. (emphasis added).
5
 Machinists, Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor Ii), 263 N.L.R.B. 984, 986-87, 111 L.R.R.M. 1115, 1117–
18 (1982) (union has vital interest in assessing its strength throughout the course of.a strike).
" Id. at 986-87, 111  L.R.R.M. at 1118.
7 Id.
Id. at 087, Ill L.R.R.M. at 1119.
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The rule violated section 8(b)(1)(A), according to the Board, because it unreasonably
restricted an employee's section 7 right to refrain from participating in concerted ac-
tivity. 9 Two of the four members of the Board who found the rule unreasonable set
forth a general standard to determine whether a union rule limiting resignation was
reasonable. 19 Members Zimmerman and Fanning proposed a standard that would find
reasonable a union rule which restricted a union member's right to resign for a period
of not more than thirty days after the tender of the member's resignation." In subse-
quent cases, this thirty-day standard became the working rule of thumb for union rules
restricting members' resignations. 12
During the Survey year, the Board ruled that a union may not lawfully restrict the
right of its members to resign from membership.' 3 In International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge 1414 and Neufeld Porsche-Audi, Inc. (Neufeld Porsche-
Audi)," the Board expressly rejected the Dalmo Victor II thirty-day standard regarding
union resignation and stated that any union restriction on the rights of its members to
resign constituted a violation of section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.' 5 Consequently, after
Neufeld Porsche-Audi, a union no longer may impose any restriction on its members' right
to resign, even in the event of a strike.' 0
Neufeld Porsche -Audi involved the constitution of the International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers (the Union). The Union's constitution restricted the
effectiveness of a member's resignation during a strike or primary picketing, and also
during a fourteen-day period immediately preceding any strike or primary picketing."
9 Id. at 986, I 1 1 L.R.R.M. at 1117.
19 1d. at 987, I I I L.R.R.M. at 1118.
" Id. Although Member Jenkins did not expressly endorse the thirty-day rule, the rule presum-
ably would be valid under Member Jenkins' view that restrictions on resignation are specifically
excluded from the scope of section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by the proviso to that provision. 263
N.L.R.B., at 995, Ill L.R.R.M. at 1126 (,Jenkins, Member, dissenting).
Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter, who concurred with the plurality opinion in
finding that the rule at issue violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, expressly refused to adopt the
thirty-day standard proposed by Members Zimmerman and Fanning. Chairman Van de Water and
Member Hunter argued that any union restriction on a union member's right to resign was
unreasonable, and any attempt to enforce that rule violated section 8(b)(I)(A) of the Act. ld. at
992-93, 111  L.R.R.M. at 1123-24.
12 See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge 1414 arid






" Id. at 1330, l 16 L.R.R.M. at 1257. The union's constitutional provision concerning resignation
in effect at the time of the member's tender of resignation provided:
Improper Conduct of a Member: ...
Accepting employment in any capacity in an establishment where a strike or
lockout exists as recognized under this Constitution, without permission. Resignation
shall not relieve a member of his obligation to refrain from accepting employment at
the establishment for the duration of the strike or lockout if the resignation occurs
during the period of the strike or lockout or within 14 days preceding its commence-
ment. Where observance of a primary picket line is required, any resignation tendered
during the period that the picket line is maintained, or within 14 days preceding its
establishment, shall not become effective as a resignation during the period the picket
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Under that constitution, a member could not accept employment with the struck em-
ployer during the strike if his resignation was tendered within the fourteen-day period
or during the strike.ts Moreover, if a primary picket line was involved, the member's
resignation was not effective and the member's obligation to observe the picket line was
not extinguished.'g
On September 8, 1980, employees in a unit represented by the Union commenced
an economic strike against their employer which continued until March 1, 1981.20
 During
the strike, a union member delivered a letter of resignation to the Union's offices and
returned to work three days later." One week after the employee tendered his resig-
nation, the Union filed charges against the employee, alleging that he had violated their
constitution's provisions on resignation," and two months later imposed a $2,250 fine
against the employee." The worker's employer, Neufeld Porsche-Audi, filed an unfair
labor practice charge against the Union," and the General Counsel for the NLRB
responded by issuing a complaint upon that charge against the Union alleging that the
union had violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA. 23
In a three-to-one decision, the NLRB ruled that the Union's efforts to restrict its
members' resignations were unlawful." Significantly, the Board also, in dicta, specifically
rejected the decision of Members Zimmerman and Fanning in Dalmo Victor II, which
established the thirty-day standard for union restrictions on resignations. The Neufeld
Porsche-Audi Board declared that any restriction imposed by a union on its members'
right to resign was invalid. 27
The Board in Neufeld Porsche -Audi began its decision by reviewing relevant United
States Supreme Court decisions which examined a union's authority to enforce its rules.
The NLRB first considered the basic standard for the lawfulness of union rules estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Allis
-Chalmers Mfg. Co." and Scofield v. NLRB. 29
The test established by Allis -Chalmers is applied to determine whether a union rule is an
"internal" action. 3° The Court defined "internal" action as those union actions taken
against full union members pursuant to a nonarbitrary rule aimed at achieving a legiti-
mate union objective." If that test is met, the test for lawfulness of the union rule under
Scofield becomes whether the union rule first, "reflects a legitimate union interest,"
second, "impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws," and third, "is
line is maintained, nor shall it relieve a member of his or her obligation to observe
the primary picket line for its duration,
Id.
" See supra note 17.
19 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.




26 Id. at 1330, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1258.
25 Id.
2" Id. at 1331, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1258. Chairman Hunter and Members Dennis and Dotson found
that any union restriction on resignation was unlawful. Member Zimmerman dissented in part.
27 Id.
29 388 U.S. 175, 65 L.R.R.M. 2449 (1967).
29 394 U.S. 423, 70 1...R.R.M. 3105 (1969).
3° Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 195, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2457.
SI Id. at 194-95, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2456-57.
December 1985]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW 	 109
reasonably enforced against union members who are free to leave the union and escape
the rule." 32
In the instant case, the Board suggested that a union rule restricting resignation
might violate the Allis -Chalmers "internal action" test, but the Board did not base its
decision on that finding." Instead, the Board found that a union rule restricting resig-
nations violated the second and third portions of the Scofield test.$" The Board acknowl-
edged that the union rule advanced the legitimate union interests of maintaining strike
solidarity and protecting employees who wished to continue a strike." A union rule
restricting resignations conflicted, however, with the second portion of the Scofield test,
the Board stated, because it impaired fundamental policies underlying the labor laws."
Such a rule also violated the third portion of the Scofield test, the Board continued,
because employees were not "free to leave the union and escape the rule.""
In considering the second portion of the Scofield test, the Board explained that any
restriction on resignation impaired the underlying policies of section 7 of the NLRA. 33
The basis of section 7, the Board noted, is its guarantee of employee rights to organize
and participate in concerted activities, or, conversely, to refrain from such activities."
The Board reasoned that any union restriction which delays or impedes a member's
resignation necessarily interferes with the employee's right to refrain from concerted
activities provided for in section 7 of the Act.0 In so holding, the NLRB refused to
balance the interests of the union with the section 7 rights of employees. The Board
stated that any effort to equate the "institutional interests" of a union with the "statutory
rights" of employees was improper." Regardless of the legitimacy of union interests, the
Board reasoned, those interests cannot outweigh fundamental section 7 rights. 42
In addition, any union rule restricting resignation, the Board held, also violates the
third portion of the Scofield test requiring that union rules be "reasonably enforced
against union members who are free to leave the union and escape the rule."' 3 In the
Board's view, a rule restricting resignation violates the principle embodied in the Scofield
32 Scofield, 394 U.S. at 430, 70 L.R.R.M. at 3108.
Neufeld Porsche-Audi, 270 N.L.R.B. at 1333-34, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1260-61.
34 Id. at 1334, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1261.
" Id. at 1333, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1260.
39 Id.
"Id. at 1333-34, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1260-61, A union rule restricting resignation, according to
the NLRB, may violate the initial requirement established by Allis-Chalmers that the union rule be
"internal" action. Id. at 1333, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1260. "Internal" action had been interpreted by the
Supreme Court to include the imposition and collection of fines on full union members who refused
to honor an authorized strike. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 195, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2457. A union rule
restricting resignation, however, may not be "internal" action, according to the Board, because it
unilaterally extends the scope of "internal" action by extending membership obligations. Neufeld
Porsche-Audi, 270 N.L.R.B. at 1333, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1260. Thus, the NLRB explained, a union
could continue to regulate its members' conduct when it otherwise would have had no control. Id.
The Board, however, did not base its decision on the internal/external activity distinction, but
instead based its decision on finding violations of the Scofield test. Id. at 1334-36, 116 L.R.R.M. at
1261-62.
' s 270 N.L.R.B. at 1333, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1260.
39 Id. See supra note 2 and accompanying text for the text of section 7 of the Act.
• Neufeld Porsche-Audi, 270 N.L.R.B. at 1333, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1260.
41 Id. at 1334, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1261.
42 Id.
49 Id. at 1333-34, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1261 (quoting Scofield, 394 U.S. at 430, 70 L.R.R.M. at 3108).
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test that a union's reach does not extend to employees who decide not to remain as part
of the union." The Board found support for its analysis in a Seventh Circuit decision
which held that the principle that employees must be free to leave the union was at the
core of an individual's section 7 rights. 45
Member Zimmerman dissented in part from the Board's decision.' 6 He concurred
with the majority's finding that the union rule at issue violated section 8(b)(I)(A) of the
Act, but relied on the fact that the union rule violated the thirty-day rule established in
Dalmo Victor 11. 47 Member Zimmerman based his dissent from the majority opinion and
his support for the thirty-day rule on two premises. The first basis for Member Zim-
merman's dissent was that section 7 rights are not absolute, as the majority contended. 48
The better view, according to Member Zimmerman, is that the NLRA is built on com-
promise and conflict, and the Board should accomodate conflicting interests by balancing
the interests involved.'" In balancing individual employee interests with the interests of
the group, Member Zimmerman argued that a limited degree of intrusion on section 7
41 Id. at 1334, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1261.
" See Pattern Makers League of North America v, NLRB, 724 F.2d 57, 60, 115 L.R.R.M. 2264,
2267 (7th Cir. 1983) (an employee's section 7 rights are not outweighed by union's institutional
needs).
The BOard in Neufeld Porsche-Audi defended its ruling against the Ninth Circuit's contrary
holding that a union can lawfully restrict its members' right to resign. First, the Board submitted
that the Ninth Circuit's "subscription theory" was in error. Neufeld Porsche -Audi, 270 N.L.R.B. at
1335, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1261. The "subscription theory" proposed that employees who resign their
membership and then refrain from strike activity violate their duty to their fellow workers and
breach an implied promise to those workers who desire to continue the strike. Dalmo Victor II, 725
F.2d at 1218, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2976. Resigning employees may not, according to the Ninth Circuit,
"betray their colleagues and expect to get away without paying the price for weakening the collective
bargaining environment." Id. The Board, however, rejected the Ninth Circuit's theory because,
according to the Board, the Supreme Court had rejected a similar theory in NLRB v. Textile Workers
Local 1029 (Granite State). Neufeld Porsche -Audi, 270 N.L.R.B. at 1335, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1261. In
Granite State, the Supreme Court rejected a union's argument that its rule restricting employees'
section 7 right to refrain from concerted activities by limiting resignation was valid because the
members had voted to strike and unanimously voted to sanction anyone who sought to return to
work during the strike. NLRB v. Textile Workers Local 1029 (Granite State), 409 U.S. 213, 217-18,
81 L.R.R.M. 2853, 2854-55 (1972).
Second, the Board recognized the concept of majority rule, but only so far as the union
established relations between the individual employee and management. Neufeld Porsche-Audi, 270
N.L.R.B. at 1335, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1261-62. The union may not, however, order an employee's
membership relations with the union. Id. at 1335, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1262.
Third, the Board stated that union interests embodied in the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A) do
not coexist with employees' section 7 rights. Id. at 1335-36, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1262. While acknowl-
edging that such union interests are legitimate, the Board held those institutional interests of the
union always to be subordinate to individual employee statutory rights. Id. at 1336, 116 L.R.R.M.
at 1262.
Finally, the Board asserted that the Ninth Circuit, in Dalmo Victor 11, overlooked the third
portion of the Scofield test, which provides that a union rule must be "reasonably enforced against
union members who are free to leave the union and escape the rule." Id., see Scofield, 394 U.S. at
430, 70 L.R.R.M. at 3108. Any union restriction on resignation, according to the Board, violates
this principle. Neufeld Porsche -Audi, 270 N.L.R.B. at 1336, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1262.
46 270 N.L.R.B. at 1337, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1263 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
47 1d. at 1340, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1265 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
48 Id.
49 1d. at 1337, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1263 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
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rights should be permiued.50 The Supreme Court had balanced competing interests
between employees and unions before, argued Member Zimmerman, and section 7 rights
had not been held absolute rights in those cases. 51
In addition to advocating a balancing of principles which underlie the Act, Member
Zimmerman also based his dissent upon his interpretation of the Supreme Court's
decisions in Allis-Chalmers, Scofield, and NLRB v. Textile. Workers Local 1029 (Granite State). 52
Member Zimmerman noted that the Allis-Chalmers Court, in formulating the "internal"
action test, established the principle that the right to refrain from union activity contained
in section 7 is not an absolute right," and that Scofield also supported that view. 54 Nothing
in either the Scofield or Allis-Chalmers decisions, according to Member Zimmerman,
suggests that a reasonable rule restricting resignation would not he upheld by the
Supreme Court.`''' In Granite State, Member Zimmerman observed, the Court, had pre-
faced its finding that an employee must be free to refrain from concerted activities by
noting that in that case, there were no restraints on the resignation of members, and
that the Court was not deciding the extent to which a union could restrict resignation. 56
Member Zimmerman ., therefore, dissented from the part of the opinion which overruled
Dalmo Victor 11 and the thirty-day rule which Dalmo Victor 11 established. 57
su Id. at 1337-38, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1263 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
5, Id. at 1340, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1265 (citing Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition
Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 88 L.R.R.M. 2660 (1975)) (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting). In
Emporium Capwell, employees picketed their employer in order to force their employer to bargain
with them over conditions of employment as they affected race, after the employees refused to
pursue their grievances through the established grievance procedure. 420 U.S. at 55-56, 88
L.R.R.M. at 2662-63. The employer discharged the employees. Id. at 56, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2663. In
a suit against the employer for violating section 8(a)(1) of the Act by interfering with employees'
section 7 rights, the Supreme Court upheld the discharge. Id. at 70-73, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2668-69.
Although a no—strike provision was in effect, the Court based its decison on the principle that the
majority rules through the exclusive representative of employees in the unit. Id. at 62, 88 L.R.R.M.
at 2665. The Court found that the interests of the union in presenting a united front to the
employer on bargainable issues outweighed the employees' interests here, although it recognized
the employees' legitimate purpose of battling discrimination. Id. See also Pattern Makers League of
North America v. NLRB, 724 F.2d 57, 115 L.R.R.M. 2264 (7th Cir. 1983). According to Member
Zimmerman, the Seventh Circuit decision, which the majority of the Board in Neufeld Porsche -Audi
cited to support their conclusion that section 7 rights were absolute relative to union rights,
acknowledged the existence of both union and employee interests, but in that case properly found
that the interests of employees outweighed those of the union. Neufeld Porsche-Audi, 270 N.L.R.B.
at 1339, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1264 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
" 409 U.S. 213, 81 L.R.R.M. 2853 (1972).




56 Id. In Granite State, the Court stated: "Ivde do not now decide to what extent the contractual
relationship between the union and member may curtail the freedom to resign. But where, as here,
there are no restraints on the resignation of members, we conclude ... " that the" employee's section
7 rights outweigh the union's interest in solidarity. 409 U.S. at 217-18, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2855.
Member Zimmerman disagreed with the Neufeld Porsche -Audi majority's interpretation of the
Supreme Court's decision in Granite State. Neufeld Porsche-Audi, 270 N.L.R.B. at 1338-39, 116
L.R.R.M. at 1263-64 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting). Unless the language of the Granite State
decision is interpreted to imply that the Court would sanction a reasonable union rule restricting
resignation by its members, Member Zimmerman argued, the Court's language becomes superflu-
ous. Id. at 1338-39, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1264 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
57 270 N.L.R.B. at 1340, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1265 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
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The NLRB, in Neufeld Porsche
-Audi, held that any union restriction on resignation
was invalid, and that attempted enforcement of such a restriction violated section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. 56
 The Board's decision, however, may not be consistent with the
NLRA's stated goal of encouraging collective bargaining in order to promote industrial
peace,59
 because it upsets the balance among employee, employer, and union interests
that national labor policy seeks to achieve. The NLRB's position that any union restriction
on resignation is unlawful, therefore, may not be supported by the courts.
In the Ninth Circuit, for example, the NLRB's decision to prohibit any union
restrictions on resignation will not likely be accepted. The Ninth Circuit in Machinists
Local 1327 v. NLRB 6° held that even the Dalmo Victor II thirty-day standard, which the
Board overruled in Neufeld Porsche -Audi, unreasonably restricted unions from enforcing
valid membership rules and thus frustrated federal labor policy. 6 ' The Ninth Circuit
noted that the national labor policy is based upon employees acting collectively through
an exclusive bargaining representative, and that section 8(b)(1)(A) reserves to unions the
power to make reasonable rules regarding retention and acquisition of membership. 62
The Machinists court recognized that Scofield established the proper test for deter-
mining when an "internal" union rule is reasonable. 63 Scofield requires that a union rule
pertain to a legitimate union concern, violate no policy underlying the labor laws enacted
by Congress, and be reasonably enforced against union members who "may leave the
union and escape the effects of the rule."64
 The Ninth Circuit, unlike the NLRB, however,
found that a union rule, which restricted resignations for fourteen days prior to a strike
and during the entire strike period by fining members who resigned and returned to
work with the struck employer, met all three portions of the Scofield test. 65
In applying the Scofield test, the Ninth Circuit first found that the union in Machinists
Local 1327 v. NLRB had a legitimate interest in controlling resignations because post-
resignation strike breaking threatens the union's existence and breaches an implied
58 Id, at 1336, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1262.
52 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). Section 1 of the Act provides in pertinent part:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association and employers . substantially burdens and affects the
flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions ....
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize
and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interrup-
tion, and promotes the flow of commerce by ... restoring equality of bargaining power
between employers and employees ....
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their em-
ployment or other mutual aid or protection.
Id.
6° 725 F.2d 1212, 115 L.R.R.M. 2972 (9th Cir. 1984).
6 ' Id. at 1215, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2974.
62 Id. at 1215-16, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2975.
65 Id. at 1216, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2975.
f'" Scofield, 394 U.S. at 430, 70 L.R.R.M. at 3110.
"Machinists, 725 F.2d at 1217, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2975.
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promise of loyalty to those fellow workers who desire to strike." Second, continued the
court, both the employees' right to resign and the union's interest in making rules
regarding acquisition and retention of membership are provided for in the NLRA. 67
Because both interests have been "imbedded" in the labor laws for many years, the Ninth
Circuit stated, neither the employees' right nor the union's interest can "override" the
other — both must be accomodated." Third, the Ninth Circuit found union restrictions
on resignation not only reasonable, but also vital to the interests of the union in pres-
enting a united front to the employer and in giving meaning to the terms of the contract
between the union and its members." Union members were still free to resign; the union
could only reasonably restrict the time when resignations became effective."
The Ninth Circuit, therefore, is unlikely to follow the Board's decision in Neufeld
Porsche -Audi to prohibit union restrictions on resignation. The NLRB's determination in
Neufeld Porsche -Audi that employee statutory section 7 rights necessarily outweigh any
union interests71 is inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit's decision that while an employee
has a section 7 right to resign, it is also reasonable for the union to adopt rules which
reasonably restrict resignations and penalize a member for breaching a duty to refrain
from strike-breaking." Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit probably will continue to permit
such restrictions, provided that they are reasonable.
Not only is the Ninth Circuit unlikely to follow the Board's ruling in Neufeld Porsche-
Audi that any union restriction on resignation is invalid, but the Board's decision may
also conflict with the Supreme Court's analysis of federal labor policy. The Supreme
Court has held that employees' rights to engage in section 7 activity are not absolute
under the NLRA, as the Board seemed to imply, but are sometimes subordinate to the
interests of the union in presenting a united front in bargaining and in maintaining its
bargaining power as a group. 75
 Indeed, the Court has stated that sections 7 and 8(b)(1)(A)
of the Act should be interpreted in view of the fact that they are but two of many
interwoven sections in a complex Act, and mindful of the manifest purpose of Congress
to fashion a coherent national labor policy. 74
In applying the Scofield test, however, the Board determined that regardless of their
legitimacy, union interests in reasonably restricting resignations are always subordinate
to the statutory rights of employees. 75 Such a determination is at odds with the Supreme
Court's method of interpreting the Act with a view toward the underlying purposes of
the NLRA. Accordingly, employee interests should not always prevail but should be
balanced with union interests.
66 Id. at 1217, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2976.
67 Id.
" Id.
" Id. at 1218, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2976-77.
711 Id.
Neufeld Porsche-Audi, 270 N.L.R.B. at 1334, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1 261.
72 Machinists, 725 F.2d at 1217-18, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2976-77.
" Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org. , 420 U.S. 50, 70, 88 L.R.R.M.
2660, 2665 (1975). For a discussion of this case and its balancing of union and employee interests,
see supra note 51 and accompanying text. See also 11. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338, 14
L.R.R.M. 501, 504-05 (1944) (Supreme Court recognized concept of majority rule, and that in
practice, the concept might result in some individuals losing rights).
74 Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 179-80, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2450.
Neufeld Porsche-Audi, 270 N.L.R.B. at 1334, 116 L.R,R,M, at 1 261.
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Furthermore, the Board's application of the Scofield test in finding that any union
restriction on resignation is unlawful ignores the Supreme Court's decision in Allis-
Chalmers, upon which the Scofield test is based." In Allis-Chalmers, the Court recognized
as central to the federal labor policy the chosen union's power to "protect against erosion
of its status ... through reasonable discipline of members who violate rules and regu-
lations governing membership."" In granting employees the right to refrain from union
activity in section 7 and prohibiting unions from interfering with the exercise of that
right, Congress, according to the Supreme Court, did not intend to "strip unions of the
power to fine members for strike breaking."'" By summarily finding that union interests
are always to be subordinated to those of individual employees, and thus prohibiting
any restrictions on resignation by union members, the Board in Neufeld Porsche -Audi has
in effect contradicted the Supreme Court's decision in Allis -Chalmers to balance employee
and union interests which conflict:79 Because the Board's decision in Neufeld Porsche-Audi
upsets the intended balance of employee, employer, and union interests, and contradicts
the Supreme Court's policy statement in Allis -Chalmers, the Board's decision should not
be followed by the courts.
In sum, the NLRB ruled in Neufeld Porsche-Audi, that a union may no longer impose
any restriction on its members' right to resign, and expressly overruled the thirty-day
standard for union restrictions on resignations established in Dalmo Victor II. The Neufeld
Porsche -Audi decision, however, is not likely to be accepted by the courts. The Ninth
Circuit has expressly refused to adopt even the thirty-day rule, holding that if a union
rule meets the Scofield test, the rule will be upheld. The second portion of the Scofield
test requires that the union rule not impair fundamental policies underlying the labor
laws. The Ninth Circuit, unlike the Board, interpreted that requirement as compelling
a balancing test between employee rights and union rights, and found that a union's
interest in rules restricting resignation outweighs employees' section 7 rights to refrain
from union activity when the rule is reasonable. The Board in Neufeld Porsche -Audi, in
contrast, stated that employees' section 7 rights to refrain from concerted activities are
absolute. The Ninth Circuit interpreted the third element of the Scofield test, which states
that union rules be "reasonably enforced against union members who are free to leave
the union and escape the rule," 8" as not prohibiting union rules which reasonably
restricted resignations. 81 The Ninth Circuit's finding that reasonable union restrictions
on resignation are not only permissible but vital to the existence of the union is more
consistent with national labor policy. A reasonable restriction on resignation does not
prevent a member from resigning, as the Board's decision in Neufeld Porsche -Audi implies,
but merely delays the effectiveness of the resignation, giving the union time to adjust its
bargaining strategy, especially during a strike. Finally, section 8(b)(1)(A) provides that
while unions are prohibited from interfering with an employee's exercise of section 7
rights, such a prohibition ''shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe
its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein .. . . "H2
7" Scofield, 394 U.S. at 428-32, 70 L.R.R.M. 3107-08.
"Allis-Chalmers 388 U.S. at 181, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2451.
7" Id, at 183, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2452.
79 Id.
" Scofield, 394 U.S. at 430. 70 L.R.R.M. at 3108.
"' Maehinisls, 725 F.2d at 1217-18,115 L.R.R.M. at 2976-77.
"' 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1982).
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Because the Ninth Circuit's analysis is more consistent with both the provisions of
the NLRA and the Supreme Court's method of balancing conflicting interests, it is that
analysis which is likely to be followed by other courts. If' the Supreme Court does resolve
this issue in the future, the Court will probably find Neufeld Porsche-Audi inconsistent
with the principle established in Allis-Chalmers and its progeny allowing unions to disci-
pline their members. Without some reasonable means to regulate both acquisition and
retention of membership, the union's right to discipline its members is essentially a nullity.
Accordingly, if the issue reaches the Supreme Court, it will likely overrule Neufeld Porsche-
Audi.
111. CONCERTED ACTIVITY
A. *Maintaining the Jurisdictional Restrictions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act: Briggs
Transportation Company v. International Brotherhood of" Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen, and Helpers of America'
The Norris-LaGuardia Act2 removes the federal courts' jurisdiction in labor cases
in which a party seeks an injunction enjoining any union activity which disputes terms
and conditions of employment. 3 Congress enacted this provision primarily to prevent
federal courts from restricting the legitimate exercise of rights of American workers that
were created and are protected by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). -' The
Norris-LaGuardia Act expressly applies to all courts of the United States,' but after the
Supreme Court's recent decision in NLRB v. Bildisco and Bildisco, 6 there is some question
whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies in labor disputes arising out of bankruptcy
proceedings. In Bildisco, the Supreme Court allowed a bankruptcy trustee to reject
collective bargaining agreements that had been entered into by the debtor filing for
bankruptcy.? In the first part of the two part Bildisco decision, the Court held that a
bankruptcy trustee's power to reject executory contracts under section 365(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code' included the power to reject collective bargaining agreements.'' In
addition, reasoning that the NLRA's provisions are subordinated to the "exigencies of
bankruptcy,"'' the Bildisco Court held that parties seeking the bankruptcy court's per-
mission to reject union contracts need not comply with the NLRA's procedures for mid-
term contract modification."
* By William F. Martin Jr., Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
739 F.2d 341, 116 L.R.R.M. 3169 (8th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 105 S. Ct. 295 (1984).
2
 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982).
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 113 (1982).
4 Briggs Transp. Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 739 F.2d 341, 344, 116 L.R.R.M.
3169, 3171 (8th Cir. 1984). The NLRA is set out in 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
529 U.S.C:. § 101 (1982).
• 109 S. Ct. 1188, 115 L.R.R.M. 2805 (1984).
7 /dial 1196-97, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2812-13.
• 1 l U.S.C. § 305(a) (1982). Section 365(a) provides: 'Except as provided in section 765 and
766 of this title and in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject to the court's
approval, may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor."
9 104 S. Ct. at 1196-97, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2812-13,
i° Id. at 1200, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2815.
" Id. at 1196-97, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2813. The NLRA's contract modification procedures are set
out in 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
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The Bildisco decision, however, left several questions regarding contract modification
in bankruptcy unanswered. For example, the Court in Bildisco did not address the
question of what actions unions may lawfully take to protest legally proper contract
modifications that are accomplished through bankruptcy. Similarly, the Bildisco Court
did not address the issue of what powers courts have in reviewing union actions pro-
testing bankruptcy modifications of collective bargaining agreements. Finally, the Bildisco
decision left questions open with respect to courts' jurisdiction to issue injunctions where
a union contract has been modified in a bankruptcy proceeding. It is unclear from the
Bildisco decision whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act's jurisdictional restrictions still apply
in situations where a union is protesting bankruptcy abrogations of collective bargaining
agreements.
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
in Briggs Transportation Company v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 12 held that it had
no jurisdiction to enjoin employees from protesting a modification of their collective
bargaining agreement." The Briggs court did not question the legality of the Briggs
Company's contract abrogation because the company's actions were proper under Bil-
disco.' 4 The court found, however, that the Norris-LaGuardia Act removed the court's
jurisdiction to enjoin any union protests disputing terms and conditions of employment."
.Thus, according to the Briggs court, the Norris-LaGuardia Act's jurisdictional restrictions
are not subordinated to the Bankruptcy Code and unions are free to protest any contract
abrogations which are lawful under Bildisco."
In Briggs, the Briggs Transportation Company, a motor transportation company
with a history of financial problems, laid off 900 of its employees and filed a petition
for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code." After filing the bank-
ruptcy petition, Briggs closed 35 of its 57 terminals and laid off approximately 800 more
employees." Of Briggs' remaining 400 employees, about 300 were represented by the
unions who were the defendants in Briggs. 19
On several occasions between January and August, 1983, Briggs Company repre-
sentatives met with union officials to attempt to reduce its obligations under various
collective bargaining agreements with the unions." After these negotiations failed, the
Briggs Company filed a motion in the bankruptcy court for authority to abrogate its
collective bargaining contracts under section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. 2 ' Upon the
bankruptcy court's granting of this motion, the Briggs Company immediately announced
a unilateral reduction in its employees' wages, benefits and terms of employment." The
next week, the employee members of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters began
a strike and stationed pickets at many Briggs terminals." Briggs then agreed to postpone
12 739 F.2d 341, 116 L.R.R.M. 3169 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 295 (1984).
' Id. at 344, 116 L.R.R.M. at 3171.
14 Id.
' 5 Id. at 343-44, 116 L.R.R.M. at 3170-71.
L" Id. at 344, 116 L.R.R.M. at 3171.
17 Id. at 342, 116 L.R.R.M. at 3169.
Id.
19 1d.
" Id. at 342, 116 L.R.R.M. at 3169-70.
21 Id. at 342, 116 L.R.R.M. at 3170.
22 Id.
23 Id.
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the effective date of the changes, in exchange for the Teamsters ending the strike."
When the strike was suspended, Briggs and the union again began to negotiate. These
subsequent negotiations also broke off, and the union resumed picketing. 25
On April 20, 1984, Briggs filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Minnesota, seeking, inter cilia, to enjoin the union from picketing and display-
ing signs within 2000 feet of Briggs' terminals. 28 Briggs claimed the activities interfered
with the contract abrogation that had been approved by the bankruptcy court. 27 The
district court found for the defendant, thereby denying Briggs the relief it had re-
quested. 28 In refusing to issue the requested injunction, the district court found that the
Norris-LaGuardia Act29 limited the courts' power to issue injunctions in labor disputes
over terms and conditions of employment." The district court also held that Bildisco,
while requiring a subordination of NLRA protections to the Bankruptcy Code, did not
require a similar subordination of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to the bankruptcy laws."
The court stated that although Bildisco allowed Briggs to cut its employees' wages, Bildisco
did not prohibit the employees from complaining."
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's order refusing to grant
plaintiff Briggs an injunction against the union. In affirming the district court's decision,
the Eighth Circuit determined that neither Congress nor the Supreme Court had sub-
ordinated Norris-LaGuardia's jurisdictional restrictions to the Bankruptcy Code." The
court concluded that neither the Bankruptcy Code nor Bildisco removed the jurisdictional
restrictions that the Norris-LaGuardia Act placed on federal courts in labor disputes."
The court noted that the parties cited no provision of the Bankruptcy Code nor anything
in its legislative history to indicate that Congress intended the Bankruptcy Code to lift
the Norris-LaGuardia restrictions." In addition, the court approvingly cited decisions
from the Second and Sixth Circuits which had found that certain provisions of the
bankruptcy laws did not lift the jurisdictional restrictions of Norris-LaGuardia." In both
Crowe & Associates, Inc. v. Bricklayers & Masons Union Local No. 2" and Petrusch v. Teamsters
Local 317,38 the courts found no congressional intent to subordinate the Norris-La-
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 1d. at 342-43, 116 L.R.R.M. at 3170. Briggs also sought to enjoin the defendants from
interfering with the company's normal business operations, the local and over-the-road movement
of the company's freight and equipment, the company's real and personal property, and the
company's employees, agents, customers, suppliers, and vendors and their families. Id. Two days
after filing the motion in the district court seeking an injunction, the Briggs Company unilaterally
implemented the postponed changes in terms of employment. Id. at 343, 116 L.R.R.M. at 3170.
" Id. at 342, 116 L.R.R.M. at 3170.
29 Briggs Transp. Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 40 Bankr. 972, 975, 116 L.R.R.M.
2241, 2244 (D. Minn. 1984).
29 1d. at 973, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2244 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 113(c) (1982)).
'° Id.
" Id. at 974, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2244.
" Id. at 975, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2244.
" 739 F.2d at 343-44, 116 L.R.R.M. at 3170-71.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 343, 116 L.R.R.M. at 3170-71.
36 Id. at 343-44, 116 L.R.R.M. at 3171.
" 713 F.2d 211, 114 L.R.R.M. 2024 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
38 667 F.2d 297, 109 L.R.R.M. 2197 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 974 (1984).
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Guardia Act to the Bankruptcy Code. 39
 Roth the Crowe and Petrusch courts noted that
the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 4° did not even mention the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. In addition, the Petrusch court pointed out that the Commission
on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States" also did not discuss any possible effect.
on Norris-LaGuardia." Both the decisions in Crowe and Petrusch, after examining the
Bankruptcy Code and its legislative history, concluded that Congress did not intend to
implicitly and silently repeal Norris-LaGuardia through enactment of section 362 of the
Bankruptcy Code." Although the bankruptcy provision at issue in Briggs differed from
the provision considered by the Second and Sixth Circuits, tht Briggs court agreed that
Congress would not have silently repealed the Norris-LaGuardia Act through the Bank-
ruptcy Code."
In addition to concluding that Congress did not intend to subordinate the Norris-
LaGuardia Act to the Bankruptcy Code, the Eighth Circuit also held that the Supreme
Court's Bildisco decision did not require a subordination of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. to
bankruptcy provisions." The Bildisco decision, according to the Eighth Circuit, does not
remove the jurisdictional restrictions imposed by Norris-LaGuardia." According to the
Briggs court, the Bildisco holding simply allows the bankruptcy court to reject collective
bargaining agreements as part of a Chapter 11 reorganization. 48 The second part of
Bildisco, as interpreted by Briggs, also holds that employers do not commit an unfair
labor practice under section 8(a) of the NLRA by modifying collective bargaining agree-
ments after filing for bankruptcy but prior to court approval of a contract abrogation."
In reaching this interpretation of Bildisco, the Briggs court stated that the Supreme Court
did not mention Norris-LaGuardia nor imply that the Norris-LaGuardia Act should be
repealed in bankruptcy reorganization cases such as Briggs where union contracts are
modified. 50 The court reasoned that it would unnecessarily limit American workers'
ability to legitimately exercise their rights if it were to interpret Bildisco as repealing the
Norris-LaGuardia jurisdictional restrictions."
39 Crowe, 713 F.2d at 214-15, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2027; Petrusch, 667 F.2d at 299-300, 109 L.R.R.M.
at 2198.
4 ' REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977);
NOTES OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in
5 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5788, 5840-41 (1978).
41 Groove, 713 F.2(1 at 214-15, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2027; Petrusch, 667 F.2d at 299-300, 109 L.R.R.M.
at 2198.
' 2 REPORT OF THE COMM, ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-
137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
43
 667 F.2d at 300, 109 L.R.R.M. at 2198.
44 Crowe, 713 F.2d at 214-15, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2027; Petrusch, 667 F.24 at 299-300, 109 L.R.R.M.
at 2198.
45
 739 F.2d at 344, 116 L.R.R.M. at 3171. The decisions cited by the Eighth Circuit both
involved the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362, and both decisions
found that section 362 did not alter the jurisdictional limitations imposed by Norris-LaGuardia. See
Crowe, 713 F.2d at 214-15, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2027; Petrusch 667 F.2d at 299-300, 109 L.R.R.M. at
2198.
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After reaching its decision that neither Congress nor the Supreme Court intended
to subordinate the Norris-LaGuardia Act to the Bankruptcy Code, the Briggs court
indicated that two additional factors supported its affirming the district court's decision.
First, the court stated that if any union conduct violated provisions of state or federal
law, the Briggs Company would have the same remedies that other employers have
under existing statutory and case law." Second, the court found that since any Briggs
Company employees who strike out of dissatisfaction with wages, benefits, or terms of
employment are economic strikers, the Briggs' Company could respond in any legal
manner to continue its operations."
The Briggs decision refusing to ease the jurisdictional restrictions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act is consistent with the current positions of both Congress and the Supreme
Court. The Briggs court correctly observed that nothing in the Bankruptcy Code or its
legislative history indicates that Congress intended to use bankruptcy provisions to repeal
Norris-LaGuardia. 54 Briggs' reliance on two cases from other circuits, Crowe and Petrusch,
is well placed because both cases found no congressional intent to subordinate the Norris-
LaGuardia Act to the Bankruptcy Code." If Congress did not intend to repeal Norris-
LaGuardia through the bankruptcy provisions considered by Crowe and Petrusch,56 it was
reasonable for the Briggs court to conclude that Congress would similarly not have
intended to repeal Norris-LaGuardia through section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
The Briggs court also held that the Supreme Court's decision in Bildisco does not
require an easing of the Norris-LaGuardia Act's jurisdictional restrictions." Although
the Briggs discussion of Bildisco is somewhat limited, the Briggs court's holding is consistent
with Bildisco. As the Briggs court recognized, it is unlikely that the Bildisco Court intended
to subordinate the Norris-LaGuardia Act to the Bankruptcy Code because Bildisco neither
discussed Norris-LaGuardia nor implied that Norris-LaGuardia should not apply in
bankruptcy reorganizations." Because the Bildisco Court did not indicate that its decision
would affect the application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, courts should continue to
enforce the Act. Thus, the Briggs court, concluding that it had no jurisdiction to issue
an injunction, remained consistent with the mandates of Norris-LaGuardia."
As a consequence of the Briggs decision, union workers may continue activities which
protest terms and conditions of employment without having those activities enjoined by
52 Id.
53 Id. There are generally two kinds of strikes which are permitted under the National Labor
Relations Act — economic strikes and unfair labor practice strikes. 2 C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW, 1007-11 (2d ed. 1983). An unfair labor practice strike is a strike initiated in whole or
in part in response to an unfair labor practice of the employer, while an economic strike is one that
attempts to enforce economic demands on the employer. Id. The distinction is important because
only unfair labor practice strikers have an absolute right to reinstatement. Id. Employers facing
economic strikes may hire permanent replacements for the strikers to continue operations and will
only have to reinstate economic strikers if vacancies exist. Id.
" 739 F.2d at 344, 116 L.R.R.M. at 3170-71.
55 Crowe, 713 F.2d at 214-15, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2027; Petrusch, 667 F.2d at 299-300, 109 L.R.R.M.
at 2198.
56 Crowe, 713 F.2d at 214-15, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2026; Petrusch, 667 F.2d at 299-300, 109 L.R.R.M.
at 2198.
57 739 F.2d at 344, 116 L.R.R.M. at 3171.
58
59 See id.
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judicial injunctions. 6° After Briggs, the power to protest changes in employment condi-
tions remains intact even in situations where the changes in employment conditions have
been accomplished through legal methods approved of by the Supreme Court. 6 ' Such a
decision is consistent with the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the purpose of which is to remove
the power courts had to prevent American workers from legitimately exercising their
rights.62
 The Briggs result is not anomalous simply because employers may be subjected
to employee protests for actions which are unquestionably legal. Indeed, present state
and federal laws currently allow workers to strike to protest employer actions which are
legal." The Briggs decision does not change the legal status of any actions taken by an
employer in reliance on bankruptcy provisions, but instead merely attempts to maintain
the equality of bargaining power between labor and management by maintaining the
jurisdictional restrictions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT DECISIONS
A. *Constructive Persuader Agreements Require Disclosure Under the LMRDA: Master
Printers of America v. Donovan'
Under. section 203(b) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(LMRDA or Act), any person who enters into an agreement with an employer to engage
in union or open shop "persuader activity" must disclose that arrangement by filing with
the Secretary of Labor. 2 The Act describes the object of "persuader activity" as being to
directly or indirectly "persuade employees to exercise or not to exercise, or persuade
employees as to the manner of exercising, the right to organize and bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing." A person meeting the LMRDA's criteria
must file a detailed statement of the terms and conditions of such an arrangement within




63 Upon expiration of a collective bargaining agreement, for example, an employer may attempt
to establish new wage levels or new terms and conditions of employment. Even though such an
attempt to change economic terms of employment is perfectly legal, employees may still legally
protest the employer's action through a strike. See C. MORRIS, supra note 53, at 1011-14.
* Jennifer Kemp, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW,
' 751 F.2d 700, 118 L.R.R.M. 2049 (4th Cir. 1984).
2 29 U.S.C. § 433(b) (1982). Section 203(6) of the Act (codified at § 433(b)) provides:
Every person who pursuant to any agreement with an employer undertakes activities
where an object thereof is, directly or indirectly —
(1) to persuade employees to exercise or not to exercise, or persuade employees as to
the manner of exercising, the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing; ... shall file within thirty'days after entering
into such agreement a report ... containing .. , a detailed statement of the terms
and conditions of such agreement or arrangement. Every such person shall file an-
nually with respect to each fiscal year during which payments were made as a result
of such an agreement or arrangement a report ... containing a statement 	 of its
receipts	 . on account of labor relations advice or services, designating the sources
thereof, and ... its disbursements.
3 Id.
4 Id.
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ployer to perform persuader activity must file an annual report accounting for receipts
from employers for labor relations advice or services and connected disbursements.5
The Act provides an exemption for persons agreeing to perform only an advisory
function to employers regarding methods of discouraging establishment of a union shop,
as long as no attempt is made to persuade employees.°
The LMRDA has been interpreted broadly, as remedial legislation,' The Fourth,
Fifth and Seventh Circuits have construed section 203(b) of the Act as regulating a
suspect group, "persuaders," rather than merely a suspect activity, "persuading." 5 These
courts have reasoned that the legislative history of the Act supports the view that
Congress connected corruption in the labor field with activities of management per-
suaders, and determined to regulate them as a group, rather than to address isolated
instances of persuader activity. 9 The congressional purpose for enacting the Act was
found to be not only deterrence of actual corruption or the appearance of corruption,
but the enablement of investigative methods in an area where there has been a dem-
onstrated propensity for wrongdoing.'°
29 U.S.C. § 433(b) (1982).
6 29 U.S.C. § 433(c) (1982) provides: "Nothing in this section shall be construed to require any
employer or other person to file a report covering the services of such person by reason of his
giving or agreeing to give advice ...."
' See, e.g., Price v. Wirtz, 412 F.2d 647, 71 L.R.R.M. 2354 (5th Cir. 1969). In Price, the Fifth
Circuit construed the advisory exemption so narrowly as to render it vestigial, while the enabling
provisions were interpreted liberally. Id. at 652, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2356 (Dell, J., dissenting). The issue
in Price was whether, by engaging in persuader activity with one employer, a labor consultant
thereby lost his exemption as to other employers with whom he performed only an advisory function
which was otherwise nonreportable. Id. at 648, 71 L.R.R.M. 2354-55. The Price court found that
even one instance of persuader activity with one employer caused a consultant to forfeit his
exemption, even as to those agreements with other employers which involved no persuader activity.
Id. at 650, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2357.
The Fourth Circuit interpreted the section in the same fashion, construing the § 433(c) ex-
emption as a gloss which merely affirmed that a consultant who strictly limited his function to that
of advice-giver in all cases did not, by giving that advice, subject himself to disclosure obligations.
Douglas v. Wirtz, 353 F.2d 30, 34, 60 L.R.R.M. 2264, 2267 (4th Cir. 1965).
The Seventh Circuit also endorsed this view in affirming Donovan v. Master Printers of America,
where the district court held that a trade association which performed advisory functions for 797
members and persuasion activity for three members was required to account annually for all 800
members. 532 F. Supp. 1140, 1143, 109 L.R.R.M. 3215, 3217 (N.D. Ill. 1981), aff 'd, 699 F.2d 370,
112 L.R.R.M. 2738 (7th Cir. 1983). The district court acknowledged that, if not for the three
instances of' persuader activity, the 797 members receiving only advice need not have been reported.
Id. at 1143, 109 L.R.R.M. at 3218. The district court, however, treated the first instance of persuader
activity on the part of a labor consultant as a trigger compelling full disclosure of information
otherwise nonreportable under section 433(c). Id. The district court rejected the argument that this
construction of the Act violated first amendment rights of speech or association, or that it rendered
the Act unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 1146-49, 109 L.R.R.M. at 3221-25.
8 See supra note 7 and cases discussed therein. These courts have endorsed the view that one
instance of persuader activity between a labor consultant and any employer triggers annual re-
porting requirements under section 203(b), even as to those employers who have not agreed to
persuader activity, but who have received only "advice" which otherwise would be nonreportable.
9 See supra note 7 and cases discussed therein.
10 See supra note 7 and cases discussed therein. In light of these assumptions and objectives,
any consultant who engaged in face-to-face persuader activity on behalf of any employer was viewed
by Congress as inherently suspect, and was required to account for all activities, both persuasive
and advisory. See Price v. Wirtz, 412 F.2d 64 7 , 649-51, 71 L.R.R.M. 2354, 2555-57 (5th Cir. 1969);
Douglas v. Wirtz, 353 F.2d 30, 34, 60 L.R.R.M. 2264, 2267 (4th Cir. 1965).
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During the Survey year, the Fourth Circuit in Master Printers of America v. Donovan
ruled that requiring a trade association consisting of nonunion employers to disclose
arrangements whereby employees of the association's members received an anti-union
trade magazine directly from the trade association as part of an outstanding employee
program, did not violate the trade association's- constitutional rights of speech and
association. 11 The court found that occasional articles with an anti-union focus in a trade
magazine constituted "persuader" activity, even where the subject matter of the articles
was theoretical or under the guise of news from around the nation, and did not specif-
ically target employees from a particular shop receiving the publication. 12 The court
found no need for face-to-face persuasion where employer members of the trade asso-
ciation knew or should have known the anti-union flavor of the publication and agreed
to participate in a program whereby the magazine was mailed directly to outstanding
employee craftsmen.' 3
The plaintiff in the case was Master Printers of America (MPA), a trade association
composed of about 5,000 nonunion printing companies." One program offered by MPA
to its members is the Craftsmanship Program, which recognizes employee expertise and
promotes good employee-management relations.j' Winners of the Craftsmanship Award
receive a free subscription to an MPA quarterly magazine called Insight, which is delivered
directly to the employee's home. 16 Insight contains articles of general interest to employees
in the printing industry as well as articles which feature the employer's viewpoint." MPA
disputed whether these articles expressing the employer's viewpoint constituted per-
suader material within the meaning of section 203(h), thus subjecting MPA to LMRDA
reporting requirements.' 8
I n 1978, MPA brought suit in federal district court challenging the authority of the
Secretary of Labor to require MPA to file reports under section 203(b) of the LMRDA. 19
The Secretary responded by seeking an injunction to compel compliance with the Act."
The suits were consolidated in the form of cross motions for summary judgment, and
the district court granted the Secretary's motion and ordered MPA to comply. 2 ' On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded for trial on the issue whether MPA's
activities fell within the scope of section 203(b). 22 Following a trial, the district court
ruled on remand that MPA's activities were covered by the Act. 23
" Master Printers of America v. Donovan, 751 F.2d 700, 713-14, 118 L.R.R.M. 2049, 2059
(4th Cir. 1984).
12 Id. at 703, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2051.
is Id.
' 4 Master Printers of America v. Marshall, 101 L.R.R.M. 2483, 2483 (E.D. Va. 1979), rend and
remanded, 620 F.2d 293, 105 L.R.R.M. 2995 (4th Cir. 1980).
' 5. Id. Candidates for the program are nominated by their employers and are reviewed by a
committee of industry experts before receiving the actual Craftsman Award at an awards banquet.
Id. at 2483-84.
'n Id. at 2484.
17
 Master Printers, 751 F.2d at 702, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2050. Articles discuss technological improve-
ments, trends of products or processes, profit facts, open-shop advantages, human interest stories,
and awards events. Id.
1,1 Id. at 702-03, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2050-51,
Id. at 701, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2050.
2.1 id .
2 ' Master Printers of America v. Marshall, 101 L.R.R.M. 2483, 2486 (F.D. Va. 1979).
'" Master Printers of America v. Marshall, 620 EN 293, 293, 105 L.R.R.M. 2995, 2995 (4th
Cir. 1980).
2s
	 Printers of America v. Marshall, 105 L.R.R.M. 2996, 2998 (E.D. Va. 1980). At issue
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MPA then appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that section
203(b) was unconstitutional because it violated MPA's first amendment rights. 24 The
court of appeals affirmed the district court's factual findings, but remanded for an initial
determination of the constitutional questions. 25 On remand for the second time, the
district court concluded that section 203(b) was constitutional. 26 MPA appealed that
decision, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 27
In its decision to affirm, the court of appeals rejected three arguments with which
MPA challenged the constitutionality of section 203(h). First, MPA contended that the
Act infringed its first amendment rights of speech and association by creating a substan-
tial deterrent effect on continued MPA membership for numerous employers." MPA
also argued that the statute was void for vagueness. 29 Finally, MPA asserted that the
thirty-day reporting requirement of section 203(b) constituted a prior restraint on free
speech, because it required compliance prior to publication regardless of when the
magazine was actually published or of its actual contents."
In addressing the first amendment challenge, the court expressed skepticism re-
garding the speculative "deterrent effect" on MPA membership. It concluded, however,
that even if the reporting requirements did infringe to some degree on MPA's first
amendment rights, the government interests served by the Act far outweighed the harm
suffered.'' In arriving at this conclusion, the court exercised "exacting" scrutiny," fo-
cusing on four factors: the degree of infringement on first amendment rights; the
importance of the government interest protected by the Act; whether a substantial
relationship existed between the government interest and the information required to
be disclosed; and the closeness of the "fit" between the Act and the government interest
it purported to further."
was whether the members participating in the Craftsmanship Program had entered a persuader
agreement with the Master Printers organization. Id. at 2996. The court weighed the frequency of
persuader articles appearing in the Insight magazine from 1973 to 1977 which contained unambig-
uously anti-union material. Id. at 2996-97. The court also found evidence that MPA distributed
pamphlets to member employers which described Insight as covering subjects such as the advantages
of the open shop. Id. at 2997.
Other pamphlets sent to employers dealt with advice to employees on how to deal with union
organizing drives and how to maintain an open shop. Id. The court found that although member
employers testified as to lack of subjective intencto enter persuader agreements, the court need
not accept that testimony as conclusive. Id. In light of the abundance of information afforded
employers by MPA, the court refused to accept the employers' asserted lack of awareness. Id. at
2998. Thus, the court found a persuader agreement present. Id.
24 Master Printers of America v. Marshall, 679 F.2d 884, 884, 110 L.R.R.M. 2583, 2583 (4th
Cir. 1981).
" Id.
'2 " Master Printers of America v. Donovan, 112 L.R.R.M. 2504, 2508 (E.D. Va. 1982).
' 7 Master Printers of America v. Donovan, 751 F.2d 700, 702, 118 L.R.R.M. 2049, 2050 (4th
Cir. 1984).




" Id. The court cited Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 65-66 (1976), for the proper standard of
review where compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may infringe
upon first amendment rights.
98 Master Printers, 751 F.2d at 703, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2051.
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First, the court examined the extent of the "chill" on MPA's first amendment rights. 54
The court used the standard established in NAACP v. Alabama 35 and followed in Buckley
v. Valeo,36
 evaluating whether a likelihood existed that first amendment rights were
chilled. This standard, the Master Printers court explained, required only a showing of
reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure would subject the complainant to
threats, harassment or reprisals." The court found that the evidence submitted by MPA
which attempted to show possible annoyance and harassment demonstrated only a
speculative "chill" on MPA members' first amendment rights."
The court then addressed the second factor, the importance of the government
interest served by the Act." The court concluded that deterrence of actual corruption
and the government's power to inform itself through investigations in order to protect
its vital interests were compelling government interests:" The court then examined the
legislative history of the LMRDA and determined that the Act grew out of congressional
findings that "union busting" management middlemen were conspiring with employers
to undermine employee efforts to exercise their collective bargaining rights. 41 According
to the court, these congressional findings of corruption and disregard for employee
rights led to the enactment of section 203(b) to eliminate improper practices which
defeated the policies set forth in the Labor Management Relations Act. 42 Thus, the court
held that if, in fact, MPA suffered minimal infringement of its first amendment rights,
that infringement was the consequence of government efforts to protect legitimate and
important societal interests,'"
The court then stated that the disclosure scheme embodied in section 203(b) was
substantially related to the compelling government interests which were the objective of
the Act:" Referring to the need for disclosure as "sunlight," the court noted that section
203(b) provided "sunlight" in the area of labor/management relations in several ways. 45
Comparing the need for "sunlight" in labor/management relations to a similar need in
political spending, the court recognized that disclosure helps employees, like voters in
an election, to understand the source of information that is distributed to them:" The
34 Id. at 704, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2052.
33
 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958) (plaintiff sought disclosure of NAACP's membership list).
36
 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (plaintiff sought disclosure of campaign fund sources and amounts).
37 Master Printers, 751 F.2d at 703, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2052 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74).
38 Id. at 705, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2053. MPA attempted to show that industry competitors could
derive useful competitive information from knowing the amount of dues paid by employer/members
of MPA, and that members' fear of this disclosure would result in a membership decline in MPA.
Id. at 705, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2052. The court, however, found that the type of useful information
which could be calculated from knowledge of the dues amount was information already easily
accessible to those in the industry (e.g., size, number of employees, whether a shop was unionized).
Id. Thus, the court refused to take seriously MPA's assertion of fear of declining membership. Id.
at 705, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2053.
39 Id. at 706, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2053.
4° Id. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67).
4, Id.
"Id. at 706, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2054 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 401(b), 401(c) (1982)).
43 M. at 707, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2054.
44 Id.
45 Id.
4" Id. The court in quoting Buckley stated that "Thipublicity is justly recommended as a remedy
for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light is the
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court maintained that exposure discourages potential abuse and reduces the appearance
of impropriety in an area known to be subject to corruption." Finally, the court noted
that section 203(b) ensures the Secretary of Labor the means to gather information and
detect violations." Thus, the court concluded that 203(b)'s scheme was substantially
related to the government interests sought to be served.
The fourth factor addressed by the court in the first amendment test was whether
the Act was carefully tailored to achieve its purpose. 49 MPA contended that the Act was
overbroad in two ways: in the number of employers covered; and in the amount of
detail required to be reported. 5° While the number of employers potentially affected by
section 203(h) exceeded the number enrolled in the Craftsmanship Program, the court
attributed no significance to this disparity." The court determined that Congress believed
management persuaders as a group were inherently suspect, and therefore required
disclosure of a wide range of activities, even some activities which were not improper. 52
In fact, the court acknowledged that the difficulty of distinguishing persuader from
nonpersuader activity in the labor field created a critical need for wide-ranging disclo-
sure." The court did note that MPA membership, in and of itself, did not call for
disclosure. Only if labor relations advice or persuasion was present, the court concluded,
were reporting requirements triggered."
The court maintained that the two-fold aspect of section 203(b) — annual reporting
of receipts and disbursements for labor relations advice and services, and the thirty-day,
detailed reporting of agreements to persuade — showed that the Act was tailored to
serve its purpose." Those employers who have not entered a persuader agreement (that
is, nonparticipants in the Craftsmanship Program) appear only on the annual report,
which does not specify the content of advice or designate which employers are members
of MPA. 56 Those employers, however, who have entered the suspect area of actual
persuasion through the Craftsmanship Program, the court noted, are subject to disclo-
sure in the more detailed and immediate thirty-day report. 57 Thus, the court found that
the stringency of the exposure was narrowly tailored to the degree of suspect activity,
and that MPA's claim of overbreadth was unconvincing. 5'
The court next discussed MPA's vagueness argument. 59 MPA contended that the
term "persuade" was so vague that due process was offended, because it was impossible
most efficient policeman. — Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67 (quoting L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLES' MONEY
72 (1933)).
" 751 F.2d at 708, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2055.
Id.
"Id.
5') Id. MPA pointed out that, although over 5,000 employers would be affected by § 933(b), only
900 were actually participating in the Craftsmanship Program at the time of the suit. Id. The 4,100
employers who were nonparticipants in the program, but who potentially received "advice" from
the trade union would be subject to disclosure by MPA on the annual report of information which
had gone unreported under the."advice" exception, § 433(c).
51 751 F.2d at 708, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2055.
59 Id.
55 Id.
54 Id. at 708 n.12, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2055 n.12.
"Id. at 709, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2055-56.
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to determine what activity triggered reporting requirements. 60 The court concluded that
the term "persuade" conveyed sufficiently definite warning as to conduct regulated by
the statute, when measured by common understanding and practices. 61 The court noted
that the term "persuade" only took effect in the context of an agreement between an
employer and a consultant, and only when persuasion pursuant to that agreement was
aimed at an employee on the subject of collective bargaining or the right to organize. 62
The court stated that it was unimportant whether an article discussed organizing on a
theoretical level or reported the specifics of a particular organizing campaign." The
crux of the matter, according to the court, was the intention of the employer to agree
to persuade employees about the merits of union organizing. 64 The agreement between
MPA and member/employers made anti-union articles discussing a different employer
or union applicable to the specific MPA employer and employees. 65 Thus, the court held
that an MPA employer/member's knowledge and tacit approval of the anti-union subject
matter contained in Insight, whether theoretical or specific, coupled with the employer's
permission to allow Insight to be distributed to his employees, created an agreement to
persuade and required disclosure under section 203(b). 66
Finally, the court found no merit in MPA's prior restraint clairn. 67 The prior restraint
argument was based on the district court's holding that the persuader agreement came
into being when an MPA member joined the Craftsmanship Program. 68 Because a report
must be filed within thirty days from the date of the agreement, and because this
requirement may occur before Insight is actually published, MPA argued that in certain
instances it may have to comply when that particular issue of Insight contains no per-
suader material." MPA argued that requiring a determination in advance of a publication
date whether to make the disclosure amounted to a prior restraint on protected speech.'°
The court rejected MPA's argument because prior restraint requires direct restraint on
speech and no direct restraint was found in enforcing section 203(6). 71
The Master Printers decision clarifies two significant areas in the enforcement of
section 203(b). First, the court explained the factors which were required to be present
in order to hold that an employer had constructively agreed to persuade with a third
party, and was thus subject to section 203(b) disclosure requirements. The first factor
was whether an employer knew or should have known of the anti-union content of
fio Id. at 710, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2057. This asserted ambiguity offended due process in two ways
according to MPA. First, MPA offered evidence that the difficulty of ascertaining what constituted
persuasion had resulted in "self-censorship" by Insight writers who wished to steer far clear of the
persuasion zone. Id, Second, MPA argued that the subjectivity of the term "persuade" lent itself to
arbitrary enforcement because the standards for application of the statute were unclear. Id. at 710,
118 L.R.R.M. at 2056.




65 Id. at 712 n.13, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2057-58 n.13.
6" Id, at 712, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2058. The court considered MPA's suggestion that Insight be
regarded like the Wall Street Journal or the Reader's Digest to be "preposterous". Id.
67 Id. at 713, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2058.




71 Id. at 713, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2058.
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materials which reached his employees. 77 Second, the material must have reached the
employees directly from a third party, not through the employer. 73 In other words, an
employer may not plead ignorance of the content of materials which reached his em-
ployees with the employer's permission. 7'
In addition, the court made clear that materials need not be addressed specifically
to a particular employer or a particular union to be classified as persuasive. 75 Materials
which deal with organization or collective bargaining on a theoretical level fall within
the section 203(b) definition of persuader activity. 76 Materials disguised as "newsworthy"
comment on the plight of unions across the country, and even articles which describe
factual events concerning a specific union or employer fall within the scction 203(b)
definition of persuasion. 77 These materials, however, must be given to employees pur-
suant to an agreement with an employer in order to be subject to report requirements
under section 203(b). 78 Thus, the court has defined persuader activity in the broadest
possible sense, while retaining the necessary requirement that employers "conspire" with
a third party for those materials to reach employees, in order to fall within the statute. 79
This approach fulfills the spirit in which the LMRDA was enacted and affirms the
courts' intention of implementing the legislative objective to bring "sunlight" to all areas
of labor/employer relations. It demonstrates the courts' willingness to scrutinize materials
disguised as factual news coverage, and expose their true identity as persuader materials,
when, and only when, the material reaches employees subject. to an agreement between
the employer and a third party. This application of section 203(b) does not impinge on
any honest free speech; rather, it permits the hearer to identify the speaker, so that
employees may recognize the likelihood of bias inherent in materials they receive. 80
The Master Printers decision makes it imperative for employers to be actually aware
of the content of materials which reach their employees from a third party with the
employer's blessing, since employers are now made constructively aware of content.s'
Employers should be aware that materials with persuasive content, whether general or
specific in nature, subject the third party source to report requirements which reveal the
" Id. at 711-12, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2057.




" Id. at 711-12, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2057.
m Id. at 711, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2057.
79 Id .
Hu Id. 'The objective of the legislation at issue in Buckley was analogous to the source identification
which was sought in Master Printers. In Buckley, the goal of the legislation was to identify the SOU FCC
of campaign funds in a political election. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Thus, the court's
use of the Buckley precedent was valid and directly on point. The Buckley Court fnund that the
objective of the Federal Election Campaign Act, the constitutionality of which was challenged, was
to expose the source of campaign funds in order to protect against improper influence, to safeguard
the integrity or the electoral process, and to inform the electorate. Id. at 23-28. These objectives
are parallel to those sought by the legislators who enacted the LNIDRA. See supra note 43 and
accompanying text. Both cases involved areas of traditional concern regarding corruption. Both
cases upheld statutes the purpose of which was to expose the sources of money or information, so
that those whose decision-making process was the object of the persuasive activity were able to
evaluate the proper weight to be given the persuasive materials.
" 1 751 F.2d at 711 n.13, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2057-58 n.13.
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amounts spent by a particular employer for labor relations advice, as well as actual
persuader "services." 82
In addition, a new reportable category has been created, that of employers who do
not agree to allow persuader materials to reach their employees, but who do receive
"advice" from a consultant who has persuader agreements with other employers." These
employers who receive only "advice" from "persuader" consultants must recognize that
they are dealing with an inherently suspect party, and that their "advice" activity, al-
though unreportable on its own merits," becomes reportable by the third party when
that party is engaged in persuader activity elsewhere." Although these "advice" employ-
ers arc not required to appear on the detailed, thirty-day disclosure to which employers
who engage in actual persuasion are subject, they will appear on the less stringent annual
report." The employer who desires confidentiality of amounts spent for labor relations
advice or services which fall short of persuader activity must now choose consultants
carefully, avoiding those who engage in suspect persuader activity elsewhere.
In Master Printers, the Fourth Circuit continued the trend among the circuits to
interpret section 203(b) liberally to reach direct and indirect covert activity by employers
in the labor relations area." The Master Printers decision demonstrates a determination
to expose sources of information which reach employees on the subject of organizing
and collective bargaining." The resulting "sunlight" which is thrust upon employers who
"Id. at 709, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2055-56.
85 Id.
" See supra note 6 for language of 29 U.S.C. § 433(c) (1982), the advice exception.
8 ' 751 F.2d at. 709, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2056.
Hfi Id.
L See supra note 7 and cases cited therein.
"8
 A contrast of the judicial attitudes toward covert versus overt persuader activity is demon-
strated by comparing the present opinion with the original district court opinion, Master Printers
of America v. Donovan, 108 L.R.R.M. 2050 (E.D. Va. 1981) [hereinafter referred to as Master
Printers 11. That case was decided between the time the present case was initiated and when the
present case was finally decided by the Fourth Circuit, and it dealt with the same parties, and with
the same publication, Insight. Id. at 2051. In that case, however, the issue was whether distribution
of Insight to employees by employers triggered report requirements under *433(6). Id. The court
held that no disclosure was required, because no agreement to persuade was present between MPA
and the employer, in light of the fact that MPA did not send the publication directly to employees'
homes. Id.
In an alternative to a finding of no persuader activity, the court ruled that MPA's distribution
of Insight to employers fell within the "advice" exception in § 433(c). Id. This "advice" exception
had been narrowly construed to protect only those who performed exclusively advice functions and
who performed no persuader activity on behalf of any employer. See supra notes 7-9 and accom-
panying text. Master Printers I, however, unlike the Wirtz case, dealt only with advice, because no
evidence of persuader activity was produced. Id. at 2052. It thus qualified for the narrow § 433(c)
exception.
The critical difference between the facts of Master Printers I and the present case is the deceptive
appearance of impartiality in the present case, where the employee received the material directly
from MPA without the realization that it reached him by.an
 agent of his employer. See 751 F.2d at
702, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2050. In contrast, in Master Printers I, the employee received the material
from the hands of the employer and was therefore aware of the bias inherent in the material. 108
L.R.R.M. at 2051. The contrast in outcome of these two decisions based on the same articles and
the same parties, demonstrates that the activity which is the objective of § 433(b) is covert persuader
activity, rather than overt activity. In other words, source exposure is the objective of the statute,
not suppression of free speech.
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would otherwise hide behind purportedly impartial publishers of a trade magazine
containing allegedly "newsworthy" articles about failing unions, fulfills the spirit in which
the LMRDA was enacted. 89 In the future, employers must be aware that they assume
responsibility for agreeing to the content of persuasive materials which they arrange to
reach their employees directly from an "outside" source. The burden of this responsibility
involves disclosure of employer information under section 203(b) by the distributor of
the persuasive materials, even when the materials are not specifically targeted towards a
particular shop, but are of a general nature.
V. PREEMPTION
A. *States' Ability to Limit Employees' Section 7 Right to Select the Officers of their Labor
Unions: Brown v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International
Union Local 54'
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (Act) 2 grants employees the right to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.'' Under the provisions
of the Act, any interference by management' or labor organizations 5 with this section 7
right of employees is an unfair labor practice which the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) has the power to prohibit. 6 The federal preemption doctrine similarly protects
this right of employees to select the bargaining representatives of their own choice from
interference by the states.? Under the federal preemption doctrine, if there is a substan-
tive conflict between a state's law and section 7's provisions, the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution dictates that the provisions of the federal law must
prevail. 8
In the 1945 case of Hill v. Florida,9 the United States Supreme Court held that
section 7 conferred on employees an absolute right to select the bargaining representa-
tives of their own choice.'" Thus, according to the Court, a Florida statute, which
provided for state licensing of union officials and prohibited the licensing of officials
8" See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
* By Joseph L. Johnson III, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
104 S. Ct. 3179, 116 L.R.R.M. 2921 (1984).
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982), provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or
all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment
as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982).
4 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982).
5 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1982).
See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982); see generally Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders
Intl Union Local 54 v. Danziger, 709 F.2d 815, 824, 113 L.R.R.M. 2868, 2874 (3d Cir. 1983).
Brown v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54, 104 S. Ct.
3179, 3186, 116 L.R.R.M. 2921, 2925 (1984).
8 Id. at 3187, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2925-26.
" 325 U.S. 538, 16 L.R.R.M. 734 (1945).
") Id. at 541, 16 L.R.R.M. at 735.
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who failed to satisfy the qualifications set forth in the statute, was in conflict with section
7 because the state law placed limits on who employees could select to represent them
in bargaining with management'? The Court similarly found that another section of the
Florida statute, under which an injunction had been issued against a union, was in
conflict with employees' section 7 rights.' 2 This statutorily imposed sanction, the Court.
noted, prevented the union from performing its collective bargaining functions and,
therefore, infringed upon employees' section 7 right to select a particular union as their
collective bargaining representative." In the light of the conflict between the state law
and section 7 of the Act, the Court struck down both sections of the Florida statute
under the preemption doctrine."
Fourteen years later, in DeVeau v. Braisted, 15 the Supreme Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of a New York statute which prohibited persons convicted of a felony from
holding office in any waterfront labor organization.'" This New York law had been
enacted in furtherance of a hi-state compact between New York and New Jersey.' 7 This
compact, which was part of an effort by both states to combat crime and corruption on
the waterfront, was expressly approved by Congress pursuant to its power under Article
1, section 10, of the Constitution.'" In a plurality opinion, the Court rejected a union's
contention that the New York statute was preempted by section 7 of the Act and, thus,
upheld the validity of the state law.'" The Court, however, did not overrule its previous
decision in Hill v. Florida, but, rather, distinguished In the view of the Court,
Congress's express approval of the bi-state compact and its passage of section 504 of the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) 2 ' manifested congressional
intent that the New York law should stand despite the provisions of section 7 of the
Act. 22
During the Survey year, in Brown v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders
International Union Local 54," the Supreme Court considered whether New jersey's
regulation of the qualifications of casino industry union officials was in conflict with and,
" Id.
12 Id, at 593, 16 L.R.R.M. at 736. An injunction was issued against the union in Hill because
the union failed to file a report with the state disclosing its name, the location of its offices, and the
names and addresses of its officers, and failed to pay a $1.00 annual fee to the state as was required
by Florida law. Id. at 540, 543, 16 L.R.R.M. at 735, 736.
' 4 Id. at 543-44, 16 L.R.R.M. at 736.
363 U.S. 199, 46 l...R.R.M. 2304 (1960).
Id. at 145, 46 1—R.R.M. at 2304-05.
17 Id, at 147, 46 L.R.R.M. at 2305.
Id. at 149, 46 L.R.R.M. at 2306. Article I, section 10 of the Federal Constitution provides in
part that, "No Stale shall without the Consent of Congress ... enter into any Agreement or Compact
with another state . ."
19 Id. at 154-55, 46 L.R.R.M. at 2308-09.
20 Id. at 155, 46 L.R.R.M. at 2309.
2 ' § 504(a), 29 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1982), provides in pertinent part:
No person ... who has been convicted of, or served any part of a prison term resulting
from his conviction of [a series of enumerated crimes] shall serve ... as an officer,
director, trustee, member of any executive board or similar governing body, business
agent, manager, organizer ... of any labor organization ... for five years after such
conviction or after the end of such imprisonment
22 DeVeau, 325 U.S. at 155, 46 L.R.R.M. at 2309.
29 104 S. Ct. 3179, 116 L.R.R.M. 2921 (1984).
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thus, preempted by section 7 of the Act." The Court in Brown upheld the validity of a
section of a New Jersey statute which prohibited persons who had been convicted of any
of a series of enumerated crimes or were associates of career offenders from serving as
casino industry union officials. 25 The Court, however, remanded to the district court the
portion of the case concerning whether New Jersey could impose sanctions on unions
which allowed disqualified individuals to remain in office. 26 The Court stated that on
remand the district court should determine whether the imposition of the statutory
penalties would prevent the union from performing its collective bargaining functions
and, thus, impermissibly interfere with employees' section 7 right to choose which labor
union will act as their bargaining agent. 27 After the Brown decision, at least in instances
where states are attempting to combat the problem of organized crime, states may pass
legislation preventing certain types of individuals from serving as union officials and
impose lines or criminal penalties on persons who continue to hold office after being
disqualified."
Underlying the litigation in Brown was a 1976 amendment to the New Jersey Con-
stitution, which permitted the legislature to authorize casino gambling in Atlantic City. 29
In an attempt to prevent the infiltration of organized crime into the casino industry, the
New Jersey legislature in 1977 passed the Casino Control Act, which provided for
comprehensive regulation of casino gambling in Atlantic City, including the regulation
of unions representing casino employees." Specifically, section 93 of the Casino Control
Act:" required that casino employees" and unions representing persons working in
casino hotels register annually with the Casino Control Commission (Commission)." All
24 Id. at 3182, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2922.
23 Id.
26 Id. at 3190-91, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2928-29.
Id. at 3191, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2929.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 3182, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2922.
3° Id.
Si Section 93, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-93(a) (West Supp. 1985) provides in part:
Each labor organization, union or affiliate seeking to represent employees licensed or
registered under this act and employed by a casino hotel or a casino licensee shall
register with the commission annually, and shall disclose such information to the
commission as the commission may require, including the names of all affiliated
organizations, pension and welfare systems and all officers and agents of such orga-
nizations and systems; provided, however, that no labor organization, union, or affiliate
shall he required to furnish such information to the extent such information is included
in a report filed by any labor organization, union, or affiliate with the Secretary of
Labor pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. or § 1001 et seq. if a copy of such report,
or the portion thereof containing such information, is furnished to the commission
pursuant to the aforesaid federal provisions. The commission may in its discretion
exempt any labor organization, union, or affiliate from the registration requirements
of this subsection where the commission finds that such organization, union, or affiliate
is not the certified bargaining representative of any employee licensed or registered
under this act, is not involved actively, directly or substantially in the control or
direction of the representation of any such employee, and is not seeking to do so.
82 Under the New Jersey statute, casino employees include those performing "service or cus-
todial duties not directly related to operations of the casinos, including, without limitation, barten-
ders, waiters, waitresses, maintenance personnel, kitchen staff, but whose employment duties do
not require or authorize access to the casino." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12- 8 (West Supp. 1985).
39 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-93 (West Supp. 1985).
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persons required to be registered under section 93 were subject to certain qualification
criteria which were set forth in section 86" of the Casino Control Act." Under the
qualifications standards set forth in section 86, any person who had been convicted of
any of a series of enumerated crimes or was an associate of a "career offender" would
be prohibited from serving as a casino industry union official." Those labor unions with
officials found not to have satisfied the qualification standards set forth in section 86
could be prohibited under section 93(b) from receiving union dues from employees and
from administering union pension and welfare funds."
The Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union Local
54 (Local 54) was an unincorporated labor organization which had 12,000 members,
8,000 of whom were employees in casino hotels in Atlantic City." Pursuant to the terms
of the Casino Control Act, Local 54 filed a registration statement with the Commission
in 1978.' 9 Thereafter, the Division of Gaming Enforcement (Division) conducted a
lengthy investigation, and in 1981 reported to the Commission that in its view Local 54's
president, Frank Gerace, its secretary-treasurer, Robert Lumino, and its grievance man-
ager, Frank Materio, were disqualified from being union officials under the criteria set
forth in section 86 of the Casino Control Act." Subsequent to the release of the Division's
report on Local 54, the Commission scheduled a disqualification hearing to determine
the validity of the Division's allegations. 4 ' When Local 54 raised objections to the consti-
" Section 86, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-86(c) (West Supp. 1985) provides for disqualification of a
person who had been convicted of any of a series of enumerated crimes. Another qualification
criteria contained in section 86, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-86(f) (West Supp. 1985), provides:
The identification of the applicant or any person who is required to be qualified under
this act as a condition of a casino license as a career offender or a member of a career
offender cartel or an associate of a career offender or a career offender cartel in such
a manner which creates a reasonable belief that the association is of such a nature as
to be inimical to the policy of this act and to gaming operations. For purposes of this
section, career offender shall be defined as any person whose behavior is pursued in
an occupational manner or context for the purpose of economic gain, utilizing such
methods as are deemed criminal violations of the public policy of this State. A career
offender cartel shall be defined as any group of persons who operate together as
career offenders ....
"See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-86 (West. Supp. 1985).
56 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-86(c), (f) (West Supp. 1985). A "career offender" is defined under
the New Jersey statute as "any person whose behavior is pursued in an occupational manner or
context for the purpose of economic gain, utilizing such methods as are deemed criminal violations
of the public policy of this state." N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 5:12-86(f) (West Supp. 1984).
37 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-93(b) (West Supp. 1984). Section 93(b) provides:
No labor organization, union or affiliate registered or required to be registered pur-
suant to this section and representing or seeking to represent employees licensed or
registered under this act may receive any dues from any employee licensed or regis-
tered under this act and employed by a casino licensee or its agent, or administer any
pension or welfare funds, if any officer, agent, or principal employee of the labor
organization, union or affiliate is disqualified in accordance with the criteria contained
in section 86 of this act. The commission may for the purposes of this subsection waive
any disqualification criteria consistent with the public policy of this act and upon a
finding that the interests of justice so require.
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tutionality of section 86 and section 93 at this hearing, the Commission ruled that it
lacked the authority to consider such challenges."
Local 54 then filed a complaint in federal district court seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief on the grounds that the relevant sections of New Jersey's Casino Control
Act were preempted by section 7 of the Act, the LMRDA, and the Employment Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA)." After a hearing, the district court concluded that
Local 54 was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claims and, therefore, denied the
union's motion for a preliminary injunction:" Because no preliminary injunction was
entered, the Commission went forward and conducted its disqualification hearing con-
cerning Local 54. 45 On September 28, 1982, the Commission ruled that Local 54's
president, Gerace, and grievance manager, Materio, were disqualified under section 86(f )
because they were associated with members of organized crime in a manner inimical to
the policy of the Casino Control Act and to gaming operations." The Commission also
disqualified Local 54's business agent, Karlos LaSane, because of his 1973 conviction of
extortion of persons doing business in Atlantic City while he was a City Commissioner. 47
Finally, the Commission ordered that these individuals be removed as officers of Local
54 and that, if the union failed to take such action, it would be prohibited from collecting
union dues from its members."
Subsequent to the Commission's decision, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit held that the district court had erred in refusing to grant the union's
request for a preliminary injunction." Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Hill
v. Florida, the Third Circuit held that section 93 of the Casino Control Act conflicted
with and was preempted by section 7 of the Act insofar as the New Jersey statute allowed
the Commission to disqualify elected union officials. 5° The court of appeals also held
invalid as preempted by ERISA5 ' a portion of section 93 which empowered the Com-
mission to prohibit any casino worker's union that had officers who had been disqualified
under the Casino Control Act from administering union pension and welfare funds. 52
42 Id. at 3184, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2923-24.
• Id.
44 Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Intl Union Local 54 v. Danzinger, 536 F.
Stipp. 317, 342-43 (D.N.J. 1982).
" Brown, 104 S. Ct. at 3185, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2924.
46 Id.
• ld. The secretary-treasurer of Local 54, Robert Lumino, who the Division had earlier iden-
tified as a union official who should also be disqualified, died in June, 1981, prior to the Commis-
sion's decision. Id. at 3185 n.7, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2924 n.7.
"Id. at 3185, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2924.
• Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54 v. Danzinger, 709
F.2d 815, 830, 113 L.R.R.M. 2868, 2879 (3d Cir. 1983).
3" Id.
5L In finding that the New Jersey law was preempted by ERISA, the Court relied on section
514(a) of ERISA, which provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter
and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section
1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1982).
52 Danzinger, 709 F.2d at 830-31, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2879-80.
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The Commission appealed the Third Circuit's decision and the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to consider the preemption issue."
In its opinion, the Supreme ,Court first focused on the federal preemption doctrine."
According to the Court, when the federal preemption doctrine is invoked, a court must.
first examine the intent of Congress in passing the legislation. 55 If Congress has explicitly
mandated the preemption of state laws or indicated an intent to fully occupy the field
of regulation, then the state law, the Court found, must be struck down. 56
 Even if there
is no express or implied congressional intent to occupy a particular area of law, the
Court asserted that the state law may still be invalidated under the preemption doctrine
when an actual conflict between federal and state law exists or when a state law stands
as an impediment to the accomplishment of the purposes of Congress. 57
In determining whether the provisions of New Jersey's Casino Control Act were
preempted by section 7 of the Act, the Court first noted that section 7 neither contained
explicit preemptive language nor otherwise indicated an intent by Congress to occupy
the entire field of labor-management relations. 58 The Court then turned to its prior
decision in Hill v. Florida to determine whether there was an actual conflict between the
New Jersey law and section 7 of the Act.. 59 The Court acknowledged that the Hill decision
supported Local 54's contention that section 7 of the Act provided workers with an
absolute right to choose the officials of their union. 60 The Court stated, however, that
the Hill decision did not control the present case because, subsequent to the Court's
ruling in Hill, Congress disclaimed any intent to preempt all state laws regulating the
qualifications of union officials.''
By the passage of section 504(a) of the LMRDA, 62
 the Court noted, Congress had
prohibited persons who had been convicted of any of a series of enumerated crimes
from serving as officers in a union for five years subsequent to the conviction." In the
view of the Court, by enacting section 504(a), Congress had "unmistakably indicated"
that the right of employees to select the officers of their bargaining representative was
not absolute. 6
 The Court also asserted that section 603(a) of the LMORA" expressly
disclaimed congressional intent to preempt state laws regulating the responsibilities of
union officials, except where preemption was expressly provided for in a section of the
"Brown, 104 S. Ct. at 3185, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2924.
54 Id.
" Id.
5° Id. at 3185-86, 116 L.R.R.11. at 2024.
57 Id. at 3186, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2925.
5, Id.
" Id. at 3187, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2926.
1") Id.
61 Id. at 3188, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2926.
"2
 For text of § 504(a) of the LM RDA, 29 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1982), see supra note 21.
"' Brown, 104 S. Ct. at 3188, 116 1„R.R.M. at 2926 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1982)).
1 i 4 Id. at 3188, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2926.
"'Section 603(a), 29 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1982), provides:
Except as explicitly provided to the contrary, nothing in this chapter shall reduce or
limit the responsibilities of any labor organization or any officer . under any other
Federal law or under the laws of any State, and, except as explicitly provided to the
contrary, nothing in this chapter shall take away any right or bar any remedy to which
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LMRDA.66 The failure of Congress to expressly provide for the preemption of state laws
in section 504(a), the Court stated, demonstrated that Congress intended to preserve
some room for state action concerning the qualifications of union officials. 67
Moreover, the Court found that Congress's approval of the bi-state compact at issue
in DeVeau v. Braisted similarly manifested congressional intent not to preempt all state
regulations concerning the qualifications of union officials. 69 The Court noted that at
congressional hearings concerning the bi-state compact, union officials had urged Con-
gress not to approve the New York-New Jersey agreement on the grounds that such
action would appear to sanction the New York law prohibiting convicted felons from
being officers in waterfront unions and similar legislation enacted by the state. 69 By
approving the compact over such objections, the Court asserted that Congress had
concluded that, at least where the states were faced with the problems of "crime, cor-
ruption, and racketeering," state regulation of the qualifications of union officials was
consistent with national labor policy as embodied in section 7 of the Act."
Thu's, noting that New Jersey's Casino Control Act, like the New York legislation
enacted in DeVeau, was designed to combat organized crime's infiltration of a local
industry, the Court held that New Jersey's regulation of the qualifications of casino
industry union officials did not actually conflict with section 7 of the Act." The Court
further asserted that congressional enactment of section 504(a) of the LMRDA and its
awareness of New York's similar restrictions when approving the bi-state compact also
demonstrated that New Jersey's imposition of qualification criteria for casino industry
union officials did not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress." The Court, therefore, concluded that this
portion of New Jersey's Casino Control Act was not preempted by section 7 of the Act."
Although New Jersey's regulation of the qualifications of casino industry union
officials was not preempted by section 7 of the Act, the Court asserted that the state's
imposition of a union dues collection ban on Local 54 for failing to remove disqualified
persons from their union positions raised a separate preemption issue." According to
the Court, although workers' right to select union officials could now be regulated by
the state, section 7 of the Act still gave employees the absolute right to choose which
labor organization would act as their bargaining representative. 75 Thus, the Court em-
phasized that the issue in the case at bar was whether the imposition of section 93(b)'s
dues collection ban would prohibit Local 54 from performing its functions as the em-
ployees' chosen collective-bargaining representative. 76 While Local 54 maintained that
85% of its income came from its collection of dues from its members and that it could
not perform its functions as the employees' bargaining agent without these payments,
66 Brown, 104 S. Ct. at 3188, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2926-27 (quoting DeVeau, 363 U.S. at 157, 46
L.R.R.M. at 2309-10).
67 Id. at 3188, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2927.
m Id. at 3189, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2927.
69 Id.
'° Id. at 3189-90, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2928.
7' Id. at 3190, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2928.
72 Id .
73 Id,
74 Id. at 3190-91, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2928.
75 Id. at 3190, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2928.
"Id. at 3191, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2929.
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the Court found these factual allegations had not been addressed by the district court
or the court of appeals." The Court, therefore, remanded this portion of the case so
that the district court could make the requisite findings of fact concerning the effect
which the imposition of a dues collection sanction could have on Local 54's ability to
perform its functions as employees' chosen bargaining agent. 78
Finally, the Court declined to reach the issue of whether the imposition of section
93(b)'s second sanction prohibiting a union from administering its welfare and pension
funds was preempted by section 514(a) of ERISA. 79 Because the Commission did not
impose this second sanction on Local 54, the Court ruled that this issue was not ripe for
review." Accordingly, the Court vacated the court of appeals' holding that ERISA
preempted this sanction. 8 '
In his dissenting opinion which was joined by Justices Stevens and Powell, Justice
White agreed with the majority that federal labor law did not preempt state laws regu-
lating the qualifications of union officials, but stated that this issue was not presented by
the case at bar. 82 According to justice White, section 93(b) of the Casino Control Act did
not seek to penalize union officials who did not meet section 86's qualification standards,
but instead sought to impose sanctions on the unions themselves." Because section 7 of
the Act provided employees with an absolute right to select the particular labor union
which would act as their bargaining agent, Justice White asserted that, under the federal
preemption doctrine, states were prohibited from imposing sanctions on a union which
would prevent a union from carrying out its collective-bargaining functions and, thereby,
nullify the employees' exercise of their section 7 rights." In examining the consequences
of section 93, Justice White asserted that dues collection ban sanctions, like the one
imposed by New Jersey, render a union unable to sustain itself financially and, thus,
effectively prevent a union from engaging in collective-bargaining activities on behalf of
its members. 85 Thus, in the view of justice White, there was no need to remand this case
to district court because the imposition of section 93(b)'s dues collection ban would
impair Local 54's ability to function to such an extent that it would infringe upon
employees' absolute section 7 right to bargain through the representative of their own
choice." Justice White, therefore, concluded that section 93(b) was preempted by section
7 of the Act and should have been struck down by the Court. 87
By its decision in Brown, the Supreme Court expressly overruled the portion of its
prior decision in Hill v. Florida which had found that employees had an unqualified right
" Id.
" Id. Since the Supreme Court issued its decision, the Commission withdrew its decision to
impose a dues collection ban on Local 54 and instead ordered the union to remove Gerace, Materio,
and LaSane from their union positions. Hotel and Restaurent Employees and Bartenders Intl
Union Local 54 v. Read, 597 F. Supp. 1431, 1436 (D. N.J. 1984), aff'd without opinion, 772 F.2d 893
(3d. Cir. 1985).
79 104 S. Ct. at 3191, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2929.
80 Id.
Id.
82 Id. at 3192, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2930 (White, J., dissenting).
• 63 hi .
" Id. at 3193, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2930 (White, J., dissenting).
85 Id .
86 Id. at 3193, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2931 (White, J., dissenting).
87 id.
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under section 7 of the Act to select the officers of their labor union. 88 After the Brown
decision, at least in instances where legislation is aimed at combatting the problems of
"crime, corruption, and racketeering," states may enact laws preventing certain types of
individuals from serving as union officials- 88 In the future, states will be allowed to
enforce their disqualification standards by imposing fines or criminal penalties on union
officials who continue to hold office after being disqualified. 98
The ability of the states to impose sanctions on unions which allow individuals to
stay in office after being disqualified remains uncertain after Brown. The Brown Court
did affirm the portion of the Hill decision holding that employees had an absolute right
under section 7 of the Act to select a particular labor union as their bargaining agent. 91
The failure of the Court in Brown to strike down New Jersey's imposition of a dues
collection ban under the preemption doctrine, however, makes it unclear which sanctions
a state may impose on a union without conflicting with employees' exercise of their
section 7 right. If, in the future, the Court invalidates state laws like New Jersey's,
employees' absolute section 7 right to bargain collectively through the representative of
their choice will be protected. 98 lf, however, in the future, the Court upholds a statute
allowing a state to impose a dues collection ban on a union like Local 54 on the grounds
that the statute does not prevent the union from performing its collective-bargaining
functions, employees' absolute section 7 right to choose their collective-bargaining agent
could be severely weakened. A union's ability to sustain itself financially depends to a
great extent on its ability to collect dues from its members." For example, the imposition
of a dues collection ban on Local 54 would deprive the union of 85% of its monthly
income." Thus, as Justice White stated in his dissent, a union against which such a dues
collection ban sanction is imposed "obviously cannot effectively engage in collective
bargaining activities on behalf of its members" and, thus, workers' right to bargain with
management through the representative of their own choice would effectively be nulli-
fied. 95 Therefore, if the imposition of this type of sanction by a state on a labor union is
not found by the Court to be preempted by section 7 of the Act, employees' section 7
right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing could be
eroded by the states.
In summary, the Brown decision establishes the right of states to prohibit certain
types of individuals from being labor officials. 88 States will be allowed to enforce their
disqualification standards by imposing fines or criminal penalties on union officials who
continue to hold office after being disqualified. 9' The ability of the states to impose
sanctions on unions which allow officials to stay in office after being disqualified remains
uncertain after Brown. According to , the test put forth by the Brown Court, if the
imposition of the sanction will so incapacitate a union as to prevent it from performing
98
 Id. at 3190, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2928.
99 Id. at 3189-90, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2928.
91r Id. at 319i, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2929. See also id. at 3192 n.2, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2930 n.2 (White,
J.' dissenting).
91 Id. at 3190, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2928.
92 See generally id. at 3192-93, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2930-31 (White, J., dissenting).
9 5 Id. at 3193, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2930 (White, J., dissenting).
94 Id. at 3191, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2929.
95 Id. at 3193, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2930-31 (White, J. dissenting).
"O Id. at 3190, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2928.
94 Id. at 3191, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2929.
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its functions as employees' chosen collective-bargaining agent, the state law will be
preempted by section 7 of' the Act."
VI. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
A. *The Supreme Court Overrules National League of Cities v. Usery,' Thereby Extending
the Fair Labor Standards . Act to Virtually All State And Local Government Employees: Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 2
Pursuant to its constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce," Congress
enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)a in 1938, and amended it several times
there-after.' Among the nation-wide protections for employees afforded by the FLSA
are standards forbidding employers from paying their employees less than certain pre-
scribed minimum and overtime wages." Originally, the FLSA's minimum and overtime
wage provisions applied neither to mass transit employees nor to state and local govern-
ment employees.' In a series of amendments to the FLSA between 1961 and 1974, 8
however, Congress extended the FLSA's coverage first to private mass transit workers,
and later to state and local government workers, including those employed by publicly
owned and operated mass transit systems. 9
Although Congress's power under the Constitution's commerce clausem has consis-
tently been deemed plenary," one of the few spheres in which the Supreme Court has
limited congressional power to regulate commerce is in the narrow area where that
regulation conflicts with the notion of state sovereignty as embodied in the constitutional
sa Id.
* By Gary Steven Wigodsky, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S.
Ct. 1005, 1007 (1985).
105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
3 U.S. CoNs-r. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The interstate commerce clause in the United States Constitution
states: "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce ... among the several states
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
5 The pertinent amendments are as follows: Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, Pub.
L. No. 87-30, §§ 2(c), 9, 75 Stat. 68, 71 (1961) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 203, 213 (1982))
(minimum wage coverage extended to employees of private mass transit carriers whose annual
gross revenues were no less than one million dollars); Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 102(a) & (b), 80 Stat. 831 (1966) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 203
(1982)) (minimum wage and overtime provisions extended to state and local government employees
working for schools, hospitals, and mass transit carriers); Fair Labor Standards Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 21(b), 88 Stat. 68 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 213
(1982)) (minimum wage and overtime provisions extended to virtually all state and local government
employees, including all public mass transit workers).
6 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207 (1982).
7 Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1008.
6 See supra note 5.
9 See supra note 5.
'° U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
" E.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reel. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 286 (1981); National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840 (1976), overruled on other grounds, Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115
(1941).
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scheme of federalism." Indeed, the reaction of many state and local governments to
Congress's extension of the FLSA to state and local government employees has been to
challenge such extension on state sovereignty grounds." In- these suits, the Supreme
Court was faced with the difficult task of balancing the competing constitutional interests
underlying Congress's regulation of interstate commerce under the commerce clause,
and the states' assertion of sovereignty under the tenth amendment."
The tension between the federal and state governments over the federal commerce
power's intrusion into areas of state sovereignty was manifested in several recent Su-
preme Court decisions. In deciding Maryland v. Wirlz 15 in 1968, for example, the Court
rejected the claim that the constitutional conception of federalism precluded Congress
from extending the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime provisions to cover employees
of state schools and hospitals." Rather, the Court held, because Congress's power to
regulate interstate commerce is plenary, a rational basis for congressional action under
the commerce clause sufficed, notwithstanding any contention that state sovereignty had
been infringed."' In 1976, however, a sharply divided Court overturned Wirtz in National
League of Cities v. Usery,"' ruling that the notion of state sovereignty, as incorporated in
the tenth amendment, prohibited Congress from exercising its commerce power in such
a way as to interfere with a state government in traditional areas of state functions. 19
The courts subsequently grappled with the National League of Cities doctrine of state
sovereignty, finding it difficult to distinguish between traditional and nontraditional state
functions.20 Consequently, in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Reclamation Association," the
Supreme Court attempted to refine its National League of Cities doctrine into a four part
test to facilitate judicial determination of those limited areas encompassed in the realm
of "traditional state functions." 22 The Court ruled that under the principles of National
League of Cities the tenth amendment only limited federal power to regulate interstate
commerce insofar as Congress sought to regulate states as states, in matters that were
12 See, e.g., National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 842; Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7
(1975). The area of civil liberties makes up the bulk of the Court's rare decisions that limit Congress's
otherwise plenary power under the commerce clause. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 858
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
" See, e.g., Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1005 (city of San Antonio challenged the validity of the
Department of Labor's application of the FLSA to its mass transit employees); National League of
Cities, 426 U.S. at 833 (the National League of Cities, joined by the National Governors' Conference,
several states, and several city governments, sought a declaration that the application of the FLSA
to state and local government employees was unconstitutional); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183,
187 (1968) (Maryland, joined by 27 other states, challenged as unconstitutional the extension of
the FLSA to public school and hospital employees).
14
 See Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1010-12; see also infra note 108 (text of the tenth amendment).
15
 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled in National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 855. National League of
Cities was overruled, in turn, in Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1007.
16 Id, at 195.
" Id. at 190,195-96.
18 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Concurring in the Court's decision, Justice Blackmun supplied the
majority's fifth and deciding vote in National League of Cities, although he was "not untroubled by
certain possible implications of the Court's opinion ...." National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
19 Id. at 852, 855.
I° Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1007, 1011-12.
21 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
22 Id. at 287-88.
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indisputably attributes of state sovereignty, and in such a way that impaired the ability
of states to structure integral operations of traditional state functions. 23 In addition, the
Court held, the nature and the extent of the federal interest must justify the submission
of the state concerns.24 Nevertheless, application of the Hodel test proved troublesome
as wel1. 25 United Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad26 is exemplary. Though ruling
that application of the Railway Labor Act27 to states did not violate any state sovereignty
aspect of the tenth amendment, the Long Island Court noted that the meaning of
traditional state functions remained elusive, even after the Hodel refinement of National
League of Cities. 2 '
During the Survey year, the Supreme Court reconsidered and overruled National
League of Cities. 29 In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (Garcia), the Court
found that the National League of Cities doctrine was both practically unworkable and
constitutionally unsound.30 Accordingly, the Court ruled that unless expressly exempted
by the FLSA's limited exceptions," all workers, including state employees, are now fully
covered by the statute, regardless of whether they work for their states in areas of
traditional state functions."
The litigation in Garcia, which ultimately led to the abrogation of the National League
of Cities doctrine, began following a 1979 determination by the Wage and Hour Admin-
istration of the Department of Labor that the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Au-
thority (SAMTA) was subject to the FLSA." Desiring to avoid the FLSA's overtime pay
scale, SAMTA filed suit against the Secretary of Labor in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas seeking a declaratory judgment that National League of
Cities exempted it from the federal labor law." The Department of Labor counterclaimed
for enforcement of the FLSA's overtime provisions, and Garcia and other SAMTA
employees were allowed to intervene as claimants against SAMTA."
" Id,
24 Id. at 287-88 & n.29.
See Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1011-12.
26 455 U.S. 678, 109 L.R.R.M. 3017 (1982).
27 Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982).
2 ' Long Island, 455 U.S. at 684, 109 L.R.R.M. at 3019; see also Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1011.
29 Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1007.
"" Id.
u The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (1982), still exempts a very limited class
of state employees from its coverage, such as elected state officials and their political, that is, non-
civil service, appointees.
32 See Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1020.
" Id, at 1009. Soon after, the Department of Labor amended its FLSA interpretive regulations
to provide that publicly owned mass transit systems were not entitled to immunity from the FLSA
under National League of Cities. 44 Fed. Reg. 75,630 (1979) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 775.3(b)(3)
(1984)),
M Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1009. SAMTA did not argue that, because SAMTA's mass transit system
consists solely of intrastate rather than interstate commerce, the commerce clause did not apply. Id.
at 1010. It has long been settled that Congress's authority under the interstate commerce clause
extends to intrastate commerce which affects interstate commerce in any way. Id. If SAMTA were
a private employer, therefore, it would have no claim against Congress's authority to enforce the
minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA. Id. Hence, SAMTA's sole claim rests in the
tenth amendment's reservation of rights to the states. Id. Under National League of Cities, SAMTA
argued, Congress was precluded from exercising its otherwise valid power under the commerce
clause, because to do so would necessarily and improperly infringe on state sovereignty. Id.
" Id. at 1009.
December 1985]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 141
Like most urban mass transit systems in the United States, San Antonio's public
transportation complex began in private hands, but subsequently fell under increasing
public contro1. 36 By the 1970s, San Antonio's mass transit system, by then exclusively
owned and operated by the city through its transit authority, was heavily dependent on
federal monetary contributions, as were most mass transit systems across the country. 37
Although San Antonio initially abided by the FLSA," after the Supreme Court decided
National League of Cities, the city terminated its compliance with the overtime provision
of the FLSA, believing it was thereafter immune from federal labor laws." The focus
of the controversy became that part of the Hodel test which would exempt San Antonio
from the coverage of federal labor laws if it were engaging in a traditional state func-
tion."
Relying on National League of Cities, the district court granted SAMTA's motion for
summary judgment, holding that the mass transit service provided by San Antonio was
a traditional state function.'" Garcia and the Secretary of Labor appealed directly to the
Supreme Court.42 Pending this appeal, the Court decided Long Island, in which it held
that the Railway Labor Act constitutionally applies to state-run railroads because mass
transit is not a traditional state function under the Hodel test. 43 The Court therefore
vacated the district court's opinion in Garcia, and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with Long Island." On remand, the district court adhered to its original view, 45
however, and thus, Garcia and the Secretary of Labor again appealed directly to the
Supreme Court." After initial argument in 1983, the parties were asked to re-argue the
case, specifically addressing the question of whether the interpretation of the tenth
amendment as set forth in National League of Cities should be reconsidered.'"
In 1985, Justice Blackmun, who had reluctantly supplied the fifth vote in creating
the five-to-four majority in National League of Cities, 48 wrote the majority opinion for the
Court in Garcia, reversing the district court's decision, and overruling National League of
Cities.49 Writing for the Court in Garcia, Justice Blackmun concluded that the proposition
embraced in National League of Cities, that the tenth amendment precludes Congress
Id. at 1007. Initially, passenger transportation in San Antonio was provided by a private
company. Id. In 1913, Texas and the city of San Antonio began subjecting city passenger transpor-
tation to government regulation. Id. In 1959, San Antonio purchased the privately owned San
Antonio Transit Company and replaced it with a public authority known as the San Antonio Transit
System (SATS). Id. In 1978, the city transferred its facilities and equipment to the San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority (SAMTA). Id.
" Id. at 1008. Between 1970 and 1980, for example, SATS and SAMTA were subsidized by
over $50,000,000 by the federal government. Id.
SS Id.
'9 Id.
40 Id. at 1011.
4 ' Id. at 1009.
42 Id.
" See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
44 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 457 U.S. 1102 (1982).
45 San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Tex. 1983);
see also Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1009.
"Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1010.
" Id.
"See supra note 18.
"Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1021.
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from interfering with states engaging in commerce in areas of traditional functions of
state governments, had proved both unworkable and constitutionally indefensible."
In beginning its analysis in Garcia, the Court noted that the lower federal courts
had experienced extreme difficulty in delineating the traditional state functions which
were to be protected by the tenth amendment from federal interference under National
League of Cities:" The Court recognized that activities such as regulating ambulance
drivers, licensing automobile drivers, operating airports, performing solid waste disposal,
and operating highway authorities had been judicially deemed to be traditional state
functions, and thus were immune From congressional interference under federal labor
laws." Further, the Court realized that similar activities such as regulating traffic on
public roads, regulating air transportation, regulating intrastate natural gas sales, and
operating telephone systems had been judicially held not to constitute traditional state
functions." The Garcia Court thus found "it difficult, if not impossible, to identify an
organizing principle that places each of the cases in the first group on one side of a line
and each of the cases in the second group on the other side." 54
Returning to its analysis in Long Island, the Garcia Court observed that it too had
failed to demarcate an identifiable principle for distinguishing between traditional and
nontraditional state functions." In Long Island, the Court noted, it relied in part on the
"'historical reality that the operation of railroads is not among the functions traditionally
performed by state and local governments,'" yet, at the same time, it rejected "a static
historical view of state functions.'" 56 In addition, the Court acknowledged that it had
defined traditional state functions in terms of "basic state prerogatives,"" but then failed
to explain what makes a function a basic state prerogative."
Finally, observing that the application of the FLSA to states as employers and the
requirement that states pay federal taxes similarly implicate state sovereignty concerns,
the Court looked to its historical treatment of issues of federalism raised by federal
taxation of state entities. The Court noted its failure in tax immunity cases to successfully
distinguish between traditional and nontraditional state functions, essential and nones-
sential state functions, or between governmental and proprietary state functions." It
thus reasoned that attempts to distinguish between traditional and nontraditional state
functions in determining which were immune from federal labor laws likewise would
prove futile. 6° As a result, the Court concluded that the principle of state sovereignty
set out in National League of Cities and refined in Hodel, which had led to contradictory
results, was, in practical terms, totally unworkable."
After thus concluding that National League of Cities would lead to inconsistent and
conflicting results because it was unworkable, the Court inquired into the possible reasons
"" Id.
sa Id. at 1011- 13.
52 Id. at 1011.
ss Id.
" Id. at 1011,
55 Id.
1" Id. at 1012 (quoting Long Island, 455 U.S. at 686,109 L.R.R.M. at 3020) (first emphasis added
in Garcia, second emphasis in original).
57 Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1012 (citing Long Island, 455 U.S. at 686-87,109 L.R.R.M. at 3020).
" Id. at 1012.
"Id. at 1012-14.
60 Id.
"' Id. at 1016.
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for its impracticability. The Court found that the fundamental reason for the doctrine's
practical infeasibility was that it controverted the very state sovereignty concerns that it
purported to protect.' That is, the Court reasoned that the problem the courts were
having in judging whether a state function was "traditional" could he traced to National
League of Cities's mistaken assumption about the essence of a federal system in which the
states, not the federal courts, are equipped to make such judgtnents. 63 Any judicial rule
of state immunity that looks to the "traditional," "integral" or "necessary" nature of state
functions, the Court continued, would necessarily demand that the unelected federal
judiciary make decisions about which state services it favors and which it disfavors. 6-' The
Court rejected as "unsound in principle" as well as "unworkable in practice," therefore,
the rule of state immunity from federal labor regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal
of whether a particular state action is a traditional function." The Court concluded, in
other words, that the National League of Cities doctrine had proven unworkable because it
was constitutionally erroneous."
In delineating its finding that National League of Cities was constitutionally unsup-
portable, the Court explained that the Framers had intended federalism to be a doctrine
of political process rather than substantive result.° Hence, the Court declared that the
procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system should govern the
limitations, or lack thereof, on state sovereignty under the federal commerce power."
The Court therefore concluded that "Iwlhat has proved problematic is not the perception
that the Constitution's federal structure imposes limitations on the Commerce Clause,
but rather the nature and content of those limitations."''"
The Court proceeded to elaborate on its reasoning that federalism is a structural
concept, rather than a judicially created intrusion into Congress's power to regulate the
flow of interstate commerce, by first acknowledging that although the states surrendered
a variety of sovereign powers by adopting the federal Constitution, they unquestionably
retained a significant measure of sovereign authority: 76 The Court continued, however,
by declaring that the province of state sovereignty lies not in judicially carved out
exceptions to the constitutionally enumerated powers of the federal government, but, as
the Framers originally intended, state sovereignty is a political concept which "lies in the
structure of the Federal Government itself."71 The Court reasoned that this constitutional
structure of federalism was guaranteed by the states' enjoyment of proportionate rep-
resentation in the House of Representatives under article 1, section 2, and equal repre-
sentation in the Senate under article I, section 3." Furthermore, the Court noted the
prominence of the states' role in selecting the President under the electoral college
system prescribed by article II, section 1, and, perhaps most importantly, in the consti-
tutional amendment process ordained by article V."
62 Id.




67 1d. at 1016-18.
68 Id.
69 1d. at 1016.
70 Id. at 1017.
" 1d. at 1017-18.
72 Id. at 1018.
73 Id.
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Finally, the Court demonstrated that the Constitution's provision of channels, in
which states may fulfill their roles as limited sovereign governments under the American
system of federalism, is sufficient, without judicial interference. 74 For example, the Court
pointed out that solely through the political process the states had secured for themselves
statutory exceptions to the Federal Power Act, the National Labor Relations Act, the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, the Occupational Safety and Health
Act, the Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act and the Sherman Act. 75 That they
have not secured an exception to the FLSA, the Court continued, does not obscure the
extent to which the political process has preserved the limited sovereignty of the states. 78
The Garcia majority based its decision not on the supposition that state sovereignty,
which National League of Cities sought to preserve, should not be protected." Rather, the
Court ruled that the political process is both the constitutionally mandated and realisti-
cally most practical place for federalism to be preserved. 78 Accordingly, the Court ruled
that Congress's power under the commerce clause is not impliedly limited by the tenth
amendment's embodiment of federalism or state sovereignty. 79 As a result, the Court
held that the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA are applicable to
SAMTA employees, as well as to all other state and local government employees. 88
Justice Powell, writing for all four Justices in dissent, argued first that the Court
had no justification for straying from stare decisis by overruling National League of Cities,
a recent precedent on which all members of the Court had previously relied. 8 ' He went
on to argue that the reason the majority found National League of Cities unworkable was
because it mischaracterized the decision as requiring the Court to define the scope of
traditional state functions." Justice Powell argued, on the other hand, that as justice
Blackmun had noted in his concurrence in National League of Cities, the tenth amend-
ment's reservation of rights to the states requires the Court to balance the federal interests
with the interests of state sovereignty, a task in which the Court often engages." Most
importantly, therefore, Justice Powell argued that the Court had eviscerated the Amer-
ican scheme of federalism by relegating it to the political process, thereby stripping it of
its constitutional might as enforced by judicial review."
The view of federalism taken by the four dissenters was an historical one." They
first argued that the ratification of the Constitution was the result of a compromise
between federalists and anti-federalists which specifically reserved for the states, in the
tenth amendment, all powers not explicitly delegated to the federal government. 88 The
dissenters therefore concluded that the Court had emasculated the sovereignty of the
74 id. at 1018-19.
" Id. at 1019.
76 Id.
" See id. at 1016-17,
78 Id. at 1020.
79 Id.
80 See
Id. at 1021-22 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist and O'Connor JJ., dissenting).
" Id. at 1023-24 (Powell, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 1024-25 (Powell, J., dissenting).
84 Id. at 1025-26 (Powell, J., dissenting).
85 See id. at 1027-29 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1034-38 (O'Connor, J., joined by
Powell and Rehnquist JJ., dissenting).
86 id. at 1027-29 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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states by relegating it to the political whim of Congress, and then shielding that exercise
of political power from constitutional judicial review." Finally, reiterating that the Court's
role should have been to balance the federal and state interests involved, as five Justices
had done in National League of Cities, the dissent concluded that the application of
minimum wage and overtime standards to the states obviously endangered the ability of
the states to function effectively as sovereigns, while serving no countervailing federal
interest.'"
Garcia is the result of one Justice, Justice Blackmun, changing his mind. With the
switch of only one Justice, therefore, the Court was as severely split in Garcia as it had
been in National League of Cities." Justice Powell's harsh dissent in Garcia, joined by the
Chief Justice and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, accused the Court of altering two
hundred years of the constitutional doctrine of federalism." Justice O'Connor also filed
a dissent, joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, in which she accused • the Court of
severely violating the spirit of federalism as embodied in the tenth amendment," Both
she and Justice Rehnquist, in his own dissenting statement, took the ominous stance that
the Court, perhaps with soon to be appointed new Justices, would surely return to the
National League of Cities doctrine in the future. 92
The harsh dissents notwithstanding," the majority in Garcia reached the correct
result. The Court was persuasive in arguing that National League of Cities was neither a
practical decision," nor one faithful to the constitutional interests it sought to advance."
Despite Justice O'Connor's charge that it had sounded a retreat from the important
battle over the vitality of federalism, 96 the Court, in reality, set aside ideological biases
and exposed an unworkable and unprincipled decision for what it was." It surely
stretches the imagination to argue that requiring states to pay their employees time-and-
a-half for work in excess of forty hours per week, as all other employers must, will
destroy state sovereignty."
In first finding the National League of Cities doctrine unworkable, the Court accurately
pointed out the troublesome nature of its endeavor to distinguish between traditional
" Id. at 1032-33 (Powell, J., dissenting).
AS id.
"9
	 League of Cities was a 5-4 decision in which Justice Blackmun, concurring in the
majority opinion with reservations, provided the deciding vote. See National League of Cities, 426
U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In Garcia, Justice Blackmun changed his mind. See Garcia,
105 S. Ct. at 1015; see also id. at 1024-25 (Powell, J., dissenting).
90 Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1023 (Powell, J., dissenting).
9 ' Id. at 1036 (O'Connor, J., joined by Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting); id. at 1033
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
92 Id. at 1038 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 1033 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
' See supra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
94 See Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1011-15.
e See id. at 1015-16.
9'. Id. at 1033 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 1019-21.
9" The Court quoted Justice Frankfurter who had previously proclaimed;
The process of Constitutional adjudication does not thrive on conjuring up hor-
rible possibilities that never happen in the real world and devising doctrines sufficiently
comprehensive in detail to cover the remotest contingency. Nor need we go beyond
what is required for a reasoned disposition of the kind of controversy now before the
Court.
Id. (quoting New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583 (1946)).
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and nontraditional state governmental functions. 9° For example, the Court illustrated
the hopelessness in trying to devise a rule which would reconcile the placing by courts
of state regulation of drivers on the traditional side, arid state regulation of traffic on
the nontraditional side.'" The Court did not, however, overrule recent precedent merely
because the rule was difficult to apply. 1 ° 1 Rather, the Court looked to the factors which
made the rule impractical, and correctly found that the major reason was that the rule
lacked proper constitutional foundation from the start.'° 2
As the Court elucidated, the Constitution provides ample channels in federal elec-
tions and in the constitutional amendment process for a state to champion its status as
a limited sovereign government under the American system of federalism. 1 "3 The Con-
stitution does not, moreover, make the distinction between federal regulatory power
over traditional, as opposed to nontraditional, state functions. 1 °' Nor does the commerce
clause so much as imply that Congress's regulatory power is in any way limited by notions
of state sovereignty.'" Moreover, the tenth amendment, by its own terms, reserves for
the states only those powers not granted to the federal government, unlike the expressly
enumerated power to regulate interstate commerce.'" The Court's decision in Garcia,
therefore, is both pragmatically and constitutionally sound. 'Consequently, state and
federal employees should feel secure in their rights under federal labor laws. And
federalism still thrives, as enforced by the structure of the American democratic process
rather than by the federal courts.
The dissenters in Garcia, though no less vehement than the majority, mustered little
in the way of specific constitutional support for their propositions. Aside from their own
historical vision of state sovereignty, the dissenters relied solely on the ambiguous res-
ervations of rights to the states and to the people in the tenth amendment.'° 7 They did
not, however, explain how the tenth amendment's reservation to the states of those
powers "not delegated by the Constitution [to the federal government]" 1 °8 shields the states
from congressional regulation under the Constitution's clear delegation of power to
Congress to regulate interstate commerce.
99 Id. at 1011 - 15.
M Id. at 1011.
101 Id. at 1015-16,1021.
102 Id.
,"' Id. at 1018.
'°4 See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; see also Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1016.
'°6 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
")7 Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1021-33 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, GI, Rehnquist and O'Connor,
jj., dissenting); id. at 1033-38 (O'Connor, j., joined by Powell and Rehnquist, jj., dissenting). The
dissenters argued that the Co\urt has retreated from its mission of balancing federal commerce
power with state sovereignty concerns. Id. at 1023-26 (Powell, j., dissenting); id. at 1037-38 (O'Con-
nor, J., dissenting). This argument too, however, is founded solely on the dissenters' tenuous reading
of the reservation of rights to the states in the tenth amendment as a strict constitutional mandate
which somehow limits the federal commerce power. The tenth amendment, however, merely
reserves to the states rights not granted to the federal government. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. The
constitutional grant of power to Congress to regulate interstate commerce has no limiting counter-
part in the Constitution, beyond the dissenters' strained view of the tenth amendment.
108 U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasis added). The tenth amendment' to the United States
Constitution states in full: The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id.
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Ironically, Justice O'Connor, in her bitter dissent, joined by her fellow strict con-
structionists on the Court, Justices Powell and Rehnquist, argued that the Court in Garcia
violated the "spirit" of the tenth amendment," Justice Powell, no less caustic in his
dissent, attacked the Court for its willingness to defy stare decisis by overturning such a
recent decision,'ID even though National League of Cities itself was an identical repudiation
of the recent precedent set clown in Wirtz.'" Moreover, it seems impossible to reconcile
this uneasiness with straying from stare decisis with the dissenters' desire and prediction
that Garcia will soon be overturned. 12 The dissents, short on persuasive constitutional
support, are replete with ideological admonitions that the federal government continues
to run rampant over the sovereignty of state governments."s
If logical reasoning provides for lasting judicial doctrines, state and local employees
will undoubtedly remain protected by the FLSA. If, on the other hand, the ideological
battle over states' rights and federal regulatory power continues to rage in the Supreme
Court, the dissenters' prediction of a future majority returning to the National League of
Cities doctrine may well serve once again to deny state workers their rights under the
FLSA. In any event, for now, state employees need not worry about states, as their
employers, seeking to deny them federally mandated labor protections by claiming that
the tenth amendment somehow immunizes states from abiding by federal regulation
under the commerce clause. Since Congress's power under the commerce clause is
plenary, it seems highly unlikely that states will find any way to circumvent the employee
protections of the FLSA, short of relying on a shift in the Supreme Court's composition.
In sum, Garcia overrules National League of Cities, and with it, the notion that some
state employees are not protected by the Fair Labor Standards Act. The National League
of Cities doctrine had immunized states, engaged in commerce in areas of traditional
state functions, from federal labor laws passed by Congress pursuant to the commerce
clause of the Constitution. The Garcia Court found this doctrine both unworkable and
109 105 S. Ct. at 1036 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1021-22 (Powell, J., dissenting).
'" Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 183 (1968), was overruled in 1976 in National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at
855.
"2 Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1033 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 1038 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
' 13 For example, Justice Powell, writing for all four Justices in dissent, charged that the Court's
decision "undermines the cousin tionally mandated balance of power between the [Oates and the
federal government, a balance designed to protect our fundamental liberties." Id. at 1029 (Powell,
J., dissenting). He went on to state that the Court's decision may result in the "emasculation of the
powers of the [sltates." Id. Rather than accept the Court's assertion that it sought to enforce the
notion of federalism in the most practical and constitutionally defensible way, albeit in the political
process rather than in the courts, Justice Powell accused the Court of merely paying "lip service"
to federalism and relegating the states to a "trivial" role in the constitutional scheme. Id. at 1030-
31 (Powell, J., dissenting). He concluded by stating that the Court's reading of the commerce clause
may lead the federal government to "devour the essentials of state sovereignty." Id. at 1033 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist echoed these thoughts. Id. at 1033-
38 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She stated her disapproval of the "unprecedented growth of federal
regulatory activity ..." over the past twenty years, and then endorsed the notion that Inlational
action ... has always been regarded as exceptional in our polity, an intrusion to be justified by some
necessity, the special rather than the ordinary case." Id. at 1037 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added). She even described federal revenue sharing with the states as "coercive grant programs."
Id. Justice O'Connor concluded by stating that the Court in Garcia "shirk[ed] „ , its constitutional
responsibility." Id. at 1038 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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constitutionally unsupportable, though it found that the notion of federalism, purport-
edly underlying the National League of Cities reasoning, alive and well in the structure of
the federal government and in the political process, rather than in the tenth amendment.
Thus, the states will now have to turn exclusively to the political process, and not to the
courts, to light their battles over federal regulation that they deem injurious to their
ability to function as sovereigns. That the states have secured mixed results in convincing
Congress to exempt them from some, but not other, federal labor laws displays, as the
Court reasoned, that the balancing needed to sustain the American system of federalism
is, in fact, successfully occurring in the political process.
A four Justice dissent, however, refused to accept the notion that federalism is a
political process, rather than constitutional dogma. Should an opening on the Court
present itself, therefore, the desire of the dissenters to return to a tenth amendment
limitation on Congress's commerce power may again remove the protections of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, in the name of state sovereignty, from many state and local
governmental employees.
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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
I. PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. *Allocation of Procedural Burdens and Application of Weber in Title VII Reverse
Discrimination Cases; Johnson v. Transportation Agency'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 2 prohibits discrimination in employment
because of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex. 3 In a private, non-class action
complaint under Title VII the plaintiff must prove intentional employment discrimi-
nation. 4 Proving intent, however, is difficult because the employer can readily produce
some nondiscriminatory reason that was purportedly the basis of its conduct. 3 Because
of this difficulty, the allocation of the order and burdens of proof is important in Title
VII cases.6 In ordinary Title VII cases, the Supreme Court has held that the plaintiff
must first establish a prima facie case that creates a presumption of illegal employment
discrimination.' The employer may then rebut the presumption of discrimination by
producing evidence of some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's
* By John W. Sagaser, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 748 F.2d 1308, 36 FEP Cases 725 (9th Cir. 1984), amended
and re-reported, 770 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1985). This chapter discusses the original Johnson decision,
748 F.2d 1308, 36 FEP Cases 725 (9th Cir. 1984). In the court's amended and re-reported decision,
770 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1985), the court refined its opinion by citing additional case law, id. at 756
(citing United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979)); id. at 758 (citing Bushey
v. New York State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 733 F.2d 220, 228 n.11 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 803 (1985)). The court further refined its decision by generally tightening its language, id. at
756, 758; by eliminating dicta previously in a footnOte, id. at 758 n.4; and by adding a footnote
countering the dissent's criticism regarding demonstration of an affirmative action plan's remedial
purpose, id. at 758 n.5.
2 Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-717, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1982).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (b), (c) (1982). The statute reads, in relevant part:
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
4 Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 25 FEP Cases 113, 115
(1981).
5 See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT t)1SCRIM1NATION 276-92 (2d ed. 1983).
6 Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 25 FEP Cases 113 (1981); Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 17 FEP Cases 1062 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 5 FEP Cases 965 (1973). For a recent Supreme Court case briefly recapping
this area, see United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 31 FEP Cases
609 (1983).
7 McDonnell Douglas, 41 i U.S. at 802, 5 FEP Cases at 966. This may be done by showing (i) that
he belongs to a minority, (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer
was seeking applicants, and (iii) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants of the plaintiff's qualifications. Id. A prima facie showing is
not, however, the equivalent of a factual finding of discrimination. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 579, 17 FEP
Cases at 1063. The Court in Furnco noted that this initial burden is not onerous. Id. Accord, B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 1299 (Most plaintiffs who proceed under the McDonnell
Douglas framework have little difficulty making out a prima facie case).
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treatments If the defendant employer carries its burden, the plaintiff can still prevail
by showing that defendant's stated reason for the challenged action in question was in
fact pretext or otherwise unworthy of credence.°
Although Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race or sex,
the Supreme Court has ruled that not all voluntary, private, race or gender-conscious
affirmative action plans are proscribed by Title VII.'° In the 1979 case of United Steel-
workers of America v. Weber," the United States Supreme Court, upholding a private, race-
conscious affirmative action plan against a Title VII challenge, set out a four-factor test
to determine whether an affirmative action plan is permissible under Title V11.' 2 First,
the plan must aim at breaking down historic patterns of racial segregation) 3
 Second, the
interests or employment opportunities of other employees must not be unnecessarily
infringed)" Third, the plan must not absolutely bar the advancement of other employ-
ees.'° Fourth, the plan must be a temporary measure, aimed at eliminating manifest
racial imbalances)" Since 1979, lower federal and state courts have extended the Weber
holding by using the four-factor test to determine the validity of public affirmative action
plans° and gender-conscious affirmative action plans. 18
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 5 FEP Cases at 966. A sufficient rebuttal of the prima
facie case would justify a summary judgment for the defendant. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55, 25
FEP Cases at I 16. The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the
proffered reasons. Id. at 254, 25 FEP Cases at 116.
" McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804, 5 FEP Cases at 967. The plaintiff may do this by
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason predominated over the legitimate reason offered,
or by undermining the credibility of the employer's proffered explanation. Burdine, 450 U.S. at
256, 25 FEP Cases at 116. Thus, the Court explained in Burdine, "Nile ultimate burden of per-
suading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains
at all times with the plaintiff .... [T]he McDonnell Douglas division of intermediate evidentiary
burdens serves to bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to this ultimate question"
of discrimination vet non. Id. at 253, 25 FEP Cases at 115. See also Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714, 31 FEP
Cases at 610.
10 United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204, 20 FEP Cases I, 6 (1979).
H 443 U.S. 193, 20 FEP Cases 1 (1979).
12 Id. at 209, 20 FEP Cases at 7-8. The Court noted at the outset of its reasoning in Weber that
the case did riot involve state action, and thus did not involve the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 200, 20 FEP Cases at 4. in upholding the affirmative action plan,
the Court stated that in light of the legislative history of Title VII and the historical context from
which the Act arose, a literal construction of § 703(a) and (d) of Title VII (proscribing employment.
discrimination on the basis of' race) was "misplaced." Id. at 201, 20 FEP Cases at 5. The Court
buttressed its conclusion with its interpretation of § 703(j) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2(j) (1982),
which states that Title VII shall not be interpreted to "require" racially preferential efforts. 443
U.S. at 204-06, 20 FEP Cases at 6-7. The Court stared that this led to the natural inference that
Congress chose not to prohibit voluntary affirmative action. Id. at 205-06, 20 FEP Cases at 6.




' 7 See, e.g., Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 688-90, '10 FEP Cases 1728,
1738-40 (6th Cir. 1979), cm, denied, 452 U.S. 938, 25 FEP Cases 1683 (1981); Baker v. City of
Detroit, 483 F. Supp. 930, 983-86 & n.105, 24 FEP Cases 1728, 1730-31 & n.105 (E.D. Mich.
1979), aff'd sub nom. Bratton v. Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 31 FEP Cases 465 (6th Cir.), modified on
different grounds, 712 F.2d 222, 31 FEP Cases 1795 (1983); Chmill v. City of Pittsburgh, 488 Pa. 470,
487-90, 412 A.2(1 860, 869-71, 22 FEP Cases 742, 742-43 (1980).
See, e.g., La Riviere v. EE.00, 682 F.2d 1275, 1278-79, 28 FEP Cases 1481, 1483-84 (9th
Cir. 1982).
December 1985]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 151
In these types of reverse discrimination cases involving affirmative action plans,
however, the Supreme Court has not yet decided how the burden of proof should be
allocated. To date, in these cases, state and lower federal courts have tried to combine
the Supreme Court's analysis of the allocation of order and burdens of proof in ordinary
Title VII litigation with the Supreme Court's analysis of affirmative action plans in
Weber.' 9 These courts have disagreed on the appropriate formulation for the burden of
proof in reverse discrimination cases involving affirmative action plans. 2° The differences
in the formulations turn on two questions: first, whether the plaintiff or the defendant
has the burden of proving that the plan is valid or invalid under Weber; second, whether,
if the plaintiff carries the burden of showing the plan's invalidity, the defendant may
rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case merely by pleading that it'acted pursuant to an
affirmative action plan. 21
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Johnson v. Transportation Agency"' formulated the order and burden of proof in Title VII
reverse discrimination litigation involving affirmative action plans," and upheld a gen-
der-conscious affirmative action plan as valid under Weber,' As to the burdens of proof,
the court held that in these cases a defendant employer successfully rebuts a plaintiff's
prima fade case by showing that the challenged employment action was pursuant to an
affirmative action plan, and by producing "some evidence" that its affirmative action
plan is remedial and reasonably related to its remedial purpose. 25 As to the application
of the four-factor Weber test, the Johnson court found that the affirmative action plan
was temporary,26 even though the plan did not make this explicit. 27 In addition, the court
held that an employer can demonstrate a plan is remedial by showing a conspicuous
statistical imbalance in its work force." Consequently, after Johnson, reverse discrimina-
tion plaintiffs in the Ninth Circuit face a heavy burden of proof and need to demonstrate
that the affirmative action program explicitly and significantly departs from the Weber
criteria.
The controversy in Johnson arose when Paul E. Johnson was denied a position with
the Santa Clara County Transportation Agency (Agency) 29 in favor of a woman who
' 9 See, e.g., Warsocki v. City of Omaha, 726 F.2d 1358, 1360, 34 FEP Cases 1, 2-3 (8th Cir.
1984); Setser v. Novack Investment Co., 657 F.2d 962, 968-69, 26 FEP Cases 513, 516-17 (8th
Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064, 27 FEP Cases 223 (1981); Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio
R.R., 652 F.2d 1012, 1016-18, 25 FEP Cases 889, 893-94 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Janowiak v. Corporate
City of Southbend, 576 F. Supp. 1461, 1466-1467, 33 FEP Cases 958, 961-62 (N.D. 1nd. 1983),
rev'd, 750 F.2d 557, 36 FEP Cases 737 (7th Cir. 1984).
2° Compare Janowiak, 576 F. Supp. at 1466-68, 33 FEP Cases at 961-62 (granting defendant's
motion for summary judgment because defendant had presented evidence showing that the chal-
lenged affirmative action plan was valid under Weber), with Parker, 652 F.2d at 1016, 25 FEP Cases
at 892-93 ("[slelf-serving statements for the purposes of litigation do not automatically validate a
purported affirmative action program").
See supra note 19 and cases cited therein.
22 748 F.2d 1308, 36 FEP Cases 725 (9th Cir. 1984).
25 Id. at 1310 n.2, 36 FEP Cases at 728 n.2.
21 Id. at 1314, 36 FEP Cases at 731.
25 Id. at 1310 n.2, 36 FEP Cases at 728 n.2.
26 1d, at 1313, 36 FEP Cases at 729.
"Id, at 1313, 36 FEP Cases at 729-30. The court stated that affirmative action plans "should
not be rigidly interpreted so as to make their validity depend on technicalities in drafting." Id. at
1312, 36 FEP Cases at 729.
28 Id, at 1313, 36 FEP Cases at 730.
29
 Id. at 1309, 36 FEP Cases at 727.
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had scored lower on the eligibility exam." Mr. Johnson had worked for eleven years as
a road yard clerk with the Agency." In 1979, he and eight others applied for the opening
position of road dispatcher. 32 Johnson tied for second on an oral exam, and Diane D.
Joyce, the only female applicant, placed fourth." Joyce was also a long-time employee."
After a second oral examination of the qualifying candidates, the examiners unanimously
recommended Johnson for the dispatcher position."
During the selection process Joyce informed the County Women's Coordinator that
she was applying for the dispatcher position but had ranked fourth on the eligibility
list." The Women's Coordinator relayed this information to the Agency Affirmative
Action Coordinator, who in turn recommended to the Agency Director that Joyce be
appointed. 37 The Agency Director, pursuant to the Agency's voluntary affirmative action
plan," appointed Joyce to the position.
Johnson brought a Title VII employment discrimination action in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California." The district court found that but
for his sex Johnson would have been promoted instead of Joyce. 4° Finding that the
Agency had failed to carry its burden of proving that its affirmative action plan was
valid under Weber,' the district court ordered Johnson's retroactive promotion with back
pay . 42
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed,'" disagreeing
with the district court's view of Weber, 44 and its allocation of procedural burdens in this
type of case." The court of appeals began its discussion by noting that the district court
may have inappropriately placed on the employer the burden of persuading the court
of the plan's validity. 4° For a defendant employer to rebut a plaintiff's prima facie case
of employment discrimination, the Johnson court ruled, the employer must first show
that it acted pursuant to an affirmative action plan. 47 Additionally, the court continued,
the employer must produce "some evidence" that the plan is a response to conspicuous









" Id. The plan was not adopted pursuant to any collective bargaining agreement. Id.
" Id. at 1310, 36 PEP Cases at 727.
4° Id.
4 ' Id. at 1310-11, 36 FEP Cases at 727.
42 Id. at 1310, 36 FEP Cases at 727. The district court specifically held that the Agency failed
to show its plan was temporary and remedial. Id. at 1310, 36 FEP Cases at 727-28.
43 Id. at 1314, 36 FEP Cases at 731.
14 Id. at 1311, 36 FEP Cases at 728-29.
15 Id. at 1310 n.2, 36 FEP Cases at 728 n.2.
16 Id.
47 Id. In formulating the order and burdens of proof for reverse discrimination cases involving
affirmative action plans, the Johnson court essentially adopted the Eighth Circuit's formulation in
Setser v. Novak Investment Co., 657 F.2d 962, 968-69, 26 FEP Cases 513, 516-17 (8th Cir.) (en
bane), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064 (1981).
48 748 F.2d at 1310 n.2, 36 FEP Cases at 728 n.2.
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Finally, the court stated, the employer must also produce "some evidence" that the
affirmative action plan is reasonably related to the plan's remedial purpose.'" Once an
employer has produced evidence that its refusal to hire the plaintiff was a consequence
of its implementation of the plan, the court stated, the employer is entitled to judgment
unless the plaintiff proves the plan is invalid."
The Ninth Circuit next addressed the validity of the Agency's affirmative action
plan under the four-factor Weber test. Finding the district court's view of Weber to have
been "overly restrictive," 51 the court of appeals applied each of the four parts of the
Weber test to the Agency's affirmative action plan. In addressing the Weber requirement
that the plan be temporary," the Johnson court noted that the Agency plan contained
no end date," and that the Agency Director testified that affirmative action was a
permanent part of the Agency's operating philosophy. 54 The court insisted, however,
that this evidence did not establish that the plan was permanent." The plan did not
state that it was permanent," the court explained. Moreover, the court continued, the
entire focus of the plan was on attaining — not maintaining — a work force balance to
approximate the distribution of women, minority, and handicapped persons in the Santa
Clara County work force. 57 Although an affirmative action plan must end when its
remedial function has been served, the court noted that Weber does not require a plan
to terminate on an express date or when fixed percentages for hiring, training, or
promotion were achieved." Thus, the court concluded, the Agency plan in Johnson was
sufficiently temporary to satisfy the first Weber requirement for valid affirmative action
plans."
The court then held that the challenged affirmative action plan met Weber's second
requirement that the plan have a remedial purpose of breaking down entrenched pat-
49 Id.
'° Id.
' I Id. at 1311, 36 FEP Cases at 729. The Ninth Circuit had previously held that Weber applied
to public employer gender-conscious affirmative action programs. La Riviere v. EEOC, 682 F.2d
1275, 1278-79, 28 FEP Cases 1481, 1483-84 (9th Cir. 1982). In La Riviere the court found that the
provisions of Title VII respecting gender-based discrimination (42 U,S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), (e)(1)
(1982)) were enacted to protect women against discrimination in the marketplace and to open
employment opportunities for women in occupations that had been traditionally closed to them.
Id. at 1278, 28 FEN Cases at 1483-1484. The court reasoned that these purposes mirror those
underlying Title V1I's prohibition of racial discrimination, and therefore following the reasoning
in Weber, Congress did not intend Title Vii to prohibit voluntary affirmative action programs
designed to correct long-standing sexual imbalances in the work force. Id. at 1279, 28 FEP Cases
at 1484. La Riviere involved a pilot study program ordered by the California legislature, and
undertaken by the California Highway Patrol, to determine the feasibility of women as traffic
officers. Id. at 1276, 28 FEP Cases at 1481. Forty men and forty women were selected. Id. Some
eligibility requirements were lowered to permit the women to be eligible for positions as traffic
officers. Id. The court in La Riviere proceeded to find the affirmative action program in question
valid under Weber. Id. at 1280, 28 FEP Cases at 1485.
"Johnson, 748 F.2d at 1312-13, 36 FEP Cases at 729-30.
"' Id. at 1311-12, 36 FEP Cases at 729.
" Id. at 1312, 36 FEP Cases at 729.
" Id.
56 Id. at 1313, 36 FEP Cases at 730.
57 Id.
" Id. at 1312, 36 FEN Cases at 729.
59 Id. at 1312-15, 36 FEP Cases at 729-30.
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terns of discrimination. The court ruled that to demonstrate that its plan is remedial it
is sufficient for the employer to show a conspicuous statistical imbalance in its work-
force.6° Contrary to aiming to maintain a male-female numerical balance, the court
found, the Agency's plan was directed to eliminate a manifest male-female imbalance:
statistics contained in the plan showed that prior to Johnson's promotion to road dis-
patcher, none of the Agency's 238 skilled craft workers was a woman."' A "plethora of
proof," the court stated, was not necessary to show that women are under-represented
in such positions and that strong social pressures weigh against female participation in
skilled craft positions." 2
The court then addressed the plan's validity under the third Weber requirement that
the affirmative action plan not bar the advancement of other employees."' The plaintiff
in Johnson argued that because the female candidate Joyce was the only one to be
promoted to the dispatcher position, the plan impermissibly barred all other employees. 64
The court readily dismissed the plaintiff's argument, stating that any single employment
opening necessarily excludes all others."'
The plan was also valid under the final Weber criterion that the plan not unnecessarily
infringe upon the interests of other employees, the court ruled."'" Although the plan
does not create new openings or reserve openings for other employees, the court stated,
neither does it indicate that other employees will be barred or their interests unnecessarily
infringed."' The challenged plan simply did not show, the court explained, the kind of
distinct pattern of exclusion of nonminority candidates that Weber indicates would make
a plan invalid."" Thus, the court concluded, the Agency plan, like the Weber plan, is
permissible."'"
In concurring in part and dissenting in part with the decision,'" Judge Wallace
criticized the majority's order and allocation of proof!' Rather than requiring the em-
ployer to merely show "some evidence" that the plan was in response to a conspicuous
work force imbalance and that the plan was reasonably related to its remedial purposes,
Judge Wallace argued for an alternative approach. 72 Under his proposal, the burden of
proving the validity of an affirmative action program would be shifted to the employer
as an affirmative defense." This approach, Judge Wallace argued, would be logical, and
would provide a better means of analyzing affirmative action programs."'
6° Id. at 1313, 36 FEP Cases at 730.
63 Id.
, 68 Id.
65 1d. at 1314, 36 FE? Cases at 731.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1313-14, 36 FEP Cases at 730.
67 Id. at 1314, 36 FEP Cases at 730-31. The court stated that the plan contemplated expansion
of opportunity for all because shortly before the plan was adopted the county approved 734 new
Agency positions. Id.
68 Id. at 1314, 36 FEP Cases at 731.
69 Id.
7° Id. at 1314, 36 FEP Cases at 731 (Wallace, J., concurring and dissenting).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1317, '36 FE? Cases at 733 (Wallace, J., concurring and dissenting).
7 ' Id. at 1318, 36 FEP Cases at 734 (Wallace, J., concurring and dissenting).
74 Id. at 1317, 36 FEP Cases at 733-34 (Wallace, J., concurring and dissenting).
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Turning to the issue of the affirmative action plan's validity under Weber, 75 Judge
Wallace disagreed with the majority's assertion that a statistical imbalance was sufficient
to satisfy the Weber criterion that the affirmative action plan serve the remedial purpose
of breaking down historic patterns of discrimination. 79 Statistics may function as valuable
quantitative clues to past or present discriminatory patterns and practices, Judge Wallace
asserted, but an employer cannot rely on statistics alone as a short-cut around showing
causal relationship between the discriminatory organizational practices and the response
of adopting an affirmative action plan."
Furthermore, Judge Wallace stated, the record was insufficient for the court to be
able to determine that the challenged affirmative action plan satisfied the Weber require-
ments that the plan not bar the advancement of other employees or unnecessarily
infringe upon their interests. As to the validity of the challenged affirmative action plan
under the Weber criterion that the plan be temporary, 78 Judge Wallace argued that the
majority interpreted Weber too broadly. 79 The majority erred, Judge Wallace stated, when
it ruled that Weber endorses all plans which do not admit to being permanent, but which
end when their goals are rnet. 8° Thus, Judge Wallace concluded, the majority's analysis
weakens the Supreme Court's test in Weber through doctrinal pronouncements that were
unnecessary and premature. 8 '
By placing the burden of showing that the plan is not valid under Weber on the
Title VII plaintiff, the Johnson decision insulates employers who act pursuant to either
a race-conscious or gender-conscious affirmative action program from weakly grounded
reverse discrimination actions. While the Supreme Court has not decided how the burden
of proof should be allocated in Title VII reverse discrimination actions involving affir-
mative action plans, the Ninth Circuit's formulation of the burden of proof in Johnson
is in harmony with the general principles in the Supreme Court's analysis of the order
and allocation of burdens of proof in ordinary Title VII litigation.
The Supreme Court has ruled that in ordinary Title VII cases the sufficiency of the
defendant's rebuttal of the prima facie case should be evaluated by the extent to which
it presents a legitimate reason for the employment action, 82 and frames the factual issue
with sufficient clarity to allow the plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate
that the proffered justification is pretext. 83 Thus the burden on the employer is to shOw
at least that its action was legitimate. Since not all affirmative action programs are valid
under Weber," the employer in reverse discrimination actions must do more than merely
plead that it acted pursuant to an affirmative action plan.
On the other hand, since some affirmative action plans can be valid under the Weber
test, an employer does not have to show conclusively that its affirmative action program
is valid. By producing some evidence that the challenged affirmative action plan satisfies
the Weber test, the employer adequately frames the issues for the plaintiff, and allows
78 Id. at 1318, 36 PEP Cases at 734 (Wallace, J. , concurring and dissenting).
76 Id. at 1319,36 FEP Cases at 735 (Wallace, J. , concurring and dissenting).
" Id.
78 Id. at 1320, 36 FEP Cases at 736 (Wallace, J. , concurring and dissenting).
79 Id.
88 See id.
" Id. at 1320-21, 36 FEN Cases at 736 (Wallace, J., concurring and dissenting).
82 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54, 25 FEP Cases at 115-16.
88 Id. at 253, 25 FEP Cases at 115.
64 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208, 20 FEP Cases at 7.
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the plaintiff the opportunity to discredit the employer's defense. The court in Johnson
strikes this balance between mere pleading of the existence of an affirmative action plan,
and conclusively demonstrating its validity under Weber.
Although the Johnson court held the affirmative action plan valid, the court did so
under a watered down Weber test." Comparing the affirmative action plans in Johnson
and Weber, the Johnson plan is closer to the line of impermissible affirmative action plans
identified by the Weber Court. In Weber the past discrimination against blacks from craft
jobs was so apparent as to warrant judicial notice. 86 In Johnson, however, there was
neither the deep historical discrimination so rampant as to permit judicial notice, nor
specific proof of past discrimination. Instead, the Johnson court noted the manifest
statistical imbalance of women and men in skilled craft positions," and deemed this
alone sufficient to satisfy the Weber factor that the affirmative action plan have a remedial
purpose of breaking down historic patterns of discrimination."
The dissent in Johnson criticized this lack of causal evaluation and analysis as incon-
sistent with Weber. 89
 Nevertheless, the court's ruling that the first Weber factor was met
is sound. Past employment discrimination against women on a society-wide basis is a
generally accepted historical fact. Although a causal link should be preferred, it can be
difficult to establish, 80
 and that difficulty should not bar voluntary adoption of affirmative
action plans. Statistics, therefore, should be, in the absence of contradictory evidence,
an adequate basis for employer remedial efforts.
The plan in Johnson did not require the dismissal or demotion of nonminority
employees, and therefore it satisfied the Weber factor of not unnecessarily infringing
upon the interests of nonminority employees. 6 t The Johnson plan does not, however, so
readily pass the Weber factor of not absolutely barring the advancement of other em-
ployees. In Weber both minority and nonminority employees benefitted from the insti-
tution of the affirmative action plans. 92 In Johnson, however, it is not clear whether
women could always be chosen over men until the numerical goal for the affirmative
action plan was achieved." The dissent in Johnson correctly concluded that the record
was simply insufficient for adequate scrutiny of the plan. 94
 The majority nevertheless
ruled that this Weber factor was satisfied since the plan itself did not explicitly indicate
that the other employees' opportunity for advancement was barred."
The Johnson court's analysis of Weber's prohibition of affirmative action plans that
absolutely bar the advancement of other employees is more deferential to the affirmative
action plan than the Weber Court was. Because the Supreme Court drew the Weber test
in imprecise terms, however, lower courts have essentially been given discretion to engage
in flexible interpretation. Although the Weber plan specifically allowed for the advance-
" Johnson, 748 F.2d at 1311-12, 36 FEP Cases at 728-29.
86 Weber, 443 U.S. at 198 n.1, 20 FEP Cases at 3 n.l.
87 Johnson, 748 F.2d at 1313, 36 FEP Cases at 7 30.
99 Id.
89 Id. at 1319, 36 FEP Cases at 735 (Wallace, J. , concurring and dissenting).
90 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
91 Johnson, 748 F.2d at 1313-14, 36 FEP Cases at 730-31.
32 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208, 20 FEP Cases at 7.
93 See Johnson, 748 F.2d at 1320, 36 FEP Cases at 736 (Wallace, J., concurring and dissenting).
94 Id. at 1319, 36 FEP Cases at 735 (Wallace, J. , concurring and dissenting).
95 Id. at 1312, 36 FEP Cases at 729.
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ment of nonminority employees, 96 there was no evidence before the Johnson court that
the challenged plan absolutely barred males like Paul Johnson from advancement. The
holding in Johnson, therefore, does not run afoul of Weber.
The final criterion set forth by Weber is that the plan be temporary. 97 In Weber the
plan was designed to achieve a parity of black craft employees with the percentage of
blacks in the local labor population." Even though in Johnson the Agency head testified
to the permanence of the affirmative action program," the court looked to the essence
of the plan and correctly found it to be generally of the same type as in Weber, directed
toward attaining a parity balance with the distribution of minorities in the local work
force.I"° Thus, the affirmative action plan in Johnson satisfied the four-factor Weber test,
and was correctly upheld by the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit in Johnson took a significant step toward insulating employers
who act pursuant to an affirmative action plan from reverse discrimination suits. The
court of appeals did this by only requiring the employer to show that it acted pursuant
to an affirmative action plan, and to produce "some evidence" that its plan is remedial
and is reasonably related to its remedial purpose. The court also draws the line of
permissible affirmative action plans more deferentially in favor of such plans than the
Supreme Court did in Weber. The rulings in Johnson are nevertheless sound. Its allocation
of order and burdens of proof is in the mainstream of other judicial formulas and is
consistent with the Supreme Court's analysis of the order and burdens in ordinary Title
VII cases. Although Johnson's analysis departs from the Weber analysis of affirmative
action programs, it is nevertheless permissible because Weber's imprecise standards give
lower courts the discretion to engage in flexible interpretation of challenged affirmative
action plans,
B. *Burdens of Proof in Title VII Class Discrimination Suits: Segar v. Smith'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating
against employees or job applicants on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. 2 Plaintiffs asserting a Title VII violation can establish a prima facie case of
discrimination in two ways. First, plaintiffs can demonstrate that they have been inten-
tionally discriminated against by their employers.' Claims of intentional discrimination
against an individual are characterized by the courts as allegations of "disparate treat-
ment."' The second means by which plaintiffs can establish a Title VII case is by showing
96 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208, 20 FEP Cases at 7.
97 Id.
98 Id .
" Johnson, 748 F.2d at 1312, 36 FEP Cases at 729.
'"' Id. at 1312-13, 36 FEP Cases at 729-30.
* By James A. Kobe, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 738 F.2d 1249, 35 FEP Cases 31 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
. 
Y
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
3 See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 14 FEP Cases 1514 (1977); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 5 FEP Cases 965.(1973).
See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 14 FEP Cases 1514 (1977). The Teamsters Court
stated:
Disparate treatment ... is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The
employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, al-
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that a particular facially neutral employer policy applies equally to all employees, but
falls more harshly on those employees who are also members of a protected class, and
cannot be justified by business necessity. 9
 Unlike a classic "disparate treatment" case,
such a "disparate impact" claim does not require any proof of the employer's intentional
discrimination. 6
Not all employment discrimination claims, however, follow these classic models.
Some disparate treatment claims, like most disparate impact claims, are brought as class
actions by members of a protected group, such as blacks or women.' These class actions
allege a "pattern or practice" of disparate treatment and usually attempt to demonstrate
discrimination by combining anecdotal evidence of discrimination with statistical data
showing disparities between the status of the plaintiff class and other employees. 9 In
addition, some disparate impact claims do not challenge a particular employment prac-
tice, but rather, allege that "excessively subjective" employer decisions adversely impact
upon members of a protected class." Such "excessive subjectivity" claims assert that an
employer's generalized bias against a particular class of employees results in discrimi-
natory hiring, promotion and compensation decisions.' L
Though the Supreme Court has established different orders and allocations of proof
in classic disparate treatment" and disparate impact'° cases, the applicability of the
though it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in
treatment. Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had
in mind when it enacted Title VII.
Id. at 335 n.15, 14 FEY Cases at 1519 n.15.
5 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 3 FEP Cases 175 (1971). Protected classes are
composed of individuals subject to discrimination prohibited by Title VII, such as blacks or women.
LL Id. at 932, 3 FEP Cases at 178.
7 h. Sctit.tli & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1288 (2d ed. 1983).
Id. Anecdotal evidence of discrimination is direct testimony concerning particular overt dis-





 The Supreme Court first defined the stages of a classic disparate treatment claim in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, which involved a charge that an employer discriminated against a particular
job applicant. McDonnell, 911 U.S. at 792, 5 FEP Cases at 965. The Court held that the plaintiff
must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that he was treated differently
from similarly situated individuals, Id. at 802, 5 FEP Cases at 969. A prima facie case, the Court
explained, can be established by showing that the plaintiff was qualified for the job, was denied the
position, and the employment remained open after he was refused employment. Id. If the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, the Court stated, the trial moves to its second stage in which the
employer must rebut the presumption of discrimination. However, the employer may satisfy this
rebuttal burden by merely articulating a nondiscriminatory justification for its differential treatment
of the plaintiff. Id. at 802-03, 5 FEP Cases at 969. If the employer does articulate such a nondis-
criminatory explanation for its actions, the plaintiff then has the burden of challenging this expla-
nation and proving that it is merely a pretext for discrimination in the third stage of the case. Id.
at 804, 5 FEP Cases at 970. Thus, the burden of proof remains at all times with the plaintiff. That
is. the plaintiff has the burden of establishing his case and of demonstrating the falsity of any of
the defendant's nondiscriminatory explanations for the challenged actions.
" In the classic disparate impact case, the burden shifts from the plaintiff to the defendant in
the second stage of the case. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431, 3 FEP Cases at 178. In the first stage, the
plaintiff has the burden of showing the disparate impact of a particular employer practice. This
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Court's rulings to class disparate treatment and "excessive subjectivity" disparate impact
cases is still unclear." Class disparate treatment cases are different than individual
disparate treatment cases because, instead of challenging a particular employer action,
they challenge the totality of an employer's decision-making process with respect to
hiring, promotion and compensation of workers.'' Excessive subjectivity disparate impact
cases also challenge a generalized bias in all employer decisions and are, therefore, very
different from classic disparate impact cases, which challenge a specific and defined
employer practice.'6 Thus, both class disparate treatment and excessive subjectivity dis-
parate impact cases consist of an attempt by a class of employees to demonstrate statistical
disparities between their status and the status of other similarly situated employees.' 7
Because "classic" cases differ significantly from class disparate treatment and excessive
subjectivity disparate impact claims, the appropriateness of applying the "classic" cases'
different burdens of proof to their respective class and "excessive subjectivity" counter-
parts is unclear. Courts which have examined this issue have reached different results.
During the Survey year, in Segar v. Smith"' the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that a class disparate treatment claim need not
conform to the classic three stage model of burdens of proof first developed by the
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 19 and further refined in later cases."
In Segar the appeals court held that such cases may involve only two stages. The court
stated that in the first stage, the plaintiff class would establish a presumption of discrim-
ination by a showing of differential treatment." In the second stage, the defendant
would attempt to rebut this presumption. 22 The court held that class disparate treatment
defendants, unlike defendants in individual cases, cannot simply articulate a nondiscri-
minatory explanation for the differential treatment of their plaintiff employees; they
must also present evidence challenging the inference of discrirnination. 2 ' In dicta the
court also stated that if a defendant successfully rebutted the inference of disparate
treatment by showing that a nondiscriminatory practice resulted in that differential
demonstration is usually accompanied by statistical evidence of the disproportionate impact of a
particular policy on members of a protected class. If the plaintiff satisfies this burden, the defendant
will then have the burden of proving the business necessity of the practice in question. Id. If, and
only if, the defendant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts back to the plaintiff who must
demonstrate that other, less discriminatory practices would also have accomplished the business
goals of the questioned practice. Id.




' 2 Segar v. Smith, 738-F.2d 1249, 12. 68-69, 35 FEP Cases 31, 43-44 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
19 411 U.S. 792, 5 FEP Cases 965 (1973).
2° See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 25 FEP Cases 113
(1981). The Burdine decision emphasized 'That the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact
that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the
plaintiff." Id. at 253, 25 FEP Cases at 115. The Court emphasized the limited nature of the
defendant's intermediate burden to respond to a plaintiff's prima facie case. The Court stated that
"[w]hen the plaintiff has proved a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant bears only the
burden of explaining clearly the nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions." Id. at 260, 25 FEP Cases
at 118.
Segar, 738 F.2d at 1269,.35 FEP Cases at 43-44.
22 Id.
' 23 Id. at 1269-70, 35 FEP Cases at 43-44.
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treatment, the disparate treatment claim would be transformed into a classic disparate
impact claim. 24 The defendant would then bear the burden of proving the business
necessity of the particular practice which it had raised as a defense to the class disparate
impact claim. 25
The Segar case involved a claim of employment discrimination brought against the
federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) by a class composed of black DEA special
agents. 26 Special agents perform most of the DEA's criminal investigative work. 27
 The
minimum entry level requirements for special agents are established by the Civil Service
Commission Handbook. 28 Agents enter the DEA at level GS-7 if they have three years
of general and one year of specialized experience. 29 They enter at GS-9 if they have an
additional year of specialized experience."
Race influences the work assignment of agents. 3 ' The DEA generally assigns black
agents to areas where significant numbers of suspected drug law violators are black."
Black agents are also assigned a disproportionate amount of undercover work because
the DEA believes they "will be more readily able to infiltrate organizations consisting
primarily of blacks."" Though some undercover work is desirable, too much undercover
work limits the range of an agent's experience and therefore his opportunities for
promotion. 34
Promotions within the lower GS levels are noncompetitive, while at the higher levels
they are competitive agency-wide." Competitive promotions are made, in part, on the
basis of numerical ratings and rankings, though the boards which determine these
rankings have not received any particular guidance by the agency."
In January 1977, two black special agents of the DEA along with an association
representing black special agents sued the DEA alleging that it had engaged in a "pattern
or practice" of racial discrimination against black agents in violation of Title VII." In
their class disparate treatment claim, the agents alleged that the DEA had "discriminated
in recruitment, hiring, initial grade assignments, salary, work assignments, evaluations,
discipline, and promotions." 28 In September 1977, the trial court certified the class of
all blacks who were serving or had served as special agents at the DEA, and who had
applied for positions or who would in the future apply for such positions. 39
24 Id. at 1270-71, 35 FE? Cases at 44-45.
23 Id. at 1271-72, 35 FEP Cases at 45-46. In addition to its holding with respect to burdens of
proof and its dicta regarding the relationship of class disparate treatment and disparate impact
claims, Segar is also significant for its awarding of a class-wide remedy and its refusal to require
individualized damage hearings for each member of the class. Id. at 1289-91, 35 FEP Cases at 60-
62.
25 /d. at 1260, 35 FEP Cases at 36.
27 Id. at 1259, 35 FE? Cases at 35.
25
29 Id, at 1259, 35 FEY Cases at 36.
30 Id.




35 Id. Lower level promotions are conferred to agents upon completion of one year of service




99 Id. Courts are required by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to determine by
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At trial the plaintiffs presented both statistical and anecdotal evidence of discrimi-
nation.40 Most of the anecdotal evidence, which consisted of testimony regarding dis-
criminatory acts or statements, however, was rejected by the court.'" The statistical.
analysis consisted of several multiple regression analyses." These analyses revealed a
significant wage disparity between black and white agents." Other analyses revealed
significant disparities between comparable black and white agents with respect to initial
grade assignments, work assignments, supervisory evaluations, discipline, and promo-
tions from GS-11 to GS-12, 44
The DEA attacked the value of plaintiffs' statistical evidence as a basis for an
inference of discrimination, essentially claiming that it did not compare similarly situated
black and white agents." Specifically, the DEA claimed that the plaintiff's statistical
analysis was flawed because it failed "to account for the relevant explanatory variable of
prior law enforcement experience." 46 The DEA also offered an alternative form of
statistical analysis that tended to show an absence of discrimination. 47 Furthermore, the
DEA introduced testimonial evidence relating to its efforts to implement equal oppor-
tunity goals at the agency. 48
The district court accepted the bulk of the plaintiffs' statistics and rejected both the
DEA's critique of these statistics and the DEA's statistics to the contrary. 49 The district
court concluded that salary differentials between black and white agents resulted from
discrimination. 50 Moreover, the court held that the DEA had discriminated with respect
to entry grade assignments, work assignments, supervisory evaluations, and promo-
tions, 5 ' The court specifically rejected the DEA's claim that the failure of plaintiffs'
statistics to account for prior law enforcement experience skewed their analysis.'" The
DEA appealed the finding of liability to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia."
On appeal the DEA raised several specific challenges to the district court's holding. 54
The bulk of the DEA's case was an attempt to demonstrate that the plaintiffs' statistical
order if claims brought as class actions shall be maintained as such. The court's Rule 23(b}(2) order
certifying a class determines which individuals qualify for membership in the plaintiff class.
40 Id. at 1261, 35 FEP Cases at 37. Prior to trial the parties settled the claims of intentional
discrimination with respect to recruitment and hiring. Id.
41 Id. at 1264 n.10, 35 FEP Cases at 39 n.10.
42 Id. at 1261, 35 FEP Cases at 37. Schlei and Grossman have described multiple regression
analysis as "a statistical technique designed to estimate the effect of several independent variables,
(e.g., education, experience, performance, age, race, sex) in relation to a single dependent variable
(e.g., salary). The methodology provides the ability to determine the extent to which the indepen-
dent variables have influenced the dependent variable." B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at
1342-43.
45 Segar, 738 F.2d at 1261, 35 FEP Gases at 37.
Id. at 1263, 35 FEP Cases at 38.
45 Id.
 at
 1263, 35 FEP Cases at 39.
46 Id .
47 Id.





55 Id. at 1265, 35 FEP Cases at 40.
54 Id.
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evidence was an insufficient basis for the lower court's inference of discrimination." The
DEA contended that any statistical disparities between black and white agents were the
result of different levels of prior experience." The appeals court affirmed the district
court's rejection of the DEA's challenge to the plaintiffs' statistical showing of status
disparities between similarly situated blacks and whites which was based on the lack of
evidence that whites possessed greater experience than blacks." The appeals court also
concluded that plaintiffs' statistical showing of status disparities permitted the court to
infer discrimination, even absent supporting anecdotal evidence. 58
The appeals court observed, however, that though the DEA claim that any disparities
between blacks and whites were produced by statistically unaccounted for differential
prior experience did not invalidate the plaintiffs' prima facie case of discrimination, it
could be characterized as evidence rebutting an ultimate inference of discrimination. 59
In other words, the plaintiffs' failure to fully account for black and white agents' prior
experience did not preclude a prima facie showing of disparities between similarly
situated black and white agents, but if evidence of such differential experience were
presented, such evidence might have precluded the court's ultimate inference that these
disparities resulted from discriminatory action by the DEA. 60 The appeals court, however,
ruled that the DEA had also failed to produce any evidence to support this nondiscri-
minatory explanation and therefore had failed to preclude the ultimate inference of
discriminations'
"Id. at 1287, 35 FEP Cases at 58.
5"Id. at 1274-76, 35 FEP Cases at 47-49.
" Id, at 1276-77, 35 FEP Cases at 49-50. The DEA's claim that the plaintiff's statistics were
flawed rested on the claim that they failed to account for agents' prior specialized experience in
criminal investigations. Id. at 1274, 35 FEP Cases at 44. The DEA alleged that the failure to account
for this variable skewed all of plaintiffs' statistical studies, and it was this factor, rather than the
race of the employee, which explained the lower salaries and less rapid promotion of black agents.
Id. The district court rejected this claim because all agents were required to possess one year of
specialized criminal investigative experience. Id. at 1275, 35 FEP Cases at 48. The plaintiffs' studies
only failed to account for a second year of "specialized experience" which was a prerequisite for
entry of an agent at level GS-9. Id.
" Id, at 1277-79; 35 FEP Cases at 50-52. The DEA also claimed that the disparities between
blacks and whites, which had been offered by the plaintiffs, were not large enough to justify the
trial court's inference of discrimination because they were not linked with anecdotal evidence of
discrimination. Id. at 1277, 35 FEP Cases at 50. The appeals court ruled that, although anecdotal
evidence is always helpful, it is not always necessary for a disparate treatment plaintiff to prevail.
Id. at 1278, 35 FEP Cases at 51. The court distinguished the Supreme Court's discussion of the
relation between statistical and anecdotal evidence of discrimination in Hazelwood School Dist. v.
United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08, 12 FEP Cases 1150, 1158 (1977), from the present case. The
Segar appeals court noted that in Hazelwood the plaintiff relied on statistical comparisons between
a workforce and the general population, while the plaintiffs in Segar presented more finely tuned
statistics comparing blacks and whites who were all DEA special agents. Segar, 738 F.2d at 1278-
79, 35 FEI' Cases at 56.
3" 738 F.2d at 1287, 35 FEP Cases at 58.
6"Id. The manner in which the appeals court raised this issue is somewhat confusing. Though
the court distinguished between evidence which directly undermines plaintiff's attempt to dem-
onstrate status disparities between "similarly situated" employees and evidence which provides a
nondiscriminatory explanation for status disparities, id., the distinction is not clear in this particular
case. If the DEA claim that white agents were more "promotable" because they had greater prior
experience had been supported by evidence, this claim would not only have precluded an inference
of discrimination, it also would have fatally weakened plaintiff's statistical demonstration of dispar-
ities by proving that the black and white agents being compared were not similarly situated.
Cl Id,
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The court of appeals next addressed the defendant's claim that the district court
had applied an improper rebuttal burden. 62 The DEA challenged the trial court's state-
ment that the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant once the plaintiff establishes
a prima facie case. 63 Admitting that the trial court's formulation was a technical misstate-
ment of the law, the appeals court nevertheless concluded that this statement, when read
in context with other statements by the trial court, was not a misallocation of burdens
of proo1. 64 The appeals court, concluded, therefore, that the trial court had complied
with the Supreme Court's requirement, in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine,65 that the plaintiff in disparate treatment cases carries the burden of proof at all
times. 66
Although the appeals court indicated that the trial court's statement of the respective
burdens of the plaintiff and defendant complied with the Supreme Court's holding in.
Burdine, it also indicated that the Burdine analysis might not apply to all class disparate
treatment cases. 67 Because of the significant differences between individual and class
action disparate treatment cases," the appeals court stated that the burdens of proof in •
the two types of cases may also differ. 69 The appeals court suggested that because the
burden of establishing a prima facie case in an individual's claim of disparate treatment
is easily satisfied, the defendant's rebuttal burden is also minima1. 70 The mere articulation
of a nondiscriminatory explanation for allegedly discriminatory action satisfies this bur-
den, the court explained.n Plaintiffs then, according to the court, must attempt to prove
that the defendant's explanation is a mere pretext for discrimination. 72
In contrast, the appeals court noted that prima facie class disparate treatment claims
are typically stronger than individual disparate treatment cases because numerous non-
discriminatory explanations for disparate treatment are not credible in the face of
plaintiffs' presentation of sound statistical evidence." Such statistical evidence, the court
explained, not only precludes a greater number of potential employer explanations of
disparate treatment than are precluded in the typical individual cases, 74 it also is relevant
to the court's determination of whether employer explanations for differential treatment
are merely pretexts for discrimination." Because plaintiffs' cases in class suits are typically
stronger than in individual suits, and because they often compress the first and third
stages of the individual claim into one stage, 76 the appeals court concluded that defen-
dant's rebuttal burden is greater in such class action cases than in individual cases. 77
62 Id. at 1284, 35 FEP Cases at 55-56.
" Id.
" Id.
sa Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 25 FEP Cases 113, 115
(1981).
66 Segar, 738 F.2d at 1284, 35 FEP Cases at 56.





" Id. at 1269 n.13, 35 FEP Cases at 43 n.13.
"Id. at 1269, 35 FEP Cases at 43-44.
74 Id.
75 Id,
76 Id. A statistical showing that a large number of factors do not explain status disparities
between blacks and whites may also include evidence relating to whether a particular explanatory
factor raised by the defendant to explain such disparities is merely a pretext for discrimination. Id.
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The Segar court attempted to both respect the Burdine holding that the burden of
proof always remains with the plaintiff as well as to impose on the defendant a more
demanding rebuttal burden than mere articulation of a nondiscriminatory explanation
for demonstrated disparities between blacks and whites. Trying to harmonize these
seemingly contradictory goals, the court stated that class action disparate treatment cases
consist of two stages." According to the court, in the first stage the plaintiff attempts to
produce enough evidence to justify an inference of discrimination." The court added
that if the plaintiff succeeds in demonstrating a prima facie case, in the second stage the
defendant must introduce evidence challenging or rebutting the plaintiff's evidence, so
that the court can infer that no discrimination occurred." Ultimately holding that in
both individual and class disparate treatment cases the plaintiff at all times bears the
ultimate burden of proof, the court nevertheless concluded that in class actions the
defendant must present more substantial evidence to rebut or undercut a plaintiff's -
prima facie case.'"
The Segar court determined that the DEA had neither succeeded in directly under-
mining the plaintiff's case, nor in proposing a nondiscriminatory explanation for the
demonstrated disparities between black and white agents." The court, therefore, af-
firmed the trial court's finding that DEA was liable to its black agents for intentional
racial discrimination."
In dicta, the court added that even if the DEA had successfully rebutted the charge
of intentional discrimination, the DEA might have been guilty of a Title VII violation."
Class disparate treatment claims which are successfully rebutted by a showing that a
particular nondiscriminatory employer practice or policy produced the demonstrated
disparities should proceed, the court stated, as classic claims of disparate impact. 85 The
court stated that such a transformation from class disparate treatment to classic disparate
impact claims is logical because a rebutted class disparate treatment case has all the
elements of a classic disparate impact case." The court explained that these elements
constitute a particular employer policy which has resulted in statistically demonstrable
status disparities between classes of employees. 87 The plaintiff's proof of intentional
discrimination is not required in disparate impact, as it is in disparate treatment cases. 88
When such a transformation occurs, the court reasoned, the defendant has the burden
of justifying the business necessity of the particular policy which it has raised in its
defense."
In such a situation the third stage of the individual disparate treatment case is not necessary. This
is because the plaintiff, by showing that numerous nondiscriminatory factors do not explain differ-






82 Id. at 1287-88, 35 FEP Cases at 59.
" Id. at 1288, 35 FEP Cases at 59.
84 Id. at 1270-71, 1288, 35 FEP Cases at 44-45, 59.
85 /d. at 1270-71, 35 FEP Cases at 44-45.
,6 Id.
87 Id.
88 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 3 FEP Cases 175 (1971).
Segar, 738 F.2d at 1270-71, 35 FEP Cases at 44-45.
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To illustrate its reasoning, the court observed that the DEA would have had to
justify the business necessity of requiring a second year of specialized experience if the
court had found this requirement, and not race, to be the cause of lower pay and less
promotions of black agents. 9° Such a disparate impact claim would differ from a tradi-
tional case of disparate impact. Under the Segar court's approach, the particular practice
challenged would not be originally selected by the plaintiff-employees but would be
raised by the defendant-employer in its defense of charges of generalized discrimination.
In the disparate impact portion of the case, the employer would have had to justify the
business necessity of the practice or policy which the employer had successfully raised
as a nondiscriminatory explanation for status disparities in the disparate treatment
portion of the case. The court justified its requirement that employers articulate which
of its practices unfairly affected plaintiffs on the grounds that the employer has superior
knowledge "as to precisely how its employment practices affect employees." 91
The Segar case is significant because of its holding with respect to the relative burdens
of proof on plaintiffs and defendants in Title VII disparate treatment class actions. 92
The case is also important because it suggests that class disparate treatment claims can
be transformed into disparate impact claims, if successfully rebutted by an employer's
showing that a nondiscriminatory practice caused the differential treatment. 93 The hold-
ing of Segar with respect to burdens of proof is somewhat confusing because the court.
purports to hold that their decision is in accord with the Supreme Court decision in
Burdine that the burden of proof is at all times with the plaintiff. 94 At the same time the
Segar court suggests that in class actions there is a greater rebuttal burden on the the
defendant than in individual disparate treatment cases, 95 where the defendant need
merely articulate a nondiscriminatory explanation for its action to rebut the plaintiffs'
prima facie case. Commentators 96 and some lower courts97 have also stated that the
structure and intermediate burdens of proof of individual disparate treatment cases are
ill-suited to class disparate treatment claims. 98
9° Id. at 1288, 35 FEP Cases at 59.
91 Id. at 1271, 35 FEP Cases at 44-45.
" Id. at 1268-69, 35 FEP Cases at 42-44.
"Id. at 1270-71, 35 FEP Cases at 44-45.
94 Id. at 1284, 35 FEP Cases at 56.
95
 Id. at 1269, 35 FEP Cases at 43-44.
96 B. SCHLEP & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 1288. The disparate treatment rules are designed
for probing motivation with respect to an adverse action taken against a specific individual, and are
ill-suited to a broad-based statistical attack on an entire employment. system." Id.
97 See Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 521 F. Supp. 656, 664-65, 26 FEP Cases 11 27, 1 134-
35 (N.D. Tex. 1981). The Vuyanich court stated:
The Burdine construct contemplates an initial thrust by a plaintiff, a parry by a
defendant, followed by a traditional fight with the burden on the challenger ... This
sequential model works well in the context of a simple, single-plaintiff treatment case
by determining the result where a defendant offers no explanation, or where the
defendant does explain, but the plaintiff fails to discredit the explanation. The model
works poorly, if at all, where a plaintiff class loads overwhelming force into its opening
shot	 In a complex class action, utilizing statistical proof and counterproof, the
value of the Burdine sequence — to highlight the issues in contest — is about as relevant
as a minuet is to a thermonuclear battle.
Id. at 661, 26 FEP Cases at 1132.
99 The Supreme Court may accept the reasoning of the appeals court and commentators on
this issue. If, however, the Court does not decide to treat class cases differently from individual
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Because the Segar holding with respect to burdens of proof is subject to challenge,
future class disparate treatment plaintiffs should not be satisfied with a general statistical
showing of status disparities between the plaintiff class and other employees. Such
plaintiffs should also specifically demonstrate that any defendant explanation for differ-
ential treatment is merely a pretext for discrimination. In this manner, the plaintiff will
satisfy the burden of proof articulated in not only Segar, but also in Burdine. Conversely,
cases, and instead applies its analysis in Burdine uniformly to all disparate treatment cases, it may
overturn or remand findings of liability similar to those made in Segar. Such a reversal would be a
consequence of a defendant articulating a nondiscriminatory explanation for disparate treatment,
as the DEA did in Segar, and a court refusing to accept that explanation. The nondiscriminatory
explanation advanced by the DEA was the differential prior experience of black and white agents.
Segar, 738 F.2d at 1287, 35 FEP Cases at 58. In Segar, the appeals court rejected the DEA's
explanation because the agency did not support its assertion with evidence. Id. Under a literal
interpretation of Burdine, however, the burden would have been on the plaintiff to prove that the
articulated explanation was merely pretextual, regardless of the credibility or validity of the em-
ployer's explanation. The Segar appeals court, in contrast, read Burdine as holding that, in some
cases, the plaintiff's initial evidence will be enough to discredit an employer's explanation. Id. at
1269, 35 FEP Cases at 44. The Supreme Court, in contrast, may conclude that such an interpretation
of Burdine will place too great a burden on employers to justify all racial and sexual disparities
which flow from discretionary employer decisions.
The Supreme Court may be even less willing to accept the appeals court's assertions that
successfully rebutted class disparate treatment claims can become transformed into disparate impact
claims. See id. at 1270, 35 FEP Cases at 44. The Court may conclude that such an approach is not
justified by Title VII because it permits plaintiffs to prevail who do not prove intentional discrim-
ination and who do not initially challenge a particular policy or practice of the employer. In terms
of logic and judicial economy, the appeals court's suggestion that disparate treatment plaintiffs
proceed on a disparate impact claim, once a particular practice which disproportionately affects
them has been identified, makes sense. The alternative would be to require the plaintiffs to file a
new disparate impact claim after their disparate treatment claim had been rebutted. The Supreme
Court, however, may be unwilling to sanction the appeals court's approach because it potentially
alters the thrust of Title VII. Title VII was intended by Congress to eliminate intentional discrim-
ination and to guarantee equal treatment, but riot necessarily equal status, to all employees. See
Power v. Barry, 539 F. Supp. 721, 726, 29 FEP Cases 559, 563-64 (D. Mich. 1982) (interpreting
legislative history of Title VII). The Segar doctrine, if adopted, could transform Title VII into a
vehicle for suing employers whenever the status of' employees of a protected class is inferior to
those of nonprotectecl employees.
The Segar approach does offer a solution to the difficult problem of distinguishing class
disparate treatment claims from "excessive subjectivity" disparate impact claims. See B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 1288. Such disparate impact claims do not challenge a particular practice,
but rather allege bias throughout an employment system which adversely impacts on a protected
class. Such claims, therefore, are not true disparate impact claims and should be brought as class
disparate treatment claims. If the employer demonstrates that any unequal impact of employment
policies is not caused by discrimination but by a particular practice, then the elements of a true
disparate impact claim would be present arid the case could proceed on those grounds.
Treating class disparate treatment claims and excessive subjectivity claims similarly eliminates
the logical inconsistency of applying the different standards of proof of the classic disparate impact
and disparate treatment cases to these essentially indistinguishable cases. See Pouncy v. Prudential
Iris. Co., 668 F.2d 795, 800, 28 FEP Cases 121, 125-26 (5th Cir. 1982) (court held that "excessive
subjectivity" cases in actuality are disparate treatment cases and not adverse impact cases). The
bringing of "excessive subjectivity" disparate impact cases as class disparate treatment cases is riot
only logical, it also seems advantageous to plaintiffs if, as the Segar court suggested, rebutted class
disparate treatment claims arc transformed into classic disparate impact claims. If the Segar dicta
is not applied, however, class plaintiffs will face a more difficult task because they will have to
produce sufficient evidence to support an inference of intentional discrimination.
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future disparate treatment defendants must not be satisfied with the mere articulation
of a nondiscriminatory explanation for differential treatment of employees, but must
present as much evidence as possible to support that explanation.
Whether other courts will accept the logic of Segar's dicta and permit rebutted class
disparate treatment claims to proceed as classic disparate impact cases is also unclear."
Future plaintiffs should, therefore, attempt to bring a classic disparate impact claim in
conjunction with their class disparate treatment claim. This approach will guarantee that
a disparate impact claim will survive a rebutted disparate treatment claim. The plaintiff,
however, may have difficulty bringing a classic disparate impact suit if disparities in
status flow from a subtle employer bias, and not from a particular objective employer
policy.
The bringing of' a concurrent "excessive subjectivity" disparate impact claim would
be helpful to the plaintiff if the trial court were to apply the classic disparate impact
burdens of proof to such a case. In that situation the defendant would be forced to
justify the "business necessity" of its overly subjective decision-making process. Courts
will likely recognize, however, that "excessive subjectivity" suits are, in reality, claims of
subtle, yet intentional discrimination and will, therefore, require that they be brought as
class disparate treatment cases.
The Segar court's suggestion that rebutted class disparate treatment cases be trans-
formed into traditional disparate impact cases, if recognized by other courts, would make
defending a Title VII employment discrimination case more difficult. Future defendants,
therefore, should focus on undermining the plaintiff's initial statistical showing of status
disparities between similarly situated classes of employees. The plaintiff's attempt to
show statistical disparities in employee status is the crucial battleground because once
the plaintiff makes such a showing, the defendant then has the burden of raising a policy
which provides a nondiscriminatory explanation for these disparities. Even if the em-
ployer succeeds in rebutting the inference of discrimination, the employer will then have
the subsequent burden of justifying the "business necessity" of the particular practices
which it had shown was the cause of the status disparities in question.
In conclusion, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
decision in Segar held that class disparate treatment claims may consist of only two stages
in which the plaintiff presents evidence permitting a court's inference of discrimination
and the defendant attempts to undermine that inference. The court stated that the
defendant's mere articulation of a nondiscriminatory explanation of discrimination will
not suffice, in a class disparate treatment claim, to undercut the inference of discrimi-
nation. This holding is a logical modification of the Supreme Court's holdings on burdens
of proof with respect to individual disparate treatment cases. The appeals court also
suggested that the rebuttal of a class disparate treatment case transforms it into a
disparate impact case. Though permitting successfully rebutted class disparate treatment
claims to proceed as disparate impact cases is logical in terms of judicial economy, such
an approach may also be rejected by the Supreme Court as an unjustified expansion of
the scope of Title VII claims.
99 See Pouncy, 668 F.2d at 800, 28 FEY Cases at 124-25; Rivera v. City of Witchita Falls, 665
F.2d 531, 539, 27 FEP Cases 1352, 1356 (5th Cir. 1982), for examples of opinions questioning
whether rebutted class disparate treatment cases should be permitted to proceed as disparate impact
cases. The Segar court rejected the reasoning of these two decisions. Segar, 738 F.2d at 1270-71,
35 FEP Cases at 45.
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C. *Limiting the Role of Statistical Evidence in Affirmative Action Cases: Janowiak v. City of
South Bend'
The Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 2 and
the fourteenth amendments as allowing employers to implement race-conscious affir-
mative action plans to remedy past discrimination. 4 In Fullilove v. Klutznick5 and United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 6 the Supreme Court upheld the disputed validity of race-conscious
affirmative action programs, emphasizing that such programs are needed to correct the
effects of prior discrimination.' Consequently, in the aftermath of these decisions, the
question of what constitutes past discrimination has become a major component in
challenges to the validity of affirmative action programs.
A central factor in determining whether past discrimination has occurred is the
statistical disparity, if any, between the percentage of minorities employed in the allegedly
discriminatory enterprise and the percentage of minorities in the community from which
employees are hired. 8 This approach was suggested by the Supreme Court in the 1976
case of International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States. 9 In Teamsters, the Court stated
that statistics showing racial imbalance are probative because such imbalance is often a
telltale sign of purposeful discrimination, and that absent explanation, it is ordinarily to
be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force
representative of the racial composition of the community from which employees are
hired.L°
Lower federal courts have followed this view and have given strong weight to
statistical evidence in affirmative action cases. For example, in Detroit Police Officer's
Association v. Young," in a dispute challenging the legality of an affirmative action pro-
gram, the Sixth Circuit held that "[e]ven standing alone, the statistical data was evidence
of discrimination."I 2 Similarly, in Bratton v. City of Detroit," the Sixth Circuit again found
that "[t]here is no doubt that the inference of intentional discrimination which arises
from severe statistical disparity is an accurate one."" Although additional factors indic-
ative of past discrimination were present in Teamsters, Young, and Bratton, 15 these decisions
* By William F. Martin Jr., Staff Member, Pios .rois COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
750 F.2d 557, 36 FE? Cases 737 (7th Cir. 1984).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (j) (1982).
U.S. CoNs -r. amend. XIV, § 2.
4 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 20
FE? Cases 1 (1979); Board of Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 17 FEP
Cases 1000 (1978).
5
 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
6
 443 U.S. 193, 20 FEP Cases 1 (1979).
7 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 492; Weber, 443 U.S. at 197, 20 FE? Cases at 3; see also Bakke, 438 U.S.
at 320, 17 FEP Cases at 1022.
8
 International Bhd of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 & n.20, 14 FE? Cases
1514, 1520-21 & n.20 (1976).
431 U.S. 324, 14 FEP Cases 1514 (1976).
1) Id. at 339-40 & n.20, 14 FEP Cases at 1520-21 & n.20.
11 608 F.2d 671, 20 FEP Cases 1728 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981).
12 Id. at 687, 20 FEY Cases at 1737.
704 F.2d 878, 31 FEP Cases 465 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 703 (1984).
14
 Id. at 889, 31 FEP Cases at 472.
' 5 In Teamsters, the Court recognized that many acts of overt discrimination had taken place.
431 U.S. at 339, 14 FEP Cases at 1520. In both Bratton and Young, the Sixth Circuit also found that
December 1985]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 1 69
suggest in dicta that a court could uphold the implementation of a race-conscious
affirmative action plan based solely on a factual finding of sharp statistical disparity
between the number of minorities employed in an enterprise and the number of mi-
norities present in the community.' 6
During the Survey year, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, in Janowiak v. City of South Bend, 17 held an affirmative action plan invalid, stating
that a finding of statistical disparity between the percentage of minority firefighters and
the percentage of minorities in the community was not sufficient to conclude that past
discrimination had taken place.' 8 The court found that the employer, the City of South
Bend, had to proffer something more than a finding of statistical disparity between the
percentage of minorities employed and the percentage of minorities in the community
to justify the adoption of a race-conscious affirmative action plan.' 8 Absent "something
more" to show past discrimination, the court concluded that adoption of an affirmative
action plan would violate both Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution. 2° Although this decision requires an
employer to have more than statistical evidence to support a finding of past discrimi-
nation," the decision fails to delineate the factors that must be present in order to find
that past discrimination existed.
In Janowiak, plaintiff janowiak, a white male, challenged the South Bend Fire
Department's affirmative action program on the grounds that it violated Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the fourteenth amendment of the United States Consti-
tution." In 1979 the South Bend Board of Public Safety, noting that the city had a
minority population of 14.1% and the fire department had a minority population of
only 5.3%, appointed a task force to design and implement a plan to improve the
recruitment of minorities into the city's fire department." Although the task force did
not find that the city's hiring practices were discriminatory, it suggested that the public
safety board adopt, for five years, a two minority to one nonrninority preferential hiring
plan in order for the fire department to eventually reflect the minority composition of
the city."
The minority recruitment review committee of the city's board of public safety
approved the task force recommendation and submitted the proposal to the board of
public safety for approval. 28 The board adopted the task force recommendation, declar-
ing that minority representation on the fire department should be consistent with the
minority composition of the community. 26 In implementing the newly adopted plan,
there had been many incidents of racial discrimination. Bratton, 704 F.2d at 889, 31 FEP Cases at
472; Young, 608 F.2d at 687, 20 FEP Cases at 1737.
i° Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339 n.20, 14 FEP Cases at 1520 n.20; Bratton, 704 F.2d at 889, 31 FEP
Cases at 472; Young, 608 F.2d at 687, 20 FEP Cases at 1737.
' 7 750 F.2d 557, 36 FEP Cases 737 (7th Cir. 1984).
12 Id. at 562, 36 FEP Cases at 741.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 562, 564, 36 FEP Cases at 741, 743.
21 1d.
22 Id. at 558, 36 FEP Cases at 738.
22 Id.
24 Id.
23 Id. at 559, 36 FEP Cases at 738.
26 1d.
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South Bend retained its testing procedures," but used two separate lists to rank minority
and nonminority applicants who passed the hiring exam. 28 In November of 1980, pur-
suant to this plan, the public safety board hired four minority applicants and one
nonminority applicant to the fire department. 28
Janowiak had applied to the fire department, passed the exam, and was placed
second on the nonminority list $ 0 On November 7, 1980, the board of public safety
notified Janowiak of his position on the list." At his deposition, Janowiak testified that
Robert Potvin, Assistant to the board of public safety, assured him on two separate
occasions prior to February, 1981 that the board would hire him as a firefighter." In
February of 1981, however, Potvin informed Janowiak that he would not be hired and
denied having told Janowiak that he would be hired." Janowiak filed a charge of race
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in July of
1981 and the EEOC issued a right to sue in February of 1982. 34
Janowiak brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Indiana." In December of 1983 the court granted South Bend's motion for summary
judgment. 36
 The court reasoned that neither Title VII nor the fourteenth amendment
prevented South Bend from adopting an affirmative action plan designed to remedy the
disparity between the percentage of minorities in the city's population and the percentage
of minorities in the fire department." On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that both
Title VII and the fourteenth amendment required South Bend to use more than statis-
tical data to make the finding of past discrimination necessary to adopt an affirmative
action program .38
The court first considered whether Title VII prohibited South Bend from making
a finding of past discrimination based solely on statistical data. 39 The Seventh Circuit,
citing United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 4" stated that affirmative action plans with-
stand Title VII challenges if they are designed to remedy old patterns of racial segre-
gation and do not unnecessarily trammel the interests of white employees. 4 ' The appeals
court then noted that the Supreme Court, in sustaining the plan in Weber, relied upon
more than the statistical disparity between the percentage of minority craftworkers and
the percentage of minorities in the workforce. 42 According to the Seventh Circuit's
27 Id. The task force had found the testing procedures reasonable and nondiscriminatory. Id.
"Id. at 559, 36 FEY Cases at 739.
" Id. One minority applicant failed the physical examination and was replaced by the next
applicant on the minority list in February of 1981. Id.
3° Id.
9I Id.
52 Id. Potvin later denied making any of these statements. Id.
3, Id.
54 Id.
"576 F. Supp. 1461, 33 FEP Cases 958 (N.D. Ind. 1983).
36 Id. at 1468, 33 FEE' Cases at 963. The district court found that Janowiak's EEOC charge was
not barred despite the 180 day statute of limitations because Potvin's assurances tolled the statute
of limitations. Id. at 1465, 33 FEP Cases at 961. This portion of the district court decision was
affirmed. 750 F.2d at 559-61, 36 FEP Cases at 739-41.
" 576 F. Supp. at 1466-68, 33 FEP Cases at 961-63.
38 750 F.2d at 562, 36 FEP Cases at 741.
99 Id.
48 443 U.S. 193, 20 FEP Cases 1 (1979).
" 750 F.2d at 562, 36 FEP Cases at 741 (citing Weber, 443 U.S. at 208, 20 FEP Cases at 7).
44 Id.
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interpretation of Weber, the Supreme Court relied upon the craft unions' history of
excluding blacks, as well as upon the statistical disparity, in finding the prior discrimi-
nation necessary to justify implementation of an affirmative action plan. 43 Following its
interpretation of Weber, the court of appeals concluded that Title VII prohibited the
implementation of an affirmative action plan where the finding of past discrimination
was based solely on the existence of a statistical disparity between the percentage of
minorities working for an employer and the percentage of minorities in the community."
In addition to relying on Weber, the Janowiak court also cited opinions from the
Second and Sixth Circuits which had upheld challenged affirmative action plans. 45 While
noting that the circuits had not agreed on a consistent approach in evaluating the
sufficiency of statistical data in affirmative action cases, 46 the Seventh Circuit held that
more than a statistical disparity is necessary to justify the implementation of an` affir-
mative action plan. 47 The court interpreted both Detroit Police Officers' Association v. Young's
and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) v. City of Hartford .° as requiring
more than a statistical disparity to make a finding of past discrimination." The Janowiak
court reasoned that in Young the Sixth Circuit based its finding of past discrimination in
the Detroit Police Department on more than statistical data." In Young, the court found
that the department had discriminated against blacks in the entrance exam, in duty
assignments, in the job's physical requirements, and in background investigatory pro-
cedures." Similarly, in MEW," the Second Circuit found that in addition to statistics,
there was pervasive overt racial discrimination in the construction trades." Citing Weber,
Young, and IBEW as authority, the Seventh Circuit thus concluded that Title VII required
South Bend to proffer more than statistical data to show the past discrimination necessary
to justify its adoption of an affirmative action plan. 55
After finding that South Bend's plan violated Title VII, the court addressed the
question of whether South Bend's affirmative action plan, which was based solely on a
finding of statistical disparity, violated the fourteenth amendment. 56 The court stated
that it was difficult to find a clear standard of review from Fullilove v. Klutznick 57 and
' 3 Id.
44 Id. at 563, 36 FEP Cases at 742.
" Id. The opinions cited were Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 31 FEP Cases 465 (6th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 703 (1984), International Bhd of Elec. Workers (IBEW) v. City of
Hartford, 625 F.2d 416, 22 FEP Cases 1786 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981); Detroit
Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 20 FEP Cases 1728 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 938 (1981).
" 750 F.2d at 563, 36 FEP Cases at 742.
47 Id.
45 608 F.2d 671, 20 FEP Cases 1728 (6th Cir. 1979).
45 625 F.2d 416, 22 FEP Cases 1786 (2d Cir. 1980).
"Janowiak, 750 F.2d at 562-63, 36 FEP Cases at 741-42.
5 'id. at 562, 36 FEP Cases at 741-42.
52 Young, 608 F.2d at 690, 20 FEP Cases at 1740.
53 625 F.2d 416, 22 FEP Cases 1786 (2d Cir. 1980).
54 Id. at 421-22, 22 FEP Cases at 1790.
55 Janowiak, 750 F.2d at 563, 36 FEP Cases at 742.
56 Id. The court pointed out that although courts should not reach constitutional issues in cases
which can be disposed of on other grounds, most courts considering Title VII affirmative action
challenges also address the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause issue. Id.
57 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 5 8 the two most recent Supreme Court
decisions to consider the constitutionality of race-conscious affirmative action programs. 59
The court determined, however, that generally, under Fullilove and Bakke an affirmative
action program satisfies the fourteenth amendment if the plan both serves an important
governmental interest and is directed toward the achievement of that governmental
interest.°
Applying this two-prong test to the case at bar, the court found that South Bend's
affirmative action program failed the initial inquiry because it did not serve an important
governmental interest.61 Although conceding that remedying past discrimination was an
important governmental objective that would satisfy the first prong of the test, the court
concluded that South Bend had not adequately established that past discrimination
existed. 62 According to the court, evidence of statistical disparity, coupled with the city's
admission that its previous hiring practices were reasonable, was insufficient to show
that past discrimination had occurred. 65 Reasoning that a statistical disparity, when
considered with additional evidence, could demonstrate the existence of past discrimi-
nation, the court remanded the case to the district court for a determination of whether
South Bend could put forth any such additional evidence. 64
Janowiak represents the first case to question the validity of an affirmative action
program in which a court of appeals was presented with a finding of past discrimination
solely on the basis of statistical evidence. Although the Supreme Court upheld affirmative
action programs in both Weber and Fullilove based in part on statistical data, there was
ample additional evidence of discrimination presented in those cases to support the claim
of past discrimination. In Weber, the Supreme Court found that the evidence of prior
discrimination was so pervasive that the issue was considered to be a proper subject for
judicial notice.66 In Fullilove, the Court, in the lead plurality opinion of Chief Justice
Burger, found abundant historical basis to conclude that prior discrimination had taken
place. 66 The Court noted that the presence of barriers to competitive access had their
roots in racial and ethnic discrimination. 67
Decisions of other courts of appeals similarly have relied on evidence in addition to
the statistical disparity between the number of minorities employed in the enterprise
and the number of minorities in the community in upholding affirmative action plans.
In Poung,68 for example, the Sixth Circuit relied on direct testimony of overt racial
discrimination as well as on statistics in making a finding of past discrimination. 69 In
Bratton,7° the court found that blacks in the Detroit Police Department were victims of
58 438 U.S. 256, 17 FEP Cases 1000 (1978).
" janowiak, 750 F.2d at 563, 36 FEP Cases at 742.
6° Id.
" Id. at 563-64, 36 FEP Cases at 743.
62 Id. at 564, 36 FEP Cases at 743.
65 Id.
"Id. Because the court found no discrimination and therefore no important governmental
interest, it did not reach the second prong of its test — whether the affirmative action plan was
directed toward achieving that interest.
65 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208, 20 FEP Cases at 7.
66 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 477-78.
" Id. at 477.
68 608 F.2d 671, 20 FEP Cases 1728 (6th Cir. 1979).
66 /d. at 687, 20 FEP Cases at 1737.
70 704 F.2d 878, 31 FEP Cases 465 (6th Cir. 1983).
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discriminatory practices in hiring, promotion, and in day-to-day treatment by other
members of the police force. 71 In MEW," as in Weber, the existence of racial discrimi-
nation was so pervasive that it was recognized as a subject for judicial notice." Thus, the
Janowiak decision is consistent with past affirmative action decisions. Despite the dicta in
Young and Bratton that statistics alone may be sufficient to prove prior discrimination, 74
courts which have thus far upheld affirmative action plans have done so only when
presented with evidence in addition to statistics to show prior discrimination."
By requiring employers to use more than statistical evidence to make a showing of
past discrimination, the Janowiak decision diminishes the evidentiary role of statistics in
affirmative action cases. Employers in the Seventh Circuit must now meet a higher
threshold standard to gain judicial approval of race conscious affirmative action plans."
In limiting the role of statistical evidence in affirmative action cases,77 however, the
Janowiak court failed to announce the type of additional evidence that will be sufficient
to support a finding of past discrimination. Though the court gave some suggestions
regarding the type of evidence it would consider adequate in the future, 79 Janowiak in
effect allows lower courts to determine what evidence, in addition to statistics, is sufficient
to make a finding of past discrimination.
The Janowiak decision does not provide much guidance for district courts faced with
challenges to affirmative action programs in the future. Although the Janowiak decision
clearly requires more than statistical data before an employer's race-conscious program
will withstand judicial scrutiny, 79 the decision does not specify how much more evidence
is required. The presence of facts similar to those present in the cases Janowiak cites,
such as overt or intentional discrimination directed at individuals, discriminatory en-
trance examinations, or discriminatory hiring or promotion procedures, would all appear
to be sufficient to constitute a finding of prior discrimination after Janowiak. 8° Whether
any other factors will be sufficient to justify such a finding will, no doubt, be the subject
of future litigation challenging the validity of affirmative action programs.
D. *Res Judicata in Title VII Actions: Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond'
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act2 prohibits discrimination in employment based
on an individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' Both the Equal Employ-
7, Id. at 889, 31 FEP Cases at 472.
72 625 F.2d 416, 22 FE? Cases 1786 (2d Cir. 1980).
" Id. at 422, 22 FEP Cases at 1790. See also Weber, 443 U.S. at 198 n.i, 20 FEP Cases at 3 n.l.
Bratton, 704 F.2d at 889, 31 FE? Cases at 472; Young, 608 F.2d at 687, 20 FEP Cases at 1737.
" See, e.g., Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 477-78; Weber, 443 U.S. at 208, 20 FEP Cases at 7; Bratton,
704 F.2d at 889, 31 FEP Cases at 472; Young, 608 F.2d at 687, 20 FEP Cases at 1737.
"Janowiak, 750 F.2d at 564, 36 FEP Cases at 743.
77 Id. at 562-64, 36 FE? Cases at 741-43.
78 The Janowiak court, citing Bratton, 704 F.2d at 887, 31 FEP Cases at 472, stated that evidence
showing discrimination in hiring, promotion, or in day-to-day treatment of minorities would be
sufficient to support a finding of past discrimination. 750 F.2d at 562-64, 36 FEP Cases at 741-43.
75 750 F.2d at 562, 564, 36 FEP Cases at 741, 743.
"Id. at 562-64, 36 FEP Cases at 741-43.
* Kathleen J. Collins, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
104 S. Ct. 2794, 35 FEP Cases 1 (1984).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982). Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
provides:
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ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and private individuals may bring Title VII
actions against an employer. 4
 Frequently, the initial suit is brought as a class action under
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures and is followed by individual suits. 6
Because the individual suits often raise issues identical to those in the earlier class actions,
courts have applied the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel to those later
individual suits.? Res judicata or claim preclusion bars an action when a prior final
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer — (1) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against an individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin ....
Id.
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to 2000e-5 (1982). But see § 706(f )(I) of Title VII, which authorizes
the Attorney General to sue state and local governments. An individual may sue on his own behalf
or as a member of a class action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982). The EEOC may also sue on
behalf of an individual or on behalf of a class of employees. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, 2000e-6 (1982).
Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or he sued
as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. CP/. P. 23(a).
Most often courts certify Title VII class actions under Rule 23(b)(2) as suits for injunctive or
declaratory relief. Comment, Res Judicata in Sucessive Employment Discrimination Suits, 4 ILL. L. FORUM
1049, 1058 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Res judicata]. Rule 23(b)(2) provides that:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a)
are satisfied, and in addition: . . . (2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused
to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole
FED. R. Cry. P. 23(6)(2).
Parties may also seek monetary relief for back pay in addition to injunctive relief under Rule
23(b)(2). See Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 250 (3d Cir. 1975). A party seeking
back pay but not injunctive relief must meet the more rigorous requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). Rule
23(b)(3) provides that a class action may be maintained when: "(3) the court finds that the questions
of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy." FED. R. Cry. P. 23(b)(3). Under this subsection all class
members must receive individual notice of the class action and be provided with the option to
withdraw or opt out from the class without prejudice. Comment, Res Judicata, supra, at 1058. This
option provides an important distinction between Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) class actions. In
Rule 23(6)(2) actions, absent members receive neither notification of the pending action nor the
option to exclude themselves from the suit. Id. at 1059-60 n.61.
6 See generally Comment, Res Judicata, supra note 5. The later individual suit may be brought as
a Title VII action alleging that the employer has engaged in an unlawful employment practice. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982); see supra note 3. An individual may also bring an action under the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right ...
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as
is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall he subject to like punishment, pains, penalties,
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
Id.
See generally Comment, Res judicata, supra note 5.
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judgment has already been rendered on the same claim between the same parties or
those in privity with them. 8 Collateral estoppel or issue preclusion bars reconsideration
of issues actually litigated and determined that were essential to the earlier judgment.g
As a general rule, a judgment in a class action is binding on all members of the
class.'° The United States courts of appeals, however, have been divided as to the
preclusive effect of a Title VII class action alleging a "pattern or practice" of discrimi-
nation on subsequent individual actions." A Title VII pattern-or-practice suit 'involves
an allegation that the defendant's actions constitute a pattern of conduct of intentional
discrimination against the plaintiff's protected class.' 2 The Fourth Circuit, in EEOC v.
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond,'s held that res judicata barred a class member from
bringing an action individually following a judgment in a pattern-or-practice class action
against the class." The Fourth Circuit noted that the only exceptions to the rule regard-
ing the preclusive effect of a class suit are based on due process. 15 Finding no evidence
of violations of due process, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the class action was
binding on all class members and therefore subsequent suits were barred.I 5 In contrast,
the Third Circuit held, in Edwards v. Boeing Vertol Co.," that a class member was not
barred by res judicata from bringing an individual action after a judgment in a class
action against the class. 18 The Third Circuit reasoned that because the class action
determined only that there was no "pattern or practice" of company-wide discrimination,
8 C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 72 (4th ed. 1983). To determine whether privity exists
between parties, the courts consider factors such as commonality of interests of the parties, the
extent of cooperation between the parties, the extent to which the party of the later suit controlled
the earlier litigation, and the notice and opportunity of the subsequent party to join the earlier
litigation. Id, § 100A.
9 Id.
' 0 See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S, 32, 41 (1940) (judgment in a class suit may bind members
of the class or those represented who were not made parties to it); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v.
Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 363 (1921) (decree in class suit binds all members of the class as if all were
before the court); Kemp v. Birmingham News, 608 F.2d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir. 1979) (judgment in
a class action will bind members of the class); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41(1)(e)
(1982). There are, however, exceptions to this general rule based on principles of due process. B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1268-69 (2d ed. 1983). Due process
requires proper certification of the class, adequate notice to class members and adequate represen-
tation of absent class members. Id. Furthermore, Rule 23(h)(3) class actions are not binding on class
members who have asked to be excluded or ''opted out." C. WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 72.
"See Edwards v. Boeing Vertol Co., 717 F.2d 761, 32 FEY Cases 1696 (3d Cir. 1983); EEOC
v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633, 30 FEP Cases 1137 (4th Cir. 1983).
12 See, e.g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335, 14 FEP Cases 1514, 1519 (1977)
(government suit alleging company-wide pattern and practice of employment discrimination against
blacks and Spanish-surnamed persons throughout the company's transportation system). Pattern-
or-practice suits necessarily involve claims of class-wide discrimination. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN,
supra note 10, at 1322 n.95. The EEOC may bring a pattern-or-practice action under § 707(a) of
Title VII, or a private class action may be maintained. The Supreme Court has recognized that the
elements of a prima facie pattern-or-practice case are the same in a private class action as they are
in an action by the EEOC under § 707(a). See Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 104
S. Ct. 2794, 2800 n.9, 35 FEP Cases 1, 5 n.9 (1984).
13 698 F.2d 633, 30 FEP Cases 1137 (4th Cir. 1983).
14
	
at 674-75, 30 FE? Cases at 1169-70.
15 Id. at 674, 30 FEP Cases at 1169.
16 Id,
0 717 F.2d 761, 32 FEP Cases 1696 (3d Cir. 1983).
IS Id. at 767, 32 FEP Cases at 1701.
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issues of discrimination against individuals could still exist and therefore later suits
involving specific instances of discrimination against individuals could be properly main-
tained.' 9 Thus, although a class member is generally precluded by res judicata from
bringing a subsequent individual suit based on the claims already litigated and deter-
mined, the circuit courts have been split as to whether a pattern-or-practice class action
is sufficiently similar to a subsequent individual claim of discrimination to warrant the
application of res judicata.
During the Survey year, the Supreme Court, in Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond,2° decided to resolve the split in the lower courts. Specifically, the Court in-
quired whether a judgment against a certified class in a Title VII case bars members of
that class from bringing subsequent individual actions against their employer for dis-
crimination." In an 8-0 decision, 22 the Cooper Court held that a judgment that an
employer did not engage in a pattern or practice of class-wide racial discrimination does
not preclude class members from bringing subsequent individual actions alleging dis-
crimination against them by their employer."
Cooper began when the EEOC filed a civil action against the Federal Reserve Bank
of Richmond (the Bank) in March, 1977 alleging that the Bank was violating section
703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by engaging in "policies and practices"
of racial discrimination against blacks." Subsequently, four individuals were permitted
to intervene as plaintiffs." These intervening plaintiffs alleged that they were being
discriminated against by the Bank because of their race and that they represented a class
of black employees with similar claims. 26 The district court certified that class according
to Rule 23(b)(2) and (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 27 Notice was published
in a local newspaper and mailed to individual class members. 28 The notice contained a
description of the litigation and a statement that members of the class would be bound
L9 Id. The Third Circuit stated that the class action "determined no more than that class
representatives had failed to prove a company-wide pattern or practice of discrimination. Edwards
is not, however, attempting to relitigate what was finally determined in the class action .... The
class action judgment is not a former adjudication." Id.
2° 104 S. Ct. 2794, 35 FEP Cases 1 (1984).
IL Id at 2796, 35 FEP Cases at 2.
" Justice Powell did not participate in the decision.
" Id. at 2802, 35 FEP Cases at 6.
24 Id. at 2796, 35 FEP Cases at 2.
2 ' The four intervening plaintiffs were Sylvia Cooper, Constance Russell, Helen Moore and
Elmore Hannah, Jr. Id. at 2796 n.2, 35 FEP Cases at 2 n.2. Section 706(f)(1) of Title VII permits
a party to intervene in an action filed by the EEOC as a matter of right. 42 U.S.C:. § 2000e-5(f)(1)
(1982). See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at 1167.
26 104 S. Ct. at 2796, 35 FEP Cases at 2. The intervening plaintiffs alleged that the Bank's
practices violated section 1981 as well as Title VII. Id.
27 Id. at 2796-97, 35 FEP Cases at 2. The certified class included:
[a]ll black persons who have been employed by the defendant at its Charlotte Branch
Office at any time since January 3, 1974 [6 months prior to the first charge filed by
the intervenors with EEOC], who have been discriminated against in promotion, wages,
job assignments and terms and conditions of employment because of their race.
Id. at 2797, 35 FEP Cases at 2; see also id. at 2797 n.3, 35 FE? Cases at 2 n.3. Although the court
certified•the class under both Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3), the procedural requirements of Rule
23(b)(3) such as personal pretrial notice to each class member and provision for class members to
opt out of the litigation were followed. See id. at 2796-97, 35 FEP Cases at 2.
26 Id. at 2797, 35 FEP Cases at 2.
December 1985]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 177
by the judgment or other determination unless they excluded themselves by notifying
the court clerk in writingP Among those who were notified of the class action were
Phyllis Baxter and five other bank employees." Although all parties agreed that Baxter
and the other five employees were members of the certified class, the "Baxter petitioners"
failed to exclude themselves from the class after receiving notices'
After testimony was given at trial by both the intervening plaintiffs and the Baxter
petitioners, the district court held that the Bank had engaged in a pattern and practice
of racial discrimination from 1974 to 1978 by failing to afford black employees oppor-
tunities afforded white employees," The court found, however, that this class-wide
discrimination was present only in pay grades four and five." As for the intervening
plaintiffs, the court observed that the Bank had discriminated against Cooper and
Russell, but not Moore and Hannah.s 4 The court made no decision as to the Baxter
petitioners."
Subsequently, the Baxter petitioners moved to intervene in the class action claiming
that the Bank had discriminated against each of them by denying them promotions
because of their race." The district court denied the motion to intervene for two reasons:
(1) one of the Baxter petitioners was a member of the class designated by the court as
entitled to reliefs' and therefore her rights would be protected in Stage II of the class
action proceedings dealing with relief:" and (2) the other five Baxter petitioners held
39 Id. at 2797 n.4, 35 FEP Cases at 2 n.4. Paragraph 5 of the notice stated:
If you decide to remain in this action, you should be advised that: the court will include
you in the class in this action unless you request to be excluded from the class in
writing; the judgment in this case, whether favorable or unfavorable to the plaintiff
and the plaintiff-intervenors, will include all members of the class; all class members
will be bound by the judgment or other determination of this action; and if you do
not request exclusion, you may appear at the hearings and trial of this action through
the attorney of your choice.
3° Phyllis Baxter and the five other employees, Brenda Gilliam, Glenda Knott, Emma Ruffin,
Alfred Harrison and Sherri McCorkle, referred to by the Court as the "Baxter petitioners," all
stipulated that they had received the notice. Id. at 2797 n.5, 35 FEP Cases at 3 n.5.





" Id, Instead, as the Supreme Court observed, the district court "somewhat cryptically stated
that although it had an opinion about 'the entitlement to relief of some of the class members who
testified at trial,' it would defer decision of such matters to a further proceeding." Id.
96 Id. at 2798, 35 FEP Cases at 3. Apparently, the Baxter petitioners were seeking to intervene
to protect their right to appeal pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
governing permissive intervention. According to Wright, "it may not be too late to intervene even
after final judgment if it is necessary to preserve some right that cannot be otherwise protected."
C. WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 75.
" The petitioner, Emma Ruffin, held a position within pay grades four and five. 104 S. Ct. at
2798, 45 FEP Cases at 3.
" Id. Class actions alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination generally are divided into
two stages. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at 1323-24. In the first stage — the liability
stage — the plaintiff class must establish a prima facie case of a pattern or practice of discrimination.
Id. at 1323. This burden is usually satisfied through the use of statistical evidence. Id. If the
defendant cannot produce sufficient evidence to dispel the inference of discrimination, the court
will infer that the class members were victims of the alleged discriminatory pattern or practice. Id.
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positions above pay grade five and were thus outside the designated class entitled to
relief." In dictum, however, the district court added that it saw no reason why the five
Baxter petitioners could not each file actions in their individual capacities.4 °
After the district court denied their motion to intervene, the Baxter petitioners filed
individual actions against the Bank alleging racial discrimination in violation of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. 4 ' The Bank answered by filing a motion to dismiss claiming that the
action was barred under the doctrine of res judicata. 42 The Bank argued that because
each of the five Baxter petitioners was a member of the original class certified in the
Cooper litigation and because each held a position other than grade four or five, the
Baxter petitioners were consequently bound by the district court's earlier finding that
no class-wide discrimination existed above grade five. 43 The district court denied the
Bank's motion to dismiss based on res judicata, but certified an order for interlocutory
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 44 The Bank's
interlocutory appeal and its pending appeal from the Cooper decision were then consol-
idated by the appellate court. 43
The Fourth Circuit began by addressing the Cooper litigation and reversed the district
court's holding that class-wide discrimination existed in pay grades four and five and
that two of the intervening plaintiffs had been discriminated against by the Bank.4 6
According to the Fourth Circuit, there was insufficient evidence either to support the
district court finding of a pattern or practice of racial discrimination in grades four and
five47 or to support the finding that two of the intervening plaintiffs, Russell and Cooper,
were victims of racial discrimination. 48 Turning to the interlocutory appeal,. the court
held that the Baxter petitioners were precluded by res judicata from bringing individual
race discrimination claims against the Bank following the adverse judgment in the Cooper
class action.49 The appeals court relied on its prior decisions holding that a final judgment
The court will then move to the second stage — the remedial stage — in which the court determines
the matter of relief for individual class members. Id. at 1323-24.
ss 104 S. Ct. at 2798, 35 FEP Cases at 3.
"Id. The court suggested that the Baxter petitioners file individual actions pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). 104 S. Ct. at 2798, 35 FEP Cases at 3.
4 ' 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). See 104 S. Ct. at 2798, 35 FEP Cases at 3.
42
 104 S. Ct. at 2798, 35 FEP Cases at 3. According to Schlei and Grossman, support exists for
the principle that a judgment on the merits in an action brought on one legal basis of liability, such
as § 703(a)(1) of Title VII, may preclude bringing a subsequent action based on the same facts, but .
a different legal basis, such as a § 1981 action. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at 87. See,
e.g., Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556, 561, 31 FEP Cases 612, 613-15 (5th Cir. 1983)
(dismissal of Title VII action for untimeliness precludes a later § 1983 claim); Poe v. John Deere
Co., 695 F.2d 1103, 1105-08, 30 FEP Cases 827, 828-30 (8th Cir. 1982) (judgment in a Title VII
and § 1981 action bars subsequent action raising state law claims).
4 ' 104 S. Ct. at 2798, 35 FEP Cases at 3.
44 Id. The district court's order met the requirements of a discretionary interlocutory appeal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982). The order involved a "controlling question of law as to
which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion" and the appeals court agreed to hear
the appeal. Id.
48 104 S. Ct. at 2798, 35 FEP Cases at 3.
46 EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633, 664, 669, 30 FEP Cases 1137,
1161, 1165 (4th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 104 S. Ct.
2794, 35 FEP Cases 1 (1984).
47 1d. at 664, 30 FEP Cases at 1161.
48 Id. at 669, 673, 30 FEP Cases at 1165, 1168.
99 Id. at 675, 30 FEP Cases at 1170.
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in a properly certified class action binds a class member who has not asked to be excluded
from, or "opted out" of, the class action after notice from subsequently asserting an
individual claim. 5"
After it granted certiorari, 5 ' the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's
holding that the Baxter petitioners were precluded by res judicata." The Court held
that the class action judgment that the Bank did not engage in a pattern or practice of
class-wide racial discrimination did not preclude a class member from maintaining an
individual action based on racial discrimination." The Court began by observing that
under the general principles of res judicata, a judgment in a properly maintained class
action is binding on all class members in subsequent litigation. 54 Thus, the Court noted
that a judgment in favor of the plaintiff class extinguishes the original claim and creates
a new claim on the judgment. 55 Alternatively, according to the Court, a judgment in
favor of the defendant extinguishes the claim and bars subsequent actions on that claim:"
Having made these general observations regarding the preclusive effect of a class
action, the Court discussed some specific differences between individual and class action
claims of racial discrimination. According to the Court, the plaintiff who brings an
individual racial discrimination action under section 703(a) of Title VII has the initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case that he has been discriminated against by his
employer on account of race." The plaintiff meets this burden by showing: (I) that he
is a member of a racial minority, (2) that he applied and was qualified for a position the
employer was trying to fill, (3) that the employer rejected him, and (4) that following his
rejection the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants
5° Id. at 674, 30 FEP Cases at 1169. The court relied on Dalton v. Employment Sec. Comm'n
of North Carolina, 671 F.2d 835, 838, 28 FEY Cases 178, 180 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.
Cr. 138, 29 FE? Cases 1560 (1983) (plaintiff who agreed to consent decree in Title VII class action
which expressly stated to be a final resolution of all issues was bound by the decree); Woodson v.
Fulton, 614 F.2d 940, 942, 22 FEY Cases 59, 61 (4th Cir. 1980) (consent decree awarding damages
to class members in a class action for racial discrimination in employment barred later individual
§ 1983 suit by class member); Kemp v. Birmingham News Co., 608 F.2d 1049, 1052, 21 FEP Cases
830, 833 (5th Cir. 1979) (consent decree entered in a Title VII class action is binding on class
members and precludes a later individual claim of racial discrimination in employment); Dorsey v.
Smith, 91 F.R.D. 261, 262-63, 30 FEP Cases 1232, 1233 (I). Md. 1981) (black employee who was
member of earlier class action is barred by res judicata from litigating claim of racial discrimination
where court found in earlier class action that employer engaged in discrimination).
The appeals court noted, however, that there were exceptions based on due process to the rule
that a final determination in a class action will bar subsequent individual actions. 698 F.2d at 674,
30 FEP Cases at 1169. Due process requires a class to be properly certified, adequate notice to class
members and adequate representation of absent class members. !d. See also B. SCIILEI & P. GRoss-
MAN, supra note 10, at 1268-69.
" 104 S. Ct. 334 (1984).
52 104 S. Ct. 2794, 2802, 35 FEP Cases I, 6 (1984).
5 3 Id.
" Id. at 2799, 35 FEP Cases at 4.
55 Id. Although the class or a member of the class may not raise the same claim in a later action,
once there is a judgment in favor of the plaintiff-class, a new claim is created and the class or an
individual member may sue the original defendant to enforce that judgment. See Kasper Wire
Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g & Mach., 575 F.2d 530, 535 (1978). See also generally C. WRIGHT, supra
note 8, § 100A.
56 104 S. Ct. at 2799, 35 FEP Cases at 4.
57 Id.
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with the plaintiff's qualifications. 33 The employer must then come forward with evidence
of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its rejection of the plaintiff. 59
 The plaintiff
can then prove that the employer's alleged nondiscriminatory reason is actually a pretext
for intentional discrimination. 63
In contrast to individual actions, the Supreme Court noted that in Title VII pattern-
or-practice class actions the plaintiff class must demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that a pattern or practice of discriminatory treatment existed and that the
pattern or practice was the employer's standard operating procedure. 6 ' Evidence of
isolated or sporadic instances of discrimination, the Court stressed, is insufficient to
establish a prima facie case of company-wide discrimination. 62 Moreover, the Court
noted, while a finding of a pattern or practice of discrimination supports prospective
relief, such as an order enjoining the employer from continuing its discriminatory
practices, additional proceedings are usually necessary after the liability stage of the trial
to determine the scope of relief to individual members of the class. 63
The Court then summarized its examination of the differences between an individ-
ual's discrimination claim and a class action alleging a pattern or practice of discrimi-
nation. The focus in an individual action, the Court observed, is on a specific employment
decision regarding a specific individual, whereas the focus at the liability stage of a
pattern-or-practice class action is not on one specific employment decision, but on a
regular practice of discriminatory decision-making." The Court stressed that this dis-
tinction between individual and class actions was critical to its earlier holding in General
Telephone Company of Southwest v. Falcon. 65 In Falcon, the Court held that an individual
employee's claim that he was denied a promotion on racial grounds was insufficient to
make him an adequate representative of a class of employees who had allegedly been
refused employthent for discriminatory reasons. 66
 The Court noted that evidence that
the plaintiff was passed over for promotion when less deserving white employees were
59 Id. See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 5 FEP Cases 965, 969
(1973).
59 104 S. Ct. at 2799, 35 FEP Cases at 4. See also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 254, 25 FEE' Cases 113, 116 (1981).
6° 104 S. Ct. at 2799, 35 FEP Cases at 4. See also B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at
1286-87.
61 104 S. Ct. at 2799-2800, 35 FEP Cases at 4-5. See also Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 336, 14 FEP Cases 1514, 1520 (1977) (proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the
company's pattern or practice of discrimination was the standard operating procedure was re-
quired); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 772, 12 FEP Cases 549, 559 (1976) (dem-
onstrating the existence of a discriminatory pattern or practice established a presumption that
individual class members were victims of discrimination).
62 104 S. Ct. at 2799-2800, 35 FEP Cases at 4.
65 Id. at 2800, 35 FEP Cases at 5. See also supra note 38.
64
 104 S. Ct. at 2800, 35 FEP Cases at 5.
65 457 U.S. 147, 28 FEP Cases 1745 (1982).
66 Id. at 156-58, 28 FEP Cases at 1749-50. In Falcon, the Court explained:
Conceptually, there is a wide gap between (a) an individual's claim that he has been
denied a promotion on discriminatory grounds and his otherwise unsupported alle-
gation that the company has a policy of discrimination and (b) the existence of a class
of persons who have suffered the same injury as the individual, such that the individ-
ual's claims and the class claim will share common questions of law or fact and the
individual's claim will be typical of the class claims.
Id. at 157-58, 28 FEP Cases at 1750.
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promoted might have supported the conclusion that the plaintiff was discriminated
against individually, but this evidence did not necessarily justify the inference that there
was a company-wide pattern or practice of employment discrimination. 67 Thus, the Court
in Falcon ruled that the existence of a valid individual claim did not justify the conclusion
that the individual plaintiff could maintain a class action. 68 Extending the reasoning in
Falcon, the Cooper Court concluded that if the existence of an individual discrimination
claim does not necessarily mean that a company-wide class action may be maintained,
then it follows that the failure to prove that a company-wide practice or policy of
discrimination exists does not necessarily mean that discrimination on an individual basis
is nonexistent. 69
After examining the distinction between individual and class actions, the Court
proceeded to analyze the Cooper facts. First, the Court concluded that based on the
different burdens of proof in individual claims and class actions, the district court could
properly hold that the intervening plaintiffs, Cooper and Russell, who held positions
above grade five, had legitimate individual claims of discrimination, while also ruling
that the plaintiff-class had failed to prove class-wide discrimination above grade five."
Next, the Court analyzed the court of appeals' reasoning as to the Baxter petitioners.
According to the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit correctly concluded that the Baxter
petitioners, as members of the original class in the Cooper litigation, were bound by the
judgment against the class. 71 In the Supreme Court's judgment, however, the appellate
court erred in the preclusive effect it gave to that prior decision." According to the
Supreme Court, the prior judgment should be viewed as precluding only two types of
subsequent actions." First, the Court stated that the prior judgment bars class members
from maintaining another class action against the Bank raising the same claim of a
pattern or practice of discrimination. 74 Second, the Court found that the prior judgment
bars class members in any other action against the Bank from raising the issue of whether
the Bank engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination." The Court noted, however,
that the judgment did not bar the Baxter petitioners from later raising their individual
claims."
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the Bank's argument
that allowing the Baxter petitioners to maintain separate individual actions would frus-
trate the purposes of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." The Court noted
that Rule 23 was designed to provide a practical method for determining common




 104 S. Ct. at 2801, 35 FEP Cases at 5.
7° Id. at 2801-02, 35 FEP Cases at 5-6.





76 Id. The Court found, however, that "the prior adjudication may well prove beneficial to the
Bank in the Baxter action; the determination in the Cooper action that the Bank had not engaged
in a general pattern or practice of discrimination would be relevant on the issue of pretext." Id.
" Id.
78 Id.
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claims were precluded would have the result of requiring every class member to intervene
to litigate the merits of his or her individual claim. Such intervention, according to the
Court, would defeat the purpose of Rule 23."
The Court also rejected the Bank's contention that Rule 23 required the district
court to decide the merits of the Baxter petitioners' individual claims because they
testified at the trial." The Bank argued that because the purpose behind Rule 23 was
to avoid repetitive litigation, and because the subsequent individual actions would entail
a reexamination of the evidence presented at the first proceeding, the district court
should have decided the Baxter petitioner claims." The Supreme Court, however, main-
tained that Rule 23 does not require as a matter of law that district courts rule on every
matter on which they received testimony." The Court reiterated that Rule 23 was
designed to provide a device for efficiently determining common questions. 83 That
purpose, according to the Court, might be thwarted by requiring the lower courts to
decide "a host of individual claims." 84 Thus, the Court held that the subsequent individual
claims brought by the Baxter petitioners were not barred by res judicata."
The Supreme Court's decision in Coo-per represents a more appropriate interpreta-
tion of the preclusive effect of a class action on subsequent individual actions than that
of the Fourth Circuit. The Supreme Court did not simply rely on the general rule that
a prior judgment in a class action is binding on class members in subsequent litigation."
Instead, the Court carefully compared an individual claim of discrimination with a class
action claiming a pattern or practice of discrimination." As a result of this comparison,
the Court recognized that these two claims were not identical and therefore held that
res judicata should not be applied to bar a subsequent individual claim following a
judgment against the class in a pattern-or-practice class action 88
To demonstrate the differences between an individual action and a class action, the
Court compared the proof required to establish a prima facie case in each type of
action.89
 In an individual action, the elements of a prima facie case focus on specific
instances of discrimination against the plaintiff personally. In contrast, in a pattern-or-
practice class action, the focus is on whether the employer is engaged in a company-
wide policy of racial discrimination." The trial in this type of class action is divided into
two stages: Stage I is the liability stage, and Stage II is the remedial stage." At the
liability stage of the trial, the plaintiff-class must show by a preponderance of the evidence
that racial discrimination is the company's standard operating procedure. 92 The plaintiff-
" Id.
8° Id.
81 Id. at 2802-03, 35 FEP Cases at 6-7.
82 Id. at 2802, 35 FEP Cases at 7.
"11 Id. at 2802-03, 35 FEP Cases at 7.
84 Id,
8s
86 See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
" See 104 S. Ct. at 2799-2800, 35 FEP Cases at 4-5; see also supra text accompanying notes 56-
68.
" See 104 S. Ct. at 2799-2800, 35 FEP Cases at 4-5.
89 See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
9(' See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 14 FEP Cases 1514 (1977); see also supra text
accompanying notes 60-62.
91 See B. SCHLEI 8c P. GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at 1323-24.
92 See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336, 14 FEP Cases at 1519.
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class meets this initial burden through the use of statistical evidence." To establish a
prima facie case in a class action alleging racial discrimination in hiring, for example,
the class will offer statistics comparing the racial composition of the employer's work
force with the general population from which employees are hired." If the class action
claims discrimination in promotion, the class will present evidence comparing the number
of whites promoted against the number of blacks promoted with similar work records
within the defendant company." Individual instances of racial discrimination may be
offered into evidence, but they are insufficient to prove a pattern or practice of racial
discrimination."
At the close of the liability stage, if the trier of fact finds that the employer has
engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination then the trial will proceed to the
second stage — the remedial stage." In the remedial stage class members testify as to
specific instances of individual discrimination." From this testimony, the court deter-
mines the appropriate award for each class member. 99 Following a determination in
favor of the class and the subsequent determination of individual relief, a member of
the class is barred by res judicata from maintaining an individual action for racial
discrimination against the employer. Individuals are barred in this situation because all
the requirements for res judicata are fulfilled; the action involves identical parties,m
with identical claims,'" and there is a prior final judgment on the merits. 102
On the other hand, if the trier of fact at the close of the liability stage finds that the
employer has not engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination then the trial will
not proceed to the remedial stage and class members will not testify regarding individual
acts of discrimination.m Consequently, all that is determined is that the class was unable
to prove that an employer had a system-wide policy of racial discrimination.'" The
merits of an individual class member's claim of discrimination have not been deter-
mined.'" Therefore, subsequent suits brought by class members alleging individual
discrimination are not barred by res judicata because the claims are not identical.
An unsuccessful class action followed by individual suits is precisely the situation
addressed in Cooper. The Baxter petitioners were members of the original class which
attempted to show that the Bank had engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimina-
tion.'" The final judgment in that action, as the Supreme Court recognized, was the
failure of the class to prove that a pattern or practice of discrimination existed. 1 "7
"See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at 1322-23.
9. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 337-38, 14 FEP Cases at 1520.
95 See EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d at 650-51, 30 FEP Cases at 1150,
96 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 337, 14 FEP Cases at 1519; B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 10
at 1322.
97 B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at 1959; Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 361, 14 FEY Cases
at 1529.
98 B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at 1454, 1456.
99 1d. at 1456-57.
' 94 See C. WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 100A.
' 9 ' Id.
ISO Id .
LOS See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at 1454.
104 See supra text accompanying note 68.
105 See Cooper, 104 S. Ct. at 2802, 35 FEP Cases at 6.
LOS Id. at 2797, 35 FEP Cases at 3. See also supra note 36 and accompanying text.
107 See 104 S. Ct. at 2802, 35 FEP Cases at 6.
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Although both actions involved identical parties, there was no prior determination that
the employer did or did not discriminate against the individual Baxter petitioners on
account of race.m° Accordingly, the Court correctly held that the Baxter petitioners could
maintain individual actions alleging racial discrimination.
In sum, the Supreme Court in Cooper resolved the division in the circuit courts and
settled the question of the applicability of res judicata to Title VII pattern-or-practice
class actions. Where the plaintiff-class in a pattern-or-practice class action fails to prove
that the employer engaged in a company-wide policy of discrimination, a class member
is not barred by res judicata from maintaining a subsequent individual suit alleging
employment discrimination. 104 The Cooper Court, in contrast to the Fourth Circuit, closely
examined the proof required to establish a prima facie case in both of these actions."°
Accordingly, the Court held that the prior final judgment in the first action determined
only that the class had failed to prove a company-wide pattern or practice of discrimi-
nation existed." The first judgment did not settle the question as to whether individual
instances of discrimination existed. 1 E 2 Thus, a class member is not bound by the first
judgment against the class and may bring a later individual action claiming racial dis-
crimination.
E. * Court Appointment of Counsel in Title VII Cases: Bradshaw v. United States District
Court for the Southern District of California'
Section 2000e-5(f )(1)(B) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorizes a
district court, in its discretion, to assign counsel to the complainant in employment
discrimination cases. 2 This provision allowing appointment of counsel demonstrates
congressional recognition that attorney's fees awards may provide insufficient incentive
to assure representation of those individuals with civil rights grievances' The purpose
of the statutory provision of Title VII authorizing appointment of counsel is thus to
See id.
1 °9 See id.
110
 104 S. Ct. at 2800, 35 FEP Cases at 4-5.
111
 Id. at 2802, 35 FE? Cases at 7.
112 Id. at 2801, 35 FEP Cases at 5.
* By Scott Hoing, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
742 F.2d 515, 35 FEP Cases 1297 (9th Cir. 1984).
2 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(0(1)(B) (1982) provides in
part: "Upon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just,
the court may appoint an attorney for such complainant and may authorize the commencement of
the action without the payment of fees, costs, or security."
3 Under the attorney's fees provision of Title VII, a district court, in its discretion, may award
attorney's fees and costs to a prevailing party. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, § 706(k), codified
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982). A primary purpose of awarding such fees is to en-
courage individuals injured by discrimination to seek judicial relief and to guarantee them effective
access to the judicial process. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429, 31 FEP Cases 1169, 1171
(1983); Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). Congress articulated the
attorney's fees provision, stating: "All of these civil rights laws depend heavily upon private en-
forcement, and fee awards have proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a
meaningful opportunity to vindicate the important Congressional policies which these laws contain."
Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039, 1041 (2d Cir. 1978) (quoting S. REP. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 5908, 5910).
4 See Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y of San Diego, 662 F.2d 1301, 1319, 27 FEP Cases 841, 857
(9th Cir. 1981) (Bradshaw II).
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broaden the effective access to the judicial process of those individuals with meritorious
civil rights claims. 5
An employment discrimination plaintiff does not have an unqualified right to ap-
pointment of counsel in a civil rights action. 6 Rather, Title VII provides that a court may
appoint an attorney for a complainant "in such circumstances as the court may deem
just." Consequently, courts have established certain criteria for determining when dis-
cretion should be exercised in favor of appointing counsel for a pro se plaintiff in a
matter brought pursuant to Title VII. Three factors have emerged as particularly
relevant to this determination under the broad statutory mandate: first, whether the
plaintiff has a meritorious claim, second, whether the plaintiff has made diligent efforts
to secure counsel, and third, whether the plaintiff has inadequate resources to retain
counse1.5 Satisfaction of these three criteria, unless exceptional circumstances dictate
otherwise, entitles a complainant under the Civil Rights Act to the appointment of
counsel. 9 Under these standards, normally, a district court's decision will be subject to
review only for an abuse of discretion."'
During the Survey year, in Bradshaw v. Unites States District Court for the Southern District
of California (Bradshaw III)," a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit ruled that a district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to make coercive
appointment of counsel, when counsel could not be located to voluntarily assist a plaintiff
proceeding in forma pauperis in a Title VII action. 12 The panel reached this decision
even though the plaintiff fulfilled the three relevant criteria for court appointment of
counsel under section 2000e-5(f )(1)(B).' 3 In Bradshaw III the court of appeals held that
while there are three essential factors which must be considered by a district court in
5 Id. The Bradshaw II court noted: "The only plausible reason for enactment of the [court
appointment of counsel) provision was Congress' recognition that some civil rights claimants with
meritorious cases would be unable to obtain counsel." Id.
6 See Arnold v. Speedgrip Chuck, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 679, 680, 27 FEP Cases 950, 951 (N.D.
Ind, 1981).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f )(1)(B) (1982). "The statute's clear intent is to limit the appointment of
counsel in suits brought pursuant to Title VII to only those situations where, in the sound discretion
of the court, the circumstances clearly warrant it." Arnold v. Speedgrip Chuck, Inc., 524 F. Supp.
679, 680, 27 FEP Cases 950, 951 (N.D. Ind. 1981). See also Bradshaw II, 662 F.2d at 1321, 27 FEP
Cases at 859 (Wallace, J., dissenting) ("Congress did not make appointment of counsel a matter of
right, but rather left it to the discretion of the district courts.").
B See, e.g., Bradshaw II, 662 F.2d at 1318, 27 FEP Cases at 857. See also Ivey v. Board of Regents
of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 269, 28 FEP Cases 1577, 1579 (9th Cir. 1982); Luna v. International
Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 614 F.2d 529, 531, 22 FEP Cases 525, 527 (5th Cir.
1980); Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1308-10, 15 FEP Cases 1787, 1790-91 (5th
Cir. 1977); Arnold v, Speedgrip Chuck, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 679, 680, 27 FEP Cases 950, 951 (N.D.
Ind. 1981). These factors are applicable in all cases, according to the courts, and are usually the
only relevant factors. Bradshaw 11, 662 F.2d at 1318 n.43, 27 FEP Cases at 856 n.43. However, in
cases where particular Facts so warrant, other similar factors may be taken into account by a district
court in deciding whether to assign counsel. Id. See also White v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co.,
646 F.2d 203, 205, 25 FEP Cases 1541, 1542-43 (5th Cir. 1981).
g Bradshaw v. United States Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of California, 742 F.2d 515, 520, 35
FEP Cases 1297, 1301 (9th Cir. 1984) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (Bradshaw III).
1 ° Bradshaw II, 662 F.2d at 1318, 27 FEP Cases at 856. See also White v. United States Pipe &
Foundry Co., 646 F.2d 203, 205, 25 FEP Cases 1541, 1542-43 (5th Cir. 1981).
" 742 F.2d 515, 35 FEP Cases 1297 (9th Cir. 1984).
' 2 Id. at 519, 35 FEP Cases at 1300-01.
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f )(1)(B) (1982). See 742 F.2d at 516, 35 FEP Cases at 1298.
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exercising its discretionary power of appointment under section 2000e-5(f)(1)(B),"
other factors may properly be taken into account in denying appointment of counsel as
exceptional circumstances dictate.' 5 Because Bradshaw III was emphatically presented by
the court as an anomalous case, it illustrates general judicial satisfaction with the three
criteria standard normally dispositive for court appointment of counsel under section
2000e-5(f)(1)(B). Bradshaw III reveals, however, that the three criteria standard is not
absolute.
In early 1975, Nancy Bradshaw, acting in propia persona, filed a sex discrimination
action against the Zoological Society of San Diego alleging unlawful denial of employ-
ment. 16 Prior to the initiation of the suit, Bradshaw had filed a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) which had found "reasonable cause" to
believe that the Zoological Society discriminated against Bradshaw in denying her ap-
plication for a position at the Zoo." In April of 1975, the district court granted summary
judgment to the defendant, finding Bradshaw's claims to be time-barred. 18
 Three years
later, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's determinations and remanded the
case for further proceedings. 18
The proceedings resumed in the district court with the filing of an answer by the
Zoological Society to the complaint. 20 Bradshaw then filed a motion for appointment of
counsel under section 2000e-5(f )(1)(B), and for leave to proceed in forma pauperis."
The district court granted the request to proceed in forma pauperis, though it denied
the motion for appointment of counsel. 22
 Bradshaw subsequently filed a motion to
reconsider, and sought leave to amend her complaint to plead a class action." Both
requests were denied by the district court. 24 Pursuant to title 28, section 1291, Bradshaw
filed a notice of appeal 2 5
14 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
15
 Bradshaw III, 742 F.2d at 517, 35 FEP Cases at 1299. According to the Bradshaw III court,
each case regarding court appointment of counsel is to be judged individually depending on the
circumstances. Id. at 518, 35 FEP Cases at 1300.
16 Bradshaw II, 662 F.2d at 1303, 27 FEP Cases at 842-43. Specifically, Bradshaw brought suit
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976) and 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). In addition to her gender claim, Bradshaw claimed discrimination on the
basis of marital status and in retaliation for her past complaints of discrimination. 662 F.2d at 1303
n.1, 27 FEP Cases at 843 n. 1.
In the initial action in the district court, the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.
Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y of San Diego, 10 FEP Cases 1268, 1274 (S.D. Cal. 1975). This decision
was subsequently reversed and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. Bradshaw
v. Zoological Soc'y of San Diego, 569 F.2d 1066, 1069, 116 FEP Cases 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1978)
(Bradshaw I). The decision on remand was also appealed and was the subject of Bradshaw II, 662
F.2d 1301, 27 FEP Cases 841 (9th Cir. 1981).
17 Bradshaw II, 662 F.2d at 1303, 27 FEP Cases at 843.
'a Id. The district court found that both the Title VII and section 1983 claims were barred. Id.
18 Bradshaw 1, 569 F.2d at 1069, 16 FEP Cases at 830.
20 Bradshaw II, 662 F.2d at 1303, 27 FEP Cases at 843.
2 ' Id. With this motion, Bradshaw filed affidavits regarding both her impecunious financial
situation and her unsuccessful efforts to obtain an attorney. Id. Although her successful request to
proceed in forma pauperis was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1915, similar relief could have been predicated
upon 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) which seems to require a lesser showing in Title VII cases. 662
F.2d at 1303 n.4, 27 FEP Cases at 843 n.4.
22 662 F.2d at 1303 n.4, 27 FEP Cases at 843 n.4.
28 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) vests in the courts of appeal 'jurisdiction of appeals from all final
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that orders denying appointment of counsel in
Title VII suits are appealable under section 1291. 26
 Taking jurisdiction over Bradshaw's
appeal, the court of appeals noted that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides for
appointment of counsel in employment discrimination cases at the court's discretion. 27
The appellate court further observed that three critical factors have emerged as relevant
to the exercise of discretion under this statutory mandate:2s Although the court noted
that normally a district court's decision is subject to review only for an abuse of discre-
tion,29
 the court held that standard was not applicable in this case." Thus, turning to
the merits of Bradshaw's appeal, the court stated that because the appeal satisfied the
three relevant criteria set forth by the court, Ms. Bradshaw was entitled to appointment
of counsel pursuant to section 2000e-5(0(1)(B)." Consequently, the case was again
remanded to the district court for further proceedings."
In March of 1983, the district court entered findings of fact detailing its unsuccessful
attempts to appoint counsel for Bradshaw." The court findings revealed that the district
court strove for thirteen months to find an attorney to represent Ms. Bradshaw."
Numerous public and private organizations and attorneys were contacted by either the
court or Ms. Bradshaw. 35 No one, however, would voluntarily assist her in the prosecution
of her case." Finally, these findings included an order that she either continue pro se
or seek further relief from the court of appeals." As a result, Bradshaw filed a petition
25 Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) vests in the courts of appeal "jurisdiction of appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts."
26
 Bradshaw 11, 662 F.2d at 1320, 27 FEP Cases at 858. The court was confronted with two other
issues relating to its jurisdiction over the appeal. Id, at 1303, 27 FEP Cases at 843. As to the first
issue, the court held that the order of the district court denying Bradshaw leave to amend her
complaint was not appealable, because the opportunity to amend, if erroneously denied, is effectively
protected after final judgment on the merits. Id. at 1304, 27 FEP Cases at 844. The second issue
was the Zoo's challenge to the appeal on the ground that it was taken from an unappealable order
denying reconsideration of the district court's earlier denial of Bradshaw's original motions. The
court held the motion for "reconsideration" to be simply a renewal of the motions on the merits
and consequently found that the notice of appeal was timely filed. Id. at 1305 & n.10, 27 FEP Cases
at 844-45 & n.10.
27 Id. at 1318, 27 FEP Cases at 856.
23 Id, See supra note 8 and accompanying text for a discussion of these three factors.
25 Bradshaw II, 662 F.2d at 1318, 27 FEP Cases at 856 (citing White v. United States Pipe &
Foundry Co., 646 F.2d 203, 205, 25 FEP Cases 1541, 1542-43 (5th Cir. 1981); Spanos v. Penn
Cent. Transp. Co., 470 F.2d 806, 808, 5 FEP Cases 527, 529 (3d Cir. 1972) (per curiam)).
3° Bradshaw II, 662 F.2d at 1318, 27 FEP Cases at 856. The court stated that the district court's
decision does not represent the reasoned judgment necessary to application of that standard." Id.
Further, the court noted, "'such discretionary choices are not left to a court's inclination, but to its
judgment; and its judgment is to be guided by sound legal principles.'" Id. (quoting Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416, 10 FEP Cases 1181, 1187 (1975) (quoting United States v.
Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d) (Marshall, CD)). Thus, the court concluded,
"'we are unable to conclude from the record that the district court exercised a reasoned and well-
informed discretion which we may review, — Id. at 1319, 27 FEP Cases at 857 (quoting Caston v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1308, 15 FEP Cases 1787, 1790 (5th Cir. 1977)).
Id, at 1319-20, 27 FEP Cases at 857-58.
32 Id. at 1320, 27 FEP Cases at 858.
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for writ of mandamus seeking to compel the district court to assign counsel." In this
posture, a panel of the Ninth Circuit again considered appointment of counsel for Ms.
Bradshaw pursuant to section 2000e-5(f )(1)(B). 39
The court began its discussion stating that this case highlights the inherent defects
in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 4° The court observed that while section
2000e-5(f)(l)(B) authorizes court appointment of counsel, it fails to provide compen-
sation to those so appointed." This deficiency, according to the court, exacerbated the
district court's difficulty in finding counsel willing to voluntarily represent Bradshaw. 42
The court noted that chief among the reasons given by attorneys and organizations
contacted by the district court was the lack of compensation. 43
In Bradshaw II" a majority of the appeals court had held that the district court had
abused its discretion because it failed to consider one of the three essential factors
relevant to the exercise of its discretionary power of appointment of counsel under
section 2000e-5(f )(1)(B) and that the district court had been wrong as a matter of law
in its evaluation of another of these factors.° According to the Bradshaw III panel,
however, the Bradshaw II opinion was careful to point out that the three factors were
not exclusive, and that under certain circumstances other factors may properly be taken
into account.46
 Examining the record supplemented by the additional findings of fact,
the panel held the instant case to be appropriate for consideration of factors other than
the standard three."
Looking to other factors, the court noted that the majority in Bradshaw II never
anticipated there would be such a lack of willingness to represent Ms. Bradshaw." First,
recounting the degree of resistance by the members of the San Diego bar, the court
concluded that the helpfulness of coercive appointment of counsel was questionable as
regards both the indigent and the court. 49




41 Id. Compensation would be available to a prevailing party, however, under the attorney's fees
provision in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)(1982). See supra note
2 and accompanying text.
42
 Bradshaw III, 742 F.2d at 516, 35 FEP Cases at 1298.
" The court further found that in addition to the obvious demand on attorney time, the costs
of discovery for this complex employment discrimination case were thought to be prohibitive. Id.
Moreover, the court implied that the attorney's fees provision in Title VII was insufficient to
overcome these pecuniary concerns. Id.
44 Bradshaw II, 662 F.2d 1301, 27 FEP Cases 841 (9th Cir. 1981).
45 Id. at 1319-20, 27 FEP Cases at 857-58. According to the court in Bradshaw II, the district
court's decision to allow Ms. Bradshaw to proceed in forma pauperis resolved the first issue in her
favor, as a lesser showing of indigency is required to satisfy the test for appointment of counsel. Id.
at 1319, 27 FEP Cases at 857. The court noted that Ms. Bradshaw satisfied the second requirement
and had shown more than the requisite degree of diligence in searching for counsel. Id. Finally,
the court noted, Bradshaw's claim was shown to be meritorious for the purposes of the provision
regarding appointment of counsel. Id. at 1319-20, 27 FEP Cases at 857-58.
48
 Bradshaw III, 742 F.2d at 517, 35 FEP Cases at 1299.
47 Id.
48 Id. The court observed that the district court "fairly exhausted" the possibilities in the
community in attempting to locate willing counsel. Id.
49 Id. The court noted that the degree of reluctance was so high that members of the San.Deigo
bar were more willing to confront the court with "tenuous" thirteenth amendment arguments and
the issue of involuntary servitude than to provide counsel for Ms. Bradshaw. Id.
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bar were concerned that Ms. Bradshaw had been particularly litigious and was not
reluctant to question the competency of counsel assisting her. 5° Finally, the court stated,
the district court found that members of the bar were afraid of jeopardizing their
malpractice insurance coverage and of being subjected to state bar disciplinary proceed-
ings. 51
In determining that no remedy in the form of coercive appointment of counsel was
available to Ms. Bradshaw, the panel of the Ninth Circuit held that the exigencies
addressed by the district court on remand were properly part of the decision whether
to appoint counsel." Given the circumstances, the court stated, it was not prepared to
say the district court derived the wrong conclusion in its consideration of the additional
factors." In so holding, the court stressed that Bradshaw III is an extreme case, and
moreover, that it is not to be read as suggesting that coercive appointment of counsel is
never proper."
In a concurring opinion, Judge Reinhardt wrote separately to expand on a few
points made by the court." Noting the troublesome nature of both the result reached
and the underlying problem, Judge Reinhardt admonished that the basis of the court's
decision is that it is an "extreme case."" As such, according to Judge Reinhardt, the
peculiar facts of Bradshaw III make it apparent that it is not intended as precedent for
refusals to appoint counsel in other cases. 57 Consequently, the concurrence stated, the
standards established in Bradshaw II remain unaltered." Moreover, according to Judge
Reinhardt, the factors which determined the court's decision were noneconomic." In-
stead, Judge Reinhardt stated that they involved Bradshaw's history, her relationships
with her previous attorneys, and the attitude of the bar towards her."
Notwithstanding the result of Bradshaw III, Judge Reinhardt asserted, unpopular
litigants are entitled to the full extent of their legal rights. 61 Thus, while there was no
abuse of discretion in the instant case, the concurring judge found that it is nonetheless
clear that there exist numerous avenues for a district court judge to explore in attempting
59 Id. at 517-18, 35 FEP Cases at 1299.
5' Id. at 518, 35 FEP Cases at 1299. These fears presumably stemmed from the bar's assessment
of Ms. Bradshaw's claims, coupled with the willingness of litigants to join attorneys as defendants
in seeking redress from frivolous claims. Id.
52 Id. at 518, 35 FEP Cases at 1300.
" Id.
54 Id. This comment by the court seemed directed particularly at the California State Bar
Association, which for reasons unknown failed to file an amicus curiae brief at the request of the
court. Id. at 518-19, 35 FEP Cases at 1300. Excoriating the response of the bar to the requests for
assistance, the court observed that "[p]erhaps only the threat of widespread coercive appointments
will rekindle" the recognition that the problem of indigent legal representation is in large part a
responsibility of the bar. Id. at 519, 35 FEP Cases at 1300.






6' Id. Judge Reinhardt stated, "[w]e must be particularly careful that civil rights litigants are
afforded their full rights and that neither the unpopularity of their cause nor any perceived
belligerency on their part, or other unwillingness or inability to conform to the normal mode,
underlies or plays any part in a failure to appoint counsel." Id.
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to locate counsel willing to take a given civil rights case. 62
 Further, Judge Reinhardt
noted, in the rare case where willing counsel cannot be located, the district court must
nevertheless make an appointment in the absence of exceptional circumstances. 65 Ac-
cording to Judge Reinhardt, Bradshaw III, however, represents an exceptional situation.
The concurrence stated that another reversal of the district court would not be in the
interest of Ms. Bradshaw. 64
 Given the inevitability of further procedural delays, Judge
Reinhardt noted, proceeding to trial without the aid of an attorney might be the most
expedient option.°
Bradshaw III reveals the deficiencies inherent in section 2000e-5(f)(1)(B). Though
perhaps an anomalous case, Bradshaw III also illustrates the conceptual difficulties in
allowing exceptions to the three established criteria used to determine whether discretion
should be exercised in favor of appointing counsel under the provision. Moreover, the
Ninth Circuit in Bradshaw III failed to adequately explain why this case is exceptional
and how future cases are to be read in light of Bradshaw III. As Bradshaw /11 demonstrates,
courts are hesitant to make coercive appointments of counsel to fulfill the purpose of
the statutory provision. Consequently, although characterized as an "extreme case," 66 the
rationale of Bradshaw III inevitably leads to the result that individuals with meritorious
civil rights claims will be denied adequate representation. 67
According to the panel, Bradshaw HI "highlights" a defect in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 66
 This defect, the panel notes, is the failure of Congress to create a
fund to compensate court-appointed counsel in Title VII cases. 69
 This characterization,
however, seems unwarranted and inaccurate, and its use by the Bradshaw III court results
only in confusing the purpose and significance of section 2000e-5(f)(1)(B). Congress
included an attorney's fees provision in Title V11 7° as a means by which to induce
attorneys to represent individuals with civil rights grievances, and to encourage those
injured by discrimination to seek judicial relief for their meritorious claims." The pro-
vision allowing court appointment of counsel, however, indicates congressional recog-
62
 Id. Judge Reinhardt noted that "the ingenuity of federal judges, when sufficiently motivated,
is limitless .	 ." Id.
"Id. at 520, 35 FEP Cases at 1301 (Reinhardt, J. , concurring). The inability of a district judge
to find a volunteer does not, by itself, constitute exceptional circumstances. Id.
64 Id.
69 Id. Judge Reinhardt stated that "proceeding to trial without an attorney may under these
unique circumstances be the lesser of the evils." Id.
66 Id. at 518, 35 FEP Cases at 1300.
67
 Given the complexity of civil rights litigation, an individual unschooled in the field stands
"little hope of successfully prosecuting his case to a final resolution on the merits." Bradshaw II, 662
F.2d at 1306, 27 FEP Cases at 846. Refusal to appoint an attorney to an individual with a meritorious
claim, therefore, is almost tantamount to a dismissal.
68 Id. at 516, 35 FEP Cases at 1298.
69 Id.
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982). See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
7I
 See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429, 31 FEP Cases 1169, 1171 (1983); Newman
v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). In Bradshaw II the court noted, "Congress
indeed intended the prospect of an award of fees to the prevailing party as a means to 'make it
easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a meritorious suit.
—
 662 F.2d at 1319, 27 FEP Cases
at 857 (quoting 110 CoNc.. Itt;c. 12,724 (1969) (Remarks of Senator Humphrey)); see also Copeland
v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc) (legislative history of the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Award of 1976 demonstrates congressional intent to assist individuals with civil
rights grievances).
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nition that the attorney's fees awards provision may at times prove to be an insufficient,
incentive. 72 Thus, the provision authorizing court appointment of counsel was enacted
to ensure that those civil rights claimants with meritorious cases would be able to obtain
counsel." As such, given the relationship between the attorney's fees provision and the
appointment of counsel provision in Title VII, congressional failure to provide a fund
for payment of court-appointed counsel does not constitute a "defect". Rather, section
2000e-5(f )(1)(B) simply manifests a congressional desire that court-appointed counsel
be compensated exactly as are voluntary counse1. 74
To determine whether an individual is entitled to court appointment of counsel
under section 2000e-5(f )(1)(B), courts have developed a test of three criteria which must
be satisfied by the claimant. 75 Failure by a district court to consider any one of the three
criteria constitutes reversible error." Indeed, in determining whether a civil rights plain-
tiff is entitled to court-appointed counsel, these three factors are "usually the only
relevant factors."'" Given the congressional intent that those individuals with meritorious
civil rights cases be adequately represented, the near exclusivity of the three factors
seems particularly appropriate."
The Bradshaw III decision, however, creates an exception to this almost exclusive
reliance on the three criteria that is neither warranted nor consistent with section 2000e-
5(f )( I)(B). The panel's decision in Bradshaw III is flawed because it rests solely upon the
attitude of the local bar and its resistance to assisting Ms. Bradshaw. First, and fatal to
the Bradshaw III rationale, the panel noted that chief among the reasons given by
attorneys and organizations for refusing to assist Bradshaw was the lack of compensa-
tion." Opportunity for recovery for time and expenses, however, could be available to
a prevailing party under section 2000e-5(k). 8° Moreover, the broad statutory mandate
authorizing court appointment of counsel was enacted precisely to correct occasions
where attorney's fees awards proved insufficient to induce representation. 8 ' Thus, per-
mitting the district court to deny assignment of counsel to Ms. Bradshaw because attor-
72 Bradshaw II, 662 F.2d at 1319, 27 FEP Cases at 857.
73 Id,
74 That is, when the attorney's fees provision is inadequate to induce representation of an
indigent claimant, the court appointment provision offers added "incentive." This added "incentive"
— essentially court coercion — does riot alter the basic 'compensation scheme contemplated by
Congress. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text. The risks of losing remain the same.
" These criteria are: (1) the plaintiff must have a meritorious claim, (2) the plaintiff must make
diligent efforts to obtain an attorney, and (3) the plaintiff must demonstrate an inability to retain
counsel. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
7" See Bradshaw II, 662 F.2d at 1319-20, 27 FEP Cases at 857-58.
" Id. at 1318 n.43, 27 FEP Cases at 856 n.43.
7"Once a civil rights plaintiff has satisfied the three criteria, it is difficult to imagine a situation
where Congress would not intend that representation be provided. This seems especially so because,
as with the attorney's fees provision, Congress surely intended deterence of discrimination to be a
secondary purpose of the statutory mandate. See, e.g., Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 889
n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en bane). Failure to provide counsel to indigent claimants satisfying these
criteria would tend to vitiate the deterence aspects of the provision.
79 Bradshaw III, 742 F.2d at 516, 35 FEP Cases at 1298.
8" See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
st This was recognized by the Ninth Circuit itself in Bradshaw II where the court stated, "the
provision allowing appointment of counsel indicates congressional recognition of the fact than an
award of fees may prove an insufficient incentive." 662 F.2d at 1319, 27 FEP Cases at 857.
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neys do not wish to represent her "chiefly" because of their dissatisfaction with the
compensation scheme is contrary to the purpose of section 2000e-5(f)(1)(B). 82
Another factor proffered by the Bradshaw III court to support its acceptance of the
district court's failure to make a coercive appointment is the local bar's concern that
Bradshaw was a particularly litigious person and, more importantly, that attorneys who
have represented her in the past have themselves been the subject of court hearings,
regarding their competency." The cogency of this argument, however, is severely un-
dermined by Judge Reinhardt's concurrence which notes that "unpopular and even
obstreperous litigants are entitled to the full measure of their legal rights."'" Moreover,
as the court admits, it has no knowledge regarding the legitimacy of Bradshaw's com-
plaints about her former counsel." Finally, Bradshaw's present claim had been deter-
mined to be meritorious." Consequently, her reputation for litigiousness should have
been irrelevant,
A third set of related factors in the panel's decision concerned the bar members'
fear of jeopardizing their malpractice insurance coverage and of being subject to state
bar disciplinary proceedings. 87 These factors are insufficient to justify Bradshaw III as an
exception to the traditional consideration of the three standard criteria which Ms. Brad-
shaw had satisfied. As noted, the meritoriousness of her claims had already been deter-
mined.88
 Further, and perhaps ironically, failure to come forward to assist indigent
litigants is a violation of the spirit of ethical considerations of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility."
" The court apparently conceded this, noting, "[w]ere the lack of compensation the only
reason for the bar's recalcitrance, we would be far less inclined to accept the district court's failure
to make a coercive appointment." Bradshaw III, 742 F.2d at 517, 35 FEP Cases at 1299.
" Id. at 516-18, 35 FEP Cases at 1298-99.
84 Id. at 519, 35 FEP Cases at 1301 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
85 Id. at 517, 35 FEP Cases at 1299.
" Bradshaw II, 662 F.2d at 1319-20, 27 FEP Cases at 857-58. As the court observed:
[w]here the administrative agency charged with enforcing the statute has made a
determination that there is reasonable cause to believe that the plaintiff was the victim
of discrimination, as it [the EEOC] has in Miss Bradshaw's case, the court need
ordinarily make no further inquiry for purposes of appointment of counsel.
Id. at 1320, 27 FEP Cases at 857-58. Although the dissent in Bradshaw II took issue with the
majority's holding that an EEOC determination of reasonable cause will suffice to establish the
"merit" requirement, id. at 1322, 27 FEP Cases at 860, the Bradshaw III court did not alter or qualify
its previous holding regarding the satisfaction of the merit requirement by Ms. Bradshaw.
" Bradshaw III, 742 F.2d at 518, 35 FEP Cases at 1299.
88 See supra note 86.
" As the Bradshaw III panel noted, "(flailure to come forward to assist indigent litigants at the
request of the court is an indication of loss of professionalism. It is also a violation of the spirit, if
not the letter, of ethical considerationi of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility." 742 F.2d
at 518, 35 FEP Cases at 1300. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-16, EC 2-
25—EC 2-31 (1980). EC 2-29, for example, provides:
When a lawyer is appointed by a court or requested by a bar association to undertake
representation of a person unable to obtain counsel, whether for financial or other
reasons, he should not seek to be excused from undertaking the representation except
for compelling reasons. Compelling reasons do not include such factors as the repug-
nance of the subject matter of the proceeding, the identity or position of a person
involved in the case, ... or the belief of the lawyer regarding the merits of the civil
case.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-29 (1980).
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Thus, the panel decision fails to explain how Bradshaw III differs from other cases
where voluntary representation cannot be induced by the attorney's fees awards provision
of Title VII. The Bradshaw III holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in failing to make a coercive appointment of counsel rests exclusively on the attitude of
the members of the bar towards Ms. Bradshaw and their adamancy in refusing to assist
her with her claims. Moreover, the primary basis of this refusal centered on monetary
concerns. 90 It is precisely this situation at which the statutory provision authorizing
appointment of counsel is directed. Given that Ms. Bradshaw satisfied the criteria nec-
essary to fall within the ambit of section 2000e-5(1)(1)(B), the exception carved out in
Bradshaw III requires greater articulation than the court gave.
Bradshaw III upholds an exception to the view that usually only three factors are
relevant to a district court's determination of whether to exercise its discretion in ap-
pointing counsel to a civil rights plaintiff pursuant to section 2000e-5(f)(1)(B). The
Bradshaw III court failed to explain adequately the need for an exception. Consequently,
the decision calls into question the integrity of the three factor test. Moreover, in denying
Ms. Bradshaw representation, the court failed to distinguish her case, thus placing the
decision in direct contravention of the statutory mandate. 91 Ultimately, Bradshaw III eads
to the result that individuals with meritorious claims can be left without effective access
to the judicial processes.
F. *The Rejection of Comparable Worth Claims: Spaulding v. University of Washingtonh
Sex-based wage discrimination is prohibited by both Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 19642 and the Equal Pay Act of 1963. 5 Plaintiffs asserting a Title VII violation
can establish a prima facie case of discrimination in two ways. The first method is termed
claims of "disparate treatment." 4 Under this method, plaintiffs must show by direct or
circumstantial proof that their employer intentionally discriminated against them. 5 Plain-
90 See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
g' As Judge Reinhardt noted, "under the Civil Rights Act plaintiffs are, unless exceptional
circumstances exist, entitled to the appointment of counsel whenever the three criteria set forth in
Bradshaw II are met .... [Uri the rare case in which the services of a volunteer cannot be obtained,
the district court must nevertheless make an appointment." Bradshaw III, 742 F.2d at 520, 35 FEP
Cases at 1301 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). Failure to appoint counsel in such a case is tantamount
to a dismissal.
* By James A. Kobe, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW..
1 740 F.2d 686, 35 FEP Cases 217 (9th Cir. 1984).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
s 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982).
4 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 14 FEP Cases 1514 (1977)
(involving government charges that the Teamsters discriminated against blacks and hispanics in the
seniority system of the union's collective bargaining agreement); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 5 FEP Cases 965 (1973) (involving civil rights activist's charge that his layoff by
McDonnell and McDonnell's subsequent refusal to rehire him were racially motivated).
5 The Court stated in Teamsters:
"Disparate treatment" ... is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The
employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, al-
though it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in
treatment. Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had
in mind when it enacted Title VII.
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15, 14 FEP Cases at 1519 n.15 (citations omitted).
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tiffs can also establish a Title VII claim by a second means, known as claims of "disparate
impact," without proof of discriminatory motive. In a disparate impact case, plaintiffs
make a prima fade case if they can demonstrate that a particular employer policy is
facially neutral in its treatment of different groups but in fact falls more harshly on
members of a protected class than other groups of employees, and cannot be justified
by business necessity. 0
To be entitled to relief under the Equal Pay Act, plaintiffs must demonstrate that
they received unequal compensation for work "substantially equal" to that performed
by other employees.? If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie Equal Pay Act claim, the
employer can then rebut this claim by showing that the inequality is the result of a
seniority system, a merit system, or a system which links earnings to the quality or
quantity of production. 8 These exceptions to the Equal Pay Act's mandate of equal pay
for equal work were incorporated into Title Vii by the Bennet Amendment. 9 Prior to
1981 the Bennet Amendment was interpreted as limiting Title VII wage discrimination
claims to those which involved claims of unequal pay for "substantially equal" work.")
In Washington v. Gunther, however, the Supreme Court held that jobs do not, in all
cases, have to be "substantially equal" for Title V I I's prohibitions to apply." In Gunther
the Court stated that differing treatment of employees, whose jobs are not identical, is
allowed in a claim of "disparate treatment," 12 hut the Court did not decide whether a
comparison of dissimilar jobs could be the basis of a disparate impact claim. The Court
explicitly distinguished the facts before it in Gunther, which involved intentional discrim-
ination and only required a comparison of jobs in the context of determining disparate
treatment, from the type of disparate impact case characterized as a "comparable worth"
claim."
"Comparable worth" claims compare different jobs, in the context of showing pay
inequities between jobs which are de facto segregated by race or sex." Because neither
Title VII nor the Equal Pay Act prohibit differential pay rates for different jobs, these
6 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-31, 15 FEP Cases 10, 13-15 (1977) (involving a
challenge to Alabama's statutory height and weight requirements for prison guard positions); Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-32, 3 FEP Cases 175, 177-78 (1971)  (involving black
employee's challenge to employer's policy of only hiring high school graduates). The disparate
impact theory was first recognized in Griggs. Plaintiffs are not, however, required to choose between
the disparate impact and disparate treatment theory, but are permitted to proceed concurrently
under both theories. See, e.g., Wright v. National Archives & Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 710-11,
21 FEP Cases 8, 13-14 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
7 29 U.S.C. § 206(c1)(1) (1982). See generally B. SCHLE/ & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI-
NATION LAW 437-63 (2d ed. 1983).
8 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982).
9 § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982). The amendment reads:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any em-
ployer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages
or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differen-
tiation is authorized by the [Equal Pay Act].
Id.
See B. SCHI,EI & P. GROSSMAN', supra note 7, at 463-64, 474.
" Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 181, 25 FEP Cases 1521, 1529 (1981). Gunther was a
"disparate treatment" case involving intentional discrimination against female prison guards.
12 Id,
1 3 Id. at 180-81, 25 FEP Cases at 1528.
" B. SCIII.EI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 477-78.
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claims are based on the contention that the different jobs being compared are of "com-
parable worth" to the employer and therefore should be compensated equally. 15 Com-
parable worth plaintiffs concede that an employer's reliance on the market in determin-
ing differential wage rates for de facto sex-segregated jobs is a facially neutral employer
policy. These plaintiffs contend, however, that this policy establishes a prima facie case
of disparate impact on women because the market wages for traditionally female occu-
pations are lower than those for traditionally male occupations of comparable worth. 16
During the Survey year, in Spaulding v. University of Washington," the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a prima facie disparate impact claim
could not be constructed by a showing of wage disparities between jobs of allegedly
comparable worth. 18 The court's decision is in accord with previous cases in which courts
have refused to recognize claims of "comparable worth" in disparate impact cases.° The
court ruled that the employer policy challenged in a disparate impact claim cannot be
an employer's market-determined wage structure, but must be a "specific employer
practice" over which the employer has discretionary control. 2a The court distinguished
an employer's general reliance on market wage rates from a narrow discretionary practice
on the grounds that the purpose of disparate impact analysis is to challenge neutral
policies which are a non-job related pretext for intentional discrimination — not to
challenge broader unequal distributions of wealth which are beyond the control of a
single employer." Spaulding is significant because it was decided subsequent to Gunther,
which expanded the scope of Title VII claims by no longer requiring that they be made
in the context of equal work. 22 The Spaulding decision demonstrates that although
divergences in pay among employees in comparable jobs is relevant to a "disparate
treatment" claim of intentional discrimination, differential compensation for jobs of
allegedly comparable worth does not establish a claim of "disparate impact." Spaulding
thus indicates that courts will continue to avoid a subjective determination of the worth
of jobs to employers and will continue to hold that an employer's reliance on market
wage rates, even when market wages for predominantly male jobs are higher than market
wages for predominantly female jobs of comparable worth, does not constitute illegal
sex-based wage discrimination under Title VII.
Id,
16 Id. According to Schlei and Grossman, "fal plaintiff in a 'pure' comparable worth lawsuit, by
analogy, seeks to show that an employment practice — the setting of wage rates by job classification
— has a disproportionately adverse effect on one sex because a lower wage is given to predominantly
female jobs than to predominantly male jobs." Id. Schlei and Grossman also apply the term "com-
parable worth" to cases such as Gunther which do not actually require an evaluation of the "worth"
of the jobs compared, but which do compare the treatment and compensation of individuals who
are not doing substantially equal work. See id. This casenote will not apply the term comparable
worth to cases unless plaintiffs claim that the jobs compared are of comparable worth to the
employer.
' 7 740 F.2d 686, 35 FE? Cases 217 (9th Cir. 1984).
ia Id. at 706, 35 FEP Cases at 231.
' 9 See Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 22 FEP Cases 959 (10th Cir. 1980)
(claim of city nurses that they were underpaid with respect to other city and community jobs of
comparable worth); Christensen v. State of Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 , 13 FEP Cases 161 (8th Cir. 1977)
(comparable worth claim of female clerical workers that they were paid less than male physical
plant workers).
" Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 707, 35 FEP Cases at 231.
2 ' See id. at 707-08, 35 FEP Cases at 231-32.
22 See Gunther, 452 U.S. at 181, 25 FEP Cases at 1521.
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The plaintiffs in Spaulding were past and present members of the predominantly
female faculty of the University of Washington School of Nursing. 23
 The defendant, the
University of Washington (University), was created and funded by the Washington State
Legislature. 24 The University consists of sixteen separate schools. 25 Each school is re-
sponsible for the hiring and compensation of faculty members, subject to the approval
of the University president." The University budget office allocates the funds received
from the state legislature to the various schools, after earmarking a percentage of these
funds for across the board wage increases.27
In March 1972, members of the nursing faculty filed a petition with the University
alleging sex discrimination on the part of the University with respect to compensation."
The University responded that because each academic discipline was distinctive, a dif-
ferent "academic marketplace" existed for each discipline. 29
 The University contended,
therefore, that a comparison of salaries between schools was not relevant." The school
did, however, undertake a comparison on a school-by-school basis of its faculty salaries
with those of other colleges and universities. 3 ' This comparison indicated that the Uni-
versity's salaries were, on the whole, 9% below those of comparable universities. 32
 The
University's School of Nursing salaries were 10.9% below those paid by comparable
schools of nursing, though other schools at the University were equally below the level
of compensation at similar academic institutions. 33 In 1972 the budget office allocated a
3% across the board salary increase to all schools and an additional 2% increase to the
School of Nursing in response to the results of its salary study." The nursing faculty
remained dissatisfied with the level of compensation after the 1972 adjustment and
ultimately brought suit in federal district court alleging that the University engaged in
discriminatory compensation practices in violation of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act."
In August 1977, the federal district court judge referred the case to a special
master." After the master had taken evidence, but before he issued his findings, the
Supreme Court decided Gunther. 37 After receiving memoranda from both parties on the
affect of the Gunther decision on their case, the master concluded that Gunther did not
affect the outcome of the case and recommended that the district court dismiss the
nursing faculty's suit." The district court thus granted the University's motion for
" Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 691, 35 FEP Cases at 218.











35 Id. at 693, 35 FEP Cases at 220. The plaintiffs also sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
permits individuals to bring actions against state officials for deprivations of civil rights.
56
 740 F.2d at 693, 35 FEP Cases at 220.
37 Id.
38 Id.
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involuntary dismissa1. 3° Appealing the district court's decision, the nursing faculty con-
tended that it had demonstrated that the University had violated both the Equal Pay Act
and the disparate treatment and disparate impact models of Title V11. 40
Holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie claim of Title VII
discrimination, 4 I the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that it
reached this conclusion under both a "de novo" and a "clearly erroneous" standard of
review.42 The court acknowledged, with respect to the nursing faculty's claim of disparate
treatment, that after Gunther disparate treatment could be demonstrated through an
examination of the differential treatment of sex-segregated jobs which were comparable,
though not substantially identical. 43 The court added, however, that a demonstration of
a wage disparity between comparable jobs, alone, did not constitute a prima facie case
of disparate treatment. 44 Wage disparity between different jobs alone is insufficient,
according to the court, because it is neither direct evidence of intentional discrimination
nor evidence from which an inference of discrimination can be made. 45
Though the nursing faculty also introduced evidence purporting to show discrimi-
natory acts of University officials, the court held that this evidence demonstrated only
sporadic discriminatory acts and was an insufficient basis for a prima facie case. 46 The
nursing faculty attempted to buttress this evidence with statistical data of the differential
compensation of female nursing faculty and male faculty members in other depart-
ments.47 The court stated, however, that the unreliability of the nursing faculty's statistics,
combined with the statistical model's failure to distinguish the effect of sex on compen-
39 Id.
49 Id. at 691-92, 35 FEP Cases at 218-19. The nursing faculty also appealed the denial of its
section 1983 claim. Id.
" Id. at 699, 35 FEY Cases at 225. The appeals court also affirmed the district court's rejection
of the nursing faculty's other claims. The court affirmed the district court's rejection of the section
1983 claim on jurisdictional grounds, though the district court went directly to the claim's merits.
The appeals court stated that section 1983 claims against a state or its agency require a waiver by
the state of its sovereign immunity. Because the nursing faculty did not assert a waiver of sovereign
immunity, the appeals court held that the district court had lacked jurisdiction over the section
1983 claim. Id. at 693-94, 35 FEP Cases at 220-21.
The court of appeals also affirmed the district court's rejection of the plaintiff's claim that the
University had violated the Equal Pay Act, stating that it would overturn the district court's decision
only if it was clearly erroneous. Id. at 696-98, 35 FEP Cases at 223-24. The plaintiff's claim that
the appeals court should engage in de novo review of the Equal Pay Act claim was denied by the
court. Id. at 696, 35 FEP Cases at 222. The district court concluded that though some female
nursing faculty members were paid less than some male faculty members in other schools, the
nursing faculty failed to demonstrate, as is required by the Equal Pay Act, that the work of the
faculty members in different disciplines was "substantially equal." Id. at 696-97, 35 FEP Cases at
223-24. The appeals court noted that the district court's finding that teaching jobs in different
schools are not substantially equal was not clearly erroneous and was supported by the different
emphasis placed on research, training and community service skills by the various disciplines. Id.
at 697-98, 35 FEP Cases at 223-24.
42 Id. at 699, 35 FEP Cases at 225.
" Id. at 699-700, 35 FEP Cases at 225. See also B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 474.
41 740 F.2d at 700, 35 FEP Cases at 226.
" Id,
46 Id. at 702, 35 FEP Cases at 228.
47 Id. at 703, 35 FEP Cases at 228. If plaintiffs clearly prove wage disparities, the court observed,
this demonstration can provide the basis for a court's inference of an employer's discriminatory
intent based on the difference in compensation of certain classes of employees. Id.
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sation from the effect of other variables, precluded the drawing of any conclusions about
differential treatment or compensation on the basis of sex, and, therefore, any inference
of discriminatory intent. 46
The court of appeals also affirmed the district court's determination that the nursing
faculty had failed to establish a prima facie case of Title VII discrimination under a
disparate impact claim. 49 The court did not entirely preclude the use of disparate impact
analysis in sex-based wage discrimination cases.5° The court stated, however, that such
analysis is only appropriate when the particular employer practice at issue is a narrow
one, such as a fringe benefit policy, subject to the exercise of employer judgment."
The court rejected the plaintiff's claim that the University's reliance on market rates
to set differential wages for jobs of "comparable worth" is an employer policy or practice
which can be challenged by an assertion of disparate impact. 52 A "wide-ranging claim of
wage disparity between only comparable jobs," the court stated, cannot be constructed
by showing the disparate impact of market wage rates. 53 The setting of wage rates, the
court explained, is not determined soley by the judgment of the employer, and salaries
are affected by factors other than the objective "worth" of a job. 54 Such other factors are
precisely those which would be reflected in the market rate of pay for a particular job,
the court observed. In support of its decision the court cited a law review note that
discussed such factors as the number of available workers in a particular field, the number
of employers who require the skills of these particular workers, and the ability of these
workers to organize and bargain collectively. 55 The court held that because such factors
" Id. at 703-04, 35 FEP Cases at 228-29. The court noted the superiority of multiple regression
statistical analysis to the analysis presented by the nursing faculty, which consisted merely of a
simple matching of male and female faculty members assumed, but not shown, to be equal in terms
of training and experience. Id, at 704, 35 FEP Cases at 229. See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN,
supra note 7, at 1342-43. Schlei and Grossman state:
Multiple regression analyses arc particularly well suited for comparing the wage rates
paid to members of a protected group with those paid to whites or males, because a
simple direct comparison of those wages would fail to take into account the differences
caused by differing occupations and other relevant and nondiscriminatory factors....
[Multiple regression analysis] is a statistical technique designed to estimate the effect
of several independent variables (e.g. education, experience, performance, age, race,'
sex) in relation to a single dependent variable (e.g. salary). The methodology provides
the ability to determine the extent to which the independent variables have influenced
the dependent variable.
Id.
47 740 F.2d at 706-07, 35 FEP Cases at 231.
5° Id, at 707-08, 35 FEP Cases at 231-32.
5 ' id. at 707, 35 FEP Cases at 231.
52 Id, at 708, 35 FEP Cases at 232-33. If the employer had relied on differential market rates
for men and women doing equal work, such a wage disparity would have constituted a violation of
the Equal Pay Act. See, e.g., Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 9 FEP Cases 919 (1974).
55 740 F.2d at 706, 35 FEP Cases at 231. The court quoted the district court decision in Power
v. Barry, 539 F. Supp. 721, 29 FEP Cases 559 (C.D. Mich. 1982). In Power, the court concluded
that the legislative histories of the Equal.Pay Act and Title VII indicate that Congress did not intend
the courts to make independent and subjective evaluations and comparisons of the worth of various
jobs to an employer. /d. at 726, 29 FEP Cases at 563-64. Other courts have similarly rejected
comparable worth claims. Lemon v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 27 FEP Cases 959
(10th Cir. 1980); Christensen v. State of Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 13 FEP Cases 161 (8th Cir. 1977).
34 740 F.2d at 708, 35 FEP Cases at 232-33.
55
 740 F.2d at 706, 35 FEP Cases at 231. See Note, Sex-Based Wage Discrimination Under The Title
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are beyond the employer's control, a reliance on the "market" is not a discretionary
business practice or employer decision subject to the sanctions of Title VII merely
because it impacts disproportionately on a protected class. 56
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Spaulding does not significantly change recent inter-
pretation of Title VII. The case is important, however, because it delineates the bound-
aries of Title VII liability in the wake of the Supreme Court's expansion of Title VII in
Gunther. After Gunther, the Equal Pay Act's requirement of "substantially equal" work
no longer applies to Title VII claims of intentional sex-based wage discrimination.
Spaulding indicates the extent to which analysis of comparable, but not equal, jobs can
establish disparate impact Title VII claims. Both Spaulding and Gunther hold that an
analysis of comparable jobs is relevant in the context of a disparate treatment claim
because the plaintiff is attempting to prove intentional discrimination. The treatment of
only "comparable" jobs is relevant because it compares not the worth of the jobs, but,
rather, the employer's differential treatment of individuals doing comparable work. 57
Whether an analysis of comparable jobs or work can ever be the basis of a disparate
impact claim is left open by both Gunther and Spaulding. The Spaulding court specifically
refused to make "any broad statement as to the general availability of the impact model
in other broad based sex-wage cases."58 Moreover, even though the Spaulding court stated
that the Supreme Court's expansion of Title VII liability is limited to "recognition of
intentional discrimination,"59 the Spaulding court also distinguished the nursing faculty's
broad based attack on the University's wage structure from successful challenges to more
specific employer practices under the disparate impact doctrine. 60 The court, therefore,
rejected any disparate impact claim which requires a judicial determination of the
"worth" of different jobs. 6 ' The Ninth Circuit explicitly left open the possibility that
plaintiffs may demonstrate the disparate impact of narrow, discretionary employer prac-
tices on classes of workers who are not doing substantially equal work. 62
Though the court appears uncertain, there is no theoretical difficulty in permitting
disparate impact claims to be demonstrated through an analysis of comparable work if
VII Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1083, 1098 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Sex-
Based Wage Discrimination].
56 740 F.2d at 708, 35 FEP Cases at 232-33.
" Though the court analyzed and rejected a claim. of comparable "worth," Judge Schroeder,
in his concurring opinion, stated that the plaintiffs "repeatedly disclaimed having presented any
comparable worth theory" and only claimed that nursing and other faculty positions were "com-
parable work." Id. at 710, 35 FEP Cases at 239 (Schroeder, J., concurring). Claims of comparable
work and not worth are logical with respect to the nursing faculty's claim of disparate treatment.
See supra note 16. An allegation of comparable "worth" with respect to plaintiffs' disparate impact
claim, however, seems necessary. If the worth of the positions were not comparable there would be
no expectation 'that the positions would he compensated equally, and any demonstrated wage
disparity would, therefore, be meaningless with respect to a claim of wage discrimination.
" 740 F.2d at 706, 35 FEP Cases at 231 (citing Power v. Barry, 539 F. Supp. 721, 29 FF.P 559
(C.D. Mich. 1982)).
59 Id.
64' Id, at 707-08, 35 FEP Cases at 231-33.
61 Id. at 706-07, 35 FEP Cases at 231-32. Therefore, the Spaulding court is in agreement with
pre-Gunther appellate decisions which have rejected claims of wage discrimination based on alle-
gations that different sex-segregated jobs receive different rates of pay though they are of "com-
parable worth" to an employer. See supra note 19. See also Power v. Barry, 539 F. Supp. 721, 29 FEP
Cases 559 (C.D. Mich. 1982),
52 740 F.2d at 706, 35 FEP Cases at 231.
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the employer practice challenged is specific and discretionary. 63 The disparate impact of
some types of fringe benefits for instance could be demonstrated by an analysis of their
differential effect on the compensation of somewhat different de facto sex-segregated
jobs without involving the court in an analysis of the comparable "worth" of those jobs
to an employer. An employer's policy of providing retirement benefits based on sex-
segregated annuity tables, for example, has been successfully challenged under a Title
VII disparate impact claim; the plan required all employees to make equal contributions,
yet provided female employees lower benefits." If female employees doing the same
work as male employees brought such an action, it would be a classic disparate impact
claim involving equal work. If the employer's job classification policy, however, had
resulted in classes of all-female secretaries and all-male clerks doing similar but not equal
work, the secretary's disparate impact claim challenge to the benefit policy would require
a court to examine whether the jobs — secretaries and clerks — were comparable, but
would not require the court to determine whether the "worth" of the jobs was compa-
rable. Although such a claim might be denied by courts which interpret Gunther as only
permitting comparable work to be examined when intentional discrimination is alleged, 65
this type of claim would not contradict the Spaulding decision, which only precludes
disparate impact claims where proof of the comparable worth of the two jobs is an
essential element of the claim.
The Supreme Court declined to review the Spaulding court's rejection of comparable
worth claims under the disparate impact model." The Court had already indicated its
reluctance to accept such claims by emphasizing that Gunther did not involve a "contro-
versial" claim of comparable worth. 67 Furthermore, acceptance of comparable worth
claims would force courts to make subjective evaluations of the worth of various jobs
and would then require them to impose those evaluations on employers. Such an im-
position would be difficult, complicated, the subject of constant judicial review, and
would also interfere with collective bargaining agreements, which often result in pay
rates higher or lower than the "worth" of a job to an employer." Finally, judicial wage
setting through a valuation of jobs' worth in relation to other jobs would violate the
congressional intent of the Equal Pay Act and of Title VII. 69
In summary, the Spaulding court held that a Title VII disparate impact claim can
not be constructed by a showing of wage disparities between jobs of allegedly comparable
worth. The Spaulding court rejected the nursing faculty's comparable worth claim on
two grounds. First, it rejected the proposition that courts have the authority or compe-
63 The court also cites Note, Sex-Based Wage Discrimination, supra note 55, for the proposition
that courts should not recognize disparate impact claims based on comparable worth. 740 F.2d at
706, 35 FEP Cases at 231. This note, however, does endorse the recognition of disparate impact
claims based on other than comparable worth. See Note, Sex-Based Wage Discrimination, supra note
55, at 1092.
64 See Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492, 32 FEP Cases 233 (1983), aff'g in
part, re-o'g in part, 671 F.2d 330, 28 FEP Cases 361 (9th Cir. 1982).
63 See Power v. Barry, 539 F. Supp. 721, 29 FEP 559 (C.D. Mich. 1982).
66 Spaulding v. University of Washington, 105 S. Ct. 511, 36 FEP Cases 464 (1984) (denying
certiorari).
67 Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 166, 25 FEP Cases 1521, 1522-23 (1981).
66 Note, Sex-Based Wage Discrimination, supra note 55, at 1098.
69 See Power v. Barry, 539 F, Supp. 721, 726, 29 FEP Cases 559, 563-64 (C.D. Mich. 1982),
for a discussion of the legislative histories of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII.
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tence to determine the comparable "worth" of different jobs. 7° Second, even if compa-
rable worth were not an issue, 7 ' the court rejected the claim that an employer's reliance
on the market to determine wages was the type of discretionary employer practice which
could be challenged under Title V11. 72 Therefore, the Spaulding court is in agreement
with pre-Gunther appellate decisions which have rejected claims of wage discrimination
based on the comparable worth theory." In the Ninth Circuit's opinion, the Supreme
Court's expansion of Title VII liability in Gunther is limited to cases of intentional
discrimination and, possibly, challenges to narrow and discretionary employer practices.
Thus, in the future, claims of wage discrimination based solely on a showing of wage
disparities between different jobs alleged to be of only comparable worth to an employer
will still not constitute a prima facie case of Title VII wage discrimination.
IL REMEDIES
A. *Right to Contribution Not Available to Parties Found to be in Violation of Section 1981:
Anderson v. Local Union No. 3'
Under the doctrine of contribution, a tortfeasor attempts to shift some of the
judgment rendered against him to one or more joint tortfeasors. 2 By doing so, the
tortfeasor can avoid paying more than his proportionate share of the judgment. 3 In
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers,* however, the United States Supreme Court
held that such a right is not available to a defendant found to be in violation of Title
V11 5 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 6 The Supreme Court held that a right to contribution
70 740 F.2d 686, 706, 35 FEP Cases 217, 231.
'' See Briggs v. County of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435, 442, 28 FEP Cases 739, 748 (C.D. Wis.
1982), where the court concluded that municipal nurses and sanitarians performed jobs which were
of "comparable value" to the city. 'This conclusion rested, in part, on city job classification ratings
which were similar for the two positions.
" 740 F.2d at 708, 35 FEP at 232.
" Power v. Barry, 539 F. Supp. 721, 29 FEP 559 (C.D. Mich. 1982); see also supra note 19.
* By Eric D. Daniels, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
751 F.2d 546, 36 FEP Cases 1249 (2d Cir. 1984).
2 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A (1979); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 50 (1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
'See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A (1979); PROSSER, supra note 2, § 50.
4 451 U.S. 77, 25 FEP Cases 737 (1981). In a class action brought against Northwest Airlines
by a female cabin attendant, Northwest Airlines was held liable to the class of female employees
for backpay because wage differentials between male and female cabin attendants were found to
violate Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2a (1982)) and the Equal Pay Act (29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982)).
See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763, 789-90, 6 FEP Cases 902, 923 (D.D.C.
1973). In subsequent litigation, Northwest Airlines brought an action seeking contribution from
the unions responsible for collectively bargaining for the wages of male and female cabin attendants.
451 U.S. at 82, 25 FEP Cases at 739.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982). The pertinent part of the Act reads as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer — (I) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
Id.
6 451 U.S. at 98-99, 25 FEP Cases at 745.
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could not be inferred from either the language 7 or legislative history of Title VII."
Moreover, the Court maintained that it would be improper to add a common law right
to contribution to the statutory rights created by Congress in that statute. 9
During the Survey year, in Anderson v. Local Union No. 3, 10 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit extended the holding of Northwest Airlines by barring
claims for contribution under section 1981" of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which
guarantees equal rights under the law for all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States.t 2 The court in Anderson held that Local Union No. 3, International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO (Local 3), was not entitled to any award
for contribution, since a proper reading of the Northwest Airlines decision would preclude
such an award under section 1981." Therefore, after Anderson, a party found to be in
violation of section 1981 will not be allowed to seek contribution from another party.
In employment discrimination suits antecedent to Anderson, classes of black and
hispanic individuals alleged that Madison Square Garden Center, Inc. and Madison
Square Garden Corp. (the Garden Entities), various individuals, and Local 3, the union
which represents laborers employed at Madison Square Garden, had violated the civil
rights laws by engaging in a pattern of hiring and employment practices which made it
impossible for class members to secure higher paying and generally more desirable
positions as laborers at Madison Square Garden." Prior to the trial of these suits,
Id. at 91-95, 25 FEP Cases at 792-44. The Court first stated that the language used in Title
VII did not expressly create a right to contribution. Id. at 91, 25 FEP Cases at 742. Nor, the Court
noted, did the language support implication of a right to contribution under Title VII. M. at 93.,
25 FEP Cases at 743. In fact, according to the Court, "[title comprehensive character of the remedial
scheme expressly fashioned by Congress strongly evidences an intent not to authorize [a right to
contribution)." Id. at 93-94, 25 FEP Cases at 743.
Id. at 94, 25 ['EP Cases at 743. The Court stated that the legislative history of Title VII
provided no support toward the recognition of a right to contribution under the statute. Id.
9 Id. at 98, 25 FEY Cases at 745. The Court explained that it could not, in the face of such a
comprehensive legislative scheme as Title VII, fashion new remedies that might upset a carefully
planned legislative program. Id. at 97, 25 FEP Cases at 745. Based on this, the Court concluded
that "[w[hatever may be a federal court's power to fashion remedies in other areas of the law, we
are satisfied that it would be improper for us to add a right to contribution to the statutory rights
that Congress created in .... Title VII." Id. at 98, 25 FEP Cases at 745 (footnote omitted).
10 751 F.2d 546, 36 FEP Cases 1249 (2d Cir. 1984).
" 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). That section provides in full:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exaction of every kind, and to no
other.
Id.
" 751 F.2d at 550, 36 FEP Cases at 1252-53. Anderson also involved a claim for indemnification.
Id. at 547, 36 FEP Cases at 1250. Indemnification refers to an order requiring a party to reimburse
in full the party who has discharged a common liability. See PROSSER, supra note 2, § 51. The court
stated that the rationale of its holding, with regard to contribution, extended as well to claims for
indemnification. 751 F.2d at 548, 36 FEP Cases at 1251.
Id. at 548-49, 36 FEP Cases at 1251-52.
' 4 See Ingram v. Madison Square Garden Center, 482 F. Supp. 414, 21 FEP Cases 718 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); 482 F. Supp. 918, 32 FEP Cases 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); 535 F. Supp. 1082, 32 FEP Cases 548
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), modified, 709 F.2d 807, 32 FEP Cases 641 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 346, 33
FEP Cases 48 (1983).
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however, the plaintiff classes entered into a consent decree with all the defendants other
than Local 3. 15 As a result, the plaintiff classes withdrew their claims against the settling
defendants." Litigation against Local 3, however, proceeded to trial and resulted in a
finding that Local 3 had violated both Title VII and section 1981. 17 The court entered
judgment against Local 3 for injunctive and monetary relief." In so doing, the court
specifically accounted for payments received by the plaintiff classes from the settling
defendants and reduced Local 3's liability accordingly.'" The appeals court upheld the
award against Local 3. as modified. 20
At this point, Local 3 announced that it would seek contribution for amounts
awarded to the plaintiff classes in the antecedent litigation. 2 ' Following this announce-
ment, individual plaintiffs and the Garden Entities commenced an action for declaratory
relief. 22 The United States District Court for the Southern Distria•of New York, finding
no factual question to be tried, granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. 23
The court declared that the plaintiffs were not liable to Local 3 for any monies associated
with the prior litigation. 24
The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting the plain-
tiffs' motion for summary judgment and dismissing Local 3's claim of a right to contri-
bution.25 In reaching its decision, the court rejected the two arguments raised by the
union in favor of recognizing a right to contribution. First, the court rejected Local 3's
argument that Northwest Airlines should be read narrowly. 26 Local 3 argued that Northwest
Airlines should be read to bar the assertion of a claim to contribution under Title VII
only in those circumstances in which no charge of discrimination was ever filed against
the party from whom contribution is sought. 27 The court stated, however, that a proper
reading of Northwest Airlines decision would bar all actions for contribution under Title
VII, even those among named respondents. 28
The Anderson court also rejected Local 3's assertion that Northwest Airlines should not
be read to bar claims for contribution under section 1981, 22 Local 3 maintained that the
holding in Northwest Airlines hinged on the Supreme Court's concern that a judicially-
16 751 F.2d at 547, 36 FEP Cases at 1250. The terms of the decree were approved by the district
court. 482 F. Supp. at 429, 32 FEP Cases at 538.
16 751 F.2d at 547, 36 FEP Cases at 1250.
17 482 F. Supp. at 424, 21 FEP Cases at 724. The court stated that Local 3 referred applicants
to the Garden to fill positions in the Garden work force. Id. at 420, 21 FEP Cases at 721. The court
found that the union had engaged in a pattern of "subjective and aandardless" referrals. Id. at
420, 21 FEP Cases at 722. Furthermore, according to the court, Local 3 had frustrated the attempts
of minorities to gain information about becoming laborers at the Garden. Id. at 421, 21 FEP Cases
at 722.
16 535 F. Supp. at 1095, 32 FEP Cases at 559.
19 Id.
29 709 F.2d 807, 814, 32 FEP Cases 641, 647-48 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 346, 33 FEP
Cases 48 (1983).
21 751 F.2d at 547, 36 FEP Cases at 1250.
22 Id.
22 582 F. Supp. 627, 633, 34 FEP Cases 517, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
24 Id.
" 751 F.2d at 547, 36 FEP Cases at 1250.
2.6 id. at 548, 36 FEP Cases at 1251.
27 Id.
26 Id.
29 Id, at 548, 36 FEP Cases at 1251 -52.
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fashioned right to contribution under Title VII would upset a comprehensive legislative
scheme." Unlike the Title VII situation, however, the union contended that there was
not the same degree of comprehensiveness legislated with regard to section 1981 ac-
tions." Disagreeing with this reasoning, the court indicated that the comprehensive
legislative scheme for Title VII enforcement would nevertheless be disrupted if defen-
dants found liable under both Title VII and section 1981 were permitted to bring actions
for contribution." The court further stated that the threat of section 1981-derived
actions for contribution among persons conceivably liable under Title VII would dis-
courage the voluntary settlement of employment discrimination cases." The court noted
that other courts have stressed the importance of voluntary settlements in this area of
law," and that Congress had expressed a strong preference for voluntary settlement in
the enactment of Title VII." Therefore, by refusing to read Northwest Airlines narrowly,
the Anderson court held that actions for contribution in a section 1981 litigation, like
those in a Title VII litigation, would be barred."
Underlying both Anderson and Northwest Airlines is the notion of judicial restraint.
Although the Supreme Court noted in Northwest Airlines that there were two main policy
considerations which favored the recognition of the right to contribution under Title
VII," the Court stated that it would be an "improper" exercise of judicial authority for
it to create such a right under that statute." First, the Court maintained that recognition
of the right to contribution reflects the view that when two or more persons share
responsibility for a wrong, it is inequitable to require one to pay the entire cost of
reparation." Second, the Court pointed out that it is sound policy to deter all wrongdoers
by reducing the likelihood that any will entirely escape liability."
3° Id. at 548, 36 FEP Cases at 1251.
3 ' Id.
32 Id. at 548, 36 FEP Cases at 1252.
" Id.
34 Id. Such settlements, the court noted, work to speed the placement in the workplace of
historically under-represented groups. Id. at 549, 36 FEP Cases at 1252. See, e.g., Carson v. American
Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n.14, 25 FEP Cases I, 4 n.14 (1981) (identifying voluntary settlement
as "one of the policies underlying Title VII"); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44,
7 FEP Cases 81, 84 (1974) ("[c]ooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the preferred
means for achieving [the goals of Title VIl]"); Bushey v. New York State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 733
F.2d 220, 226, 34 FEP Cases 1065, 1070 (2d Cir. 1984); Kirkland v. New York State Dept of
Corrections Servs., 711 F.2d 1117, 1128, 32 FEP Cases 509, 517 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 997, 33 FEP Cases 1344 (1984) ("lilt is settled that voluntary compliance is a preferred means
of achieving Title VIPs goals of eliminating employment discrimination").
33 751 F.2d at 549, 36 FEP Cases at 1252. See, e.g., Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S.
79, 88 n.14, 25 FEP Cases 1, 4 n.14 (1981) ("'[c]ooperation and voluntary compliance ... were
selected [by Congress] as the preferred means for achieving [the goals of Title VII]"').
36 751 F.2d at 550, 36 FEP Cases at 1252-53. The court also rejected Local 3's contention that
Northwest Airlines did not extend to claims for contribution by agents against their principals. Id. at
549, 36 FEP Cases at 1251-52. Local 3 argued that it had merely acted at the direction of the
Garden Entities in the perpetration of its discriminatory practices. Id. at 548, 36 FEP Cases at 1251.
The court stated, however, that this contention established, at most, a basis for the Garden Entities'
liability in the antecedent litigation. Id. at 549, 36 FEP Cases at 1252.
37
 451 U.S. at 88-89, 25 FEP Cases at 741-42.
" Id. at 98, 25 FEP Cases at 745.
"Id. at 88, 25 FEP Cases at 741.
4" Id.
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The Northwest Airlines Court concluded, however, that policy considerations alone
could not provide a sufficient basis for recognizing the right to contribution under Title
VII.'" Rather, the right to contribution had to be created, according to the Court, either
by statute when Congress enacted Title VII or through the exercise of judicial power to
fashion appropriate remedies for unlawful conduct. 42 In Northwest Airlines, the Court
found no basis for concluding that the right to contribution had been created by Congress
when Congress enacted Title VII. 45 Furthermore, the Court refused to exercise its power
to create a right to contribution under Title VII. 44 In explaining this refusal, the Court
stated that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. 45 Federal courts, the Court
pointed out, have not been vested with open-ended lawmaking powers . 46 In exercising
its judicial power, therefore, the Court noted that it is subject to the paramount authority
of Congress.'" Since the Court had already found that Congress had not created a right
to contribution in enacting Title VII, the Court concluded that it would be an "improper"
exercise of judicial authority for it to create such a right under that statute. 48 By refusing
to read Northwest Airlines narrowly, 48 the Anderson court acquiesced in this notion of
judicial restraint.
Thus, in light of Anderson and Northwest Airlines, the equitable considefations ad-
vanced by those seeking contribution under Title VII or section 1981 are properly
addressed to Congress, not to the federal courts. The Northwest Airlines Court and, by
implication, the Anderson court, recognized that these equitable considerations existed,
but determined that Congress is more properly suited to evaluate such considerations.
The question of the availability of the right to contribution for one found liable under
Title VII or section 1981, though closed for now by Anderson and Northwest Airlines,
remains "'more appropriately [one] for those who write the laws, rather than for those
who interpret them.'" 5"
Should Congress decide to resolve this issue, as both the Northwest Airlines Court
and the Anderson court have indicated it should, the proper focal point for that resolution
would be the two policy considerations raised by the Court in Northwest Airlines." The
first of those policy considerations is that when two or more persons share responsibility
for a wrong, it is inequitable to require one to pay the entire cost of reparation. 52 The
second policy consideration raised by the Northwest Airlines Court is that it is sound policy
to deter all wrongdoers by reducing the likelihood that any will entirely escape liability."
4 ' Id. at 90, 25 FEP Cases at 742.
42 Id.
45 Id. at 91-95, 25 FEP Cases at 742-44. First, the Court explained that a right to contribution
could not be inferred from the language of Title VII. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
Neither, the Court indicated, could such a right be inferred from the legislative history of the
statute. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
44 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
45 451 U.S. at 95, 25 FEP Cases at 744.
45 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 98, 25 FEP Cases at 745.
49 See supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
5° Id. at 98 n.41, 25 FEP Cases at 745 n.41.
See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
52 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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These considerations, one of equity and one of deterrence, appear to weigh in favor of
congressional recognition of a right to contribution under section 1981.
A party's right to contribution under section 1981 is now, by virtue of Anderson,
barred by the Supreme Court's decision in Northwest Airlines. Although the Northwest
Airlines Court found that policy considerations supported recognition of the right to
contribution, it stated that its actions were constrained by the paramount authority of
Congress. Therefore, whether claims for contribution will be allowed under Title VII
and, after Anderson, under section 1981, is now a question that must be addressed by
Congress.
III. EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
A. *Retroactive Relief for Discriminatory Use of Gender-Based Mortality Tables in Calculating
Pension Benefits: Spirt v. Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association'
Under Title VII, it is an unlawful employment practice "to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin."' Pension
benefits have presented controversy because annuities have traditionally been calculated
separately for men and women.' Because of the actuarial finding that women, as a class,
outlive men,4 employee pension plans have generally paid women lower monthly benefits
on the assumption that women's longer lifespans would result in equal total benefits to
women and men. 5
* By Thomas W. Bridge, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
I
 735 F.2d 23, 28, 34 FEP Cases 1510, 1514 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 247 (1984).
2 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
3 See generally Key, Sex-Based Pension Plans in Perspective: City of Los Angeles, Department of
Water and Power v. Manhart, 2 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1979); Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination:
Manhart, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 85.
See, e.g., Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492, 3496, 32 FEP Cases 233, 237
(1983) ("women as a class live longer than men"); City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
704-05, 17 FEP Cases 395, 397 (1978) ("[a]s a class, women live longer than men"). The validity
of this actuarial finding has been challenged on the basis that factors other than sex are responsible
for differences in longevity. See Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock, & Sullivan, Sex Discrimination in
Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans: A Legal and Demographic Analysis, 47 U. Cm. L. REV. 505 (1980);
Brilmayer, Laycock Sc Sullivan, The Efficient Use of Averages as Nondiscrimination: A Rejoinder to Professor
Benston, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 222 (1983); Key, supra note 3, at 8-9. Cf. Benston, Discrimination and
Economic Efficiency in Employee Fringe Benefits: A Clarification of Issues and Response to Professors Brilmayer,
Laycock, and Sullivan, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 250 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Benston, A Response];
Benston, The Economics of Gender Discrimination in Employee Fringe Benefits: Manhart Revisited, 49 U.
Cm. L. REV. 489 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Benston, Economics]. The actuarial longevity of women
is complicated by the finding that only sixteen percent of women outlive their male counterparts.
Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 671 F.2d 330, 332 n.1, 28 FEP Cases 369, 370 n,1 (9th Cir.
1982), off 'd, 103 S. Ct. 3492, 32 FEP Cases 233 (1983).
5 See Key, supra note 3, at 14; Benston, Economics, supra note 4, at 490. The calculation of benefit
payments is more complicated than merely dividing total contributions by life expectancy, in part
because of investment income earned by undistributed contributions. See Brief of Eight Individual
Actuaries as Amici Curiae at 12, Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492, 32 FEP
Cases 233 (1983). These other factors do not affect the differences in treatment because of the use
of gender-based mortality tables, and are therefore not considered here.
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In 1978, in City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 6 the Supreme Court held that Tide VII
prohibited an employer operating a defined-benefit pension system? from requiring
women to make higher contributions than men. 6 The Court in Manhart rejected the
argument that higher contributions by women were justified because men and women
would receive equal monthly retirement benefits under the plan, women had a longer
actuarial lifespan, and therefore women, as a class, would receive greater total benefits
than men.° Title VII focuses on the individual, the Manhart Court held, and prohibits
attributing group characteristics to individuals.'°
Having found a violation of Title VII, the Court turned to the issue of relief. While
noting that a presumption exists in Title VII cases favoring retroactive as well as pro-
spective relief, the Manhart Court granted only prospective relief." Retroactive liability,
the Court reasoned, was not justified because the fund's administrators could reasonably
have assumed that their plan was lawful.' 2 Furthermore, the Court reasoned, the impact
of retroactive liability could jeopardize the stability of the entire retirement fund.' 3
 The
solvency of the pension fund, the Court noted, depended on calculation of liability and
provision of sufficient funds to meet its obligations.'4 Retroactive liability, the Court
found, could threaten a fund's solvency by reducing its assets and making it unable to
meet its obligations.'°
In 1983, in Arizona Governing ,Committee v. Norris,' 6 the Supreme Court held that
Title VII prohibited the operation of a defined-contribution" retirement system under
which a woman who chose to purchase a lifetime annuity through her employer received
lower monthly payments than a similarly situated man.° The Norris Court also granted
only prospective relief.° As in Manhart, the Court held, plan administrators may rea-
sonably have assumed that the plan was lawful. 2° Furthermore, the Court reasoned,
retroactive liability could impose staggering costs, threatening the fiscal stability of the
plans and the state and local governnients operating them." In both Manhart and Norris,
6 435 U.S. 702, 17 FEP Cases 395 (1978).
7 A defined-benefit pension program is one in which the level of payments to be received is
specified and guaranteed by the plan. Contributions to the plan to fund future payments are
calculated according to a specified formula. See Ryan & Burkley, Nondiscrimination in Pension Plans,
34 LAS. L.J. 201, 203 (1983).
Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711, 17 FEP Cases at 400.
"Id. at 708-09, 17 FEP Cases at 399.
1 ° Id. at 708, 17 FEP Cases at 399.
" Id, at 723, 17 FEP Cases at 404.
12 Id. at 720-21, 17 FEP Cases at 403.
13 Id. at 721, 17 FEP Cases at 404.
' 4 Id.
' 5 Id.
16 103 S. Ct. 3492, 32 FEP Cases 233 (1983).
17 Under a defined-contribution pension system, payments are made into individual accounts
for each employee, and no specific level of benefits is guaranteed. The accumulated contributions
and investment income are then distributed at retirement in a lump sum, or are, optionally, used
to purchase a lifetime annuity with monthly payments. The amount of the monthly benefit depends
on the amount of accumulated contributions' and the participant's projected lifespan. See Ryan &
Burkley, supra note 7, at 203.
i8 103 S. Ct. at 3499, 32 FEP Cases at 239 (opinion of Marshall, J.).
19 Id. at 3510, 32 FEP Cases at 248 (opinion of Powell, J.).
2° Id. at 3510, 32 FEP Cases at 247 (opinion of Powell, J.).
2 ' Id, at 3510, 32 FEP Cases at 248 (opinion of Powell, J.).
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the Court noted that Title VII presumptively granted retroactive relief, yet the Court
declined to grant it.
During the Survey year, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
retroactive relief from an employer's use of gender-based mortality tables is appropriate
if such relief would not be a monetary burden on the pension plan and would not violate
the settled expectations of plan participants. 22 In Spirt v. Teachers Insurance and Annuity
Associalion,23 the appeals court clarified the basis of the Norris Court's refusal to grant
retroactive relief. 24 The Spire decision reasserts the presumption of retroactive relief for
Title VII violations, and dramatically hastens the implementation of Norris by requiring
the use of gender-neutral mortality tables in pension benefit calculations for all contri-
butions accrued by future retirees, not just those contributed after the Norris decision."
In Spirt, Diana L. Spirt, a tenured professor at Long Island University, was required
by her employer to participate in a pension plan administered by Teachers Insurance
Annuity Association (TIAA) and the College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF)." Under
this defined-contribution plan," contributions were equal for similarly situated male and
female employees." Upon the employee's retirement, the accumulated contributions
were used to purchase an annuity paying fixed amounts for the life of the retiree." The
amount of the payment under these annuities was calculated using gender-based mor-
tality tables, which assumed a longer average life expectancy for women than for men."
As a result, a woman would receive lower monthly payments than a man of the same
age with equal total contributions. 3 '
Diana Spirt filed suit against TIAA-CREF and her employer, alleging that the use
of gender-based mortality tables violated Title VII and the equal protection clause of
22 Spirt v. Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association, 735 F.2d 23, 28, 34 FEP Cases 1510,
1514 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 247 (1984).
25 735 F.2d 23, 34 FEP Cases 1510 (2d Cir. 1984).
" Id. at 27-28, 34 FEP Cases at 1513, See Ryan & Rock, Post-Norris Ambiguities: Unanswered
Questions for Women and the Pension Industry; 17 AKRON L. REV. 171 (1983), for a good exposition of
the uncertainties in the wake of the Norris decision.
25 Norris required gender neutral mortality tables to be used only for contributions made after
that decision; therefore, benefits to men and women would be equalized only for those employees
that began contributing to the plan after that decision. Such employees are likely to be young and
decades away from retirement and the receipt of completely sex-neutral benefits. See Norris, 103 S.
Ct. at 3510, 32 FEP Cases at 248 (opinion of Powell, J .).
26 Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1298, 1300, 20 FEP Cases 738, 740
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff 'd in part, rev'd in part, 691 F.2d 1054, 29 FEP Cases 1599 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated
and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 3566, 32 FEP Cases 359 (1983).
" See supra note 17.
28 Spin, 475 F. Supp. at 1300, 20 FEP Cases at 740. The contributions in Spin were made by
both the employees and employer Long Island University according to a formula under which the
employee contributed 5% of his or her salary, and the employer contributed an amount equal to
5% of the first $4,800 and 11% of the remaining salary. Participation in the plan was mandatory
for tenured professors. Id.
28 Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 691 F.2d 1054, 1058, 29 FEP Cases 1599, 1602 (2d
Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 3566, 32 FEP Cases 359 (1983). The employee in this
plan could choose to receive a single life annuity, one with a guaranteed period, or a joint-life
annuity with a specified beneficiary. The plan did not, however, include an option whereby a retiree
could receive a lump sum payment of all contributions at retirement. Id.
35 1d.
si
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the fourteenth amendment. 32 The district court held that the use of gender-based
mortality tables by the CREF plan violated Title VII," and enjoined CREF from using
gender-based mortality tables in computing any benefits for plan participants who retired
after May I, 1980." The district court found that TIAA was exempted from the pro-
visions of Title VII as an insurance company. 35 The court of appeals affirmed the district
court's finding of a Title VII violation by CREF, and held that. TIAA was also in violation
of Title VII." The court of appeals held that both TIAA and CREF were bound by the
district court's order requiring the use of gender-neutral mortality tables to calculate
benefits of all retirees." The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the decision of
the lower courts, and remanded for reconsideration in light of its decision in Norris."
Because Norris had settled that Title VII prohibited an employer from calculating
pension benefits using gender-based mortality tables, the Spirt court on remand consid-
ered only the issue of relief." The issue of relief, however, was an important one. Large
sums of money were involved in the retirement plans, and the court's framing of relief
would have a profound impact on how soon retirees' annuities would be calculated
entirely using gender-neutral mortality tables.°
The fundamental issue, the court stated, was retroactivity." That term is ambiguous,
the court noted, because no claim was made to require the plans to pay additional sums
to past retirees.42 Instead, the court focused on whether the monthly payment calcula-
tions for future retirees should apply gender-neutral mortality tables to all past contri-
butions, or just to contributions made after August I, 1983, the date of the Supreme
Court's decision in Norris.°
The Spirt court considered the Norris Court's denial of retroactive relief." The Spirt
court noted that it used the term retroactive liability in a limited sense to apply only to
benefits calculated for future retirees, not to unequal payments previously made to all
past retirees calculated with gender-based mortality tables. 45 Even considering only fu-
ture retirees, the Spirt court continued, the issue remained whether application of gen-
der-neutral  mortality tables would be required for all accumulated contributions of
future retirees, or just those contributions accumulated after the Norris decision.°
In deciding whether to require application of gender-neutral mortality tables to all
accumulated contributions, the Spirt court considered the specific concerns which
" Spirt, 475 F. Supp. at 1301, 20 FEP Cases at 740. The district court denied Spires equal
protection claim. Id. at 1313-15, 20 FEP Cases at 750-51.
" Spirt, 691 F.2d at 1059, 28 FEP Cases at 1602-03.
"Spin, 475 F. Supp. at 1316, 28 FEP Cases at 752. The Court deferred the requirement of
gender-neutral actuarial tables to the end of the academic year to ease the transition. Id.
" spirt, 691 F.2d at 1064, 29 FEP Cases at 1606.
36 Id. at 1066, 29 FEP Cases at 1608. The court held that, although TIAA was in the business
of insurance, its employment-related pension plan was not exempted from Title VII coverage by
the McCarran Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982). Spin, 691 F.2d at 1065, 29 FEP Cases at 1608.
" 691 F.2d at .1066, 29 FEP Cases at 1608.
38 Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 3566, 32 FEP Cases 359 (1983).
' 9 spirt, 735 F.2d at 25, 34 FEP Cases at 1511-12.
4° See supra note 25.





46 Id. at 27, 34 FEN Cases at 1512-13.
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prompted the Norris Court to reject Title VIPs presumption of retroactive relief.47
Considering the application of retroactive relief, the Norris Court had assumed that the
Arizona system would be forced to "top up" women's benefits to the higher level received
by men, the spirt court noted, rather than adjust the amounts received by both male
and female future retirees according to gender-neutral mortality tables." As a result,
the Spirt court continued, the Norris Court feared that the imposition of the cost of
"topping up" the women's benefits on the plans would threaten the economic stability
and security of the pension system.-09
The spirt court distinguished the TIAA-CREF plans from the Arizona plans, noting
that the Arizona plans provided some certainty about the level of benefits to be received."
The participants in the TIAA-CREF plans, the court reasoned, had no such expectancy
because the plan stressed that the precise level of benefits would be determined by the
plan's investment performance." The Spirt court concluded that requiring application
of gender-neutral mortality tables to all contributions made by future retirees would not
necessarily burden either the employer or TIAA-CREF with increased costs."
Application of gender-neutral mortality tables to all contributions made by future
retirees, the court continued, could instead result in recalculation of benefits for all
future retirees, both men and women." Male retirees, as a class, would receive fewer
dollars under gender-neutral mortality tables than under gender-based mortality tables,
the court noted. That result would not, however, be inequitable in the absence of settled
expectations of male retirees of a certain level of benefits."
Although the majority on this issue in Norris did not specify the expectations of
male plan participants as a factor in its denial of retroactive application of gender-neutral
mortality tables, the spirt court noted, the Norris dissenters on this issue would have
remanded for consideration of the expectations of male plan participants. 55 The Norris
Court must have assumed, the spirt court concluded, that the male participants in the
Arizona plan had settled expectations which precluded application of gender-neutral
mortality tables to all future retirees, both male and female." The Spirt court rejected
TIAA's contention that Norris barred retroactivity in all cases because someone would
inevitably be burdened; had the Norris Court intended such a holding, the spin court
reasoned, one would expect it to appear clearly in the Court's opinion. 57
The Spirt court concluded that it would require retroactive application of gender-
neutral mortality tables unless this would violate settled expectations of plan partici-
pants. 58 Turning to the TIAA-CREF plan, the Spirt court modified the district court's
holding that participants in the TIAA-CREF plans had no settled expectations as to the
amount of future benefits." Plan participants had no expectations, the Spirt court found,
41 Id. at 26-27, 34 FEP Cases at 1512-13.
" Id. at 26, 34 FEP Cases at 1512.
49 Id.
30 1d. at 26-27,34 FEP Cases at 1512-13.




5 ' Id. at 27-28, 34 FEP Cases at 1513.
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other than TIAA's guarantee of a minimum two and one-half percent return on invest-
ment." Gender-neutral mortality tables must be applied to all accumulated contributions
of future retirees, the Spirt court held, except to the degree that employing gender-
neutral tables would increase TIAA's costs in bringing benefits in a given year up to this
minimum guaranteed leve1. 6 '
The Spirt court was faced with the difficult task of interpreting the holding in
Norris. 62 In unraveling the Norris Court's holding, the Spirt court established an analytical
framework for deciding whether gender-neutral mortality tables must be applied to all
contributions paid in by future retirees. This framework was missing from the Norris
decision. The decision in Spirt related the issues of relief to Title V1I's central thrust of
remedying employment-related job discrimination by clarifying the departures of Man-
hart and Norris from the presumption of retroactive relief. 68
Much of the confusion surrounding the debate over implementing gender-neutral
mortality tables sterns from a failure to identify the burdens retroactive application might
impose. Provision of pension benefits, like insurance, is a zero-sum system: total benefits
dispersed should equal contributions paid in plus income from investing those contri-
butions, minus administrative costs," Gender-neutral mortality tables average the ex-
pected life spans of all plan participants rather than treating men and women sepa-
rately. 65 The total benefits disbursed, however, would remain unchanged. No burden is
thus placed on the pension system itself solely by requiring gender-neutral mortality
tables to be used in benefit calculations."
Under gender-neutral mortality tables, men receive slightly lower benefits than
under gender-based mortality tables.17 The mere fact that men as a class would receive
slightly lower benefits using gender-neutral mortality tables cannot defeat their appli-
cation; Norris held that gender-neutral mortality tables must be used for all future
contributions. 68 The difficulty in requiring retroactive application can only arise, as the
60 Id. at 28-29, 34 FEP Cases at 1514.
Id. at 29, 34 FEP Cases at 1514.
62 In Norris, separate majorities decided the issues of finding a Title VII violation and of relief'.
Only Justice O'Connor joined with the majority on both issues. On the issue of a Title V11 violation,
Justice Marshall wrote the opinion, joined by Justices Brennan, White, Stevens, and O'Connor. On
the issue of relief, Justice Powell wrote the opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Blackmun, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Justice O'Connor also wrote a separate opinion. The majority
which refused to grant retroactive application of the prohibition against gender-based mortality
tables was thus made up of four members who found no Title VII violation present. Norris, 103 S.
Ct. 3492, 32 FEP Cases 233 (1983).
65 See supra notes 6-21 and accompanying text.
See Benston, A Response, supra note 4, at 273.
"5 Brief of Eight Individual Actuaries as Amid Curiae at 7-9, Arizona Governing Comm. v.
Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492, 32 FEP Cases 233 (1983).
Id. The effect on males is diminished by the fact that many retirees elect a joint and survivor
annuity option which guarantees payments for the lifetime of the participant and the participant's
spouse. A man's wife would presumably outlive him, whereas a woman's husband would presumably
have a shorter life expectancy, and would thus have only a minimal effect on benefits. See Ryan &
Burkley, supra note 7, at 204. Some commentators contend that gender-neutral mortality tables will
benefit men as a class more than women. Id. at 206. Finally, data shows that only 16% of all women
outlive their male counterparts. The remaining 84% receive diminished benefits to subsidize the
longer-living 16%. See supra note 4.
"'Spirt, 735 F.2d at 27, 34 HP Cases at 1513.
66 Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3510, 32 FEP Cases at 248 (opinion of Powell, J.).
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Spirt court correctly noted, where male plan participants have settled expectations of a
specific level of future benefits to be paid on their pre-Norris contributions. 69 Building
on the Norris dissent, the Spirt court concluded that these settled expectations were
presumed by the Norris majority. 76 TIAA argued that Norris precluded retroactive ap-
plication if any entity, including male plan participants without clearly settled expecta-
tions, would be burdened with increased costs or decreased benefits." This contention,
if accepted by the courts, would bar retroactive relief issued against any risk-sharing
insurance plan, under which a benefit extended to one participant necessarily costs the
other participants. 72
The spirt court found no settled expectations of specific levels of benefits on the
part of male plan participants." The court continued, in dicta, to state that if a plan
were female dominated to the degree that retroactive adoption of gender-neutral mor-
tality tables would cause a substantial decline in the benefit levels the males received,
retroactive application might be inequitable." This analysis may merely reflect that male
plan participants might have some general expectations about their level of benefits
which might be violated by a drastic reduction, making retroactive application of gender-
neutral tables inequitable. The difficulty in this analysis, however, arises from the limited
reach of Title VII to the insurance industry."
Because Title VII reaches only employers and the plans they sponsor, the prohibi-
tions of Manhart and Norris do not reach annuities purchased on the "open market."'"
If male participants had an option to receive their accumulated contributions in a lump
sum," they could presumably purchase gender-based annuities on the open market
paying them higher monthly benefits. The remaining plan participants, predominantly
°Spirt, 735 F.2d at 27, 34 FEP Cases at 1513.
7" Id. at 26, 34 FEP Cases at 1512.
71 Id. at '25, 34 FEP Cases at 1511- 12.
72 See Benston, A Response, supra note 4, at 273.
" 735 F.2d at 28, 34 FEP Cases at 1514.
" Id. This conclusion presumes that tables would be gender-neutral when applied to individual
plan participants. The tables would be adjusted, however, to reflect the "mix" of male and female
plan participants. See Manhart, 435 U.S. at 718 & n.34, 17 FEP Cases at 402 & n.34 (Court's decision
does not "call into question the insurance industry practice of considering the composition of an
employer's work force in determining the probable cost of a retirement or death benefit plan"). See
also Brief of Eight Individual Actuaries as Amici Curiae at 16-17, Arizona Governing Comm. v.
Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492, 32 FEP Cases 233 (1983); Brief of American Academy of Actuaries as
Amicus Curiae at 18-19, Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492, 32 FEP Cases 233
(1983). But see Bernstein & Williams, Sex Discrimination in Pensions.- Manhart's Holding v. Manhart's
Dictum, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1241 (1978) (arguing Title VII bars consideration of work force's sexual
composition).
75 See Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3499, 32 FEP Cases at 239 (opinion of Marshall, J.).
"Man/tart, 435 U.S. at 717-18, 17 FEP Cases at 402.
[Wle do not suggest that the statute was intended to revolutionize the insurance and
pension industries. ... Nothing in our holding implies that it would be unlawful for
an employer to set aside equal retirement contributions for each employee and let
each retiree purchase the largest benefit which his or her accumulated contributions
could command in the open market.
Id.
" The particular plan in Spirt did not include an option for a lump sum distribution. Spirt, 691
F.2d at 1058 n.2, 29 FEP Cases at 1602 n.2.
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women, would have a longer lifespan as a group. 78 The plan would therefore distribute
smaller monthly benefits to reflect the change in the plan's composition, or would
jeopardize the plan's stability by disbursing greater total benefits than contributions
collected. 79 This sequence of events, under the spin court's analysis, could result in
barring retroactive application of the gender-neutral mortality table requirement." This
objection to retroactive liability seems open to all plans which permit lump sum distri-
bution under the Spirt court's analysis.
Under the Spin court's analysis, only if application of gender-neutral mortality tables
would violate settled expectations of male plan participants could retroactive application
of gender-neutral mortality tables impose increased costs on the pension plans." This
was the concern motivating the denial of retroactive application in Manhart and Norris."
In Manhart, because the very nature of a defined-benefit plan created settled expectations
for all plan participants of a certain level of benefits, retroactive liability would have
diminished the plan's assets." In Norris, the spin court noted, the majority seemed to
have assumed that settled expectations on the part of male plan participants meant that
female plan participants' benefits would have to be "topped up" at the plan's expense."
The Spirt court found no such expectations on the part of male plan participants,
and thus no need to consider the costs imposed on the employer or the plan." Following
its framework rigorously, moreover, the Spin court noted the minimal expectation of
'i'IAA's guarantee of at least two and one-half percent return on investment of contri-
butions, and concluded that use of gender-neutral mortality tables would not be required
to the extent that the plan disburses funds to meet this minimum guarantee if investment
income falls below that minimum. 86
The spin court reached the logical conclusion that gender-neutral mortality tables
must be applied to all accumulated contributions of future retirees, not only those
accumulated after the Norris decision. To apply gender-neutral mortality tables only to
that portion of a retiree's contributions made after the Norris decision would postpone
fully remedying the effect of the Title VII violation for decades, until retirees' contri-
butions were entirely made after the Norris decision. As well as hastening the remedy of
the Title VII violation, the Spirt court interpreted the fragmented Norris decision, and
created an analytical framework to explain the conditions under which retroactive ap-
plication of that decision would not be imposed.
This framework allows the central purpose of remedying Title VII violations to be
achieved by identifying the precise conditions under which retroactive relief would not
be extended. The potential danger in this analysis is if male participants are able to
receive lump sum distributions and purchase gender-based annuities on the open market.
If a significant number of male plan participants withdraw, this could create the very
78 See Brief of American Academy of Actuaries as Amicus Curiae at 17, Arizona Governing
Comm. v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492, 32 FEP Cases 233 (1983).
79 Id. at 18-19.
80 Spin, 735 F.2d at 27, 34 FEP Cases at 1514.
" Id.
88 See supra notes 6-21 and accompanying text.
" Manhart, 435 U.S. at 723, 17 FEP Cases at 404.
84 735 F.2d at 28, 34 FEP Cases at 1514.
85 Id.
18 Id. at 28-29, 34 FEP Cases at 1514.
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kind of female dominated plan in which gender-neutral mortality tables could create a
substantial reduction in the benefits of remaining male participants. This problem results,
however, not from a weakness in the Court's analysis, but from the limited reach of Title
VII to employers only. Insurance companies on the "open market" remain free of the
Title VII requirement of gender-neutral mortality tables. 8" By offering annuities calcu-
lated with gender-based mortality tables with higher monthly payments to males, they
may disrupt and postpone remedying the effects of the discrimination in the use of
gender-based mortality tables.
IV. SEN/OR1TY SYSTEMS
A. *Voluntary Race-Conscious Affirmative Action Versus Seniority Rights: Wygant
v. Jackson Board of Education'
The equal protection clause in the fourteenth amendment 2 forbids the state gov-
ernments from discriminating on the basis of races Pursuant to its power to regulate
interstate commerce, Congress statutorily extended this constitutional prohibition against
racial discrimination beyond state governmental action to include federally funded pro-
grams and most private and public employers, by enacting Title VI and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 4 The Supreme Court has applied these proscriptions by sub-
jecting race classifications to the strictest judicial scrutiny, 6 making it virtually impossible
for a racial classification to pass constitutional or statutory musters Paradoxically, this
strict scrutiny of all racial classifications has impeded recent race-conscious endeavors to
eradicate those manifestations of past and present racial discrimination which society,
through its public and private sectors, has not been successful in redressing without the
use of race-based remedies.' It is well settled that race-conscious remedies are necessary
to grant relief to judicially proven direct victims of racial discrimination!' Voluntary and
" See Manhart, 435 U.S. at 717-18, 17 FEP Cases at 402.
* By Gary Steven Wigodsky, Staff Member, BosToN COLLEGE Law REVIEW.
746 F.2d 1152, 36 FEP Cases 153 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985) (No.
84-1340).
2 U.S. CoNs. r. amend. XIV, § I.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307, 17 FEP Cases 1000, 1017 (1978)
(declaring illegal the race-based exclusion of the plaintiff from medical school, the Court relied on
statutory grounds under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but held that this statute proscribes
exactly what the fourteenth amendment does in the way of racial discrimination); Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1959) (Court held that segregation by race in public schools, whether
or not the facilities are equal, is a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment).
4 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, 2000e-2 (1982) (Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act applies to federally funded programs and Title VII applies to most private and public employ-
ers).
5
 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291, 17 FEP Cases at 1001.
6 Id. at 297-98 n.37, 17 FEP Cases at 1013 n.37.
See infra note 9 and accompanying text.
8 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448-, 482 (1980). In Fullilove, Chief Justice Burger, writing for
a six-to-three majority, explained as follows:
As a threshold matter, we reject the contention that in the remedial context the
Congress must act in a wholly "color-blind" fashion. In Swann v. Charlotte-Meeklenbarg
Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 18-21 (1971), we rejected this argument in considering
a court-formulated school desegregation remedy on the basis that examination of the
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court-ordered attempts to grant class-wide, race-conscious relief, however, absent an
identification of individual victims of discrimination, continue to be challenged under
the equal protection clause and the Civil Rights Act as "reverse discrimination." 9
Nevertheless, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,") a sharply divided
Supreme Court held that race is a permissible consideration in the admissions policy of
a state school where that policy is designed, and narrowly tailored, to remedy the effects
of proven past racial discrimination." By a five-to-four vote, the Court ruled that neither
racial composition of student bodies was an unavoidable starting point and that racially
based attendance assignments were permissible so long as no absolute racial balance
of each school was required. In McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971), citing
Swann, we observed: "In this remedial process, steps will almost invariably require that
students be assigned 'differently because of their race.' Any other approach would
freeze the status quo that is the very target of all desegregation processes." And in
North Carolina Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971), we ... held that 'just
as the race of students must be considered in determining whether a constitutional
violation has occurred, so also must race be considered in formulating a remedy."
... [T]he authority of a court to incorporate racial criteria into a remedial decree
also extends to statutory violations. Where federal antidiscrimination laws have been
violated, an equitable remedy may in the appropriate case include a racial or ethnic
factor.
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 482-83.
9 See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453 (challenge to a congressional set-aside of government contracts
for minority businesses); United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197, 20 FEP
Cases 1, 3 (1979) (challenge to a collectively bargained affirmative action plan which gave preference
to minorities for in-house training positions); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 278, 17 FEP Cases at 1006 (challenge
to a school admissions policy which considered race).
It should be noted that the Supreme Court has held that incidental infringement on the rights
of innocent nonminorities does not invalidate an affirmative action plan so long as that plan is
pursuing legitimate remedial goals and as long as it is drawn narrowly so that it does not unneces-
sarily prefer minority group members at the expense of punishing innocent nonminorities. See,
e.g., Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 484; Weber, 443 U.S. at 201-02, 20 FEP Cases at 5.
'° 438 U.S. 265, 17 FEP Cases 1000 (1978).
" Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist and Stevens,
held that the affirmative action plan in Bakke violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 287,
320, 17 FEP Cases at 1010, 1022; see also id. at 421, 17 FEP Cases at 1049 (Stevens, J., joined by
Burger, C.J., Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Writing for a
different majority, however, Justice Powell, joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshal! and Black-
mun, held that under Title VI and the equal protection clause properly tailored race-conscious
affirmative action is permissible. Id. at 272, 17 FEP Cases at 1004. Justices White, Marshall and
Blackmun all filed separate opinions as well, concurring in part and dissenting in part from the
Court's opinion.
Justice Marshall's separate opinion stands out as a passionate cry for the Court to reconsider
the notion that it seemed to adopt that class-based racial preference is only permissible where past
discrimination has been proven. Id. at 387, 17 FEP Cases at 1052 (Marshall, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Though applauding the judgment of the Court insofar as it upheld the use
of race-conscious relief, Justice Marshall, writing separately, criticized the Court's limiting of per-
missible relief to situations where individual victims of past discrimination have been identified,
and its unwillingness to accept his proposition that "after several hundred years of class-based
discrimination against Negroes ... a class-based remedy for that discrimination [must be] permis-
sible." Id. at 400, 17 FEP Cases at 1057 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Marshall elaborated further:
In declining to so hold, today's judgment ignores the fact that for several hundred
years Negroes have been discriminated against, not as individuals, but rather solely
because of the color of their skins. It is unnecessary in twentieth century America to
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the equal protection clause nor Title VI of the Civil Rights Act preclude a state from
voluntarily taking affirmative action to remedy current effects of past discrimination by
granting preferential treatment to, members of minority racial groups, regardless of
whether they have been specified as direct victims of discrimination." In United Steel-
workers of America v. Weber,t 3 the Court, in rejecting a Title VII challenge to a collectively
bargained agreement to set aside 50% of in-house training positions to minorities re-
gardless of their lack of seniority, extended its sanctioning of race-conscious affirmative
action to voluntary employment practices of private parties. 14 The Court held that even
if Title VII prohibits courts from ordering private businesses to remedy the effects of
general societal discrimination against minorities, Title VII, read in the light of the evils
it was intended to eliminate, must be interpreted to permit private parties to address
voluntarily the lingering effects of past and present societal discrimination, even where
individual victims of that discrimination have not been, or cannot be, identified. 14
Although voluntary affirmative action employment programs designed to remedy
past discrimination against minority racial groups have been sanctioned by the Supreme
Court notwithstanding the equal protection clause and the Civil Rights Act, 16 opposition
to such programs persists and is especially strong where the affirmative action plan
conflicts with other valid employment practices, such as the conferring of benefits on
the basis of seniority." In 1984, the Supreme Court ruled, in Firefighters Local Union No.
have individual Negroes demonstrate that they have been victims of racial discrimi-
nation; the racism of our society has been so pervasive, that none, regardless of wealth
or position, has managed to escape its impact. The experience of Negroes in America
has been different in kind, not just in degree, from that of other ethnic groups. It is
not merely the history of slavery alone but also that a whole people were marked as
inferior by the law. And that mark has endured.
Id. (emphasis added).
" M. at 317-18, 17 FEP Cases at 1021 (Powell, J., joined by Brennan, White, Marshall and
Blackmun, JJ.). The specific affirmative action plan in this case was struck down, however, because
it based admission solely on the plaintiff's race in its racially separated two-track admissions pro-
cedure. Id. at 320, 17 FEP Cases at 1022 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist and Stevens,
JJ.). A majority of the Court agreed, nonetheless, that race may be considered as one of many
factors in an otherwise race-neutral admissions process. Id. at 318, 17 FEP Cases at 102! (Powell,
J., joined by Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
" 443 U.S. 193, 20 FEP Cases 1 (1979).
14 See id. at 208, 20 FEP Cases at 7.
15 Id. The Court concluded that, contrary to the respondent's challenge, Title VII was not
intended to prohibit all race-conscious employment practices, but rather to "open employment
opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them." Id. at 203,
20 FEP Cases at 5. Read in this light, the Court reasoned, Title VII "cannot be interpreted as an
absolute prohibition against all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action efforts." Id. at
204, 20 FE? Cases at 6. To the contrary, the Court held that the statute was intended as a "spur or
catalyst to cause 'employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment
practices and to endeavor to eliminate . the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page
in this country's history .. . .'" Id. (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975));
cf. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 475. In Fullilove the Court stated: "Our cases dealing with application of
Title VII ... express no doubTUrthe congressional authority to prohibit practices challenged as
perpetuating the effects of not unlauful discrimination . . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
16 E.g., Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 491-92 (upholding a federal statute which reserved 10% of public
works projects to minority firms); Weber, 443 U.S. at 197, 20 FEP Cases at 3 (upholding a collectively
bargained affirmative action plan setting aside 50% of the openings in an in-plant training program
for black employees).
17 See, e.g., Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2581, 34 FEP Cases
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1784 v. Stotts, 18 that a court-ordered affirmative action plan which conflicted with valid,
existing seniority rights violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 19 The district court in
Stotts, relying on a consent decree in which the city promised to use its best efforts to
increase the representation of minorities in its fire department, had enjoined the city
from instituting layoffs in accordance with its seniority system insofar as those layoffs
would reduce the percentage of minorities in the department. 20 The Supreme Court
reversed, however, holding that the district court's order was neither a justifiable con-
struction of the consent decree — because the decree did not mention layoffs or the
existing seniority system, nor an appropriate modification of the decree — because Title
VII protects bona fide seniority rights." The Court noted that the district court-ordered
affirmative action plan was agreed to by neither the city nor the union, and that it was
not warranted by the identification of direct victims of discrimination. 22 Thus, the Court
reasoned, the district court had exceeded its authority by ordering the city to enforce
an affirmative action plan that directly contradicted the city's seniority system." Though
it employed sweeping language which strongly implied that Title VII only allows race-
conscious remedies where discrimination against identified victims has been proven, 24
the Court noted that its decision was based on the compulsory nature of the district
court's unilateral modification of the consent decree. The Court refused to decide,
therefore, whether an identical, but voluntary, affirmative action plan would be permis-
sible in similar circumstances. 25
During the Survey year, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 26 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that a voluntary affirmative action layoff
plan is constitutional even though it interferes with seniority precepts." Specifically, the
court of appeals in Wygant held that the recent Supreme Court decision in Stotts29 is not
applicable to voluntary affirmative action programs under the equal protection clause. 29
Consequently, after Wygant, purely voluntary affirmative action that conflicts with se-
niority principles by providing preference for minority racial balance will be permissible,
without requiring the identification of individual victims of discrimination, where the
agreement seeks to legitimately remedy the lingering effects of societal discrimination
by attempting to end the under-representation of minorities. The Supreme Court sub-
sequently granted certiorari to review this decision, and heard oral arguments in the
case in November, 1985. 90
1702, 1705 (1984) (challenge to an affirmative action plan in a court-modified consent decree which
conflicted with seniority rights in layoff procedures); Weber, 443 U.S. at 199-200, 20 FEP Cases at
4 (nonminority plaintiffs alleged that they were victims of illegal racial discrimination where minority
balance was given preference over existing seniority rights).
' 8 104 S. Ct. 2576, 34 FE? Cases 1702 (1984).
19 /d. at 2581, 34 FEP Cases at 1705.
2° Id. at 2582, 34 FEP Cases at 1706.
2 ' Id. at 2590, 34 FE? Cases at 1712.
22 Id. at 2587-88, 34 FEP Cases at 1709.
25 1c1. at 2585, 34 FEP Cases at 1708.
24 See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2590, 34 FEP Cases at 1712.
" 746 F.2d 1152, 36 FEP Cases 153 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985) (No.
84-1340).
" Id. at 1157, 36 FEP Cases at 157.
25 104 S. Ct. 2576, 34 FEP Cases 1702 (1984).
29 Wygant, 746 F.2d at 1158, 36 FEP Cases at 157.
'° Wygant, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985) (No. 84-1340).
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In Wygant, nineteen nonminority school teachers employed, or previously employed,
by the Jackson Board of Education (School Board) challenged their layoffs under the
federal Constitution, Title VII and various federal and state statutory civil rights pro-
visions. 31 The district court reviewed the historical racial employment practices of the
Jackson School Board in order to determine whether the affirmative action plan chal-
lenged by the plaintiff's pursues the legitimate goal of remedying the effects of systemic
discrimination against minorities, as manifested in their under-representation in the
Jackson school faculties.
Prior to 1953, no minority teachers were hired by the School Board. 32 By 1961, only
ten minority teachers were employed out of a total of five hundred and fifteen, creating
a minority teacher ratio of 1.8%." The School Board first began to address this problem
of the under-representation of minority school teachers in 1969, when the minority
student population in its schools constituted 15.2% of the total student population, as
compared with a minority teacher representation of only 3.9%.34
In the early 1970s, collective bargaining negotiators began to address the problem
of racial imbalance in the school faculties." Some teachers took the position that the
School Board and the teachers union, when faced with fiscal constraints leading to
unavoidable layoffs, should modify the existing seniority preference system to the extent
necessary to prevent a deterioration of the racial balance among the school system's
faculties." Despite initial opposition, and after racial tensions erupted into violence,
agreement was reached in 1972 between the teachers union and the School Board,
whereby layoffs would not be made in such a way as to reduce minority representation
on the faculties of Jackson public schools."
In 1973, when layoffs were required, the School Board abided by this agreement. 38
In 1974, however, when further layoffs became necessary, the School Board gave pref-
erence to tenured nonminority employees at the expense of reducing the ratio of
minority members on the faculties." This action spawned a breach of contract action
which ultimately was decided by a state court in favor of the minority employees who
31 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 546 F. Supp. 1195, 1197, 29 FEP Cases 1359, 1361 (E.D.
Mich. 1982), aff'd, 746 F,2d 1152, 36 FEP Cases 153 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015
(1985) (No. 84-1340). The plaintiffs alleged that the affirmative action plan violates Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982); federal civil rights statutes 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1983 and 1985 (1982); arid several state constitutional and statutory provisions. Id, The district
court only reached the merits on the federal constitutional challenge under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.




36 Id, at 1198, 29 FEP Cases at 1360-61.
37 Id. The relevant portion of the contract reads as follows:
In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the number of teachers through
layoff from employment by the [School] Board, teachers with the most seniority in
the district shall be retained, except that at no time will there be a greater percentage
of minority personnel laid off than the current percentage of minority personnel
employed at the time of the layoff.
Id.
38 Id. at 1198, 29 FEP Cases at 1361.
99 Id.
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were laid off." The court upheld the constitutionality and validity of the collective
bargaining agreement, which mandated that priority be given to sustaining racial balance
rather than to fostering seniority principles.4 ' Thereafter, the School Board complied
with its agreement." This adherence to the affirmative action program led to the suit in
Wygant by nineteen nonminority teachers."
Some of the plaintiffs in Wygant alleged that they had been notified of impending
layoff, and that as a result of the racial balance provision in the collective bargaining
agreement they would be replaced illegally by minority teachers who had less seniority."
The remaining plaintiffs alleged that they had been removed from their positions under
similar circumstances several years before." In addition to several federa1 46 and state"
statutory violations, the plaintiffs alleged that their layoffs. violate the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 8 The defendants moved for summary judgment and
dismissal of the plaintiff's' claims, and the plaintiffs countered with their own motion for
summary judgment." Both sides agreed that the facts as stated in the defendants'
pleading, as noted above, were not in dispute." Therefore, the trial court assumed that
they were true. 51
Faced with cross motions for summary judgment in Wygant, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan ruled that the affirmative action plan in
question does not violate the equal protection clause because the plan both is warranted
" Id.; Jackson Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ. of Jackson' Pub. Schools, No. 77-0011484 CZ
( Jackson County Cir. Ct., 1979).




45 Id. at 1198-99, 29 FEP Cases at 1361.
46 The district court ultimately ruled that the affirmative action plan, which voluntarily gave
priority to racial balance over seniority, is not a violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 1202-03, 29 FEP Cases at 1364. Having so ruled, the district court
proceeded to dismiss the plaintiffs' § 1981, § 1983 and § 1985 federal statutory claims, reasoning
that success on those claims is dependent on success of the plaintiffs' equal protection challenge.
Id. at 1203, 29 FEP Cases at 1365. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' federal statutory claim
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because they had failed to file an administrative
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, a statutorily imposed federal court
jurisdictional prerequisite. Id. at 1203-04, 29 FEP Cases at 1361.
47 Having dismissed all of the federal claims, the court proceeded to dismiss for lack of pendent
jurisdiction all of the plaintiffs' state claims. Id. at 1203, 29 FEP Cases at 1361.
45 Id. at 1199, 29 FEP Cases at 1361. Though the district court ruled that the affirmative action
plan does not violate the equal protection clause, the court never reached the Title VII claim
because the plaintiffs had failed to meet the federal court jurisdictional requirement, under 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), of first filing an administrative charge with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission. Wygant, 546 F. Supp. at 1203, 29 FEP Cases at 1365. Nevertheless, under the
Sixth Circuit's extension of Weller to equal protection challenges in Young, the court treated Title
VII as if it raised the same issues as the equal protection clause. Id. at 1199-1202, 29 FEP Cases at
1362-65. Although five Justices apparently held in Bakke that the Civil Rights Act and the equal
protection clause permit exactly the same types of race-conscious affirmative action, see supra note
11, the question still appears unsettled.
49 546 F, Supp. at 1199, 29 FEP Cases at 1362.
s° Id.
5 ' Id.
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by the under-representation of minority teachers in the school system, and is tailored
narrowly to redress that problem. 52 The plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the district court, incorporating most of its
findings and conclusions." The court of appeals also considered the district court's
opinion in light of two subsequently decided cases — its own holding in Oliver v. Kala-
mazoo Board of Education" and the Supreme Court's holding in Stotts — and ruled that
unlike the court-ordered affirmative action plans which were held illegal in those cases,
the voluntary affirmative action plan in Wygant is not impermissible. 55 The plaintiffs
petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted on April 15, 1985. 56
The plaintiffs in Wygant first argued in the district court that an employer and a
union may not negotiate an affirmative action plan which gives preference to minorities,
where there has been no judicial finding of past employer discrimination." The district
court rejected this contention." The court noted that the Supreme Court's decision in
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber59 stands for the proposition that Title VII does not
require a judicial finding of employer discrimination before a private sector employer
may adopt an affirmative action plan to remedy the substantial and chronic under-
representation of minorities that has resulted from past and present societal discrimi-
nation, yet which may be all but impossible to prove." The court further noted that
Detroit Police Officers' Association v. Young, 61 decided by the Sixth Circuit, extends this
particular holding of Weber to public employers and to alleged constitutional violations
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment." The existence of
conspicuous racial imbalance is sufficient under the Weber decision, the court concluded,
to warrant an affirmative action program." As a result, the district court denied the
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment."
52 Id. at 1202, 29 FEP Cases at 1364.
" Wygant, 746 F.2d at 1157, 36 FEP Cases at 156.
54 706 F.2d 757, 31 FEP Cases 1108 (6th Cir. 1983).
Wygant, 746 F.2d at 1157-58, 36 FEP Cases at 157.
Wygant, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985) (No. 84-1340). The Court heard oral arguments in Wygant
in November, 1985. In predicting how the Supreme Court may decide the case, two factors should
be kept in mind. First, the Court normally avoids deciding a constitutional issue where it can dispose
of a case on statutory grounds. In upholding the affirmative action plan under Title VII in Weber,
however, the Court implied that the plan was not only consistent with the statute, but also consistent
with the Constitution. Otherwise, presumably, the Court would not have upheld the plan. Here,
on the other hand, the Supreme Court, as a federal court, has no jurisdiction to decide the Title
VI claim. See supra note 46. This leads to the second factor: where federal court jurisdiction is
lacking, the federal courts — the Supreme Court included — have no authority to rule on the
merits of a claim. Therefore, the Supreme Court should find itself compelled to rule solely on the
equal protection claim in Wygant. The Court may, however, suggest in dicta that Title VII does or
does not permit the same types of affirmative action as the equal protection clause. See supra note
48. Although it is unlikely, the Court may take this opportunity to clear up the continuing confusion
in this area.
57
	 546 F. Supp. at 1199, 29 FEP Cases at 1362.
3" Id.
39 443 U.S. 193, 20 FEP Cases I (1979).
so Wygant, 546 F. Supp. at 1199, 29 FEP Cases at 1362.
61 608 F.2d 671, 20 FEP Cases 1728 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938, 25 FEP Cases
1683 (1981).
62 Wygant, 546 F. Supp. at 1199-1200, 29 FEP Cases at 1362.
65 Id.
64 Id. at 1200, 29 FEP Cases at 1362.
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The district court then considered whether the Constitution allows an affirmative
action plan in the specific circumstances surrounding the suit brought in Wygant. The
court found that according to previous Supreme Court cases, the Constitution requires
some evidence that minority teachers have not enjoyed the same representation as
nonminority teachers in the Jackson public school system." In Weber, the court observed,
the Supreme Court viewed this requirement in terms of "'conspicuous racial imbalance
in traditionally segregated job categories.'" 66 For an affirmative action plan to be in
accordance with the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, the court noted,
the Sixth Circuit's Young decision stated that there must be a "'sound basis for concluding
that minority under-representation is substantial and chronic, and that the handicap of
past discrimination is impeding access .. of minorities. -67 The district court found,
therefore, that in addressing the constitutional validity of the affirmative action plan, if
the purpose of the plan is legitimate, there is no need to show that those receiving
preferential treatment have been individually subjected to discrimination, because it is
enough that the recipients are within a general class of persons likely to have been the
victims of the discrimination." The requirement of a showing of under-representation,
the court continued, must be adapted to the facts of the case."
The district court in Wygant found it appropriate to compare the percentage of
minority faculty members to the percentage of minority students in the student body,
rather than to the percentage of minority teachers in the labor pool." The use of this
standard is vital, the court explained, because of the important position minority teachers
hold as role models for their students.71 Under this standard, the trial court found that
minority faculty members clearly were "substantially" and "chronically" under-repre-
sented in Jackson public schools." Therefore, the court concluded, the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause does not preclude the union and the School Board
from voluntarily negotiating a race-conscious affirmative action plan designed to protect
minority teachers from necessary layoffs."
Having found that the circumstances in the Jackson school system warranted the
adoption of affirmative action goals for the hiring of teachers, the district court turned
to the constitutionality of the means employed by the School Board to achieve those
goals. The Sixth Circuit's opinion in Young, the court noted, articulated a standard of
reasonableness, under which the affirmative action plan must be related substantially to
the objectives of remedying the effects of past discrimination and correcting substantial
and chronic under-representation. 74 The district court found that because the affirmative
action plan in Wygant precludes a reduction in the percentage of minority teachers in
the school system in the event of necessary layoffs, it is related sufficiently to the goal of
remedying the substantial and chronic under-representation of minorities that has re-
65 Id. at 1200, 29 FEP Cases at 1362-63.
66 Id. at 1200, 29 FEP Cases at 1363 (quoting Weber, 443 U.S. at 209, 20 FEP Cases at 6).
67 Wygant, 546 F. Supp. at 1200 (quoting Young, 608 F.2d at 694, 20 FEP Cases at 1743).
Wygant, 546 F. Supp. at 1200, 29 FEP Cases at 1363.
69 Id. at 1200-01, 29 FEP Cases at 1363.
" Id. at 1201, 29 FEP Cases at 1363.
71 Id.
" Id.
" Id. at 1201, 29 FEP Cases at 1364.
74 Id. at 1201-02, 29 FEP Cases at 1364.
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suited from years of past discriminatory hiring practices. 75 Furthermore, the court found,
the affirmative action plan is sufficiently narrow in scope because it is temporary in
nature, and neither requires the retention of unqualified minorities, nor unnecessarily
or invidiously trammels the rights of nonminority teachers." Since the plan was collec-
tively bargained by the teachers union, a majority of whose members were nonminority
teachers, the court could find no reason for viewing the agreement as discriminating
against the nonminority plaintiffs." The court therefore concluded that the affirmative
action program in Wygant does not violate the equal protection clause."
On appeal, a three judge panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed, incorporating most of
the district court's reasoning in full." Although one concurring judge objected to the
district court's comparison of the proportion of minority teachers to the proportion of
minority students, rather than to the proportion of minority teachers in the relevant
labor pool," and although the two judge majority deemed it unnecessary to address this
issue because it was not contested by the parties,"' all three judges agreed that regardless
of which standard is used, minority teachers were under-represented, and therefore
affirmative action is warranted in Wygant. 82 The appeals court then considered whether
the district court's holding should be reversed in the wake of the subsequently decided
cases of Oliver and Stotts. The court of appeals rejected this contention, distinguishing
the court-ordered, non-voluntary, affirmative action plans in Oliver and Stotts from the
collectively bargained, purely voluntary plan in Wygant.gs
The appeals court first ruled that Oliver, which had invalidated a lower court's order
of a 20% minority quota for black teachers in disregard of an existing seniority system,
does not control Wygant. 84 Because Oliver dealt with a judicially compelled court-ordered
affirmative action plan, the court reasoned, it is not applicable to the voluntary collective
bargaining agreement:at issue in Wygant."
The court of appeals also held that the district court's decision in Wygant is consistent
with the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Stotts." The court of appeals in Wygant
pointed out that the Stotts Court expressly declined to address the issue raised in Wygant
of purely voluntary affirmative action programs which conflict with seniority preference
principles."' Moreover, the court of appeals observed, the Stotts Court did not overrule
Weber, which still stands for the proposition that voluntary affirmative action is permis-
sible, at least under Title VII." Accordingly, since the affirmative action program in
Wygant is voluntary like that in Weber, and unlike that in Stotts, the court of appeals found
that it does not violate the equal protection clause." 9 Rather, the appeals court held, the




" Wygant, 746 F.2d at 1158, 36 FEP Cases at 156.
"Id. at 1159-61, 36 FEP Cases at 158-59 (Wellford, J., concurring).
Id. at 1156 11.1, 36 FEP Cases at 155 n.1 (opinion of the court).
92
 Id. at 1158, 36 FEP Cases at 157; id. at 1161, 36 FEP Cases at 159 (Wellford, J., concurring).
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minority preference provision in the collective bargaining agreement between the School
Board and the teachers union is a constitutionally legitimate attempt to "remedy past
obvious race discrimination and to meet the practical problems posed by racial tensions
engendered by that history." 9°
Because the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Wygant less than one year after
deciding Stotts, it presumably has agreed to resolve the issue of purely voluntary affir-
mative action, which is squarely presented by the Sixth Circuit's distinguishing of Stotts. 9 '
Though the Supreme Court. in Stotts invalidated the district court's modification of the
consent decree by a six-to-three vote, the significance of the case is blurred by its
procedural and substantive complexity, as illustrated by the filing by two Justices of
conflicting concurrences to the majority opinion, and the filing ofone vehement dissent,
in which three justices joined. 92 Writing for the majority, Justice White utilized sweeping
language suggesting that permissible Title VII remedies are limited to make-whole relief
of individual victims of discrimination, 93 even though he seemed to conclude his analysis
with a narrow holding on the issue of whether the district court had exceeded its
authority. 94 Although Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment reached by the majority,
he expressly disassociated himself from the majority's Title VII analysis, predicating his
vote solely on the district court's abuse of discretion under the rules governing the
construction and enforcement of consent decrees.% justice O'Connor, on the other hand,
wrote separately to concur both in the Court's judgment and in the Court's broad
language which strongly implied that there are substantial limitations under Title VII
for race-conscious relief. 96 Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
9° Id. at 1159, 36 FEP Cases at 157.
9 ' The Court, of course, may decide, or avoid deciding, the issues presented in this chapter on
the grounds here discussed, or on other grounds. For example, the Court may view the case solely
as an equal protection case, or solely as a Title VII case, and may distinguish between the two as it
has not done previously. Cf. ,supra note 48. Another aspect of the case which may lead to an
alternative resolution is the use of minority student proportions as opposed to the percentage of
minority teachers in the labor pool. Sec supra text accompanying notes 70-72, 80-81. Whether the
Court chooses to decide the case on a tangential issue or whether it resolves the case as presented
here, the Court should find itself obliged at least to address, if not resolve, the distinction as set out
by the Sixth Circuit between voluntary and court ordered affirmative action.
92 justice White wrote the opinion for the Court, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor joined. Justice Stevens concurred only in the judgment. Justice
O'Connor concurred separately in the judgment and in the Court's discussion of limits on Title
VII remedies. Justice Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Brennan and Marshall
joined.
93 Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2589, 34 FEP Cases at 1711. Justice White stated that the policy behind
Title VII remedies is "that policy which is to provide make-whole relief only to those who have been
actual victims of discrimination." Id. (emphasis added).
," Id. at 2590, 34 FEP Cases at 1712.
95 Concurring only in the judgment of the Court, Justice Stevens described the Court's Title
VII analysis as "wholly advisory." Id. at 2594-95, 34 FEP Cases at 1715 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Instead, Justice Stevens relied on his view that the district court abused its discretion in modifying
the consent decree absent the 'changed circumstances" which are required for such a modification.
Id. at 2595, 34 FEP Cases at 1716 (Stevens, J., concurring).
`"' For example, Justice O'Connor stated: "Tide VII affirmatively protects bona fide seniority
systems, including those with discriminatory effects on minorities." Id. at 2592, 34 FEP Cases at
1714 (O'Connor, j., concurring). She went on to state:
A court may not grant preferential treatment to any individual or group simply because
the group to which they (sic] belong is adversely affected by a bona fide seniority
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impetuously protested the Court's procedural and substantive handling of the case,
declaring that the decision "is less troubling for the law that it creates than for the law
that it ignores."97
Regardless of the Court's failure in Stotts to articulate the breadth of its ruling, the
Sixth Circuit's opinion in Wygant is justified in light of both the Stotts Court's explicit
system. Rather, a court may use its remedial powers, including its power to modify a
consent decree, only to prevent future violations and to compensate identified victims of
unlawful discrimination.
Id, at 2593, 34 FEP Cases at 1719 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
97 Id. at 2595, 34 FEP Cases at 1716-17 (Blackmun,	 joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting). Justice Blackmun, writing for Justices Brennan and Marshall, lambasted the Court for
its treatment of both the procedural and substantive issues in the case. First, he accused the majority
of violating long standing Court practice by not declaring the case moot in light of the fact that the
layoffs were no longer in effect, Id. at 2596, 34 FEP Cases at 1717 (Blackmun, j,, joined by Brennan
and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). He continued by charging that "having improperly asserted jurisdic-
tion, the Court then ignore[di the proper standard of review." Id. Justice Blackmun viewed the
district court's action as a preliminary injunction, and therefore, he argued that the correct standard
to apply is the deferential abuse of discretion review. Id. On the other hand, the Court, according
to Justice Blackmun, treated the district court order as a permanent injunction, thereby reaching
the merits of the case even though the district court never did so. Id. Finally, Justice Blackmun
contended, once erroneously reaching the merits, the Court ignored specific facts of the cases on
which it relied which made those cases inapplicable. Id.
Justice Blackmun proceeded to criticize the majority's reasoning, more specifically, on several
grounds. For example, he disputed the Court's characterization of the issue as one which involved
a court ordered abrogation of existing seniority rights. Rather, he suggested that the district court
order merely enjoined the layoffs of a certain number of minority firefighters, and had nothing to
do with ordering the layoffs of nonminorities in alleged violation of their contractual rights. Id. at
2602, 34 FEP Cases at 1722 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun continued, even if the majority's view that the order was a per-
manent injunction is correct, the consent decree explicitly reserved for the district court the power
to make "further orders as may he necessary or appropriate to effectuate the purposes of the
decree." Id. at 2603, 34 FEP Cases at 1723 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting). He concluded, therefore, that since adherence to strict seniority principles would have
destroyed the efficacy of the consent decree, the district court had not exceeded its authority in
modifying the decree so that its aims could be realized. Id.
Justice Blackmun continued to deride the Court's reasoning by pointing out the absurd un-
fairness in its procedural treatment of the court order as a permanent injunction. He noted that
as a court-modified consent decree, the "court order" did not involve the particMation of the
litigating parties. Id. To the complete incredulity of the dissent, the Court ruled against the minority
firefighters on the merits of their claim because they did not substantiate their charges, yet the
Court treated the unilateral court modification of the consent decree as a permanent injunction as
if the minority firefighters had been given a chance to litigate the merits at the district court level.
Id. According to the dissent, since the district court had unilaterally modified the decree, the
minority firefighters were never given the opportunity to substantiate the merits of the charges
which the Supreme Court faulted them for not substantiating. Id. Finally, Justice Blackmun, seem-
ingly exasperated by the Court's procedural handling of the case, moved to the underlying merits
of the controversy over race-conscious affirmative action under Title VII.
Noting that the nature of systemic discrimination is such that it requires class-based remedies,
Justice Blackmun disputed the Court's view of Title VII remedial authority. Id. at 2606-10, 34 FEP
Cases at 1724-28 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). He also noted
that the Court seemingly ignored the unanimous view of the United States Courts of Appeals which
have all held that Title VII allows race-conscious affirmative action, as well as ignoring the Court's
own majority opinions in Bakke and Weber, in which the author of the Stotts opinion, Justice White,
had joined. Id. Writing for the three dissenters in Stotts, Justice Blackmun therefore "concluded"
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refusal to address the applicability of its decision to voluntary affirmative action," and
its conspicuous failure to overturn Weber,99 which upheld voluntary affirmative action.
Moreover, the facts in Wygant are distinguishable from those in Stotts.
Though employing overly broad language as to the limited range of proper Title
VII remedies, the Stotts Court emphasized that its holding was based on the district court
exceeding its authority by invalidating an existing, nondiscriminatory seniority system
under an affirmative action plan in a consent decree, to which the effected parties never
agreed, and which did not expressly address the seniority issue.'" Under Title VII, the
Stotts Court held, bona fide seniority systems are protected from such court-ordered,
non-voluntary invalidation.'°' In Wygant, on the other hand, all parties involved agreed
to the affirmative action plan.'" In addition, the plan in Wygant specifically addressed
the issue of seniority and explicitly gave priority to racial balance over strict seniority
principles." Therefore, the affirmative action plan in Wygant was not judicially ordered
against anyone's will, nor does it conflict with anyone's pre-existing seniority rights.
Notwithstanding the Stow Court's sweeping statements suggesting a limit to appro-
priate race-conscious remedies under Title VII to identified victims of discrimination,
neither the Stotts majority nor any other Supreme Court majority ever has held that
Title. VII or the equal protection clause preclude private parties from voluntarily pur-
suing valid affirmative action goals which happen to conflict with seniority principles.'"
Consequently, under Bakke and Weber, in which the Court endorsed, respectively, race-
conscious affirmative action by states and by private parties, the Wygant court was correct
in holding that the equal protection clause is not violated.'"
that the Court could not have meant that the policy behind Title VII only allows the make-whole
relief of proven victims of discrimination; but rather the Court must have meant, notwithstanding
its language to the contrary, that the particular relief granted in Stotts was not justified in the
circumstances. Id. at 2610, 34 FEP Cases at 1728 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall,
IV, dissenting).
"Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2590, 34 FEP Cases at 1712.
" See Wygant, 746 F.2d at 1158, 36 FEP Cases at 157.
' 00 Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2586, 34 FEP Cases at 1709.
101 Id.
LOR Wygant, 746 F.2d at 1158, 36 FEP Cases at 157.
1 °5 Id.
104
	 id. at 1158-59, 36 FEP Cases at 157.
I" Although it is clear that the Stotts Court's decision did not expressly prohibit the type of
affirmative action plan upheld in Wygant, whether it impliedly prohibits voluntary affirmative action
plans which interfere with seniority rights is a question that remains for the Court to decide this
term in Wygant. A literal reading of the holding in Stotts does not make this implication, however.
The Stotts Court noted that the consent decree that it invalidated, which had been entered and then
modified by the district court, did not have the approval of either the city or the union that it
effected. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2586, 34 FEP Cases at 1709. It was, therefore, an improper construction
of the decree; and it certainly was not voluntary. Id. at 2486-88, 34 FE? Cases at 1709-10.
Furthermore, the Court noted that the decree itself did not address the issues of layoffs and
seniority. Id. at 2586, 34 FEP Cases at 1709. Therefore, the Court concluded, the district court had
exceeded its authority in modifying the decree to apply to layoffs and the pre-existing seniority
plan. Id. Consequently, Stotts should be read to preclude under Title VII only those affirmative
action plans which are court ordered and which interfere with existing nondiscriminatory seniority
rights.
The Stotts decision, however, is arguably much broader than the narrow holding suggests. In
reaching its decision, the Court noted that the legislative history of Title VII illustrates that at least
some of the bill's proponents never meant it to grant relief to minority group members who were
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The Supreme Court should affirm Wygant because the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit
is sound, and because the same compelling policy reasons found by the Weber Court are
present in Wygant. As the Court found in Weber, the Civil Rights Act — and, by impli-
cation, the equal protection clause — was intended to erase a long history of discrimi-
nation against minorities, not as individuals, but as a class. 106 It follows that class-based
remedies are essential to effectively redress the effects of class-based discrimination. 107
Therefore, even though the Supreme Court definitively held in Stunts that a court,
consistent with Title VII, may not order an affirmative action plan which abrogates the
existing seniority rights of nonminorities in the absence of proven discrimination against
minorities, the Weber Court's decision sanctioning voluntary affirmative action not in
conflict with existing rights remains in force. Since the Wygant decision allows parties to
voluntarily bargain for affirmative action agreements which take into account the history
of discrimination, without having to prove specific examples of discrimination, it was
correctly decided, because controlled by Weber, not Stotts.
Moreover, as a practical matter, voluntary affirmative action is the ideal means of
remedying the effects of past discrimination."' Employers, understandably, will always
not individual victims of discrimination. Id. at 2589, 34 FEP Cases at 1711-12. For example, the
Court quoted Senators Clark and Case, the bipartisan "captains" of Title VII, from the Congres-
sional Record: "No court order can ... [provide a remedy] for anyone who was not discriminated
against in violation of [Title VII]. This is stated expressly in the last sentence of section [706(g) of
Title VII)." Id. (quoting 110 CONC.. REC. 7214 (1964) (remarks of Senators Clark and Case)). Justice
O'Connor emphasized this reading of Title VII in her separate concurrence. See supra note 96. But
See 514 pro note 95 ( Justice Stevens' separate concurrence).
The dissent, alarmed at the implications of these sweeping generalizations which the majority
added to its holding, criticized the Court's opinion both procedurally and substantively. Stotts, 104
S. Ct. at 2595-2610, 34 FEP Cases at 1716-28 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting). See the supra note 97.
wr' See Weber, 443 U.S. at 201-02, 20 FEP Cases at 5; see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 327, 17 FEP
Cases at 1025 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Concurring in the portion of the opinion which upheld the use of race-conscious
affirmative action, Justice Brennan, speaking for three other Justices, stated:
[W ]e cannot — and, as we shall demonstrate, need not under our Constitution or Title
VI, which merely extends the constraints of the Fourteenth Amendment to private
parties who receive federal funds — let color blindness become myopia which makes
the reality that many "created equal" have been treated within our lifetimes as inferior
both by the law and by their fellow citizens.
Id.
'" Cf: supra note 11 (discussing separate opinion of Justice Marshall in Bakke); see also Fullilove,
448 U.S. at 482. Writing for the majority in Fullilove upholding the affirmative action plan, Chief
Justice Burger, who had dissented in Bakke and Weber from the Court's sanctioning of the use of
affirmative action, rejected the contention that "Congress must act in a wholly color-blind fashion"
when seeking to remedy the effects of discrimination against minorities. Id. He declared that lalny
other approach would freeze the status quo that is the very target" of efforts to so remedy
discrimination against minorities. Id.
108 See Weber, 443 U.S. at 209-10, 20 FEP Cases at 8 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Concurring in
the Court's opinion in Weber, Justice Blackmun sought to expand the Court's reliance on the
congressional intent to abolish racial discrimination and thus consider some of the practical consid-
erations behind the use of voluntary affirmative action. For example, he argued that reading Title
VII to preclude voluntary race-conscious affirmative action would create a "catch 22" situation for
employers. On one hand, Justice Blackmun reasoned, employers would face liability for past
discrimination against minorities. On the other hand, he continued, they would risk liability to
nonminorities for any voluntary efforts to mitigate the effects of their prior discriminatory practices
against minorities. Id.
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be less than eager to admit prior discrimination, especially when faced with potential
civil rights liability. Since it is very unlikely that employers will admit prior discriminatory
practices, all claims of discrimination will have to be litigated if the Court requires a
judicial finding of individual victims of discrimination; and the employer always will be
opposing affirmative action. Voluntary affirmative action, however, avoids the costs in
time, money and effort of litigation, and it avoids the risks of litigation where direct
discrimination against specific individuals is difficult, if not impossible, to prove. Most
importantly, voluntary affirmative action simply is more conducive to easing the racial
tensions that have resulted from years of society-wide discrimination against rninorities. 1 "
It makes little sense, therefore, to eschew the route of voluntary compliance with
the laws against discrimination by requiring parties to litigate issues on which they
otherwise would agree. In addition, if voluntary affirmative action is prohibited, em-
ployers will be placed in an untenable situation. On one hand, they risk potential liability
for racially discriminatory practices in the past; and on the other hand, they risk liability
to nonminorities for any voluntary attempts they take to mitigate the effects of their
prior discrimination against minorities."° Finally, it would be a cruel irony if the Court
were to interpret Title VII of the Civil Rights Act or the equal protection clause, both
of which were intended to cure the effects of centuries of racial injustice, to preclude
efforts to erase the lingering effects of past discrimination, especially voluntary efforts." 1
In sum, the Supreme Court in Stotts invalidated under Title VII a court modified
consent decree that implemented an affirmative action program which conflicted with
existing seniority rights. In Wygant, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held, however, that
Stotts does not control voluntary affirmative action programs which may interfere with
seniority principles. The court of appeals distinguished Stotts on the ground that it involved
1 " See id. Concurring in Weber, Justice Blackmun argued that it is simply very practical to allow
voluntary affirmative action where discriminatory impact on minorities is obvious, and therefore
discriminatory intent is arguably present, but, most likely, difficult to prove. Id. at 211, 20 FEP
Cases at 8-9 (Blackmun, J., concurring). He asserted that employers, by adopting voluntary affir-
mative action plans, could avoid the costs of identifying individual victims of past discrimination,
and past victims could avoid the costs and risks of suing for damages. Id. Justice Blackmun
concluded, therefore, that "(sItrong considerations of equity support an interpretation of Title VII
that would permit private affirmative action" even if Title VII does not so require. Id. at 214, 20
FEP Cases at 10 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Similarly, in Bakke, Justice Brennan, writing for four Justices concurring in part and dissenting
in part, stated:
Indeed, the requirement of a judicial determination of a constitutional or statutory
violation as a predicate for race-conscious remedial actions would be self-defeating.
Such a requirement would severely undermine efforts to achieve voluntary compliance
with the requirements of the law. And, our society and jurisprudence have always stressed
the value of voluntary efforts to further the objectives of the law. Judicial intervention is a last
resort to achieve cessation of illegal conduct or the remedying of its effects rather than a prerequisite
to action.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 364, 17 FEP Cases at 1038-39 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall and
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
us See supra note 108.
in See Weber, 443 U.S. at 204, 20 FEP Cases at 6. After searching the legislative history of the
Civil Rights Act and the historical context in which it was passed, the Court declared that interpreting
the Act to forbid all race-conscious affirmative action would "bring about an end completely at
variance with the purpose of the statute and must be rejected." Id. at 202, 20 FEP Cases at 5
(emphasis added).
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an illegitimate court modification of a consent decree — which modification was not
approved by the parties effected, and which wrongly interpreted the decree. Despite the
broad language wielded in the Stotts opinion, which some may read as signalling a retreat
from the Court's sanctioning of race-conscious attempts to remedy the results of past
discrimination, Wygant, relying on the still valid Weber decision, stands for the proposition
that purely voluntary affirmative action plans which legitimately seek to remedy the
lingering effects of past discrimination do not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. There is ample, if not compelling, constitutional and statutory precedent,
as well as sound policy considerations, upon which the Supreme Court may base a
decision to affirm Wygant in its present term.
V. AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
A. *Defining Willfulness Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Trans World
Airlines v. Thurston'
Persons between the ages of forty and seventy are protected from discrimination by
employers on the basis of age by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA or Act). 2 Section 7(b) of the Act directs that rights created under the ADEA be
"enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies and procedures" 3 of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (ELSA), 4 rather than by remedies defined by the ADEA. 3 The remedial
provisions of the two statutes, however, are not precisely the same. 6 The ADEA modifies
the remedial procedure of the FLSA. Under the FLSA, liquidated damages are awarded
for any and every violation, 2 automatically doubling the plaintiff's recovery. 3 The ADEA,
however, directs that liquidated damages shall only be awarded under the provisions of
that Act in the event that the defendant's violation is adjudged by the finder of fact to
be "willful."9 Where an employer's violation is determined to be willful, the plaintiff
recovers liquidated damages in an amount equal to his pecuniary recovery for lost back
wages and benefits. 10
Congress failed to provide a definition of the word "willful" as it appears in the
statute, either in the Act or in its legislative history." Previously courts have diverged in
their efforts to fill this statutory void. 12 During the Survey year, the United States Supreme
* Rainer L.C. Frost, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
105 S. Ct. 613, 36 FEP Cases 977 (1985).
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982). The age span covered by the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 (ADEA) is defined by 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1982).
29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982). See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 579, 16 FEP Cases 885, 887
(1978).
5 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
6 See Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 105 S. Ct. 613, 623-24, 36 FEP Cases 977, 984 (1985).
7 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982).
8 See Thurston, 105 S. Ct. at 624, 36 FEP Cases at 984.
9 29 U.S.C. § 626(h) (1982).
10 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982).
" See Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 154, 27 FEP Cases 610, 614 (7th Cir.
1981); Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 979, 25 FEP Cases 94, 96 (9th Cir. 1981).
i2 Compare Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1114, 25 FEP Cases 376, 378 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981) (approving statement that "employer acts willfully ... if he
knows, or has reason to know, that:his conduct is governed by [the Act]") (quoting Brennan v. Heard,
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Court in Trans World Airlines v. Thurston," held that a violation is "willful" if the employer
either knew or showed reckless disregard as to whether its conduct violated the ADEA.' 4
Conversely, however, the Court held that an employer that knows only of the potential
applicability of the Act will not be held liable for a "willful" violation of the Act.' 5 In so
holding, the Court stressed that reasonable good faith efforts to comply with the ADEA
would defeat allegations of a willful violation. 16
In Thurston, the original defendant was Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA), a com-
mercial airline, and the plaintiffs, Harold Thurston, Christopher J. Clark and Clifton
A. Parkhill, were pilots employed by the airline who challenged a policy permitting
employee airline captains and first officers disqualified from serving in that capacity for
reasons other than age to transfer automatically to the position of flight engineer. 17
There are three cockpit employee positions: captain, first officer and flight engineer."'
The captain is the pilot of the aircraft and controls ii.' 9 The first officer is the copilot,
assisting the pilot as second in command. 2° The Right engineer serves as an instrument
monitor at a side-facing panel and assumes control only if both the pilot and the copilot
are incapacitated. 21
TWA entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the Air Line Pilots Asso-
ciation (ALPA) in 1977, under which cockpit employees were required to retire upon
reaching the age of 60. 22 The scheme was permissible under the ADEA as part of a
bona fide system of seniority." A 1978 amendment 24 to the Act, however, prohibited
mandatory age-based retirement plans affecting individuals falling under the protection
of the Act. 25 Consequently, on July 19, 1978, TWA officials announced that the amend-
ment outlawed the company's retirement policy as it pertained to flight engineers." The
491 F.2d I, 3 (5th Cir. 1974) (emphasis in original)), with Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003,
1020 n.27, 20 FEP Cases 29, 41 n.27 (1st Cir. 1979) (willful action must be deliberate, intentional
and knowing). Compare Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 979-80, 25 FEP Cases 94,
98 (9th Cir. 1981) (violation is willful if committed knowingly and voluntarily, even if employer
acted without knowledge of the ADEA), with Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149,
155, 27 FEP Cases 610, 615 (7th Cir. 1981) (to prove willfulness under the ADEA plaintiff must
show defendant's actions to be knowing and voluntary, and that defendant knew or should have
known that actions violated the ADEA). See also 1981-1982 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR RELATIONS
AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW - WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADEA: Kelly v. American
Standard, Inc. and Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg, Co., 24 B.C.L. REV. 161 (1982).
13 105 S. Ct. 613, 36 FEP Cases 977 (1985).
14 Id. at 625, 36 FEP Cases at 985.
' 2 1d.
16 Id. at 626, 36 FEP Cases at 985.
" Id. at 619-20, 36 FEP Cases at 980-81.





23 Id. See United Airlines v, McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 195-202, 16 FEY Cases 146, 148-50 (1977).
24 See Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. 95-256, § 2(a), 92
Stat. 189 (1978) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1982)).
25 Id. See also 105 S. Ct. at 618, 36 FEY Cases at 979.
26 105 S. Ct. at 618,36 FEP Cases at 979. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations
prohibit individuals over 60 years of age from serving as a pilot on a commercial carrier. 14 CFR
§ 121.383(c)(1985). Flight engineers are the only cockpit employees who do not fall under the term
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company outlined its new policy, which initially allowed any cockpit employee, upon
reaching age sixty, to continue to work as a flight engineer. 27 ALPA objected to the plan,
however, and it was subsequently modified so that only flight engineers could automat-
ically continue employment after reaching age sixty." Pilots" could continue to work
only if they had successfully attained flight engineer status prior to their sixtieth birth-
day."
The plaintiffs' charge of illegal, age-based discrimination arose in the context of the
procedural intricacies of attaining flight engineer status. 5 ' Under the collective bargain-
ing agreement in question, flight engineer status had to be obtained by pilots under a
"bidding" system." This system required that a pilot submit a "standing bid" requesting
flight engineer status prior to his sixtieth birthday." If a flight engineer position opened,
it was awarded to the most senior pilot with a standing bid." A pilot who reached his
sixtieth birthday without being awarded a position was retired."
The bidding system for pilots seeking flight engineer status due to age-based transfer
did not apply to pilots who were transferred for any other reason." Pilots transferred
for medical reasons" or incompetence could transfer by "bumping" or displacing a flight
engineer with less seniority." If pilots transferred for non-age-based reasons were unable
to displace a flight engineer prior to their sixtieth birthday due to lack of seniority, they
were generally placed on some form of standby status and permitted to accrue further
seniority, so that a transfer to flight engineer status could be made."
Each of the plaintiffs in Thurston was denied the opportunity to use their seniority
to displace a less senior flight engineer." Consequently, Thurston was forced to retire
on May 26, 1978, prior to TWA's adoption of the new policy:" Clark did not enter a
bid, because TWA had advised him that to do so would not improve the likelihood that
he would be transferred. 42 Thus, neither Thurston nor Clark was permitted an effective
"pilot." Id. Therefore, TWA was not concerned with the permissibility of retiring pilots and copilots.
105 S. Ct. at 618 & n.3, 36 FEP Cases at 979 gc n.3.
37 105 S. Ct. at 618, 36 FEP Cases at 979-80.
"Id. at 618-19, 36 FEP Cases at 979-80.
2" Both pilots (captains) and copilots (first officers) will hereinafter he collectively referred to
as "pilots."
'" 105 S. Ct. at 619, 36 FEP Cases at 980.
3 ' Id. at 618, 621, 36 FEP Cases at 979, 981-82.




" Id. This disparity in the treatment of pilots transferring because of age and pilots transferring
for other reasons was further exacerbated by a policy instituted by TWA in 1980, requiring pilots
to "activate" their bid as soon as a position was awarded, so that they were forced to choose between
(Scylla) a premature lessening of pay and responsibility, and (Charybdis) the possibility that they
were turning down their only opportunity to avoid mandatory retirement at age 60 (in the event
that no further vacancies occurred prior to their sixtieth birthday).
37 Under 14 CFR § 67.13 (1985), a pilot must have a first-class medical certificate in order to
maintain his position. If a pilot cannot maintain a first-class medical certificate but can obtain a
second-class certificate, he can fill a flight engineer position. Id. § 67.15.
" 105 S. Ct. at 619, 36 FEP Cases at 980.
" Id. at 619 & nn.8-12, 36 FEP Cases at 980 & nn.8-12.
,° Id. at 619-20, 36 FEP Cases at 980.
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opportunity to bid for a transfer to a position as flight engineer. 43 Parkhill filed a transfer
bid, but was not awarded a flight engineer position: 14 Each of the plaintiff pilots, there-
fore, was forced to retire at the age of sixty."
Thurston, Clark and Parkhill filed suit' against TWA and ALPA, arguing that the
TWA transfer policy in which ALPA had acquiesced, violated section 4(a)(1) of the
ADEA.47 They contended that pilots retired due to age should have .been extended the
same "privilege of employment," of displacing less senior flight engineers, extended to
pilots required to leave the occupation of pilot for reasons other than age.4 8 The trial
court entered summary judgment for the defendants TWA and ALPA," stating that the
plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 5° test." The McDonnell Douglas test requires a prima
facie showing of discrimination where indirect or inferential proof of discriminatory
motive (such as statistical data) is used." In Thurston, the plaintiffs, in order to make out
a prima facie case, would have been required to show that at the time of at least one of
their transfer requests, there was an opening for the position of flight engineer. 53 The
trial court also found that TWA's policy was justified by the two affirmative defenses
that the policy was based first, on bona fide occupational qualifications and second, on
a bona fide seniority system."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the lower
court's decision. 33 Because the proof of age-based discrimination introduced by the
plaintiffs was direct rather than inferential evidence, the appeals court concluded that
the McDonnell Douglas test was an inappropriate standard of review." The court held
that where pilots who were disqualified for non-age-based reasons were allowed to bump
less senior flight engineers and thus transfer automatically, the ADEA 57 required TWA
to grant the same "privilege of employment" to pilots facing mandatory retirement."




46 The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
Id. at 620, 36 FEP Cases at 980-81.
47 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1982). The statute provides, in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful
for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's age ... ." Id.
48 105 S. Ct. at 620, 36 FEP Cases at 980-81.
49 Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Trans World Airlines, 547 F. Supp. 1221, 1223 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
5° 411 U.S. 792, 5 FEP Cases 965 (1973).
" 547 F. Supp. at 1228-29.
52 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 5 FEP Cases 965, 969 (1973); see also
Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1112-13, 25 FEP Cases 376, 378 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981).
" 105 S. Ct. at 620, 36 FEP Cases at 981.
54 See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1982) (bona fide occupational qualifications); id. § 623(f)(2) (1982)
(bone fide seniority system).
" Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Trans World Airlines, 713 F.2d 940, 957, 32 FEP Cases 1185, 1198
(2d Cir. 1983).
56 1d. at 952, 32 FEP Cases at 1194.
57 29	 § 623(a)(1) (1982).
58 713 F.2d at 949-50, 32 FE? Cases at 1191-92.
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holding that they did not warrant the discriminatory nature of the TWA transfer policy. 59
Finally, the appeals court held that TWA "was clearly aware of the 1978 ADEA amend-
ments."60 Stating that an employer's conduct is willful if it "knows or shows reckless
disregard for the matter of whether its conduct is prohibited by the ADEA," the court
of appeals held that TWA's conduct was "willful," and therefore that TWA was liable
for liquidated damages under the Act." TWA filed for certiorari, challenging the appeals
court's holdings that its transfer policy violated the ADEA and that the violation was
"willful." 62
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari," and affirmed the court of
appeals' holding that the TWA policy violated the ADEA. 64 The Court reversed, however,
as to the liquidated damages." In reaching its decision on the ADEA proscription of the
TWA policy, the Court relied on Hishon v. King & Spalding, 66 in which the Court held
that a benefit which is integral to the employment relationship "may not be doled out
in a discriminatory fashion, even if the employer would be free ... not to provide the
benefit at air" This reading of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,68
 the Court
stated, applies with equal force in the age discrimination context, because the ADEA
provisions were derived from Title VII• 69 In rejecting the applicability of the McDonnell
Douglas test in Thurston, where the plaintiffs had presented direct rather than inferential
evidence of discrimination, the Court affirmed the reasoning of the court of appeals. 7°
Because the TWA policy permitted pilots who were disqualified on any basis other than
age to bump more junior flight engineers, thus making the available method of transfer
dependant upon the pilot's age, the Court held that the TWA policy was discriminatory
on its face."
TWA's affirmative defenses of bona fide occupational qualifications and bona fide
seniority system were also rejected by the Court. TWA's retirement policy could not be
based on bona fide occupational qualifications, the Court concluded, because age is not
a bona fide occupational qualification for the position of flight engineer from which the
plaintiffs were excluded. 72 Nor could TWA successfully claim that the transfer policy
was part of a bona fide seniority system, the Court held, because any seniority system
which incorporates such a discriminatory policy is proscribed by the ADEA. 75
6' Id. at 951, 32 FEP Cases 1193.
66 Id. at 957, 32 FEP Cases at 1197.
61 Id. at 956-57, 32 FEP Cases 1197-98.
6' Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984). ALPA filed a cross-petition, raising
only the liability issue. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Thurston, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984). The Court granted
certiorari in both cases, consolidating them for argument in Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 105
S. Ct. 613, 36 FEP Cases 977 (1985).
" 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984).
64 105 S. Ct. at 621, 36 FEP Cases at 981.
" Id.
66 104 S. Ct. 2229, 34 FEP Cases 1406 (1984).
" 105 S. Ct. at 621, 36 FE? Cases at 982 (quoting 11 ishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2234, 34 FEP Cases at
1410).
66 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
69 105 S. Ct. at 621, 36 FE? Cases at 982 (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584, 16 FEP
Cases 885, 888 (1978)).
70 Id. at 622, 36 FEP Cases at 982•
7 ' Id.
72 Id. at 622-23, 36 FEP Cases at 982-83.
"Id. at 623, 36 FE? Cases at 983.
December 1985]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 233
Lastly, the Court addressed the court of appeals' finding that TWA's violation was
"willful" and thus subject to liquidated damages. 74 The Court upheld the court of appeals'
statement that an employer's violation of the ADEA is "willful" if "the employer either
knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited
by the ADEA."75 The Court, however, rejected the court of appeals' application of this
standard to TWA's conduct's
In rejecting the court of appeals' characterization of TWA's conduct as "willful," the
Court emphasized two facets of TWA's position. First, TWA apparently made a good
faith effort to bring its policies within the directives of the ADEA." The Court noted
that it was precisely the effort by TWA to achieve consistency with the ADEA which
spawned the challenged policy. 78 In light of these findings, the Court stated that it would
be unfair to TWA to characterize its adoption of the pilot transfer policy as being in
"reckless disregard" of the ADEA requirements. 79 Second, the Court held that TWA's
actions demonstrated that it "certainly did not 'know' that its conduct violated the Act.""
The holding demonstrates a strong measure of deference to the good faith efforts of
an employer to comply with the Act, even where the employer's intentionals' actions
violate the Act. 82
The principal effect of the Court's definition of the word "willful" as applied in
ntirston is to resolve the prior conflict among the circuits in favor of requiring that
willfulness be determined in relation to the Act itself rather than to the action which is
deemed to violate it. Thus, mere knowledge of the potential applicability of the ADEA
is an insufficient ground upon which to base liability.ss The premise that an ADEA
violation is "willful" if an employer was aware that the employees concerned might be
Covered by the ADEA derives from a line of cases interpreting section 6 of the Portal-
to-Portal Act (PPA). 84 Section 6 of the PPA extends the statute of limitations for violations
of the Act for an extra year if the violation is found to be willful." In regard to this
statute of limitations extension, courts have found violations to be willful where the
defendants were aware merely that the Act might apply to their actions." The result
clearly reflects the variance in the degrees of stringency required in assessing whether a
' 4 Id, at 623-26, 36 FEP Cases at 983-86.
" Id. at 625-26, 36 FEP Cases at . 985.
76 Id. at 626, 36 FEP Cases at 985.
" Id.
78 Id. at 626, 36 FEP Cases at 986.
78 Id. at 626, 36 FEP Cases at 985.
80 Id.
81 The word "intentional" as used here refers to the intent to commit the action itself, rather
than to the intent to violate the ADEA.
82 105 S. Ct. at 626, 36 FEP Cases at 986.
85 Id. at 625, 36 FEP Cases at 985.
84 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1982). The Portal-to-Portal Act (PPA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 216, 251-262 (1982),
was passed to curb litigation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) because the FLSA as
interpreted by the courts had created "wholly unexpected liabilities, immense in amount and
retroactive in operation, upon employers," one result of which was to severely impede interstate
commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 251(a) (1982). One of the purposes of the PPA was to "define and limit the
jurisdiction of the courts." 29 U.S.C. § 251(b)(3) (1982).
85
 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1982).
86 See, e.g., EEOC v. Central Kansas Med. Center, 705 F.2d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 1983); Brennan
v. Heard, 491 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1974).
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defendant's actions warrant the extension of a statute of limitations, and in assessing
whether a defendant's actions warrant a punitive doubling of pecuniary damages.
The division among the circuits on the issue of appropriately defining "willful"
included decisions holding that the standard for willfulness under the damages section
of the ADEA should be identical to that of the PPA section governing the statute of
limitations: 87 that the standards should be different; 88 that intentional actions are willful
even without knowledge of the Act's proscription;" that willfulness requires at least
constructive knowledge of the Act's proscription; 9" and that the defendant's action must
include a specific intent to violate the ADEA. 9 ' The breadth of this disparity revealed
the pressing need for a well-reasoned basis upon which to define the ADEA damages
standard of willfulness, which the Court addressed in Thurston. The Court construed the
legislative history to demonstrate an intent that the doubling of ADEA damages be
punitive in nature, applying only when the employer's actions had demonstrated them-
selves to warrant a stiffer punishment than mere pecuniary damages. 92 On that basis the
Court concluded that it would be inappropriate to permit a low threshold definition of
"willfulness" to effectively make the doubling of damages automatic." The Court con-
sequently adopted a fairly stringent definition of "willfulness" set forth in prior criminal
cases."
Although at first blush the Court's holding appears to unduly burden the plaintiff
in an ADEA action because of the stringency of the test which is applied to a charge of
"willfulness," the consideration of other less immediately apparent factors demonstrates
the propriety of such a stringent standard. In particular, TWA was to date the only
major airline to have voluntarily permitted persons over 60 to work as flight engineers."
As the Thurston Court recognized, it would be unjust to hold the airline liable for punitive
damages for taking such positive action.
B. *Burdens of Proof Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Sharry v. Hanover
Insurance Company'
In the past decade, federal courts have approved a specific standard of proof which
an employee must meet to make out a claim that his or her employer has discriminated
ar Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1113, 25 FEP Cases 376, 378 (4th Cir. 1981).
BM
 Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 979, 25 FEP Cases 94, 97-98 (9th Cir. 1981).
99
	Goodman v. Heublein, Inc., 645 F.2d 127, 131 n.6, 25 FEP Cases 645, 647 n.6 (2d Cir.
1981); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 283, 22 FEP Cases 994, 998 (3d Cir. 1980).
so Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 155-56, 27 FEP Cases 610, 615 (7th Cir.
1981),
91 Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1020 n.27, 20 FEP Cases 29, 41 n.27 (1st Cir. 1979).
" 105 S. Ct. at 624, 36 FEP Cases at 984. In support of this reading of the legislative intent,
the Court cited Congress's initial intent to incorporate § 16(a) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1982),
imposing criminal liability for a willful violation. 105 S. Ct. at 624, 36 FEP Cases at 984. See also
113 Corkro. REC. 2199 (1967). The bill as passed, S. 788, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), substituted
liquidated damages for the criminal liability in order to avoid "difficult problems of proof" and
invocation by defendants of the fifth amendment, while still furnishing an "effective deterrent to
willful violations" of the ADEA. 113 CONG. REC. 7076 (1967).
" 105 S. Ct. at 624, 36 FEP Cases at 984.
," See, e.g., United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 395 (1933) (conduct is "willful" if marked
by careless disregard for whether one has the right so to act).
"s
	 S. Ct. at 626 & n.23, 36 FEP Cases at 986 & n.23.
* By Ellen B. McGinty, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 36 FEP Cases 1822 (D. Mass. 1985).
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against him or her on the basis of age under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1976 (ADEA). 2 Employment discrimination claims necessarily involve problems
of proof because the employee must demonstrate that the employer was motivated by a
discriminatory purpose in discharging, demoting, or failing to hire or to promote the
employee.' Two issues relating to standards of proof arise in the context of employment
discrimination litigation. The first concerns whether the plaintiff must, at some time
during the trial, present direct evidence of the defendant's motive.' Second, if the
plaintiff is not required to present direct evidence, then an issue arises regarding the
extent to which inferences drawn from indirect evidence may be considered by the jury
to substantiate a finding that the defendant acted with a discriminatory motive.'
Recognizing that employment discrimination plaintiffs will rarely be able to establish
a discriminatory motive through direct evidence, the United States Supreme Court has
determined that the burden of producing evidence in such cases should be shared by
the employer and the employee!' To ensure that the burden of producing evidence of
discriminatory motive will be shared by the parties, the Court has held that, even where
there is no direct proof of discriminatory motive, an employment discrimination com-
plaint may not be dismissed for failure to state a claim if the plaintiff has established a
prima facie case of discrimination.? The Court's prima facie case device is designed to
allow the plaintiff to raise a mandatory inference of discriminatory motive by showing that
the most common reasons for a discharge or failure to hire — lack of qualification or
lack of a position — are not present. 8 Likewise, the Court has allowed that where the
defendant asserts a nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the inference raised by the
plaintiff's evidence is no longer mandatory. 9 This is a classic example of a judicially
created rebuttable presumption which places the burden of producing evidence on the
party more likely to have access to the information. 10
To make out a prima facie case of employment discrimination under the ADEA,"
plaintiffs must prove that they are within the age group protected by the statute; that
See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 20 FE? Cases 29 (1st Cir. 1979); Wilson v. Sealtest
Foods, 501 F.2d 84 (5t1-n Cir. 1974). See also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 25 FEP Cases 113 (1980) (same test for gender discrimination under Title VII); B. SCHLEI &
P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 401-02 (2d ed. 1983).
3 See Burdine 450 U.S. at 253-54, 25 FEP Cases at 115-16 (gender discrimination); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03, 5 FEP Cases 965, 969 (1972) (race discrimination);
Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1015, 20 FEP Cases at 37 (age discrimination).
4 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-55 & n.8, 25 FEP Cases at 115-16 & n.8.
5 Id.
6 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-56, 25 FEP Cases at 115-16; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-
03, 5 FEP Cases at 969; Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014, 20 FEP Cases.at 36-37. Each of these decisions was
rendered in the context of reviewing burdens of proof improperly applied at trial. For this reason,
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit did not discuss what kind of
proof was necessary to get to the jury, but rather what proof was necessary to obtain a favorable
decision on the merits. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 251-52, 25 FEP Cases at 114-15; McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 797-99, 5 FEP Cases at 967; Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1007, 20 FEP Cases at 31.
▪See infra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
BBurdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 25 FEP Cases at 115 E 16.
Id. at 254-55, 25 FEP Cases at 115-16.
See id, at 255 n.10, 25 FEP Cases at 116 n.10.
Li The United States Supreme Court developed the burdens of proof for employment discrim-
ination claims in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 5 FEP Cases 965 (1973), and
clarified them in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 25 FEP Cases 113
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they were discharged from employment; that they were qualified for the job and were
performing their responsibilities at an accepted level; and that Ater their dismissal, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek persons of their qualifica-
tions to fill it. 12 Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a presumption of
discriminatory motive arises." The burden of producing evidence then shifts to the
defendant who must come forward and present evidence showing a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for its actions." If the defendant asserts a nondiscriminatory reason
for dismissing the plaintiff, the presumption of discriminatory motive drops out of the
case and the plaintiff is given an opportunity to show that the defendant's reason was
"mere pretext" before the case is submitted to the jury." Although the burden of
producing evidence shifts to compensate for the plaintiff's lack of direct proof of motive,
the plaintiff bears the burden of persuading the jury at trial that the defendant has
engaged in discriminatory conduct. 16
During the Survey year,•in Sharry v. Hanover Insurance Company," the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts considered whether an employment
discrimination claim could be dismissed before trial if the employee could not produce
(1980). McDonnell Douglas involved claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of employment
discrimination on the basis of race, 411 U.S. at 796, 5 FEP Cases at 966-67, and Burdine involved
a Title VII claim of employment discrimination on the basis of gender, 450 U.S. at 251, 25 FEP
Cases at 114-15. Several courts of appeals have applied the McDonnell Douglas rationale to claims
under the ADEA for employment discrimination on the basis of age. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN,
supra note 2, at 401-02. In the First Circuit, Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 20 FEP Cases
29 (1979), is the seminal decision applying the McDonnell Douglas doctrine to an ADEA claim. In
Loeb the First Circuit discussed the applicability of McDonnell Douglas to ADEA claims at length and
concluded that because ADEA plaintiffs, like Title VII plaintiffs, were required to prove motive
and would have difficulty obtaining direct evidence of a discriminatory motive, the McDonnell
Douglas doctrine was likewise applicable in the context of claims of employment discrimination on
the basis of age. Id. at 1014-15, 20 FEP Cases at 36-37.
12 Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1013-14, 20 FEP Cases at 36. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-54, 25 FEP
Cases at 115-16.
Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014-15, 20 FEP Cases at 36-37. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 25 FEP
Cases at 116. There the Court stated:
The word "presumption" properly used refers only to a device for allocating the
production burden .... In a[n ADEA] case, the allocation of burdens and the creation
of a presumption by the establishment of a prima facie case is intended progressively
to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination.
Id, at 255 n.8, 25 FEP Cases at 116 n.8.
"4 Loth, 600 F.2d at 1013-15, 20 FEP Cases at 36-37.
"Id. See also Burdine, 950 U.S. at 254-55, 25 FEP Cases at 115-16. In Burdine the Court
explained:
In saying that the presumption drops from the case, we do not imply that the trier of
fact no longer may consider evidence previously introduced by the plaintiff to establish
a prima facie case. A satisfactory explanation by the defendant destroys the legally
mandatory inference of discrimination arising from the plaintiff's initial evidence.
Nonetheless, this evidence and inferences properly drawn therefrom may be consid-
ered by the trier of fact on the issue of whether the defendant's explanation is
pretextual. Indeed, there may be some cases where the plaintiff's initial evidence,
combined with effective cross-examination of the defendant, will suffice to discredit
the defendant's explanation.
Id. at 255 n.10, 25 FEP Cases at 116 n.10.
13 Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1015, 20 FEP Cases at 37.
" 36 FEP Cases 1822 (D. Mass. 1985).
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direct evidence that the employer's asserted nondiscriminatory reason for discharge was
pretext. 18 The court rejected a United States magistrate's finding that an ADEA plaintiff
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his employer's asserted reason for
dismissing him was "mere pretext."' 9 An inference of pretext, the court found, was
sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact which should be decided by a
jury.2° Rejecting the employer's motion for summary judgment, the court found that the
employee, Sharry, had presented enough evidence to raise an inference that the em-
ployer's reason for dismissal was pretext. 21 The court cautioned, however, that the
employee would still carry the burden at trial of persuading the jury that age was the
determining factor in the employer's decision to discharge."
In Sharry, the plaintiff sued his former employer, Hanover Insurance Company, for
violation of the ADEA, claiming that he was discharged from his managerial duties
because of his age. 23 The plaintiff, Joseph Sharry, had been employed as a manager of
one of Hanover's offices. 24 Sharry had an excellent performance record: in October,
1981 he received a positive employee evaluation, and in February, 1982, his office was
favorably reviewed by the company. 25 Nevertheless, in February, 1982, Sharry was
discharged26 from his managerial duties at the age of sixty-two. 27 Hanover asserted that
Sharry had been discharged because he was creating serious morale problems in the
office he managed."
After Sharry filed suit in federal district court, the district court judge assigned the
case to a United States magistrate who recommended that Hanover's motion for sum-
mary judgment be granted. 22 The magistrate found that although Sharry had raised a
presumption of discrimination through his prima facie case, Hanover had rebutted the
presumption by asserting a nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge. 20 Moreover,
according to the magistrate, Sharry had not presented enough evidence to prove that
Hanover's asserted reason was mere pretext. 3 ' Thus, the magistrate concluded, Sharry
had not met his burden of proof and Hanover was entitled to summary judgment."
Sharry then filed a motion with the district court objecting to the magistrate's recom-
mendation to grant summary judgment for Hanover. 35
Id. at 1823-24.
16 Id. Sharry and his wife also made claims based on state law concerning his discharge from
Hanover. Id. at 1823.
20 Id. at 1824.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 1823.
24 Id.
23 Id.
26 Id. The court's opinion does not clarify whether Sharry was actually fired or whether he was
merely demoted from his position as manager and left the company voluntarily. Id. The court
clearly states, however, that Sharry was involuntarily removed from his position as manager of one
of Hanover's offices. Id.
27 Id.
" Id.
29 Id at 1822-23. The magistrate additionally recommended that plaintiff's state law claims be
dismissed. Sharry did not object to this portion of the magistrates recommendation. Id. at 1823.
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The district court rejected the magistrate's recommendation and held that Sharry
had raised an inference that Hanover's reason for discharge was pretext by demonstrat-
ing his excellent performance record and the haste with which he was discharged." The
district court therefore concluded that Sharry was entitled to a trial on the merits." The
court found that the material issue of fact at trial would be whether Hanover had
discharged Sharry because of his age or for some other, legitimate motive. 36 At trial, the
court stated, Sharry would bear the burden of proving violation of the ADEA by
convincing the jury that age was "the determinative factor" in Hanover's decision to
discharge him."
The court first accepted the magistrate's finding that Sharry had made out a prima
facie case of age discrimination." In this connection, the court noted that Sharry had
shown that he was sixty-two years old when he was discharged, that he had an excellent
performance record at Hanover, that he was nevertheless discharged involuntarily, and
that his replacement was thirty-two years old. 5g Thus, the court found that Sharry had
raised a presumption that he was discharged for discriminatory reasons.° The court
also accepted the magistrate's finding that Hanover had rebutted the presumption of
discriminatory motive by asserting that Sharry had been discharged because of a morale
problem at his 'office."
The court disagreed, however, both with the magistrate's finding that Sharry had
shown no facts to support the contention that Hanover's asserted reason for discharge
was pretext, and with the defendant's argument that Sharry must prove pretext in order
to avoid summary judgment against him." With respect to the pretext issue, the court
first found that Sharry had presented evidence indicating both an excellent performance
record and a subsequent hasty discharge." According to the court, the contrast between
Sharry's recent positive review and Hanover's claim of morale problems was sufficiently
great to support an inference of pretext." Thus, a genuine issue of material fact as to
Hanover's motivation existed and a trial by a jury was required, the court concluded. 45
After holding that Sharry was entitled to a trial on the merits, the court discussed
its reasons for finding that positive proof of pretext was not required to defeat an
employer's motion for summary judgment. 46 The court stated that to require positive
proof to defeat a pretrial motion would subvert the very purpose of the judicially
endorsed presumption which arises from the prima facie case. 47 According to the court,
judges have endorsed a prima facie showing in employment discrimination cases because
few employees can produce direct proof of their employer's motives. 48 To require that
a plaintiff produce direct evidence on the pretext issue to defeat a motion for summary
" Id.
25 Id. at 1823-24.
3" Id. at 1823.





42 Id. at 1823-24.
43 1d. at 1823.
44 Id.
4, Id. at 1823-24.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1824.
46 Id. at 1823.
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judgment would, in the court's view, nullify the effect of the prima facie case device. 49
Thus, the court concluded, an employment discrimination plaintiff is entitled to a trial
on the merits if he or she establishes a prima facie case and produces sufficient evidence
to raise an inference that the defendant's asserted reasons are pretext."
The Sharry case raised a serious question as to whether employment discrimination
plaintiffs will be allowed to present their claims to juries without first producing direct
evidence that their employers' adverse employment actions were grounded in discrimi-
natory motive. In Sharry the court considered two related questions regarding proof that
an employer's asserted nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action was
pretext. The first question is whether an employment discrimination defendant, by
asserting a nondiscriminatory reason for its action, raises a mandatory inference in its
favor which the plaintiff must rebut to obtain a trial on the merits, or whether the
plaintiff's proof of a prima facie case and the defendant's rebuttal create a sufficient
issue of material fact to require a jury tria1. 5 ' The magistrate's recommendation in Shany
presented the additional question of whether a presumption arising from the defendant's
assertion of a nondiscriminatory motive could be rebutted with indirect.evidence sup-
porting an inference of pretext, or whether the plaintiff would have to show direct
evidence of pretext to get to the jury. 52
Unlike other courts which have discussed the shifting burden of proof involved in
age discrimination claims," the Sharry court addressed the plaintiff's burden of proof
under the ADEA in the context of a motion for summary judgment. 54 For this reason,
the question of whether the plaintiff is required to present evidence of pretext as part
of his or her prima facie case was directly presented to the court." In holding that
indirect evidence of pretext was sufficient to require a trial, the court implicitly held that
the plaintiff is required to present some evidence of pretext to rebut the defendant's
asserted reason for discharge before he or she is entitled to a trial. 56
This holding is a logical extension of the analysis developed by the Supreme Court
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 57 and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine." In Burdine, the court stated that one purpose of the prima facie case device was
to reduce the motive issue at trial to a question of whether the defendant's asserted
reason for its conduct was or was not a pretext for discrimination. 59 The Supreme Court
structured the shifting burden of proof to this end." Initially, the plaintiff raises a
presumption of discrimination by showing that the defendant did not discharge him for
any of the usual reasons; the defendant must then state a nondiscriminatory reason
supporting the plaintiff's discharge. 61 After rebuttal, the question remains whether the
49 See id. at 1824.
5° Id. at 1824.
5' See id, at 1823-24.
" Id. at 1823.
53 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
"Shany, 36 FE? Cases at 1823.
" Id. at 1823-24.
56 Id.
57 411 U.S. 792, 5 FEP Cases at 965 (1973).
58 450 U.S. 248, 25 FEY Cases 113 (1980).
Id. at 255-56 & n.8, 25 FEP Cases at 116 & n.8.
5° Id at 253, 255-56, 25 FE? Cases at 114, 116.
6' Id. at 254, 25 FE? Cases at 115.
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plaintiff can show that the defendant's asserted reason for discharge was a pretext for
unlawful discrimination. 62 Because the Supreme Court developed this analysis while
reviewing burdens of proof that have been applied at trial, the Court did not explicitly
recognize that the defendant's assertion of a nondiscriminatory reason creates a pre-
sumption in its favor which would entitle it to dismissal if not rebutted by evidence of
pretext. 65 In the summary judgment context, where the defendant asserts a nondiscri-
minatory reason for discharge, thereby rebutting the prima facie case, however, the
plaintiff must produce evidence of pretext in order to rebut the presumptive validity of
the defendant's reason." If the plaintiff does not dispute the defendant's asserted reason
for discharge with evidence of pretext, there is no issue of fact to try and the defendant
is entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 65
Moreover, since defendant will almost always be able to assert a nondiscriminatory
reason,° proof of pretext has become, in most cases, part of the prima facie case which
plaintiff must prove to obtain a trial.
As noted above, the Sharry court glossed over the question of whether pretext
evidence was required to rebut defendant's asserted reason for discharge. 67 The court
held that plaintiff's prima facie evidence supported an inference of pretext and was
62 See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
63 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 794-98, 5 FEP Cases at 965-67. In McDonnell Douglas the
district court dismissed the plaintiff's claim under section 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 because the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) had not found
"reasonable cause" to support a claim of discrimination. Id. at 797, 5 FEP Cases at 967. The Supreme
Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's decision, which had held that the EEOC's findings were not
dispositive of the question whether a suit could be brought. Id. The Court then went on to describe
the bUrdens of proof applied at trial. Id. at 797-98, 5 FEP Cases at 967. See also Burdine, 450 U.S.
at 250-52, 25 FEP Cases at 114-15. In Burdine the Fifth Circuit reversed the decision of the trial
judge and held that the defendant had to prove a nondiscriminatory reason by a preponderance
of the evidence to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case. 450 U.S. at 252, 25 FE? Cases at 114. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the burden of persuasion remains with plaintiff throughout
the trial, and then went on to explain the shifting burden of production. Id. at 253-56, 25 FE?
Cases at 115-16. See also Loeb,• 600 F.2d at 1012-15, 20 FEP Cases at 35-37. In Loeb, the First
Circuit, reviewing jury instructions given by the district court, held that the plaintiff was required
to prove pretext by a preponderance of the evidence in order to prevail at trial. Id. at 1014, 20
FEP Cases at 36-37.
64 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805, 5 FEP Cases at 970. There the Court stated: "on the
retrial [the employee] must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent
evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a .
discriminatory decision." Id. (emphasis added).
65 See FED. R. Civ. P. 56. The relevant text of Rule 56(c) is as follows:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, an-
swers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Id.
66 The burden placed on the defendant to rebut the prima facie case is not difficult to surmount.
The defendant must articulate a valid reason for its action which meets the negative proof of the
prima facie case. Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1011-12 & n.5, 20 FEP Cases at 35 & n.5. Thus, the defendant
will either contradict one of the assertions which comprise the prima facie case or state a valid
reason which is separate from the plaintiff's case. See id. Moreover, the defendant's asserted reason
need only be nondiscriminatory — it does not have to be a prudent reason. Id. at 1012 n.6, 20 FEP
Cases at 35 n.6.
67 Sharry, 36 FEP Cases at 1823-24.
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therefore sufficient to require a trial on the merits, 68
 while also explicitly rejecting the
magistrate's finding that direct proof of pretext is necessary to obtain a trial on the
merits. 69 The court's holding that direct proof of pretext is not required is clearly correct
because such a requirement would nullify the effectiveness of the prima facie case device.
If the plaintiff could adduce direct proof of the defendant's motive in the pretext context,
he or she would have no need of the presumption created by that device. 7° Moreover,
the Supreme Court stated in Burdine that pretext could be proved by either direct or
indirect evidence. 71
In summary, the Court in Sharry held that, where an employer asserts a nondiscri-
minatory reason for discharge, an employment discrimination plaintiff must . present
enough evidence to support an inference of pretext to obtain a trial on the merits. In
so holdiing, the Sharry court clarified that the Supreme Court's structure for a shifting
burden of proof in employment discrimination cases creates two presumptions, one in
favor of the plaintiff and another in favor of the defendant, both of which can put an
end to litigation before trial. Thus, in most cases, where the defendant is able to assert
a nondiscriminatory reason for the complained of discharge, the plaintiff should present
enough evidence in his or her prima facie case so as to raise an inference of pretext.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 1823.
7, Id. at 1824. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 25 FEP Cases at 116; Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014, 20
FEP Cases at 36-37.
7 ' Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 25 FEP Cases at 116.
